

ANTICOLONIAL AMERIKA: RESISTING THE ZONE OF NONBEING
IN AN ANGLO-SAXON EMPIRE

A Dissertation

by

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ABSTRACT

Anticolonial Amerika: Resisting the Zone of Nonbeing in an Anglo-Saxon Empire revives the anticolonial tradition of Black radical philosophy, drawing upon its unique understandings of race and empire, citizenship and sovereignty, gender and sexuality to contribute an original interpretation of contemporary American society. Following Charles W. Mills, I contend that Black political theory ought to move away from ideal theory toward an empirical, historically grounded approach to understanding the Black experience in modern North America. Unlike Mills, however, I argue that Black political theory ought to abandon the language of liberalism and the social contract in favor of philosophical concepts indigenous to the history of Black philosophy: the colonizer-colonized relation. Drawing on the work of W. E. B. Du Bois and Frantz Fanon, I argue that the colonial relation constitutes the fundamental social ontology of the modern global system – what I call the colonial ontology of Empire. Offering an anticolonial conceptual apparatus as an alternative to Mills’s conceptions of racial contract and whiteness, I begin with an exegesis of Du Bois and Fanon and develop a language for an anticolonial conception of social ontology. This colonial ontology of Empire understands the modern world as divided into the human (colonizer) and the non-human (colonized), a relation that is grounded in a global political economy. Next, I engage critical whiteness studies and argues that the struggle between Anglo-Saxons and white ethnics produced two different conceptions of whiteness. Building upon these foundations, I develop some central anticolonial concepts through critical exegeses of the works of Martin R. Delany and Eldridge Cleaver. Exploring Delany’s political and legal thought, which captures the dehumanization of the colonized and expresses the colonial relation through a political theory of sovereignty, I establish the

relationship between race and sovereignty in the U.S. To challenge feminist and intersectional accounts of race and gender, I demonstrate the power of white womanhood over Black manhood in the colonial relation by connecting Cleaver's anticolonial understanding of the white female/Black male relation in America to anticolonial social ontology. Using Robert L. Allen's internal (neo)colonialism model as a framework for connecting the colonial ontology of Empire to contemporary social scientific studies of white supremacy in America, I interpret two historical trends through a neocolonial lens: the emergence of the Black middle class as the agent of indirect rule and the development of the contemporary police state as a mode of social control for the Black internal colony. Following Fanon's rejection of European philosophy, I call for a return to anticolonial political theory among Black political theorists.

“America’s history, her aspirations, her peculiar triumphs, her even more peculiar defeats, and her position in the world – yesterday and today – are all so profoundly and stubbornly unique that the very word ‘America’ remains a new, almost completely undefined and extremely controversial proper noun. No one in the world seems to know exactly what it describes, not even we motley millions who call ourselves Americans.”

– James Baldwin, *Nobody Knows My Name* (3)

“The American Constitution was conceived and written by white Anglo-Saxon Protestants for a white Anglo-Saxon society. The fact that what is called American Society, or American Culture, did not subsequently develop into a nation made up totally of WASPs – because of Negro slavery and immigration – did not prevent the white protestants from perpetuating the group attitudes that would maintain the image of the whole American nation in terms of WASP cultural tradition.”

– Harold Cruse, *The Crisis of the Negro Intellectual* (8)

“The principal reservoir of revolutionary potential in Amerika lies in wait inside the Black Colony... The Black Colony can and will influence the fate of things to come in the U.S.A.”

– George Jackson, *Blood in My Eye* (10)

For all those who lost their lives fighting for democracy, equality, and justice. Though the victors have attempted to relegate your struggle to the dustbins of history, no amount of defamation and propaganda can prohibit history from absolving you. You will not be been forgotten.

All Power to the People!



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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

“[T]he political history of the West has been so reconstructed that race and racial domination and the emancipatory struggles against them have been eliminated from the record in an intellectual purge, a feat of documentary falsification, as thorough and impressive as anything Stalin’s history rewriters could have engineered.”

– Charles W. Mills, *Black Rights/White Wrongs*¹

“One of the central themes of American historiography is that there is no American Empire. Most historians will admit, if pressed, that the United States once had an empire. Then they will promptly insist that it was given away. But they will also speak persistently of America as a World Power.”

– William A. Williams, “The Frontier Thesis and American Foreign Policy”²

As he stood at the bow of the ship – his hands clasped on the railing, his eyes staring off toward the Atlantic’s vast horizon – the young man of thirty-two wondered in a silent curiosity what futures his journey might make possible. For a Black man living at the dawn of the twentieth century, traversing the Atlantic Ocean aroused in him consternation, for though he was traveling from New York to London as a free man in the summer of 1900 and not from West Africa to the New World as a prisoner in 1700, he could not elude the historical symbolism of his situation. Cast adrift between the two major powers of a global Anglo-Saxon empire, the anguished souls of the African victims of the Middle Passage resting miles below his feet, W. E. B. Du Bois reflected on his destination – the Pan-African Conference, where he would first proclaim, “The problem of the twentieth century is the problem of the color-line.”³ At the time, Du Bois did not realize that this conference emerged from a century of intellectual and organizational effort to understand and improve the condition of Black people globally. Nor did he realize that this conference would inaugurate a twentieth-century Pan-African project that would, under his leadership, result in a turbulent anticolonial challenge to Europe’s continued colonial imperialism.⁴ Outside the U.S., many African scholars and activists followed Du Bois in understanding their actions and their theories as part of a global anticolonial movement against

Empire. The Fifth Pan-African Congress, held in 1945 at the end World War II, marked the transition from Pan-African organization to anticolonial positive action, and within two decades, African colonies were rapidly achieving independence.⁵ This anticolonial challenge, however, emanated not only from Africa, but also from the emerging center of Empire – the United States of Amerika.⁶

Between 1950 and 1980, the anticolonial movement in Amerika proceeded decade-by-decade in three phases, and this history provides the necessary context for understanding the contemporary state of Black political theory. During the first phase of the anticolonial movement, a phase of repression in the 1950s, Du Bois went head-to-head with the U.S. federal government in an ideological battle for the hearts and minds of Black Amerika. By the time of his death in August 1963, Du Bois had developed an internationalist Pan-African anticolonial philosophy antagonistic to integrationism and exploitation both at home and abroad. In *Dusk of Dawn*, Du Bois announced the new emphasis of his work, arguing, “the history of our day...may be epitomized in one word – Empire; the domination of white Europe over black Africa and yellow Asia, through political power built on the economic control of labor, income and ideas.” And for Du Bois, the conditions facing Black people in the Amerika – segregation, lynching, and poverty – were symptoms of Empire: “The echo of this industrial imperialism was the expulsion of black men from American democracy, their subjugation to caste control and wage slavery.”⁷ Du Bois’s anticolonial approach to understanding Empire constitutes the basis of all his post-World War II writings, from *The World and Africa* in 1946 to his “Address to the Black Academic Community” in 1960, and he was specifically interested in the role that Black people in the United States played in this global arrangement. During this period, Du Bois condemned U.S. imperialism and Cold War aggression, hoping to inspire Black Americans to anticolonial

action by constructing a coherent criticism of integration, the changing but still exploitative relationship between the U.S. and Africa, and the continued dominance of whites in Africa.⁸

The Cold War politics of the Truman administration, however, actively repressed Black radicalism in Amerika by fostering integrationist hopes and anti-Communist sentiments among many Black intellectuals and leaders, resulting in the relative marginalization of Du Bois and other anticolonialists. Beginning as early as the 1890s, the Black press in the United States frequently connected domestic issues with international trends, especially with the challenges faced by Africans, but with the advent of the Cold War and the announcement of the Truman Doctrine, the executive branch dedicated its resources to creating a carrot-and-stick program designed to de-radicalize the Black community. While the Department of Justice targeted Black organizations that opposed the Cold War, the Central Intelligence Agency funded those that supported the Cold War. The State Department worked on both the international front, distributing propaganda that promoted a positive image of U.S. race relations, and the domestic front, urging the Supreme Court to end Jim Crow segregation, a strategy that culminated with *Brown v. Board of Education*. Du Bois was personally targeted by these policies: he was tried as a foreign agent, forced to pay a fine, and required to give up his passport. Whether through fear of repression or through a genuine commitment to anti-Communism, many Black leaders and writers abandoned anticolonial internationalism, choosing instead to ground civil rights arguments in Cold War rhetoric.⁹ As historian Penny M. Von Eschen explains, “The 1950s eclipse of 1940s anticolonialism had profound implications for the politics of the black American community as questions concerning political, economic, and social rights in an international context were neglected in favor of an exclusive emphasis on domestic political and civil rights.”¹⁰

In a series of powerful commentaries on the shifting political outlook of the Black middle class and the Black intelligentsia, E. Franklin Frazier criticized Black community leaders of the 1950s for abandoning anticolonial internationalism for Cold War liberalism.¹¹ In *Black Bourgeoisie*, Frazier argues that the postwar Black middle class had, on the one hand, “rejected the folk culture of the Negro masses” in favor of uncompromising integrationism and, on the other hand, established themselves as “uncompromising enemies of any radical doctrines.”¹² As an internationalist, Frazier was dismayed by the speed at which many middle class Blacks accepted the combination of acquisitive, meritocratic individualism and anti-Communist assimilationism, but he argued that they did so precisely because their economic and social status depended on the financial support and personal acceptance of powerful whites. “By echoing the opinions of the white community,” Frazier writes, “the intellectual leaders of the black bourgeoisie hope to secure the approval and recognition of the white propertied classes with whom they seek identification.”¹³ One of the most problematic results of such identification was the complete disregard for the colonial affairs of Empire by Black journalists and intellectuals. In regard to the press, Frazier noted, “Even when the Negro press shows any interest in the colonial problem, it is generally concerned with the social status and recognition of the black elite in colonial areas.”¹⁴ But he was even more critical of Black intellectuals. For Frazier, Du Bois and Paul Robeson were among the few marginalized intellectuals who maintained an anticolonial disposition in the face of the integrationist consensus; most others capitulated to an “abject conformity of thinking.”¹⁵ Unlike African scholars, who grounded their self-understanding in colonialism, Black intellectuals in the U.S. sought only assimilation, that is, “the annihilation of the Negro – physically, culturally, and spiritually.”¹⁶ By the end of the 1950s, the U.S. government convinced the Black bourgeoisie to accept its Cold War integrationist ideology at

the expense of Pan-African anticolonialism, resulting in the relative isolation of Blacks in the United States from their colonial counterparts abroad.

During the mid-1960s, the battle between integrationism and anticolonialism entered its second phase, in which the balance of influence began to tip back in favor of the latter as anticolonial thought returned to the United States through the influence of anticolonial thinkers abroad. As the Civil Rights Movement was eclipsed by various strains of Black radical thought, leading Black thinkers in U.S. once again accepted the view that the oppressive conditions they faced were expressions of a global imperial logic, and the fundamental question confronting Black radical political theory of every kind was the question of Empire. Though there is a long history of Black radical thought in the U.S. that conceives of Blacks as a “nation within a nation,” as the writings of Black anticolonial thinkers from around the world appeared in the U.S., the classical nationalist terminology was exchanged in favor of the *domestic colonialism thesis* (sometimes referred to as the internal colonization model), which asserted that Blacks in the United States constituted an internal colony within the borders of the imperial mother country.¹⁷ Inspired by the anticolonial theorizing of Aimé Césaire, Frantz Fanon, and Kwame Nkrumah, among others, the domestic colonialism thesis became arguably the most important concept of Black anticolonialism at the time, and nearly every Black radical thinker and organization was committed to some version of it. Early iterations of the domestic colonialism thesis appeared in the speeches of Malcolm X and the essays of Harold Cruse.¹⁸ Later in the decade, during the highpoint of Black Power, theorists as diverse as Student Nonviolent Coordinating Commission chairman Stokely Carmichael (Kwame Ture) and Black Panther Party for Self-Defense Minister of Information Eldridge Cleaver each described the condition of Black Amerika as an instance of domestic colonialism. Cleaver explains the notion succinctly: “We

start with the basic definition: that black people in America are a colonized people in every sense of the term and that white America is an organized imperial force holding black people in in colonial bondage.”¹⁹ The Panthers even referred to “the black colony” in their ten-point program.²⁰ Thus, the various strains of late-1960s Black radical political theory accepted as their founding assumption the anticolonial thesis that Blacks in Amerika constituted a colony within the imperialist superpower.

Given the proliferation of the domestic colonialism thesis among radical organizations, it was only a matter of time before the idea made its way into the academy. In the mid-1960s, social scientists – especially sociologists – introduced the concept as a new methodological orientation for examining the situation of oppressed racial and ethnic sub-groups within nation-states. In *Dark Ghetto: Dilemmas of Social Power*, Kenneth Clark used domestic colonialism to account for the connections between the psychology of the oppressed and the oppressive social structure.²¹ In *Black Awakening in Capitalist America*, Robert L. Allen sociologically analyzed the various strains of thought in Black Power movement and argued that the revolutionary nationalist approach to understanding Black domestic colonialism provided the best foundations for understanding the shift toward domestic neocolonialism.²² In “Internal Colonialism and Ghetto Revolt,” Robert Blauner analyzed urban uprisings, cultural nationalism, and domestic “decolonization” from the perspective of institutional sociology, a perspective he later expanded in *Racial Oppression in America*.²³ By the early-1970s, the domestic colonialism thesis was a constitutive element of the Black Sociology movement, represented by Joyce Ladner’s edited volume *The Death of White Sociology*.²⁴ Outside the Black intellectual tradition, scholars in a wide variety of disciplines used the domestic colonialism thesis to analyze various socio-political relations around the world, including Chicanos in Amerika, Celts in England, Palestinians in

Israel, and indigenous peoples in Canada and Latin America.²⁵ One journal, *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, even dedicated its first special issue to the concept of internal colonization.²⁶

Following the success of the anticolonial movement in the 1960s, the forces of repression initiated the third phase of anticolonialism in which radical dissidents were stamped out by the state while the Black middle class was invited to join a second wave of integrationism. By the 1970s, anticolonial theory had achieved popularity in the streets and in the schools, and its future as methodological paradigm seemed secure; however, state-sanctioned political repression and the de-radicalization of the academy undermined the popularity of the theory and nearly eliminated it as a viable methodology for social analysis. In the streets, radical organizations, such as the Black Panthers, were targeted by an increasingly militarized police apparatus and an emergent “superagency” approach to federal law enforcement. As Huey P. Newton explains in *War Against the Panthers: A Study of Repression in America*, the Richard M. Nixon administration not only used existing government agencies, such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the Internal Revenue Service, and the National Security Agency, to target, criminalize, and destroy the Panthers, it also developed new programs, such as COINTELPRO, and new agencies, such as Office of Drug Abuse Law Enforcement, to achieve those ends.²⁷ The Nixon administration also funneled federal money and weapons into local police departments, arming them for war with political dissidents and inaugurating the contemporary police state.²⁸ While the administration justified these developments as part of the fight against drugs, John Ehrlichman, a chief advisor and strategist for Nixon, later admitted that this was a cover for their real goals: “by getting the public to associate the hippies with marijuana and blacks with heroin, and then criminalizing both heavily, we could disrupt those communities. We could arrest their leaders, raid their

homes, break up their meetings, and vilify them night after night on the evening news. Did we know we were lying about the drugs? Of course we did.”²⁹

Meanwhile, in the schools, anticolonialism was coming under attack not only as a result of scholarly critiques but also through the de-radicalization university education, especially Black Studies. In 1971, Lewis F. Powell wrote a memo to the U.S Chamber of Commerce urging it to act as an organized front for business interests, and one of his primary aims in the memo was the reformation of universities to impede the development of student activism. One might doubt the practicality of Powell’s plan, but within one decade, membership in the Chamber of Commerce quadrupled from 60,000 to a quarter million. And the Chamber was not the only business organization to organize at this time. The Business Roundtable, founded in 1972, represented corporations that collectively accounted for half of the Gross National Product, and it spent approximately \$900 million annually funding a number of influential think tanks and leading the reforms of the university that Powell recommended.³⁰

It is well documented that Black Studies – which emerged alongside the Black Power movement and represented a “decisive break from cold war strictures that had narrowed the terms of dissent in the United States”³¹ – came under attack during this phase of intellectual repression in the universities.³² As early as 1974, Robert L. Allen observed white-controlled financial interests interfering with and undermining the autonomy of Black Studies departments. As he explains: “By selecting certain programs for funding while denying support to others, government agencies and foundations could manipulate the political orientation of these programs and the direction of academic research...Departments which were thought by the establishment to be dangerously independent or radical could thus be crippled or destroyed without the necessity of resorting to violent repression.”³³ Thus, while anticolonial activists were

being visibly killed in the streets, anticolonial scholars were being quietly deprived of the resources necessary for their research. Anticolonial theory and the domestic colonialism thesis were casualties of the coordinated efforts of the military, political, and economic elites to stamp out political and intellectual dissent during the reactionary 1970s.³⁴

Like the 1950s, the repressive practices used to target militant activists and radical scholars were accompanied by an integrationist policy designed to uplift, integrate, and (to use Du Bois's term) Amerikanize the Black middle class. While the police wing of the Nixon administration was busy suppressing the Panthers, the propaganda wing of the Nixon administration was busy co-opting Black Power rhetoric in the guise of Black Capitalism. Arguing that government programs were creating a dependent Black underclass that constituted "a colony in a nation," Nixon redefined Black Power as the power to achieve middle class status through property rights, entrepreneurial activity, and homeownership.³⁵

In 1970, historians W. Eric Perkins and J. E. Higginson observed that Nixon's Black Capitalism rhetoric was seeing success. The Black student movement, they observed, was developing bourgeois tendencies and values at the expense of Black radical politics. Drawing on Frazier's *Black Bourgeoisie*, Perkins and Higginson reproached middle class Black students of leveraging Black identity for class-based gains without developing and sustaining a critique of Amerikan Empire and the problems faced by the Black masses. "Instead of examining social reality," they wrote, the Black student community "blindly latches onto symbols. Instead of critically assaulting social myths and seeking answers to vital political equations, it embarks upon the 'politics of identity.' In other words, the petty bourgeois Black student predictably seeks existential answers to hard-nosed political questions...The quest for identity becomes the foundation of political action, thus obscuring any fundamental look at the nature of American

society.”³⁶ Perkins later extended his criticism beyond the student movement to encompass the entire Black bourgeoisie of the 1970s. In an essay coauthored with Africana Studies scholar James Turner, Perkins noted that “corporate paternalism and government intervention” – the two forces responsible for eliminating anticolonialism in the streets and in the schools – were actively cultivating an entire class of Blacks, “not merely university personnel and teachers, but the entire spectrum of professionals who must procure a college education to practice their alleged skills: State, local and federal civil servants who man the gigantic welfare state bureaucracy, the public schools’ staff, the medical and health personnel in addition to middle level managers in corporate enterprise, lawyers, politicians, and finally that sprinkling of black executives who sit on the boards of directors of the multi-national conglomerates.”³⁷ What might be called Nixon’s neocolonial integrationism was even more successful than Truman’s Cold War integrationism. While the Cold War integrationism of the 1950s was followed by a surge in anticolonial activity in the 1960s, the anticolonial tradition never recovered from the repression of the 1970s, and we therefore continue to live in an age of de-radicalization.

In Amerika today, there is a crisis of Black radical political theory – if it can be called radical any longer. Just as liberal integrationism filled the void left by the suppression of Black anticolonial internationalism in the 1950s, the past four decades have been dominated by what Harold Cruse called the “integrationist ethic.” For Cruse, when integrationism becomes the basis for Black scholarship, Black intellectuals cease to understand themselves as an historical group subjected to the power of modern Empire, viewing themselves instead as participants in the mainstream Amerikan culture that produces and reproduces Empire. When Black scholars predicate their work on the integrationist ethic, they willingly participate in the imperial project of eliminating subcultures that might compete with, or even oppose, “the American creed.”³⁸

Despite the warnings of William R. Jones and the criticisms of Tommy J. Curry, Black professional philosophy has been subsumed into the integrationist ethos of the liberal academy.³⁹ When professional Black philosophy started to come into its own in the 1970s, the coordinated repression of anticolonial theory had produced in a situation in which liberalism has become the primary political orientation for Black political thought. Today, we often see “Feminism, poststructuralism, phenomenology, existential philosophy, Marxism, pragmatism, critical theory, multiculturalism, postmodernism, and other well-known ‘isms’” discussed in Black political theory, but anticolonialism is largely absent from the conversation, even in scholarship that explores the nature of the Black community.⁴⁰ Rather than being acknowledged as an intellectual tradition of Black radical philosophy, anticolonialism is often reduced to either the political struggles for national liberation in Africa or a vague disposition among Afro-Caribbean writers.⁴¹ In the few works of Black political theory that mention the domestic colonialism thesis, it either appears in its Marxist form or is mentioned only in passing.⁴² Most do not mention it at all.⁴³ Philosophers often treat anticolonial theory and the domestic colonialism thesis as a mere relic of the past.

Since World War II, anticolonialism and integrationism have been locked in a competition for intellectual influence. Because integrationism has the backing of the American imperial state, anticolonialism is – with a few exceptions, such as the 1960s – almost always in a marginalized, defensive position. Today is no exception, and the state of professional philosophy testifies to this fact. While Empire attempted to eliminate its rival philosophical tradition, *Anticolonial Amerika: Resisting the Zone of Nonbeing in an Anglo-Saxon Empire* revives the anticolonial tradition of Black radical philosophy, drawing upon its unique understandings of race and empire, citizenship and sovereignty, gender and sexuality to contribute an original

interpretation of contemporary Amerikan society. Not only does *Anticolonial Amerika* articulate a twenty-first century revival the domestic colonialism thesis, it also revives the foundational concepts of anticolonial social ontology – colonizer and colonized. A revival of anticolonial theory has implications not just for Black political theory but all political theory, for it represents a new beginning for leftist political thought and action. As Harold Cruse once observed: “The Negro community must always be the last refuge and the ultimate hope of the American leftwing...The ghettos of color, which exist all over the United States and the non-Western world, have today become the endemic wellsprings of revolutionary ideologies that will change the social relationships of races for decades to come.”⁴⁴

Confronting Empire and the Domestication of Black Political Theory

To understand the importance of reviving the anticolonial tradition of Black radical political theory, we must identify, on the one hand, the major problem that faces radical political theory today and, on the other hand, the theoretical tools currently used to confront those problems, identifying their shortcomings. Because questions of social and political freedom are intimately connected with history and social structure, the most pressing question facing the Black radical tradition today is the question of *Empire*. Though Du Bois and those he inspired attempted to articulate a theory of Empire in the service of destroying imperialism, Empire remains the defining feature of our modern world. Renowned economic historian and theorist Samipie Terreblanche has observed the importance of understanding Empire as the defining characteristic of the global social structure, arguing, “We cannot understand the challenges of our time without understanding the ways in which 500 years of Western empire building...have shaped our world into the deeply unequal and gratuitously unjust place that is it today.”⁴⁵ Historian and political theorist Anthony Bogues has also identified Empire as the defining feature of modernity:

“Colonial empires were global entities. They structured the world for 500 years, creating subjects, new spaces, new ‘natives,’ and international inequities.”⁴⁶ Corroborating Terreblanche and Bogues, Kenyan philosopher and novelist Ngũgĩ wa Thiong’o highlights the colonial nature of Empire, explaining that “There is no region, no culture, no nation today that has not been affected by colonialism and its aftermath. Indeed, modernity can be considered a product of colonialism.”⁴⁷ Because local analyses of social structures around the world inevitably lead back to the global structure of Empire, we must understand Empire not as a political aspiration but as the structure of modernity and the context for continental, regional, and local social structures.⁴⁸

In defining the modern problem of Empire, it is necessary to recognize its historical uniqueness. To be sure, empires existed before the emergence of modern European imperialism, but Terreblanche notes some crucial differences between modern empires and the empires that came before them. As he explains, modern European empire was the first truly globalizing force: the economic and political competition between the maritime empires of emerging nation-states reorganized the global division of labor, rerouted the flow of capital and resources, and actively created the asymmetrical development of the world.⁴⁹ Not only did these empires transform the being of *homo sapiens* and their various societies, they also produced competing cultural apparatuses designed to justify their actions and obfuscate imperial horrors. As Terreblanche writes, “what made the Western empire unique is the great variety of ideological arguments that were put forward by each one of the empire-building countries over the past 500 years. All empires depended on a belief in the alleged superiority of the Western empire-building peoples and the supposed inferiority of the subjected...peoples in the Rest of the world.”⁵⁰ Thus, the very ontology of the modern world is a product of imperial expansion, and much of the epistemology of the modern world is a justification for such expansion and its resulting ontology.

Although modern imperialism has been a competition between various European powers – Spanish, Portuguese, British, Dutch, French, Italian, and German, among others – the Anglophone or Anglo-Saxon powers have controlled the pace, tone, and form of Empire for the last three centuries and continue to control the centers of Empire today. Terreblanche argues that there have been five stages of modern European imperialism, and each stage has been led by a “track-laying” power that provides the configuration of the global social structure. In the first and second stages, the track-laying powers were the Spanish, the Portuguese, and the Dutch, while the later stages have been dominated by the Anglo-Saxon powers, the United Kingdom and the United States. In Terreblanche’s words, “from 1713 until 2010 the capitalist system in the British-American world has been almost uninterruptedly the *driving force* in empire building...The rise of the American-led global empire is closely associated with the revolution in the investment in human capital and military research after the Second World War.”⁵¹ In the eighteenth century, Britain took steps to formalize its Empire, and despite losing their North American colonies in the 1780s, British developed new administrative and military strategies for more closely integrating the Empire into a single system of political control.⁵² In the nineteenth century, the British used their economy for imperial advancement by internationalizing the division of labor between the home country and its colonies; their unique reliance on open trade and market access gave the British an advantage over other empires.⁵³ In the twentieth century, however, Britain was decimated by two wars with other imperial powers, and the United States, having learned the value of open markets from the British, convinced Britain to dismantle its empire and pass the track-laying torch to its Anglo-Saxon brother across the Atlantic.⁵⁴ By the early-twenty-first century, the United States unilaterally occupied the center of a new global imperial system – militarily, economically, and politically.⁵⁵

Though some scholars have confused the twentieth-century transformations of Empire for the end of empire-as-we-knew-it, the new modes of imperial domination used by the United States continue to reflect the logic of modern Empire. There is no scholarly consensus regarding the imperial character of Amerika. For example, K. R. Dark and A. L. Harris argue that nineteenth-century continental expansion makes the United States an internal empire even though it has not become an external empire, while Charles S. Maier argues that even though there is reason to think Amerika is an external empire, it is “not yet” an internal empire.⁵⁶ Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri have claimed, in an overly optimistic and highly naïve way, that “The United States does not, and indeed no nation-state can today, form the center of an imperialist project. Imperialism is over. No nation will be world leader in the way modern European nations were.”⁵⁷ While it is true that Amerika does not preside over the same kind of Empire that the European powers previously did, the new Amerikan Empire unquestionably occupies the track-laying position charged with creating a new form of imperialism. Historian Alfred W. McCoy notes that Amerika’s “distinctive form of global governance” combines Athenian coalition-making, Roman militarism, and British commercialism into “a comprehensive system that cover[s] the globe.”⁵⁸ Amerika’s imperialism is not merely mimetic, however, for, Peter Gowan explains, “American expansionism during the twentieth century has a qualitatively different character than that of earlier European empires: it has always been a project for global dominance, not just in the sense of making America the dominant world power but in the much more ambitious sense of reconstructing the world to produce an American global order.”⁵⁹ Terreblanche argues that Amerika’s economic and military power allows it to pursue its transformative imperial agenda with little opposition, writing, “The industrial-military complex

built by the USA in the seventy years since the Second World War is the most formidable capitalist power bloc the world have ever witnessed.”⁶⁰

Unlike the old European powers, Amerika now has virtually no competition in its quest to reorganize the world to its liking, and though Amerikan leaders consistently deny their imperial ambitions, their actions tell a different story.⁶¹ In *American Empire*, Andrew J. Bacevich argues that economic expansion – the driving force behind American imperialism – depends on military interventions to open new markets, which in turn requires a political cover story to justify the whole process.⁶² Economically, the United States uses corporate power and international financial institutions to reorganize the world’s economy to suit Amerikan national interests, just as the British did in the nineteenth century. Not only has the outsourcing of industrial production replicated the global division of labor that the British developed two centuries ago, as production becomes less profitable, non-banking sectors have become increasingly financialized, with stocks becoming the main source of revenue. The United States also holds a controlling interest in international financial institutions like the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, which allows the Amerikan political and economic elites to impose policies on the domestic economies of smaller nations.⁶³ Militarily, the United States ensures access to markets and eliminates threats to those markets through a combination of overt military campaigns (including air strikes, proxy wars, and the occupation of foreign nations) and covert government programs (including CIA-sponsored coups and drone assassinations). Amerika also operates somewhere between 700 and 1000 military bases on six continents, including several command headquarters dedicated to specific geopolitical regions.⁶⁴ Politically, the United States provides a moral cover story for its economic and military aims. By appealing to either the United Nations, which was designed to obscure the perpetuation of European global

power, or humanitarian justifications for intervention (or both), Amerika hides its desire to consolidate economic and political power behind the veneer of righteousness.⁶⁵ Historian William Appleman Williams observed the close connection between economic interests and humanitarian appeals: “Most imperialists believed that an American empire would be humanitarian, and most humanitarians believed that doing good would be good for business.”⁶⁶ Whether it is stopping the forces of evil and hatred or deposing a tyrant and freeing a people, Amerika never ceases to moralize its imperial murder parade.⁶⁷

Despite the continuation of Empire under the direction of the United States in the twenty-first century, Black political theory has largely failed to confront this reality and articulate a critical response. The bifurcation of Africana philosophy and analyses of Empire reflects a larger trend in the separation of Black thought from international issues. In *White World Order, Black Power Politics*, political scientist Robert Vitalis observes the disjunction between Africana Studies and International Relations. Du Bois was on the editorial board for the first international relations journal in the United States, *Journal of Race Development*, which later became *Foreign Affairs*. Though Du Bois is acknowledged as a founding figure of Africana Studies, Vitalis laments, “None of today’s premiere public intellectuals and leaders in the discipline Du Bois is said to have inspired – Michael Eric Dyson, Henry Louis Gates Jr., Cornel West – writes for *Foreign Affairs*.”⁶⁸ For Vitalis, the lack of scholarly engagement with Du Bois’s internationalism is indicative of a broader trend of de-radicalization of Black thought in the academy. The disciplines of Africana philosophy and Black political theory have also been cordoned off from internationalist concerns. The works of Bernard Boxill, Tommie Shelby, Cathy J. Cohen, Anthony Bogues, Michael Hanchard, Michael C. Dawson, and Lucius T. Outlaw offer compelling analysis on a number of important topics for Black intellectual production, especially

regarding the domestic American context and Africana intellectual history, but theories of Empire are largely missing from their works.⁶⁹ Even though there is a long tradition of internationalism within the history of Black political thought, internationalist concerns have almost completely disappeared from contemporary Black political theory today. In other words, Black political theory has become – literally and figuratively – domesticated.

There are important reasons to think that the failure of Black political theory to situate its studies within the larger imperial context undermines the enterprise of Black thought as a whole, especially in the United States. In “‘Left Alone with America’: The Absence of Empire in the Study of American Culture,” Amy Kaplan argues that “Foregrounding imperialism in the study of American cultures shows how putatively domestic conflicts are not simply contained at home but how they both emerge in response to international struggles and spill over national boundaries to be reenacted, challenged, or transformed.”⁷⁰ The influence of the international on the domestic is especially true for understandings of race. Africana philosophy and Black political theory are often unfairly and inaccurately reduced to their reflections on “race,” as if Black people have thought about nothing else. But even if this were true, any analysis that failed to understand race as a product of Empire would fall short. “If race mattered for empire, empire also mattered for race,” historian Paul A. Kramer reminds us. “While empire is often represented as a mere outlet for metropolitan racial tensions, a screen onto which prior, homegrown racial anxieties are projected, a well-defined crucible in which domestic racial identities are foiled, none of those representations can fully account for the imperial dynamics of race making.”⁷¹ Thus, even the concept of “race,” so often taken to be the cornerstone of Africana philosophy, cannot be properly theorized without an accompanying theory of Empire.

From Black Radical Liberalism to Pan-African Anticolonialism

My goal in *Anticolonial Amerika* is to offer a philosophical framework capable of understanding the history and present of Empire, with special emphasis on the conditions faced by Black people in the United States of Amerika. To achieve this goal, it is necessary to engage Black political philosopher Charles Mills, whose sophisticated political theory requires a response from anyone interested in developing an alternative account of Empire, a response that builds upon his theoretical strengths while noting and moving beyond his theoretical shortcomings. For over two decades, Mills has battled the entrenched white idealism of academic political theory, attempting to turn liberal ideas against liberalism itself in order to dislodge the white supremacist strictures of the discipline. In his landmark work *The Racial Contract*, he criticizes the contractarian tradition by revealing what he calls “the racial contract,” the social contract’s unstated but nevertheless supplementary tacit social agreement among whites. The racial contract excludes non-whites from the body politic, relegating racialized “subpersons” into “dark ontologies” and preventing them from sharing equally in the benefits and protections of modern society. Most importantly, Mills calls for “a global theoretical framework for understanding race and white racism,” resisting the domestication of Black political theory today.⁷² Since its publication, *The Racial Contract* has left an unparalleled impact across the disciplines. As Mills notes, “*The Racial Contract* has now become a standard text to assign as a self-contained crash course on imperialism, critical race theory, and white supremacy that exposes the hypocrisies of liberalism and the Western tradition, and puts US racism in a global and historical context.”⁷³

While *The Racial Contract* has made an impact on contemporary theorization of race and racism, Mills has continued to evolve his thinking regarding the possibility of reformulating liberalism for progressive, anti-racist political purposes. In his most recent work, *Black Rights*,

White Wrongs: The Critique of Racial Liberalism, Mills extends his critique of liberal social contract theory, developing a philosophy of “black radical liberalism” as an alternative to “black mainstream liberalism.” According to Mills, black mainstream liberalism treats white supremacy as an anomaly within an easily reformed liberal political system, but black radical liberalism “draws upon the most valuable insights of the black nationalist and black Marxist traditions and incorporates them into a dramatically transformed liberalism.”⁷⁴ By synthesizing the liberal moral idealism of Immanuel Kant, the class-based materialism of Karl Marx, and the “critical race theory” of W. E. B. Du Bois – or, in reverse order, Du Bois (black), Marx (radical), and Kant (liberalism) – Mills adapts John Rawls’s principles of justice in the service of emancipatory political action. Thus, Mills seeks “to justify a radical agenda with the normative resources of liberalism rather than writing off liberalism”; in other words, he seeks to use the best values of liberalism against the historical reality of liberalism’s white supremacist practices.⁷⁵

From an anticolonial perspective, Mills’s work has contributed to two crucial shifts in philosophical practice: a rejection of ideal theory in favor of non-ideal theory and a materialist prioritization of interests over morals. The dominant mode of thinking in the discipline of philosophy is ideal theory, which philosophers use to develop descriptions that would hold true under satisfactory circumstances. Though this approach to political philosophy is closely associated with John Rawls, Mills argues that most philosophers rely on ideal theory and thus avoid confronting actual historical and social realities. Against ideal theory, Mills advocates the use of non-ideal theory, which begins with observations about the political world we live in. As he states, “My suggestion is that by looking at the *actual* historically dominant moral/political consciousness and the *actual* historically dominant moral/political ideals, we are better enabled to prescribe for our society than by starting from ahistorical abstractions.”⁷⁶ For Mills, political

theory should allow us “to explain the actual genesis of the society and the state, the way society is structured, the way the government functions, and people’s moral psychology.”⁷⁷ To achieve adequate descriptions of this type, he recommends that philosophers develop “non-idealized descriptive mapping concepts,” which are abstractions from observed facts rather than idealizations of non-existing entities and practices.⁷⁸ Though Mills’s approach relies on historicism and implies an empirical orientation, “simple empiricism,” he insists, must be avoided; since concepts are often tied to privileges and interests that emanate from the social structure, we must scrutinize any conceptual apparatus and identify its “empirical” blind spots.⁷⁹

In addition to directing philosophers away from ideal theory toward non-ideal theory, an anticolonial perspective also appreciates Mills’s “realist” approach, which acknowledges the limitations of moral and epistemic appeals in the name of racial justice. In Mills’s view, race must be understood as a material phenomenon like class, but without slipping into biological determinism: “race is material also, both in terms of economic advantage/disadvantage and in terms of patterns of social cognition being shaped by the body. It is not a biological materiality...it is a social materiality [that is] rooted in the relation between the individual body and the body politic [and] that needs to be conceptually differentiated from class.” Just as with class interests, racial interests are embedded in the political economy of a society, which means that economic and other material interests drive decision-making rather than concerns for morality or justice. As Mills writes, “Materialism rules out moral motivation as a prime social mover,” so any program to get poor and working class whites to fight for racial justice would have to rely upon “perceived group interest” to motivate political action.⁸⁰ This concern about interests carries over into Mills’s epistemology of white ignorance; he argues that “white group interests need to be recognized and acknowledged as a central causal factor in generating and

sustaining white ignorance.”⁸¹ By combining non-ideal theoretical approaches with materialist appeals to group interests, Mills has pointed political philosophy in the right direction and paved the way for a revival of the anticolonial tradition, which shares these views and concerns.

Despite the important contributions that Mills’s philosophy makes to the positive development of political theory, from an anticolonial perspective, his thought also contains a number of debilitating shortcomings. While one obvious possible criticism would be Mills’s reliance on the language of the social contract, there are three other concerns that must be prioritized. The first shortcoming of Mills’s black radical liberalism is its failure to engage and critique capitalism. For Mills, racial power in the form of white supremacy and class power in the form of capitalist exploitation are distinct systems of oppression, which means it is possible to confront them independently of one another. The result of any successful implementation of black radical liberalism would be a so-called “non-white supremacist capitalism,” which in addition to being non-white supremacist would also be “a more egalitarian, redistributivist capitalism,” since working class white interests must also be mobilized.⁸² Though Mills acknowledges the economic effects of racism, his solution suggests that Black people have race, white people have class, and the only time economic reforms are indispensable is when trying to mobilize working class whites in the interest of racial justice. On this view, “discrimination” is the primary challenge Black people face in America today, and the logical conclusion here is that poverty, homelessness, unemployment, and lack of healthcare are permissible as long as there are no racial disparities in the rates of these social problems. As long as Blacks and whites are killed by the police at comparable rates, as long as they are both incarcerated at the same rates, as long as they both work for the same unacceptable minimum wage, then capitalist exploitation will be “better” than it is now because it won’t be discriminatory. Although Mills most certainly

does not intend it, his notion of “non-white supremacist capitalism” comes dangerously close to the Cold War integrationism of the 1950s and the neocolonial integrationism of the 1970s.

The second shortcoming of Mills’s black radical liberalism is its problematic incorporation of W. E. B. Du Bois as the “critical race theorist” in his philosophical triad.⁸³ Mills first caricatures Du Bois by reducing his thought to his reflections on race and then diminishes Du Bois by introducing him as a corrective for the racist shortcomings of Kant and Marx. “Du Bois is obviously the most important theorist of race and blackness,” Mills explains, adding:

Liberalism [Kant] provides the most developed body of normative theory for understanding the rights of persons and the conceptualization of social justice. Marxism...is the most developed Western oppositional critique of liberalism and the analysis of the materialist undermining of liberalism’s ideals by the workings of capitalism...The virtue of critical race theory [Du Bois] ...is that it corrects both Western liberalism’s and Western Marxism’s failure to recognize and theorize the centrality of race and white supremacy to the making of the modern world.⁸⁴

Oddly enough, Mills never bothers to ask if Du Bois has an ethical theory of rights or a theory of political economy – yet it is reasonable to argue that he has both. Du Bois’s remark at the beginning of *Black Reconstruction* about the Negro being “an average and ordinary human being”⁸⁵ does more, ethically speaking, for Black people than all the pages of Kant’s writings combined.⁸⁶ More crucially, Du Bois’s Pan-African analysis of political economy, which first appeared in its full form in “A Negro Nation Within a Nation” and continued to mature until his death, exceeds Marx’s understanding of capitalism because it more fully addresses the colonial and racial nature of capitalism. The irony here is that Du Bois has already developed an alternative to Marxism that accounts for the very issues Mills is concerned about, but because Mills compartmentalizes thinkers by associating them with isolated issues, because Mills reduces Du Bois to a “race theorist,” he fails to engage Du Bois in his full Pan-African mode of thinking.⁸⁷

The third shortcoming of Mills's black radical liberalism is its reliance on a problematic conception of whiteness. According to Mills, "White supremacy is the unnamed political system that has made the modern world what it is today,"⁸⁸ and because the concept of white supremacy directly refers to the racial group in power, he believes the term has the "semantic virtues of signaling the existence of a *system* run by, and in the interests of, whites."⁸⁹ There are two problems with this move, for when he attempts to use "whiteness" as a blanket concept to describe history, he ultimately gets trapped between, on the one hand, relying on a bio-logic in which social phenomena are reduced to biology and, on the other hand, abandoning the term altogether.

It is certainly desirable to analyze and understand the violence of whiteness in its various forms, but when Mills attempts to account for the hierarchy among "whites," illustrated by the degradation of the Irish and the Jews at the hands of Western Europeans, he reverts to a bio-logic that imputes social power to phenotype and undermines his own historicist proclivities. Oyèrónké Oyewuémì defines bio-logic as the process by which philosophers define something as a social construction (such as gender) but then, through a slight of hand, universalize it by transferring all of its features to biology (sex).⁹⁰ In his attempt to salvage the explanatory power of whiteness in contexts where whites have colonized other whites, Mills suggests that despite their colonized status, they were still white. For example, in his discussion of the Irish and the Jews, Mills suggests that we should "'fuzzify' the categories" of "white/nonwhite" to account for internal distinctions; in this way, the Irish and the Jews become "off white."⁹¹ The problem with this solution is that it is precisely *not* historicist, refusing to contextualize the meaning and value of "whiteness" according to the imperial context in which it is operating. English oppression of the Irish was not driven by whiteness; it was driven by a colonial logic of exploitation and

genocide. German oppression of the Jews was not driven by whiteness; it was driven by a colonial logic of exploitation and genocide. To claim that the Irish remained “white” during Anglo-Saxon colonization of Ireland in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries anachronistically projects a late-twentieth-century understanding of racial difference into a context where religion, language, and culture took precedence in defining the colonized as Other. Likewise, to claim that the Jews remained “white” in the eyes of self-described Aryans during the Second World War neglects “the *actual* historically dominant moral/political ideals” of Third Reich racial ideology.⁹² Whiteness itself is a specific historical concept, and when Mills attempts to resolve the tension between the concept and historical vagaries, he retreats to a kind of bio-logic in which “whiteness” is inherently connected to white skin.

Mills’s defense of his use of the concept of “whiteness” is further problematized when he attempts to account for Japanese imperialism during World War II, since he essentially abandons the term “whiteness” altogether. According to Mills, Japanese oppression of the Chinese in the 1930s was qualitatively an example of the racial contract’s subordination of racialized bodies, but because the Japanese cannot be construed as phenotypically “white,” Mills runs into issues. The fact that Mills cannot and will not label the Japanese “white,” even though they are committing the same sorts of colonial atrocities committed by Europeans, once again reveals the bio-logic behind Mills’s commitment to the concept of “whiteness.” If the colonized Irish remain white regardless of their colonial status in a given context and the Japanese remain non-white regardless of their colonial status in a given context, then Mills’s notion of “whiteness” has less to do with power and everything to do with bodies. However, he tries to avoid this conclusion when he admits that “whiteness” has very little to do with the phenomenon he is describing. In the closing pages of *The Racial Contract*, Mills qualifies his terms: “the ‘Racial Contract’

decolorizes Whiteness by detaching it from whiteness, thereby demonstrating that in a parallel universe it could have been Yellowness, Redness, Brownness, or Blackness. Or, alternatively phrased, we could have had a yellow, red, brown, or black Whiteness: *Whiteness is not really a color at all, but a set of power relations.*⁹³ If “whiteness” is not a color but a set of power relations, then the term loses the “semantic virtue” that Mills claims it has. If, as Mills suggests, Japanese imperialism is similar enough to the pattern of European imperialism he seeks to explain, then “whiteness” has more to do with how specific instances of colonial imperialism practiced by people with white skin plays out than with imperial power relations *as such*.

Though Mills provides some useful insights regarding the deficiencies of contemporary political theory and offers some promising recommendation for correcting those deficiencies, black radical liberalism remains incomplete. Anticolonialism shares Mills’s preference for non-ideal theory because anticolonial theory starts with the facts about the world of Empire. Anticolonialism also shares Mills’s preference for materialist appeals to interests rather than moral appeals to conscience because anticolonial theory recognizes the primacy of political economy in the organization of the social structure. But it is also for these reasons that anticolonialism departs from Mills on the question of capitalism, the use of Du Bois, and the prioritization of whiteness. Black radical political theory *must* oppose capitalism. “Black people cannot afford the social injustices of capitalism,” Robert L. Allen explains. “Neither can black people afford some half-hearted compromise which would make the black community in general, and its educated classes in particular, subservient to the expansionist needs of corporate capitalism.”⁹⁴ Manning Marable echoes this sentiment, insisting that “Black people as a group will *never* achieve the historical objectives of their long struggle for freedom within the political economy of capitalism.”⁹⁵ Given that Du Bois agreed with Allen and Marable that Black

liberation in Amerika would be impossible without socialism, Mills's use of Du Bois becomes further complicated and problematic.⁹⁶ Finally, because Mills wants the notion of "whiteness" to achieve more than it can, he reaches an impasse in which he is forced to biologize whiteness or abandon the term.

There is a way out of this impasse, however, for though Mills prioritizes race, he insists that "race is *not* foundational" and remains "calculatedly agnostic on what those deeper causes for the genesis and evolution of white supremacy might be." He does say "the history of European expansionism" is an intuitive place to begin looking, and elsewhere he says that "colonialism 'lies at the heart' of the rise of Europe."⁹⁷ "The material context for racism," Mills writes in another essay, "is modern European expansionism, and the growth of empire."⁹⁸ These statements are correct, but Mills unfortunately never explores these possibilities. Turning to the anticolonial tradition, *Anticolonial Amerika* explores the connections between race, white supremacy, and European colonial expansion. Rather than construing Black Amerika as the dark ontology of the racial contract, anticolonialism understands Black Amerika as a domestic colony of the Amerikan Empire.

Rebuilding Anticolonial Political Theory: Toward a New Domestic Colonialism Thesis

Anticolonial Amerika is fundamentally a Du Boisian project in that it seeks to develop a theoretical framework capable of understanding two things: the overall logic of the Amerikan Empire and the conditions faced by the Black community within that Empire. Toward this end, I return to the domestic colonialism thesis because its very premises entail an understanding of the imperial context in which we all live. In many ways, this revival of anticolonialism is timely, not only because the Left in general and Black radical political theory in particular are in desperate need of fresh perspectives on the problems that face us today, but also because the domestic

colonialism thesis is making a comeback in both mainstream American political discourse and academic discussions. Journalist Chris Hayes's recent book *A Colony in a Nation* attempts to theorize Black poverty and mass incarceration as manifestations of colonialism, and though Hayes's superficial understanding of the anticolonial tradition results in a number of mistakes in his analysis, he has taken an important first step toward an anticolonial revival by reintroducing the language of anticolonialism to a popular audience.⁹⁹ Without a robust scholarly contribution to the re-emergence of anticolonial theory, this revival will succumb to the same theoretical shortcomings and repressive policies as it did in the 1970s, fizzling out before it has a chance to make a mark on academic and public discourse. Scholars have already begun the process of developing new approaches to anticolonial theory. In 2010, *The Black Scholar* dedicated an entire special issue to reviving Robert Allen's formulation of the domestic colonialism thesis. Scholars from a variety of disciplines – including sociology, communication, international relations, ethnic studies, and Black studies – joined together in an effort to develop a new beginning for anticolonial political theory.¹⁰⁰ *Anticolonial Amerika* joins this trend, not only because the new wave of anticolonial scholarship requires book-length treatments of Empire, but also because philosophy, like other disciplines, stands to make unique contributions to the anticolonial tradition.

As a philosophical contribution to the anticolonial revival, *Anticolonial Amerika* has two tasks. The first task is to select the best version of the domestic colonialism model. Scholarly articulations of the domestic colonialism thesis first appeared in the late-1960s, and by the 1990s, most social scientists considered it outdated or debunked, but this became the fate of anticolonialism only because Robert Blauner's version of domestic colonialism received the majority of scholarly attention while Robert L. Allen's version was basically ignored.¹⁰¹

Blauner's *Racial Oppression in America* elicited numerous responses from scholars who sought to debunk domestic colonialism from various perspectives. Nathan Glazer criticized Blauner's model from an ethnic pluralism viewpoint, arguing that while Southern Blacks might be described as a domestic colony, Northern Blacks had a choice to integrate themselves into American society in the same manner as ethnic whites had. Donald J. Harris criticized Blauner's model from a Marxist perspective, arguing that Blacks were better understood as a superexploited segment of the proletariat than a colonized people within the mother country. Michael Burawoy's criticism of Blauner's model was the most important, for he pointed out that Blauner had no way to conceive of class differences within the Black community.¹⁰² In *Racial Formation in the United States*, Michael Omi and Howard Winant cite Burawoy's criticism of Blauner, arguing that the domestic colonialism model had been debunked.¹⁰³

While these critics correctly noted that Blauner's version of the domestic colonialism thesis did not account for the class distinctions among Black people in America, they falsely asserted that the domestic colonialism thesis *as such* could not account for those class distinctions because they had ignored Allen's *Black Awakening in Capitalist America*. Even sociologist Robert Staples, one of the few scholars to carry on the anticolonial tradition after its repression in the 1970s, continued to marginalize Allen's work, claiming that Blauner's version was "probably the most sophisticated sociological exposition of the internal colonialism model."¹⁰⁴ Unlike Blauner's model, Allen's conception of domestic colonialism *includes* an intragroup class analysis designed to explain the class – and therefore ideological – divisions within the Black colony. The failure of these scholars to attend to Allen's version of the domestic colonialism thesis is even more problematic because Blauner acknowledged the relative maturity of Allen's version of the theory. "Allen," Blauner writes in *Racial Oppression in America*, "deals

much more thoroughly with the history and dynamics of the black movement, class division in the black community, and the *neocolonial strategies* of corporate capitalism.”¹⁰⁵ The conclusion that the domestic colonialism thesis could be so easily dismissed was the result of imprudent ideological assertions and not meticulous scholarly analysis.

If identifying the best domestic colonialism model is the first task of an anticolonial revival, the second task is to develop a mature conceptual apparatus capable of theoretical interventions in various disciplines and specializations within social and political theory broadly defined. Looking back to anticolonialism in the 1960s and 70s, Allen notes that most scholars – even some proponents of anticolonialism¹⁰⁶ – thought of the domestic colonialism thesis as a mere analogy or metaphor:

A problem with the early formulations of the internal colonialism/neo-colonialism thesis is that it was thought of as only an analogy, rather than as a mode of analysis in its own right. And because it was regarded as an analogy, the links between black people, other people of color in the US, and other colonized peoples throughout the world were seen as merely incidental or simply as similarities rather than as organic connections growing out of a common colonial experience.¹⁰⁷

Part of the reason that domestic colonialism was viewed so reductively is that it never had the chance to demonstrate the full range of its theoretical strength and the full extent of its philosophical implications. Because it flourished only in the social sciences (primarily in sociology) and only for a brief moment, the anticolonial paradigm failed to contribute to our understandings of social ontology, race theory, sovereignty, or sex/gender/sexuality.

Furthermore, because the original scholars who used the domestic colonialism thesis never got to the heart of the colonizer-colonized relationship that defines anticolonialism generally, the various articulations of domestic colonialism missed precisely what Allen calls the “organic connections growing out of a common colonial experience.” While I have identified Allen’s

version of domestic colonialism as the best existing model, the remainder of the book demonstrates that the theoretical range of the anticolonial tradition goes beyond mere analogies.

Part One of *Anticolonial Amerika* develops a methodological basis for anticolonialism by establishing a language for a social ontology and historically nuancing the concept of “whiteness.” These chapters provide an alternative to Mill’s Black Radical Liberalism by developing anticolonial responses to racial contract theory and critical whiteness studies. In Chapter II, “Toward an Anticolonial Ontology,” I draw on two pivotal anticolonial figures, W. E. B. Du Bois and Frantz Fanon, to build a conceptual language to describe what I call the *colonial ontology of Empire*. In their earlier works, specifically *The Souls of Black Folk* and *Black Skin/White Masks*, both Du Bois and Fanon are primarily interested in race and races, but later in their later works, specifically *Color and Democracy* and *The Wretched of the Earth*, they each prioritize the colonizer-colonized relationship and the imperial political economy into which it is embedded. In these later texts, race and racialization are products of colonialism and are therefore expressions of a deeper logic and structure of Empire. In my terms, the colonial ontology of Empire consists of two zones: the zone of being and the zone of nonbeing. The zone of being is the *ontological* zone in which the self-humanized colonizer resides, while the zone of nonbeing is the *non-tological* zone in which the de-humanized colonized resides. These two zones are separated by *the dividing line of colonial ontology*, which is visible in the economic, political, and military organization of the colonial social structure, and which appears in one of three forms of colonial relations: elimination, domination, or assimilation. In order to illustrate the explanatory power of the colonial ontology of Empire, I follow Theodore W. Allen’s example in *The Invention of the White Race* and use my terminology to describe English colonial practices in early modern Ireland (1500-1700). By using this anticolonial understanding of social

ontology in a modern colonial context not primarily defined by what we understand as modern racial differences (for example, white supremacist anti-Blackness), I demonstrate how colonial logic works as a basis for what we now call racialization.

In Chapter III, “Inventing Whiteness in an Anglo-Saxon Empire, 1600-2000,” I present a novel interpretation of the history of whiteness and Empire in American history. Unlike other philosophers, who derive their understanding of “whiteness” from critical whiteness studies, a movement among labor historians who sought to explain the connections between immigrant assimilation and white racial consciousness, I complicate the notion of whiteness by contextualizing strategies of ethnicization and assimilation in an Anglo-Saxon understanding of American Empire. According to the common understanding, various groups of European immigrants, such as the Irish, were initially excluded from whiteness and had to “become” white. As Peter Kolchin observes, however, whiteness studies scholars – and by extension, their followers – commit two fundamental errors. On the one hand, “In viewing whiteness as an independent category, many whiteness studies authors come close to reifying it and thereby losing sight of its constructed nature”; on the other hand, they assume that “American whiteness can be understood in isolation, without considering anything abroad.”¹⁰⁸ To rectify the first shortcoming, I turn to the “invention of ethnicity” tradition of assimilation theory, represented by the works of Werner Sollors and Kathleen Neils Conzen, among others, to demonstrate that whiteness was a product of the conflict between immigrants and Americans. To rectify the second shortcoming, I follow the tradition in American Studies, represented by Amy Kaplan and Donald E. Pease’s landmark collection *Cultures of United States Imperialism*, which seeks to highlight the influence of U.S. foreign policy and expansion on domestic U.S. culture. I argue that Anglo-Saxonism dominated the national and imperial identity of the U.S. through the

beginning of the twentieth century. After the Great Depression, however, a competing national paradigm of whiteness, which was constructed by non-Anglo-Saxon Europeans in Amerika, displaced Anglo-Saxonism as the dominant national (white) identity. Rather than see whiteness as an extension of Anglo-Saxonism, I argue that whiteness was created as an *alterative* to Anglo-Saxonism, one that made space for the various non-Anglo-Saxon European immigrants while maintaining the exclusion of the non-white, non-Caucasian victims of colonialism. In the twentieth century, as Anglo-Saxonism lost its hegemony, Anglo-Saxon exceptionalism was transliterated into Amerikan exceptionalism, allowing the Empire to persist.

Part Two turns to the works of nineteenth-century Black Nationalist Martin R. Delany and Black Panther Party Minister of Information Eldridge Cleaver, expanding upon the methodological and historical insights of Part One through anticolonial interventions into political theory and theories of sex/gender/sexuality. There are important historical and scholarly reasons not only for including Delany and Cleaver in the anticolonial tradition but also for positioning them as central figures. Historically speaking, they represent intellectual bookends to the Pan-African anticolonial tradition as it developed in the United States. While Delany was “one of the most articulate Afro-American precursors of pan-Africanism in the nineteenth century,” Cleaver’s philosophy is largely grounded in his closely study of Du Bois, Fanon, and Nkrumah.¹⁰⁹ While Delany’s *The Condition, Elevation, Emigration, and Destiny of the Colored People of the United States, Politically Considered* (1852) was “the first full-length analysis of the economic and political situation of blacks in the United States,”¹¹⁰ Cleaver’s *Soul on Ice*, which made the *New York Times* top-ten books list in 1968, is an iconic product of the 1960s and an insightful examination of Amerikan society during that turbulent decade. As Ishmael Reed puts it, *Soul on Ice* is not about the sixties, it *is* the sixties.¹¹¹ Literary scholar Jerome McGann

makes the connection between Delany and Cleaver explicit. Cleaver's *Soul on Ice*, McGann argues, is one of the "lineal children" of Delany's novel *Blake; or, The Huts of America* (1859), which he describes as an "ambitious investigation of the history and vicious social conditions that characterized the emergent American Empire in the nineteenth century."¹¹² In many ways, Delany and Cleaver – and their most important texts – are not incidental to the anticolonial tradition; they are essential to it.

Chapter IV, "'We have not addressed you as *citizens*': Martin R. Delany, Colonial Sovereignty, and Black Positivism in Nineteenth-Century Amerika," establishes Delany's theory of colonial sovereignty. Unlike his contemporary Frederick Douglass, who relied on natural law arguments in his legal reasoning, Delany was an avid empiricist and therefore developed a form of legal positivism. For Delany, law was not about justice but about power, and because white people held the power, they controlled the law, a power known as legislative sovereignty. Having observed that Black people were excluded from political power on a (racial) group basis, he determined that Black people were a "nation within a nation." According to Delany, the only thing that could remedy the condition of the Black internal nation was full republican citizenship, which, in contradistinction to imperial citizenship, would grant them full access to legislative sovereignty. Though Delany's sophisticated political theory has been almost completely neglected by scholars, his insights reveal the fundamental shortcomings of Carl Schmitt's theory of sovereignty, which has unfortunately, become the dominant conception of sovereignty among contemporary political theorists, white and Black.

Chapter V, "'I, a black man, confronted The Ogre': Eldridge Cleaver, Sexual Image, and the Rejection of Imperial Somatocentricity," draws on Cleaver's notion of the "sexual image" to undermine Western metaphysical schemas that place bodies at the center of ontological analysis.

By using “The Primeval Mitosis” as the interpretive key to understanding *Soul on Ice* – the way Cleaver intended – I show that Cleaver’s conception of gender is tied to the colonial social structure and not to biological sex. For Cleaver, each race-class configuration produces distinct sexual images (or gender-sexuality), and males and females must be thereby understood not as inherently empowered or disempowered based on their sex but as empowered or disempowered based on their position in the colony. Because colonizing females have power over colonized males, we can use Cleaver’s work to reread the history of white womanhood – and therefore white women – in the Amerikan Empire. Not only have white women taken an active role in expanding and enabling the Empire, feminism is itself one of the chief mechanisms by which they have done so. While most readers have taken interest in Cleaver’s psychological or existential quest to excise his internalization of white supremacist beauty standards and eliminate his attraction/hatred for white women, I will focus on Cleaver’s analysis of white women’s sexual psychology, a theory I call “Ogre psychology,” which calls into questions the supposed passive, gentile, sexless contours of white womanhood in Amerika. By working through the implications of Cleaver’s theory of the sexual image, Black radical philosophy can move beyond the somatocentric shortcomings of the prevailing forms of feminism, including intersectionality.

Part Three (re)turns to the domestic colonialism thesis, bringing the various anticolonial insights developed in the preceding chapters to bear on Robert Allen’s sociology. In Chapter VI, “Neocolonial Amerika: Rethinking the Domestic Colony in a Twenty-First-Century Empire,” I use Allen’s domestic colonialism model to reinterpret contemporary Amerikan society since the 1970s. Scholars have grown accustomed to use the term “neoliberal” to describe the United States today, but I argue that this is a Marxist smokescreen, which obfuscates the truly neocolonial structure of the country. Because the United States Empire has always practiced

neocolonialism, I trace the development of, and the connections between, domestic and foreign neocolonialism in U.S. history. Turning to anticolonial thinkers and historians, I provide an overview of neocolonial theory and U.S. neocolonial practices; turning to Du Bois, I trace the roots of “neoliberal” language back to Reconstruction. By revealing the deep historical roots of “neoliberal” ideology and its origin in the continually transforming Amerikan Empire, I show that criticisms of “neoliberalism” are merely neocolonialism misunderstood. Building on those foundations, I provide a two-part analysis of the contemporary Black domestic neocolony in Amerika. First, I demonstrate the contours of the Amerikan neocolonial police state, which relies on surveillance, incarceration, and execution to maintain control of its colonized subjects; and second, I investigate the history and development of the neocolonial Black bourgeoisie from the Black silent majority to The First Black President™. While most accounts of contemporary racial politics in Amerika offer a “complicated” picture in which progress has been made (Black president) but problems still exist (mass incarceration), the domestic neocolonialism thesis can reconcile the apparent tension between these political phenomena and show how they are actually two symptoms of the same colonial logic. Our contemporary situation is merely a continuation of the long history of Amerika’s Anglo-Saxon Empire.

To understand the logic of contemporary Empire, it is necessary to understand the major trends through which the colonial ontology of Empire has unfolded during three centuries of Anglo-Saxon supremacy. To do so, however, it is necessary to abandon all affiliations with Amerikan nationalism or Amerikan exceptionalism. As Nikhil Singh reminds us, “it will only be by recognizing the limits of U.S. nationalist traditions as a source of justice for all that we will begin to approach once more the possibility of an effective antiracism and a renewal of progressive politics in our own time.”¹¹³ Toward this end, I join Greg Thomas, who

“concentrates on the settler-colonial context of what becomes the United States of America, without effacing its colonial character or treating this social context in isolation from the rest of the world.”¹⁴ As I hope to show, the best place to begin an understanding of Anglo-Saxon imperialism is from the vantage point of a colonized group trapped within the zone of nonbeing at the heart of the Empire – those Black philosophers dedicated to creating an Anticolonial Amerika.

CHAPTER II

TOWARD AN ANTICOLONIAL ONTOLOGY*

“The truest benevolence is occasional severity. It *is* expedient that one man die for the people. One tribe exterminated, if need be, to save a whole continent. ‘Sacrifice of human life?’ Prove that it is *human* life...Physical death is no evil. It may be a blessing to the survivors...You are the enemies of Christ, the Prince of Peace; you are beasts, all the more dangerous, because you have a semi-human cunning.”

– Charles Kingsley, Letter to J. M. Ludlow (1855)¹

“There is a level of deeper structure, containing a generative mechanism, which will allow us to explain why the empirical result *must* be so, and it is this level of structure that we scientists now need to identify.”

– Roy Bhaskar, “Theorizing Ontology”²

When philosophers hear the word “ontology,” they tend to think of Scholastic metaphysics, Heideggerian phenomenology, or the post-Quine return of analytic metaphysics in the late-twentieth century.³ While these traditions of philosophy approach ontology as the study of Being, some schools of thought have articulated metaphysical claims in terms of “social ontology,” or the study of the entities that exist in a social world. Scholars who are interested in social ontology argue that political theory will be confused without a basic articulation of the elements that make up a political community. As Christian List and Laura Valentini explain,

The substantive questions in social ontology are distinct from those in political theory and in some respects prior to them. Social ontology is primarily a positive and explanatory field rather than a normative or evaluative one. Its relevance to political theory lies in the fact that political theory cannot get off the ground unless we are clear about what entities and properties exist in the social world. For example, before we can answer questions about rights, obligations, and responsibilities, we need to know what entities can be the bearers of rights, obligations, and responsibilities.⁴

There are a number of approaches to social ontology, each with its own unique vocabulary and set of assumptions. For example, there is a long history of work on social ontology in the Marxist tradition, beginning with György Lukács’s *The Ontology of Social Being*, which, in proper

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historical materialist fashion, historicizes human being and grounds its analysis in labor.⁵ In the philosophy of social science, scholars are reviving the critical realism of Roy Bhaskar, who sought to describe the interface between the natural and social sciences while providing an explanation of the emergent properties of human agency within a social setting.⁶ And in Africana philosophy, Charles Mills has argued that race ought to be treated as a constitutive feature of social ontology in a racist world.⁷

Choosing a vocabulary of social ontology is no arbitrary task, and though Mills's social ontology points us in the right direction, it contains a fundamental indeterminacy that requires us to go farther. "Since different social-ontological theories give us different accounts of what entities and properties there are in the social world," List and Valentini remind us, "they can, in turn, impose constraints on what the possible objects of analysis in political theory might be."⁸ From the perspective of Black political theory, Mills offers us good reasons to think that the Marxist and critical realist approaches to social ontology are inadequate for a Black radical social ontology. On the one hand, Mills rightly rejects individualistic conceptions of social ontology, which would require a rejection of critical realism and its overtones of Kantian individualism. On the other hand, he takes the Marxist tradition to task for its failure to understand just how deeply racial and colonial structures are engrained into the modern capitalist political economy. In *The Racial Contract*, Mills argues that race operates as the basic feature of social ontology in the modern racialized world. "My categorization (white/nonwhite, person/subperson)," he writes, "has the virtues of elegance and simplicity and seems to me to map the essential features of the racial polity accurately, to carve the social reality at its ontological joints."⁹ Mills adds that we must see race as part of a "material base." "It's not a biological materiality (that would be biological determinism)," he comments in *Black Rights/White Wrongs*. Instead, "it's a social

materiality rooted in the relation between the individual body and the body politic that needs to be conceptually differentiated from class, even if class explains its origins.”¹⁰

In general, all of these observations and arguments are quite compatible with anticolonialism, but upon further investigation, several problems with Mills’s social ontology emerge. First, Mills argues that accounting for race and races allows us to see the “ontological joints” of society, but elsewhere he claims that “race is not foundational” within the socio-historical matrix of oppressions and dominations. Second, he says that class “explains” the origins of race, but he does not demonstrate how this process works. If it is true that class explains the origin of race, then there is no need to reject the Marxist paradigm in which racism is merely a manifestation of working class false consciousness. Third, he asserts that gender “predates class,” which for Mills is the main point of disanalogy between race and gender.¹¹ In Mills’s view, class, gender, and race are all part of the social base in a materialist sense, but there is no consistent articulation of the relation between these three social phenomena. Gender precedes class but does not cause it; class precedes race but does not explain it; race demarcates the basic entities of the social ontology though other categories are antecedent to it. To be sure, Mills is correct that race is not foundational, for to make race foundational is to succumb to what Oyèrónké Oyewuémì calls body-reasoning, which places social divisions and antagonisms outside the sociological and into the natural or biological.¹² Ontologically speaking, if race were foundational, then it would be necessary to understand racial conflict and white supremacy as emanating from our very bodies. Nevertheless, Mills’s reluctance to foundationalize or prioritize *any* social phenomenon or identity category leads to an analytical impasse from which we can only emerge with an anticolonial vocabulary of social ontology.

While the social ontology of Mills's racial contract reaches an analytical impasse, anticolonial social ontology moves beyond both the threat of essentialism and the hesitation over foundationalism, for the colonizer-colonized relation provides not only a social ontological foundation but also the means for rethinking existing categories of social relations. Anticolonial social ontology has its roots in the theories of anticolonial intellectuals during the decolonization period of the mid-twentieth century. Aimé Césaire's *Discourse on Colonialism*, Albert Memmi's *The Colonizer and the Colonized*, and Frantz Fanon's *The Wretched of the Earth* are among the most important founding texts of this tradition.¹³ But anticolonial social ontology must also rely heavily on the work of W. E. B. Du Bois, not merely because he was a prolific writer but, more importantly, because the development of his Pan-Africanist political economy offers a useful alternative to Marxist criticism of capitalism. Like Mills, my anticolonial conception of social ontology rejects the individualistic tendencies of critical realism and the inadequate analysis of racism in the Marxist tradition, but unlike Mills, an anticolonial social ontology argues that the colonizer-colonized relation produces race, racism, and racialization, thus giving a "foundational explanation" of race that Mills generally avoids. Again, like Mills's social ontology, anticolonial social ontology argues that race emerges from the material condition of the global capitalist economy, but whereas Mills restricts his economic vocabulary to "class" (much like Marxism), anticolonialism conceives of the colonized as an economic category separate from the "class" divisions among the colonizers.

This chapter draws on the work of Du Bois and Fanon to develop an anticolonial social ontology. The first section shows how both Du Bois and Fanon gradually moved away from mere analyses of "race" toward a more comprehensive understanding of race, racialization, and racism as products of imperial practices and colonial contexts. The second section develops a

conceptual apparatus of anticolonial social ontology, what I call the *colonial ontology of Empire*. In this social ontology, colonizer and colonized stand opposed as the human and the non-human, while the former subjects the latter to various colonial relation. While I borrow some vocabulary from Du Bois and Fanon, this social ontology is not meant to be a rendering of either thinker; rather, it is an extrapolation from their works understood as highly developed and deeply insightful contributions to the anticolonial tradition of Africana political theory. To illustrate the distinctive implications of anticolonial social ontology, I offer comparisons to the social ontologies of three other theoretical traditions that have recently flourished in the humanities and social sciences: Marxism, postcolonialism, and Afro-pessimism. The third section illustrates the explanatory capabilities of anticolonial social ontology through an analysis of English colonialism in early modern Ireland. Building from the work of Theodore W. Allen, which represents the best prior attempt to use anticolonial concepts to understand colonialism in Ireland, I show how anticolonial thought explains the ontology of a colonial social structure in a context where the racial confrontation between, for example, Black and white is not a factor in the analysis. This anticolonial analysis of early modern Ireland shows that the dehumanization commonly attributed to mere “racism” is in fact a product of the deeper colonial logic that produces racism. Anticolonialism builds upon Mills’s criticism of ideal theory by turning to history, but it ultimately moves beyond his appeal to non-ideal theory by examining in detail the social and scientific discourses that drive the colonial machine. Anticolonial ontology provides a novel alternative to the dominant schools in contemporary theory, allowing philosophers to reinterpret historical and contemporary political systems and account for the imperial origins and colonial nature of racial oppression in the modern world.

W. E. B. Du Bois and Frantz Fanon as Anticolonial Philosophers

W. E. B. Du Bois and Frantz Fanon are central figures in the history of Africana political theory, and though the scholarship on these two towering figures of Black intellectual history have made important contributions, their shared anticolonial disposition has been largely overlooked or underappreciated. Many scholars seek to situate Du Bois within some variant of the Marxist tradition and treat his Pan-Africanism merely as a means to some form of socialism, but even the scholars who avoid this reductive reading have largely failed to comment on Du Bois's Pan-Africanism, especially the descriptive role anticolonialism plays in his work.¹⁴ Likewise, scholars tend to de-emphasize the centrality of the colonizer-colonized relation in Fanon's work.¹⁵ Perhaps only Ato Sekyi-Otu's *Fanon's Dialectic of Experience* places as great an emphasis on the colonizer-colonized relation as I intend to do; however, his analysis, first, places too much emphasis on framing Fanon's thought as response to Hegel and, second, restricts the relation to colonial domination alone, whereas I argue that the colonial relation can take assimilationist and eliminationist forms in addition to multiple forms of domination.¹⁶ Tracing the changing critique of racism in the writings Du Bois and Fanon reveals that, in their mature works, both thinkers understood the global race problem as a symptom of the West's exploitative and dehumanizing imperial political economy, pointing their readers toward the social structure – and therefore the social ontology – of what Du Bois called colonial imperialism.

At the turn of the twentieth century, Du Bois focused on racism as the primary political problem of the world, but by the end of his life, he saw racism as a manifestation of and a justification for the capitalistic and militaristic practices of colonial imperialism. The evolution of Du Bois's views on race and colonialism can be illustrated by tracking his changing references to "the color line." When Du Bois coined the term at the start of the twentieth century,

the color line referred to the racial distribution of political power, economic resources, and cultural influence around the world. For Du Bois, the modern world had produced great technological and cultural advancements, but non-white people around the world were continually denied access to those advancements on the grounds of arbitrary racial exclusion. In his December 1899 address to the American Negro Academy in Washington, D.C., Du Bois uttered the first iteration of his now famous pronouncement: “the world problem of the 20th century is the Problem of the Color line – the question of the relation of the advanced races of men who happen to be white to the great majority of the undeveloped or half developed nations of mankind who happen to be yellow, brown or black.”¹⁷ The following year, in his closing address at the first Pan African Convention in London, Du Bois reiterated his statement about the global scope of racial conflict: “The problem of the twentieth century is the problem of the colour line, the question as to how far differences of race, which show themselves chiefly in the colour of the skin and the texture of the hair, are going to be made, hereafter, the basis of denying to over half the world the right of sharing to utmost ability the opportunities and privileges of modern civilization.”¹⁸ In these early articulations, Du Bois’s color line was primarily a racial concept, intended to describe the continuing political exclusion, cultural marginalization, and economic deprivation of the non-European masses. In his opposition to white claims of racial superiority and therefore racial entitlement, Du Bois advocated a meritocratic approach to the distribution of power, which would permit worthy individuals from any group to contribute to and benefit from the achievements of the modern world regardless of race.

Despite these beginnings, by the mid-twentieth century, Du Bois had amended his conception of the color line, placing political economy at the center of his ontology of

modernity. Rather than abandon the color line concept, Du Bois transferred its conceptual significance as the “problem of modernity” into the realm of political economy. Already in “The African Roots of the War” (1915), Du Bois had argued that the “color line” was an after-the-fact justification for the global slave trade and the colonial practices of Europe, writing that “The ‘Color Line’ began to pay dividends.”¹⁹ In *Darkwater: Voices from Within the Veil*, he expanded this analysis, arguing that imperial political economy resulted in similar treatment of colonized peoples around the world and Black people in Amerika. “The present problem of problems,” Du Bois writes in reference to the nascent global anticolonial movement, “is nothing more than democracy beating itself helplessly against the color bar.”²⁰ This demand for democracy, however, could not be granted by the imperial powers because colonized labor at home and abroad were the foundation of the global capitalist system. Having replaced slavery with colonialism, Du Bois observes, “industry built on a new slavery approaches Africa to deprive the natives of their land, to force them to toil, and to reap the profit for the white world.”²¹ Back in the United States, he adds, Black workers were rapidly moving into industrialized cities where they could take advantage of the job opportunities offered by the expanding war economy; however, these workers were systematically excluded from unions and ultimately blamed for wage depreciation. In cities like East St. Louis, white workers resorted to “race hatred” and anti-Black violence to maintain their economic statuses. Unlike in *Souls of Black Folk*, where he assumed that races were the primary socio-historical groups, Du Bois concluded that the global social hierarchy consisted of a master class of imperial capitalists, followed by “the international laboring class of all colors,” and ultimately, at the bottom, “the backward oppressed groups of nature-folk, predominately yellow, brown, and black.”²² Here, Du Bois had moved away from

his prioritization of race and toward a contextualization of race – the context being a global colonial economy.

In *Color and Democracy*, Du Bois deepened the analysis presented in *Darkwater*, explaining that behind the color line lies the global structure of colonial imperialism. As he unequivocally states:

It happens, not for biological or historical reasons, that most of the inhabitants of colonies today have colored skins. This does not make them one group or race or even allied biological groups or races. In fact these colored people vary vastly in physique, history, and cultural experience. The one thing that unites them today in the world's thought is their poverty, ignorance, and disease, which renders them all, in different degrees, unresisting victims of modern capitalistic exploitation. On this foundation the modern "Color Line" has been built, with all its superstitions and pseudo-science.²³

The importance of the passage for understanding Du Bois cannot be overstated: the notion of the color line, now appearing in stare quotes, rests upon an economic foundation, and it is this economic foundation that distinguishes the colonized from the colonizer. Du Bois unequivocally separates racial status from colonial status, suggesting that various racialized peoples with various cultural and historical backgrounds become colonized peoples through their position in the global division of labor. In this passage, Du Bois replaces the color line with political economy and transfers the explanatory power of the former to the latter. One could argue, then, that the colonial relationship is, for Du Bois, an economic relationship that is rationalized through imperial racialization and the corresponding myths of superiority and inferiority – the "superstitions and pseudo-science" of European ideology. Rather than placing "race" at the center of his analysis, in later works, Du Bois contextualizes issues of race against the background of the political economy of Empire.²⁴

In the fiftieth anniversary edition of *The Souls of Black Folk*, Du Bois again slightly modified his conception of the color line, arguing that militaristic aggression accompanied

capitalist exploitation his understanding of colonial practices. “I still think today as yesterday that the color line is a great problem of this century,” Du Bois explained in the preface. “But today,” he added, emphasizing the material conditions behind the color line, “I see more clearly than yesterday that back of the problem of race and color, lies a greater problem which both obscures and implements it: and that is the fact that so many civilized persons are willing to live in comfort even if the price of this is poverty, ignorance, and disease of the majority of their fellowmen; that to maintain this privilege men have waged war until today war tends to become universal and continuous, and the excuse for this war continues largely to be color and race.”²⁵ In 1900, even though the color line was global and historical in its spatial and temporal extensions, Du Bois primarily saw it as a barrier to sharing in the cultural, technological, and political achievements of humankind. In 1953, however, Du Bois understood that the color line was a manifestation of imperial wars themselves designed to maintain the standard of living for whites of all classes in the United States and Europe. Thus, in his mature anticolonial writings, Du Bois does not view race as foundational; rather, he sees racism as a product of the global imperialist order, replete with economic, political, and military violence.

Like Du Bois, Fanon placed race at the center of his early work but went through a similar shift, eventually displacing race from the center of analysis and developing a robust description of colonial ontology. In *Black Skin/White Masks*, Fanon frames his project in terms of whiteness and Blackness, attempting to resolve the “double narcissism” of race relations in the French colonial context. Like his later work, Fanon offers a dualistic social organization, stating, “there are two camps: white and black.”²⁶ He aims to “explain the Black-White relationship,” for both the Black man and the white man are trapped in their respective races.²⁷ When he refers to their basic difference, it is on account of color, which is why he says that “the juxtaposition of

the black and white races has resulted in a massive psycho-existential complex.”²⁸ To be sure, Fanon insists that race and racial conflict are grounded in material conditions, arguing that the inferiorization of colonized peoples is a double process – first, economic; then, psycho-existential racializing.²⁹ But the ultimate psychological or existential struggle is the Black person’s belief in “the undeniable superiority of the white man” and their endeavor to achieve “white existence.”³⁰ Despite the materialist assumptions of *Black Skin/White Masks*, Fanon largely treats racism and a potentially curable neurosis requiring a psychoanalytic intervention.

In the following years, when he was contributing to the Algerian Revolution, Fanon pursued a materialist understanding of race and social structure and developed the foundations for his arguments in *The Wretched of the Earth*. In his essays, for example, Fanon argued that “The apparition of racism is not fundamentally determining. Racism is not the whole but the most visible, most day-to-day and, not to mince matters, the crudest element of a given structure.”³¹ He did, of course, acknowledge that “a colonial country is a racist country,”³² but he also insisted that “questions of race are but a superstructure, a mantle, an obscure ideological emanation concealing an economic reality.”³³ In *A Dying Colonialism*, Fanon echoed Du Bois’s observations about the material reality of the colonized, which is rife with poverty, ignorance, and disease. “[T]he colonized person,” he stated, “perceives life not as a flowering or a development of an essential productiveness, but as a permanent struggle against an omnipresent death. This ever-menacing death is experienced as endemic famine, unemployment, a high death rate, an inferiority complex and the absence of any hope for the future.”³⁴ Fanon’s evolving analysis had much to do with his involvement with the Algerian revolution, which demanded not recognition or better treatment from Europe but a transformation of the colonial social structure, right down to the economy. “The Algerian people wants to free itself from colonialism,” he

wrote in 1957, “but it does not conceive of this liberation except in a revolutionary perspective entailing an end to feudalities and the destruction of all the economic structures of colonization.”³⁵ During these years, then, Fanon’s understanding of race, racism, and racialization took on an increasingly materialist tone, and rather than emphasizing the psychological ramifications of racial conflict, he emphatically situated those ramifications as part of a broader understanding of economic exploitation and imperial violence.

While *Black Skin/White Masks* is largely a case study in white-Black relations from the perspective of a colonized intellectual in the French colonial context, his implicit aim to account for the condition of colonialism in general comes to fruition in *The Wretched of the Earth*. Fanon maintains his dualistic social ontology, claiming that “The colonial world is a Manichean world,”³⁶ but Blackness and whiteness are largely displaced by his emphasis on the relation between the colonizer and the colonized. For Fanon, “The colonized, underdeveloped man is today a political creature in the most global sense of the term.”³⁷ The colonized constitute, therefore, a single group despite being subjected to very different forms of racialization. Extending and expanding his materialist analysis of race, Fanon echoes Du Bois when he notes that the conditions common to all colonized people is not the way they are racialized but the fact that they are exploited: “Europe’s well-being and progress were built with the sweat and corpses of blacks, Arabs, Indians, and Asians. This we are determined never to forget.”³⁸ No matter which configuration one uses and no matter how many different sorts of people one recognizes, there is a plurality of races. Because the colonial world is inherently dualistic, inherently Manichean, race is not and cannot be the primary ontological marker. Where as Du Bois posits a global political economy of Empire as the foundation of the color line, Fanon similarly argues

that the material conditions of Empire constitute the conditions in which racial inferiorization differently affects various people around the world.³⁹

Understanding Fanon's use of the colonizer-colonized relation as the organizing principle of the colonial social world also clarifies his sociogenic approach to understanding racial and psychological social being in a colonial context. Fanon distinguishes between an *ontogenic* account of the human that focuses on the formation of individuals as beings in a *natural* world and a *sociogenic* account of the human that focuses on the formation of individuals as beings in a *social* world. For Fanon, ontogenic analyses cannot account for the problems faced by colonized subjects because they cannot avoid their essentialist or individualist implications. Though Fanon does not explicitly use the term sociogeny in his later works, careful attention to the changes in his vocabulary suggest the persistence of this notion. In *Black Skin/White Masks*, Fanon argues that the white gaze produces "a new type of man, a new genre [*genre*]. A Negro, in fact!"⁴⁰ In *The Wretched of the Earth*, however, he replaces *genre* with *espèces*, suggesting that when one looks one at race, it appears that there are different *kinds* of humans, but when one grasps the ontology of Empire, they see that colonialism produces radically different organisms. And the source of the differentiation is no longer the gaze but the colonial economy. As Fanon writes, "The colonial world is a compartmentalized world... This compartmentalized world, this world divided in two, is inhabited by different species [*espèces*]... Looking at the immediacies of the colonial context, it is clear that what divides this world is first and foremost what species [*espèces*], what race one belongs to."⁴¹ While it is tempting to read Fanon as using "species" and "race" interchangeably, given the important distinct between those two levels suggested elsewhere, it seems more accurate to understand "race" as an indicator of, rather than equivalent to, one's colonial status in a given context. Unlike *genre*, which might be interpreted as having

undesirable Scholastic connotations, *espèces* explicitly foregrounds the evolutionary – and therefore dynamic – possibilities of social change and revolutions. Furthermore, in his discussion of the colonizer who “goes native,” joining the colonized in the anticolonial liberation struggle, Fanon remarks that when this happens, “the species is splitting up,” that “certain colonists...remain apart from the rest of their species.”⁴² While colonizers are almost always phenotypically white, their status as colonizer derives from their position of power and their commitment to maintaining it, rather than their skin color. Thus, Fanon avoids the conceptual problems faced by Mills because he separates power and color, offering a vocabulary with real semantic virtues: “The black problem is not just about Blacks living among Whites, but about the black man exploited, enslaved, and despised by a colonialist who happens to be white.”⁴³ If race is a social construction, then Fanon offers a sociogenic understand of the role colonial relations play in constructing race.

Like the sociogenic production of race, psychologies are also sociogenically produced, taking on the forms imposed by the social ontology of the colonial social structure. In “Toward the Sociogenic Principle: Fanon, Identity, the Puzzle of Conscious Experience, and What It Is Like to Be ‘Black,’” Sylvia Wynter develops Fanon’s “sociogenic principle” to explain how the colonial social structure and its corresponding cultural values shape – and therefore multiply – human psychologies and character structures. In her sociogenic philosophical anthropology, Wynter argues that the human is a combination of biological and physiological operations filtered through a cultural sieve of meaning. As she states,

while culture freed us from nature it was able to do so only on the condition of subordinating us to its own categories, since it is through all such culture specific categories that we can alone realize ourselves, as, in Fanonian terms, always already socialized beings...we can *experience ourselves as human* only through the mediation of the processes of socialization effected by the invented *tekhne* or the cultural technology to which we give the name *culture*.⁴⁴

Human beings have no access to themselves or the world outside of culture and the values it possesses. But Wynter goes even farther, arguing that our cultural norms and values affect the very neural operations in our physical brains by transforming the reward and fear systems. For example, if someone is socialized into an anti-Black culture, then anti-Black values will be internalized to the point that the person's pre-rational physiological processes will operate on the basis of those anti-Black values. But if human experience – indeed, human *being* – cannot be understood outside the cultures and values of a given time and place, then the only human “nature” there can be is the “nature” to be shaped by history, geography, and language. It is here that Fanon's inspiration becomes fully manifest, for Wynter identifies the “Fanonian concept of sociogeny as that of a transcultural constant that can constitute a ‘common reality’ separate from [any] particularistic *points of view*.”⁴⁵ Thus, from an anticolonial perspective, it makes no sense to talk about *the* human psyche or *the* human experience or *the* human condition, for in a world bifurcated by the dividing line of colonial ontology, the sorting of *homo sapiens* into the zone of being and nonbeing will result in the emergence of different *species*, as Fanon put it, each with its own characteristics and each requiring its own explanatory theories. Given the sociogenic “nature” of the human, then, the colonial ontology of Empire produces beings racially and psychologically conditioned for life in a colonial world, and those beings in turn regularly act on those psychological dispositions to maintain and perpetuate the colonial world that created them.

Despite their philosophical, geographical, and linguistic differences, Du Bois and Fanon both developed foundational explanations of colonial imperialism in their mature works. While both philosophers began their investigations with commentary dedicated to clarifying the problems with race relations as such, they eventually placed their commentary on race within larger understandings of global imperial practices. It is perhaps significant and indicative that the

titles *The Souls of Black Folk* and *Black Skin/White Masks* both contain the word “Black” but their later works do not. It is not that race or Blackness ceased to be important to Du Bois or Fanon – on the contrary, race took on a new importance once placed within their evolving understandings of the global social structure. Reading Du Bois as a mere philosopher of race elides his incorporation of socialist and antiwar understating of colonial imperialism; likewise, treating Fanon as a mere philosopher of race ignores his deeper insights regarding the colonial origin of modern social phenomena. The foundationalist approaches offered by Du Bois and Fanon make it possible to understand race and racialization without succumbing to essentialist tendencies or liberal ineptitudes. Because racial conflict is a product of colonialism, racism is a product of political economy and not a natural product of bodies or psychologies. And because racial conflict is a product of colonialism, it can be resolved only by a transformation of social structures and not through demands to eliminate “hate.” Ultimately, Du Bois and Fanon have paved the way for the development of a robust anticolonial social ontology.

Anticolonial Social Ontology: What It Is...

While both Du Bois and Fanon began with the problem of the color line separating whites from Blacks, their respective analyses eventually moved beyond race and presented an image of the colonial ontology of Empire, or the opposition between two species, colonizer and colonized. Unlike Marxism, postcolonialism, and Afro-pessimism, all of which rely upon problematic theoretical and ontological assumptions, anticolonial social ontology captures the global scope and the colonial nature of the modern capitalist economy. Starting with the foundations laid by Du Bois and Fanon, we can develop a language to describe the materiality of colonial social ontology as a total system – what I call the *colonial ontology of Empire* (see Figure 1).

Anticolonial Social Ontology




Figure 1. Diagram of Anticolonial Social Ontology.

Because the colonial world is a Manichean world, it is necessary to understand that the colonial ontology of Empire consists of two zones of existence: the zone of being and the zone of nonbeing. The colonizer – the social being who regards themselves as the paradigm of human development – resides in the zone of being and the colonized – the social being who the colonizer regards as a natural resource to be used and shaped – resides in what Fanon calls the “zone of nonbeing.”⁴⁶ In other words, the colonizer and the colonized reside in different zones of social being: the colonizer resides in the zone of the human, and the colonized resides in the zone of the non-human. Through a process of axiological obliteration, “the colonist turns the colonized into a kind of quintessence of evil.” In this context, the colonized are not merely “the negation of values” – the colonized are “the enemy of values.”⁴⁷ Conflict between colonizer and colonized are certainly not the only forms of conflict recognized by anticolonialism, but when

colonizers extend humanity to their enemies, that is because those enemies are also colonizers. From the colonizer point of view, the colonized are viewed as objects. Fanon demonstrates this difference in treatment in his comparison of World War II and French colonialism in Algeria:

We must remember in any case that a colonized people is not just a dominated people. Under the German occupation the French remained human beings. Under the French occupation the Germans remained human beings. In Algeria there is not simply domination but the decision, literally, to occupy nothing else but a territory. The Algerians, the women dressed in haiks, the palm groves, and the camels form a landscape, the *natural* backdrop for the French presence.⁴⁸

The human/non-human dichotomy imposed by colonial practices essentially relegates the colonized to a place of social oblivion. “In the weltanschauung of a colonized people,” Fanon elaborates, “there is an impurity or a flaw that prohibits any ontological explanation...any ontology is made impossible in a colonized and acculturated society.”⁴⁹ By ontology, Fanon refers to the European approach to descriptive ontology that constitutes the existential and phenomenological traditions of thought, and what he means is that European concepts of the human cannot account for the realities of colonized peoples – they simply do not apply in the zone of nonbeing. Thus, if *ontology* describes the zone of being and the life-world of the colonizer, then what I will call *non-tology* describes the zone of nonbeing and the life-world of the colonized. The ontological and the non-tological comprise the two zones of existence in the colonial ontology of Empire.⁵⁰

Fundamental to the dualistic anticolonial analysis is what we might call *the dividing line of colonial ontology*, which separates the colonizer and the colonized, the ontological and the non-tological. This line is not merely psychological, something that can be overcome by a transformation of consciousness or a redefinition of identity; it is denoted through observable sociological phenomena at the institutional level – the most important being the police and the military. “The colonized world is a world divided in two,” Fanon writes. “The dividing line, the

border, is represented by the barracks and the police stations. In the colonies, the official, legitimate agent, the spokesperson for the colonizer and the regime of oppression, is the police officer or the soldier.” In Europe and Amerika, the white proletariat is controlled through a series of the sanctioned ideological outlets – public schools, churches, councilors, parents. “In colonial regions,” Fanon observes, “the proximity and frequent, direct intervention by the police and the military ensure the colonized are kept under close scrutiny, and contained by rifle butts and napalm.”⁵¹ While the military apparatus is the most visceral indicator of the dividing line, the line is also denoted by disparities in economic abundance, for the colonized are allowed only the barest material needs. “The colonist’s sector is a sated, sluggish sector,” Fanon affirms, while “The colonized’s sector is a famished sector, hungry for bread, meat shores, coal, and light.”⁵² The ontological and the non-tological do not reach across the dividing line of colonial ontology in a dialectical elevation of both, for the non-tological appears as complete negation to the ontological, and their relationship is one of mutual exclusion and diametric opposition.

To understand how the colonizer and the colonized interact across the dividing line of colonial ontology, it is necessary to identify the three primary types of colonial relations that appear during imperial expansion: domination, assimilation, and elimination.⁵³ *Domination* is a colonial relation in which one people subjects another people to a form of arbitrary, involuntary, and/or exploitative control. Economically, domination can be used to extract natural resources or labor – usually both – from the colonized group, resulting in the enforced impoverishment of the subjugated population. Politically, the colonized are excluded from governmental process and institutions, and colonizers have no expectation that the colonized will ever be granted participation. Militarily, the means of violence are solely in the hands of the colonizers: on the institutional level, the police and the army are used as the primary means of social control; on the

individual level, colonizers are permitted to be armed but the colonized are not. Culturally, the colonizers assume that the colonized either have no culture or have no culture worth recognizing and preserving; in most instances, the colonizers are content to let the colonized have their own cultural practices, so long as such practices do not disrupt the efficiency of the economic extractions. Domination includes the classical conception of colonialism, such as the scramble for Africa and the resulting military-political imposition, but it also includes other regimes of subjugation, such as chattel slavery (as experienced by people of African descent in the New World) and segregation (as experienced by Black Americans, Black South Africans, and Palestinians under their respective systems of Apartheid).

Assimilation is a colonial relation in which the colonized are transformed in the image of the colonizer. Unlike domination, under which the colonized are prohibited from participating in the political and cultural institutions of the colonizers, assimilation is meant to facilitate the participation of the supposedly backward and infantile colonized people in civilized forms of government. In general, once the colonized individual has shown that she can speak the language and therefore uphold the values of the colonizer, she will be permitted minor political participation rights, such as voting or holding offices of small consequence. The colonizers are, however, likely to retain control of the economy and the military because the former is the source of their wealth and the latter is the source of their power. In some cases, the colonized can assume the values, culture, and practices of the colonizer and fully assimilate into the dominant society, successfully eliminating any markers of difference that might indicate that they are outsiders; in other cases, the colonized are unable to assimilate into the dominant society of the colonizer, either because of active resistance or because a marker of difference, such as skin color, persists outside social and cultural assimilation. Instances of assimilation include English

attempts to make the Gaelic Irish adopt English cultural practices in the sixteenth century and Anglo-Saxon attempts to make Native Americans abandon the culture of their people and adopt American values and practices. Assimilation is based on colonial diffusionism, the process by which the colonizer “brings civilization” to the lesser peoples who have been colonized and thus diffusing the colonizers’ “civilized” practices and customs.⁵⁴

Elimination is a colonial relation in which the colonizer attempts or succeeds in either displacing or exterminating the colonized. Unlike domination, colonizers who practice elimination do not attempt to maintain political control over the colonized for economic purposes; instead, they seek to remove the colonized from the land or other property by either gentrification or genocide. Like assimilation, elimination is often used as an alternative to domination, but when the colonizers believe it to be either impossible or too difficult to assimilate the ostensible barbarians under their control, elimination provides a final solution. Elimination is most common when the colonizer views the colonized as a political, economic, and cultural nuisance, and therefore turns to the military option to rid the colonial space of evil inhabitants. Elimination includes the United States’ policy toward Native Americans in the nineteenth century, given that those who were not killed in the genocide were forced onto reservations, and Adolf Hitler’s subjugation of the Jews, given that those who were not killed in the genocide had their property appropriated.⁵⁵

Domination, assimilation, and elimination do not necessarily constitute an exhaustive list of static, mutually exclusive colonial relations. Multiple relations may be present at any given time and place, and these relations may change in response to the historical dynamics of changing imperial strategies. Domination is sometimes used as the first stage of assimilation, as with U.S. colonialism in the Philippines. Different colonial relations often emanate from the

same colonial regime, especially when that regime is trying to manage two separate colonized groups, as the U.S. did in the nineteenth century with Native Americans (elimination) and Africans (domination). And finally, it is possible for a colonial regime to simultaneously use two or three colonial relations against the same colonized group – for example, ending domination by assimilating the amenable individuals from the colonized group and eliminating the rest.

This anticolonial social ontology does not imply that race is unimportant or even of secondary concern; rather, it forces us to conceive of racialization sociogenically, as a product of political economy. In *The Condition, Elevation, Emigration, and Destiny of the Colored People of the United States*, Martin R. Delany argues that the anti-Black racism plaguing antebellum Amerika was a product of slavery, which in turn was the outcome of the colonizers’ economic and political needs. He writes:

we the colored people were selected as the subordinate class in this country, not on account of any actual or supposed inferiority... They would have as readily had any other class as subordinates in the country...but the condition of society *at the time*, would not admit of it...the better policy on their part was, to selected some class...who had the least claims upon them, or who had the *least chance*, or who was the *least potent* in urging their claims. This class of course was the colored people and the Indians...Nor was it, as is frequently very erroneously asserted, by colored as well as white persons, that it was on account of hatred to the African, or in other words, on account of hatred to his color, that the African was selected as the subject of oppression in this country. This is sheer nonsense...Nor was the absurd idea of natural inferiority of the African ever dreamed of, until recently adduced by the slave-holders and their abettors, in justification of their policy.⁵⁶

Europeans had been in contact with Africans for hundreds of years, Delany notes, but Africans were only targeted and captured by the European empires when mass slave labor became necessary for the modern colonial economy. As a result, Europeans created a moral cover story for their enslavement of Africans, and the combination of material and ideological structures produced a global colonial economy enforced through military aggression, relegating the colonized to a status lower than the lowest European laborer – a status Delany described as

“mere nonentities.”⁵⁷ For Delany, “nonentity” was not a racial term, for he used it to describe the condition of Mexicans after the Mexican-American War and the condition of Chinese labor in California, just as he includes Native Americans in the passage above.⁵⁸ From an anticolonial perspective, racism is a moral problem, but it must always be understood as a product of the economic, political, and military practices that generate, sustain, and transform the colonial ontology of Empire.

Anticolonial Social Ontology: ... and What It Isn't

To better illustrate the distinctive philosophical implications of anticolonial social ontology, it is helpful to compare it to three other prominent intellectual paradigms: Marxism poststructuralism, and Afro-pessimism. Juxtaposing anticolonialism with these methods is helpful for two reasons. One the one hand, anticolonial thinkers are often forced into one of these other traditions because scholars have not yet recognized anticolonialism as a distinct intellectual tradition with a conceptual starting point; thus, Du Bois is often wrongly considered a Marxist and Fanon is often incorrectly labeled a postcolonial theorist, while both are either ignored or distorted by Afro-pessimism. On the other hand, while Marxism tends to emphasize political economy, postcolonialism tends to emphasize cultural identity, and Afro-pessimism tends to emphasize Blackness, anticolonialism brings political economy, cultural identity, and race together in a novel and compelling way, resolving the shortcomings of the others. Anticolonialism can account for all the most important insights of both Marxism, postcolonialism, and Afro-pessimism while avoiding vacillations, indeterminacies, and contradictions.

Marxism has long been a dominant ideology of the global Left, but it never developed the conceptual apparatus to identify, explain, or answer the philosophical and political problems that thinkers like Du Bois and Fanon sought to address. And the problem is not that Karl Marx and

Frederick Engels never talked about race, colonialism, or empire – they did. The problem is that they did not properly understand these issues, forcing them in to their class analysis of the global economy when other concepts better capture the reality. For example, in *The Communist Manifesto*, Marx and Engels place the expansion of bourgeois capitalism at the center of their argument:

The bourgeoisie, by the rapid improvement of all instruments of production, by the immensely facilitated means of communication, draws all, even the most barbarian, nations into civilisation...It compels all nations, on pain of extinction, to adopt the bourgeois mode of production; it compels them to introduce what it calls civilisation into their midst, i.e., to become bourgeois themselves. In one word, it creates a world after its own image...Just as it has made the country dependent on the towns, so it has made barbarian and semi-barbarian countries dependent on the civilised ones, nations of peasants on nations of bourgeois, the East on the West.⁵⁹

Their assessment is accurate, but their evaluation of this imperial process is problematic. For Marx, the proletariat is the universal class and will therefore lead the global Communist revolution and inaugurate the end of history. But because the proletariat can do no such thing until it is a truly global class in the world's economy, the laboring classes of every continent must become *industrial* labor. In the Marxist framework, the workers of Asia and Africa can only become industrialized through colonialism, making it a necessary prerequisite for Communism. Political scientist Shlomo Avineri has astutely noted the colonial complicity of Marxism:

Since [according to Marx] Oriental society does not develop internally, it cannot evolve toward capitalism through the dialectics of internal change; and since Marx postulates the ultimate victory of socialism on the prior universalization of capitalism, he necessarily arrives at the position of having to endorse European colonial expansion as a brutal but necessary step toward the victory of socialism. Just as the horrors of industrialization are dialectically necessary for the triumph of communism, so the horrors of colonialism are dialectically necessary for the world revolution of the proletariat since without them the countries of Asia (and presumably Africa) will not be able to emancipate themselves from their stagnant backwardness.⁶⁰

This mentality pervades the writings of Marx and Engels. In his essays on India, Marx praises the bourgeoisie for destroying the foundations of indigenous society and laying the foundations of Western society, initiating the dialectical movement that will lift Indians out of barbarism and advance the social revolution.⁶¹ In his commentary on the French conquest of Algeria, Engels opines that, even though the French visited horrible violence against the Algerians, “the conquest of Algeria is an important and fortunate fact for the progress of civilization.”⁶² Anticolonials like Fanon, however, would disagree, for as he insists: “It is not true that it was a good thing for France to have made of Algeria what she is today.”⁶³

The explicit imperialism in Marx’s writings might be overcome by reconceiving universality beyond the boundaries of industrial labor, but this would be insufficient, for the class-based economic analytic of Marxism also implies the zone of nonbeing. Marx’s analysis of English colonialism in nineteenth-century Ireland illustrates his inability to conceive of colonized peoples *as* colonized, instead viewing them as some faction of the proletariat or altogether relegating them to the zone of nonbeing. In an 1870 letter to his colleagues in the New York branch of the International Workingmen’s Association, Marx announced a new position on colonialism in Ireland, arguing that the subjugation of the Irish was impeding the development of class-consciousness within the English labor movement. In a passage worth quoting at length, Marx lays out his analysis of the colonial situation:

Ireland is the bulwark of the *English landed aristocracy*. The exploitation of this country is not only one of the main sources of their material wealth; it is their greatest *moral* strength. They represent in fact *England’s dominion over Ireland*. . . . As for the English *bourgeoisie*, it has, *d’abord*, a common interest with the English aristocracy in turning Ireland into a simple pastureland to provide meat and wool at the cheapest possible price for the English market. It has the same interest in reducing the Irish population to such a low level, through eviction and forced emigration, that *English capital*. . . . can function with “security” As a result of the steadily-increasing concentration of leaseholding, Ireland is steadfastly supplying its surplus for the English labour market, and thus forcing

down the wages of and material and moral position of the English working class...All industrial and commercial centres in England now have a working class divided into two *hostile* camps, English proletarians and Irish proletarians. The ordinary English worker hates the Irish worker...he feels himself to be a member of the *ruling nation* and, therefore, makes himself a tool of his aristocrats and capitalists *against Ireland*, thus strengthening their domination *over himself*...This antagonism is kept alive and intensified by the press, the pulpit, the comic papers, in short by all the means at the disposal of the ruling class. *This antagonism is the secret of the English working class's impotence.*⁶⁴

While Marx has accurately captured the relationship between the English aristocracy, bourgeoisie, and proletariat, he has fundamentally misinterpreted the position of the colonized Irish in this situation. According to Marx, the Irish in Ireland play no economic role – they are merely in the way of bourgeois designs upon the land; the Irish in England are automatically assumed to be members of the proletariat merely because they collect their wages in a factory. The English working class is not alienated from Irish laborers through mere false consciousness, for the colonial relation between England and Ireland is economic, a point Marx himself belabors in the quoted passage. Against Marx, we should not view the Irish (or any colonized peoples) as simply one more stratum of a global proletariat, for their economic relationship to capital and, more importantly, to the English proletariat (or the Western proletariat), is one of subjugation. The English working class may be subordinated to the English bourgeoisie, but in relation to the Irish, the English working classes *are colonizers* precisely because they benefit materially and morally from their position over and against the Irish. The colonial relation is an economic relation, but it is not a *class* relationship; rather, class is an economic intragroup division that separates, for example, the colonizer bourgeoisie from the colonizer proletariat. But both the colonizer bourgeoisie from the colonizer proletariat stand in a political and *economic* colonial relation to all classes of colonized subjects. Thus, Marx has misunderstood the economic position of the Irish laborers here, for they are not consigned to low-wage, menial positions for

arbitrary reasons. The Irish laborers were consigned to these positions for social ontological reasons, and in nineteenth-century United Kingdom, their colonial subjugation determine their non-tological status in the zone of nonbeing.

Not only did Marx fail to understand the ontological implication of the colonial situation in a capitalist political economy, the Marxist tradition has largely perpetuated the myth that the European or Western proletariat is innocent when it comes to the sins of colonialism. In *Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism*, V. I. Lenin offered a comprehensive critique of capitalism in its monopoly stage, and though he acknowledges the material importance of colonialism in the development of monopolization, he ultimately condemns colonialism for dividing the working class movement and bourgeois-ifying the upper stratum of the proletariat, which succumbs to “opportunism” and sells out the lower strata.⁶⁵ Lenin implies that the lower strata of the European proletariat have neither participated in nor benefited from European colonialism; in fact, he might even go as far as Marx who, in his reading of English colonialism in Ireland, positions the English proletariat as the real victims of English colonialism. Not only does Marxism position the European or Western proletarians as innocent, Charles Mills has demonstrated that Marxism also believes the proletariat is best suited for uplifting the colonized masses once the revolution is underway. According to Engels, Mills explains, once the European proletariat succeeds in its revolution, it will be responsible for helping the barbaric peoples become modern; he even suggests that anticolonial nationalist movements should be suppressed until the European labor class to get in to its position of power.⁶⁶ Thus, rather than acknowledge the complicity of European labor in the construction of Empire, Marxism abandons its otherwise inductive methodology in favor of moralizing assertions about their ostensibly world-historically privileged class.

Anticolonialism not only rejects the necessity and goodness of colonialism, it also rejects the inherent goodness of the Western proletariat. Du Bois, for example, fundamentally rejected the supposed innocence of the lower strata of the colonizer proletariat, writing,

while Negro labor in America suffers because of the fundamental inequities of the whole capitalistic system, the lowest and most fatal degree of its suffering comes not from the capitalists but from fellow white laborers. It is white labor that deprives the Negro of his right to vote, denies him education, denies him affiliation with trade unions, expels him from decent houses and neighborhoods, and heaps upon him the public insults of open color discrimination. It is no sufficient answer to say that capital encourages this oppression and uses it for its own ends...the bulk of American white labor is neither ignorant nor fanatical. It knows exactly what it is doing and it means to do it.⁶⁷

In addition, by the end of his life, Du Bois projected his view of the white American proletariat onto the White proletariat of the world. “No labor party” in Europe, Du Bois argues, “will risk lower wages in order to improve the condition of colonial labor.”⁶⁸ Because white laborers everywhere are bought off with the spoils of imperialism, and because their primary objective is to achieve an even greater share of those spoils, Du Bois is compelled to reject the Marxist claim that the proletariat is the lever of historical change, seeing it instead as the cornerstone of reactionary politics. “In a colonial country,” Fanon tellingly affirms, “it used to be said, there is a community of interests between the colonized people and the working class of the colonialist country. The history of the wars of liberation waged by the colonized peoples is the history of the non-verification of this thesis.”⁶⁹ Because both Marxist theory and proletariat agitation presuppose the colonial ontology of Empire, they cannot break free from its violence – indeed, they participate in it.

Just as anticolonialism goes beyond the limitations of Marxist political economy, it also takes a stronger stance than postcolonialism regarding the role of political economy and material violence in the absolute dehumanization of the colonized.⁷⁰ While “postcolonial” is notoriously

difficult to define, many scholars understand postcolonialism as a radicalization of poststructuralism, postmodernism, and Marxism, a radicalization that both accounts for the indeterminacy of identity and “deterritorializes” the geographical borders that separate the superior and the subaltern.⁷¹ According to the postcolonial paradigm, openness, flexibility, and indeterminacy provide safeguards against the totalitarianism of meta-narratives, rootedness, and borders; only by acknowledging contingency and eradicating oppressive borders can we enter into a pluralistic space and cultivate the respect for otherness that global politics now demands.⁷²

The postcolonial language of identity and indeterminacy, of territory and transgression, is certainly alluring, even seductive, but from an anticolonial perspective there are genealogical and methodological reasons to be suspicious of it. Genealogically speaking, postcolonialism has derived nearly all of its central concepts from European philosophy, becoming a “convenient invention of Western intellectuals which reinscribes their power to define the world.”⁷³ From an anticolonial perspective, then, postcolonialism represents “the return of the Same in the guise of the Other. The language of race, class and nation is commuted into a universal crisis of ‘identity’ that makes these vexed issues more palatable within the academy.”⁷⁴ Because it sublimates issues of history, political economy, death, and destruction into issues of identity, space, representation, and marginalization, and because it assumes an equal plane of existence upon which individuals are made unequal, “postcolonialism would not be a radicalization of postmodernism or Marxism, but a domestication of anti-colonialism and anti-racism.”⁷⁵ And since postcolonialism focuses on the cultural and the linguistic at the expense of political economy, we might paraphrase Fredric Jameson and say: if postmodernism is the cultural logic of neoliberalism, then postcolonialism is the cultural logic of neocolonialism.⁷⁶

Not only is postcolonialism genealogically problematic from an anticolonial perspective, it is also methodologically flawed because it views the colony through a lens of horizontal pluralism rather than a vertical dualistic ontology. Colonies are not created by establishing geographic borders along horizontal landscapes; they are created by establishing socio-ontological hierarchies along a vertical scaffolding. As John H. O'Dell reminds us, "*In defining the colonial problem it is the role of institutional mechanisms of colonial domination which are decisive.* Territory is merely the stage upon which these historically developed mechanisms of super-exploitation are organized into a system of oppression."⁷⁷ A society is a colony neither because of its location nor because of its horizontal relation to other territories, but because of its structure and the vertical stratification of the people who inhabit it. While postcolonialism proceeds from an idealism that emphasizes the psychological dispositions and semiotic representations that privilege the Same and subordinate the Other, anticolonialism proceeds from a materialism that emphasizes the social structures and material oppressions that benefit the colonizer and dehumanize the colonized. Where postcolonialism sees a psychic antagonism between a superior and a subaltern, anticolonialism sees a material enmity between the human and the non-human.

While anticolonialism makes stronger ontological and historical claims than postcolonialism, it also avoids the conceptual obfuscations of Afro-pessimism. As two leading figures of the Afro-pessimism movement, Jared Sexton and Frank B. Wilderson III argue that anti-Blackness, rather than white supremacy or colonialism, is the defining ontological operator in the modern world. In "People-of-Color-Blindness: Notes on the Afterlife of Slavery," Sexton distinguishes between "contingent forms of suffering" and "structural forms of suffering." "The former designation," he explains, "encompasses a wide range of exploitation and exclusion,

including colonization, occupation, and even extermination, while the latter indicates the singularity of racial slavery and its afterlife.”⁷⁸ According to Sexton, the necessary and essential existence of structural suffering is embodied in the specific mechanisms of “antiblackness.” As he argues, “If the oppression of nonblack people of color in, and perhaps beyond, the United States seems *conditional* to the historic instance and functions at a more restricted empirical scope, antiblackness seems *invariant and limitless*.”⁷⁹ Though other non-white people of color may be victims of racial violence in all of its many forms, Blackness and anti-Black hatreds provide the measure against which all other modes of racialization must be understood. In “Afro-pessimism & the End of Redemption,” Wilderson elaborates on Sexton’s argument, insisting upon the radical differentiation of slavery from colonialism. As Wilderson argues, “Slavery is a relational dynamic—not an event and certainly not a place in space like the South; just as colonialism is a relational dynamic—and that relational dynamic can continue to exist once the settler has left or ceded governmental power. And these two relations are secured by radically different structures of violence.”⁸⁰ According to Wilderson, Afro-pessimism circumvents the tendency to analogize anti-Black violence of the slavery dynamic with other forms of racial violence, such as the genocidal settler colonial dynamic imposed upon Native Americans. Though they offer slightly different justifications for their social ontology, Sexton and Wilderson agree that anti-Blackness is distinct from other forms of racism because it represents *the* necessary exclusion – namely, Black social death – that makes the notion of “humanity” possible. On this view, the relation dynamic of slavery defines anti-Blackness in all times and places, for as Wilderson insists, “the violence of social death...the violence of slavery...did not end in 1865, for the simple reason that slavery did not end in 1865.”⁸¹

Despite the radical tone of Afro-pessimist's theory, their discourse regarding social death and slavery problematically re-inscribe Amerikan nationalism at the expense of a global and internationalist Pan-African theoretical history. In "Afro-Blue Notes: The Death of Afro-pessimism (2.0)?," Greg Thomas lays bare the many shortcomings of Afro-pessimism, from its selective readings of Fanon and its complete disregard for Wynter, but he aims his most incisive attack on the way in which Afro-pessimists contour their theory using an implied "Amerikanism." "The chronological marker of '1865,'" Thomas argues in reference to Wilderson, "is not insignificant or inconsequential. It indexes a specific white settler nationalist project; the USA construct of 'Americanism' (or 'amerikanism') and slaveocracy; an official, white settler-slave state nationalist history and historiography."⁸² Moving beyond the national borders of the United States, Thomas lists dozens of dates for the end of slavery across the Western Hemisphere. "To think of slavery's pseudo-abolition in terms of 1865 alone or any one date," he insists, "is not to think on the level of 'Blackness' and 'Human Life' at all; it is to reinscribe the most imperial white 'American' perspective on slavery and Blackness instead."⁸³ Circumscribed by their implicit identification with the Amerikan Empire, Afro-pessimists fail to move beyond the intellectual and political paradigms of Amerikan liberalism and the Amerikan academy. On the one hand, they merely import the imperial identity categories of race, gender, and sexuality into their social ontology, resulting in a superficial revision of standard critical theory concepts. On the other hand, by treating Blackness as a monolithic category of analysis, they cannot even describe class distinctions among Black people, let alone account for the recent trend of populating the machinery of imperialism with Black faces – as Thomas puts it, "'Empire' under 'Obama.'"⁸⁴ In the end, Thomas rightly rejects the Afro-pessimist maneuver of setting colonialism and slavery apart; as he reminds us, "There is no system of slavery in any

part of these Americas that is not still settler colonial slavery; no settler colonialism without chattel slavery or racial slavery and their neo-slaveries.”⁸⁵ Thomas’s anticolonial criticisms reveal the shortcomings of Afro-pessimism, for unlike anticolonialism, it is embedded in a nationalist paradigm and remains replete with the values and assumptions of Empire.

The social ontology derived from the anticolonial tradition of Africana political theory offers a new conceptual framework for understanding social ontology in a modern, European-dominated world and thus resolves many of the methodological shortcomings of competing social theories. Unlike Marxism, anticolonial analyses of political economy understand that the colonial relation is a distinct economic relation that cannot be reduced to class. Unlike postcolonialism, anticolonial social ontology accounts for the material basis of the extremely dehumanizing zone of nonbeing. And unlike Afro-pessimism, anticolonialism takes a rejects of U.S. nationalism as its starting point, articulating all analyses of race and class in a global anti-imperialist theoretical apparatus. In fact, class relations cannot be properly understood without understanding the colonial context in which they take shape. Finally, by introducing the colonial relation into the critique of political economy, anticolonial social ontology provides category for understanding the material basis for the emergence of race, racism, and racialization. Rather than dividing the proletariat, race is a vulgar manifestation of colonialism, a manifestation that, as Fanon says, obscures and conceals the economic, political, and military reality. The colonial ontology of Empire can explain both the class and colonial aspects of modern global system, capturing at once the racial and economic features of Empire.

A Case Study in Anticolonial Social Ontology: England and Ireland, 1500-1800

In his classic work *The Invention of the White Race*, Theodore W. Allen argues that racism originates from colonialism, and he attempts to understand that origin through Fanon’s

sociogenic analysis of the colonizer and the colonized. More specifically, he offers a genetic account of “the white race” in the Anglophone world, showing how whiteness emerged as a socio-economic product of English colonialism in seventeenth-century North America. According to Allen, however, the colonial practices that produced whiteness in the North American colonies – through antagonism with the Native Americans and the subjugation of enslaved Africans – had already been developed, practiced, and perfected in sixteenth-century Ireland without producing whiteness there. Despite the absence of whiteness, Allen insists, a certain kind of “racial oppression” emerged, namely, the “religio-racial oppression” of the Irish by the English.⁸⁶ “The renewal of English efforts to reduce Ireland to its control in the latter part of the sixteenth century, Allen elaborates, “coincided with the full and final commitment of England to the Reformation.”⁸⁷ As the English intensified their commitment to re-establishing colonial control over Catholic Ireland, a distinctively modern form of colonial oppression emerged, one in which, to use Fanon’s language, the Irish were consigned to the zone of nonbeing. For Allen, military and economic create the conditions under which racism can emerge, and because the conflict between the English and the Irish cannot be construed as a conflict between whiteness and other racial configurations, “Irish history presents a case of racial oppression *without* reference to alleged skin color, or, as the jargon goes, ‘phenotype.’”⁸⁸

Historians have noted the commonalities between English colonial rule in early modern Ireland and later English imperialism, which makes this case study a useful starting point for understanding Anglo-Saxon colonial practices more generally without reducing the analysis to conflict based on phenotype.⁸⁹ Noting the continuity between Anglophone imperial ventures, John Patrick Montaña writes, “it was the ideology and strategies first elaborated in Tudor Ireland that continued to develop, reappearing with slight variations on several continents in the diverse

territories that constituted the British Empire.”⁹⁰ Similarly, Ngũgĩ wa Thiong’o observes that “Ireland was England’s first colony, and it became a prototype for all other English colonies in Asia, Africa, and America.”⁹¹ More specifically, Nicholas P. Canny notes the similarities between Elizabeth’s policies in Ireland and North America: “Attempts to reassert English authority over Ireland produced under Elizabeth I a pattern of conquest, bolstered by attempts at colonization, which was contemporaneous with and parallel to the first effective contacts of Englishmen with North America, to plans for conquest and settlement there, and to the earliest encounters with its Indian inhabitants.”⁹² Montaña, Thiong’o, and Canny are not simply constructing a colonial metaphor: the English colonists were self-consciously undertaking a colonial project, for many Elizabethan colonial administrators and military personnel looked at the process of Spanish colonization in South America and determined that the English were doing something similar in Ireland.⁹³ From an anticolonial perspective, it is possible to elaborate on these observations and recognize the three basic modes of colonial relations – domination, assimilation, and elimination – in the various policies used by the English in seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Ireland. Because Allen never developed a complete conceptual vocabulary to describe the colonial ontology of Empire, he could not track the English’s use of the three modes of colonial relations, nor could he express the subjugation of the Irish in metaphysical language. Using the colonial ontology of Empire, I briefly improve upon Allen’s account of English colonialism in early modern Ireland, demonstrating the explanatory capabilities of anticolonial social ontology and showing ontological depth of colonialism in Ireland.

During the early modern period in England, which begins with Henry VII’s ascension to the throne at the conclusion of the War of the Roses in 1487 and ends with the death of Queen Anne in 1714, the English developed an imperial policy grounded in Anglo-Saxon Protestant

mythology and pursued through colonization. Ireland first came under the control of the English in 1155 when Pope Adrian IV, the only English pope in history, granted King Henry II of England title over Ireland. For almost four centuries, the Anglo-Normans ruled the Irish through domination, as a distinct aristocratic class of colonizers. The Anglo-Normans were the aristocratic rulers of England who sought to extend their caste rule from England to Ireland in the late-medieval period. Though they were going to live permanently in Ireland, the Anglo-Normans aristocrats needed to maintain their distinct familial, linguistic, and cultural norms and identity. To prevent mixing between the English colonials and the Irish subjects, Parliament passed the Statutes of Kilkenny in 1366, prohibiting the aristocracy from taking on Irish customs, language, and legal practices. The cultural practices of the Irish were preserved, not because they were intrinsically valuable but because they were the easiest means by which the Anglo-Norman conquerors could perpetually distinguish themselves from their subjects.

In the 1530s, Henry VIII broke with the Pope, inaugurating England's separation from the Catholic Church and precipitating a religious for English Christianity and political crisis for English rule in Ireland. Regarding religion, the newly formed Anglican Church required a source of legitimacy outside the confines of the Roman Church, and to resolve this crisis, the Protestant reformers turned to the Anglo-Saxon period of England's history. The Anglo-Saxon period of English history runs from the early-ninth century through the late-eleventh century and is primarily defined by the political and cultural influence of Alfred the Great, who united the Saxons politically and pushed the development of culture, religion, and learning. English Reformers argued that the true Church had made its way to England in ancient times and was disrupted in 597 when Pope Gregory sent missionaries to Christianize the Saxons; Henry's break with Rome, they insisted, removed illegitimate Papal control in favor of an original Christian

freedom. This religious interpretation of the Anglo-Saxons, however, quickly became political. Believing that the Norman Conquest disrupted English Common Law and introduced an alien absolute royal power into England, many political and literary figures in England began to question the authority of the monarchy and the Anglo-Norman aristocrats. Under the influence of Anglo-Saxonism, the myth of an ancient Saxon people free from monarchical despotism took on a life of its own as religious and political reformers called for the return of Anglo-Saxon common law and the supremacy of Parliament, the true representative of the people. As Kelly Brown Douglas notes, “the English Reformation was about more than just a struggle between King Henry VIII and the Roman papacy. It was concerned with cleansing English church and society of Norman contaminations and restoring both to their true Anglo-Saxon ways.”⁹⁴ By the time of the English Civil War, Anglo-Saxon Protestantism would be almost synonymous with Parliamentary politics, hostility to the king, and a civilizing mission destined to influence the world.⁹⁵

While the religious crisis was resolved by the development of Anglo-Saxonism, the English resolved their political crisis of authority in Ireland by replacing the Roman-sanctioned title over the Emerald Isle. In 1533, Parliament made the break with Rome official, passing the Act in Restraint of Appeals, which stated, “this realm of England is an empire, and so hath been accepted in the world, governed by one supreme head and king having the dignity and royal estate of the imperial crown of the same.”⁹⁶ The law excluded the Pope from any jurisdiction, political or religious, within the borders of England, making Henry a sovereign with no superior. This political change, however, resulted in a crisis of political authority in Ireland, and in response, Parliament passed the Crown of Ireland Act of 1542, creating the Kingdom of Ireland and announcing Henry as its king. As King of Ireland, Leonard P. Liggio writes, “Henry VIII

abandoned the policy of consensus and voluntary submission to English control and established a standing army in Ireland”⁹⁷ The choice to militarize the Emerald Isle, populating it with a foreign standing army, transformed the colonial relationship between England and Ireland and therefore transformed the dividing line of colonial ontology. Legally-enforced cultural distinctions gave way to militarily-enforced political and economic structures. Unlike the colonial policies of the Anglo-Normans, the English now saw the distinct cultural practices of the Irish as markers of political disloyalty. Any Irish man or woman who held on to Gaelic culture and language was considered a traitor. The Irish were no longer external enemies – they were now rebellious subjects.⁹⁸

As new modes of colonial relations followed from the new justification of Anglo-Saxon colonial right in Ireland, the Tudors abandoned domination, first in favor of assimilation and then in favor of elimination. During the sixteenth century, English plans to recolonize Ireland took several forms, but after decades of continued resistance, there was a consensus between Elizabeth I and the colonial administrators of her court that only the violent destruction of Gaelic culture – and eventually the Irish people – would achieve the desired results.⁹⁹ Unlike the Anglo-Normans before them, the Tudors abandoned all attempts to impose a ruling caste in Ireland, as the Statutes of Kilkenny sought to do, for they learned that cultural separation was impossible. The Anglo-Norman colonists in Ireland had sunk into barbarism by taking on Gaelic culture and language. Gaelic culture was a danger to the ruling elites because it tempted to suck them down into barbarism. “Colonies degenerate assuredly,” wrote Sir James Croft, a colonial administrator under Edward IV, “when the colonists imitate and embrace the habits customs and practices of the natives.” If the Irish were to be colonized, he reasoned, the Irish had to be reformed; thus, rather than waiting for Gaelic culture to recede, it had to be actively destroyed. “There is no

better way to remedy this evil,” Croft concluded regarding his non-tological conundrum, “than to do away with and destroy completely the habits and practices of the natives. Thus the natives will put on and embrace the habits and customs of the colonists. It will then come about that, once you have removed those things which alienate hearts and minds, they will both become unified, first in habits, then in mind.”¹⁰⁰

Thus, the Tudors were determined to eliminate Irish culture altogether and replace it with English customs and Common Law, a practice of colonial assimilation. To this end, the colonists first attempted a strategy of *cultivation*, trying to make the Irish practice agriculture along English patterns. When the Irish refused to abandon their own farming practices for alien English practices, the colonists attempted a strategy of *transformation*, rearranging the Irish countryside to conform to English social organization. When the Irish destroyed the new bridges, fences, and buildings that were in their way, the colonists became increasingly frustrated. By the time of Elizabeth, frequent and lengthy Irish rebellions had transformed Tudor colonial optimism into pessimistic and violent colonial aggression. After decades of continued resistance, there was a consensus between Elizabeth I and the colonial administrators of her court that only the violent destruction of Gaelic culture – and Irish people – would achieve the desired results.¹⁰¹

In the face of Irish resistance, the English developed a colonial discourse that defined the Irish as barbaric and a colonial practice of unmitigated violence – elimination. Having given up any hope of using cultivation or transformation to reform the barbarous Irish, the colonist began the process of *plantation*, namely, a process of elimination that consisted of removing the Irish from the land – by either driving them out or killing them – and replacing them with Scotch and English peasant farmers. Historian John Patrick Montaña explains that “officials determined that in any future plantations, both the natives and their customs would have to be eliminated...an

Ireland adhering to Irish customs could never be reformed, so native culture must be pulled up, root and branch, so that civility might be planted in its place.”¹⁰² First, English colonialists construed the Irish as inferior beings, commonly describing them in zoological vocabulary. For example, Barnaby Rich, a military figure under Elizabeth, claimed that the Irish “live like beastes, voide of lawe and all good order...more uncivill, more uncleanly, more barbarous and more brutish in their customs and demeanures, then in any other part of the world.”¹⁰³ Such descriptions of the colonized Irish ensured their place in the zone of nonbeing.

Second, they turned to martial law, summary execution, and mass starvation to subdue the Irish. During plantation efforts, English colonists indiscriminately murdered thousands of Irish. Sir Gilbert Humphrey boasted about “putting man, woman, and child to the sword,” while Sir Henry Sidney bragged that he lost count of how many Irish he killed.¹⁰⁴ Some officials sent Elizabeth her Irish enemies’s severed heads, which she placed on display at London Bridge.¹⁰⁵ This unmitigated violence was the result of a few rogue administrators abusing their power, for these directives came from Elizabeth I herself. While the Queen said that the Irish should be “well used,” she also believed, as Canny puts it, that “the Irish were an unreasonable people and that they...might be slaughtered by extralegal methods.”¹⁰⁶ The Queen praised the Earl of Essex for his skill in reasoning with the Irish, but she also praised him for his willingness to resort to violence: “when necessity requireth, you are ready also to oppose yourself and your forces to them whom reason and duty cannot bridle.”¹⁰⁷ Thus, Elizabethan colonialism in Ireland was defined primarily by martial law, which “allowed for execution before any offense was committed.”¹⁰⁸

For the last few decades of the sixteenth century, forced famine became the most effective means for subduing the Irish. By destroying thousands of acres of crop land and

thousands of livestock, the English believed they could starve the Irish into submission or extinction. Edmund Spencer described the suffering he witnessed in Ireland:

Out of every corner of the woods and glynnes they came creeping forth upon their hands, for their leggs would not beare them. They looked like anatomies of death; they spake like ghosts crying out of their graves; they did eate the dead carrions, happy where they find them, yea, and one another soone after, insomuch as the very carcasses they spared not to scrape out of their graves; and, if they found a plot of water-cresses or shamrocks, there they flocked as to a feast...[this] most populous and plentifull country suddainely left voyde of man and beast.¹⁰⁹

Such brutality was effective, for by the end of her reign, Elizabeth was the first English monarch ever to control the island.¹¹⁰ “English military and economic policies from the sixteenth to the eighteenth century produced in Ireland episodes of mass extermination,” Allen describes, “which in absolute numerical terms and ferocity were possibly a match for those chronicled by Las Casas” in South Amerika.¹¹¹ While noble families might succumb to the temptations of Gaelic culture, as the Anglo-Normans did in Ireland, the monarch could more effectively control its territories through the flexibility of military and economic institutions. By the end of Elizabeth’s reign in 1603, the responsibility for maintaining colonial control of Ireland had been take out of the hands of the nobility and put into the hands of the Tudor state.

As political sovereignty passed from the monarch to Parliament during the seventeenth century, so too did the prerogatives of English colonialism in Ireland, and the parliamentarians continued many of the same practices, especially elimination. There is a direct link between Elizabethan colonial practice and the colonial practice of Oliver Cromwell’s Commonwealth. While he was working as one of Elizabeth’s colonial administrators in Ireland, Spencer wrote *A View of the State of Ireland*, “an exhaustively detailed blueprint for the country’s permanent military occupation” that advocated the use of violence to subdue the wild Irish, as he called them.¹¹² Fifty years later, when Cromwell approached John Milton for advice on defeating the

Irish rebels in 1649, Milton provided his own treatise on Ireland, *Observations upon the articles of peace with the Irish Rebels*, which drew extensively from Spencer. Cromwell followed Milton's advice and approached the Irish with unrestrained violence. The New Model Army indiscriminately slaughtered Irish soldiers and civilians and resorted to the Elizabethan policy of forced famine. As Robert Bucholz and Newton Key elaborate, "throughout early 1650 the Cromwellian troops practiced a policy of scorched earth in Ireland, burning the crops so as to lead to the death by starvation of, perhaps, 600,000 in a total population of 1,400,000."¹¹³ Native Irishmen and women were forced off their lands and were subjected to rigorous segregation; any found east of river Shannon faced enslavement or death penalty. Approximately 12,000 political prisoners were transported to Barbados as forced laborers. Within one year, Cromwell achieved better control over the island than even Elizabeth. The transition that began under Elizabeth, shifting colonial prerogative from the nobility to the state, was completed under Cromwell's Commonwealth. Just as the sovereignty of the monarch had passed to the people, the imperial prerogative of the monarch was inherited by a virtuous nation of free Anglo-Saxons.¹¹⁴ Now that Parliament claimed sovereign power, Anglo-Saxon Protestant colonialism would be pursued in the name of "the people."

But the unrepentant violence of Cromwell's elimination campaign in Ireland was only one of the more horrifying instances of colonialism during this period, for, despite a series of political crisis in London, the English led a persistent and consistent campaign of displacement through out the eighteenth century. From the time that Elizabeth pursued the policy of plantation through the end of the eighteenth century, the native Gaelic Irish were gradually displaced from the land with primarily Scottish settlers, and the Protestant, parliamentarians, and Anglo-Saxonists enforced this policy of displacement even more strictly than the royalists. Colonization

was variously justified but always economically motivated. Elizabeth frequently granted land to her colonial administrators hoping that they would invite settlers into Ireland to farm the land according to “proper” English practices and produce revenue for the state; Spencer himself received 4000 acres. Under James I, tens of thousands Anglo-Scottish settlers were moved into the Ulster Plantation, and every Irish person was *prima facie* assumed to be a traitor or rebel. By the time of Oliver Cromwell, native Irish owned only sixty percent of the land, but by 1685, Irish ownership of land had fallen to approximately 20 percent. By the end of the century, that fraction had dropped to fourteen percent.¹¹⁵ “By 1701,” John O’Beirne Ranelagh concludes, “Ireland had been effectively conquered.”¹¹⁶

By the early eighteenth century, when England, Wales, and Scotland were incorporated into Great Britain, Anglo-Saxon empire had become the track-laying power of the European colonial system, a position they would hold until the mid-twentieth century. During the eighteenth century, of course, Ireland continued to suffer from Anglo-Saxon imperialism. “Ireland was ruled from London,” Bucholz and Key state, “with every regard to the interests of the English ruling class, some regard to the Protestant Irish ruling class, and no regard at all to those of the native Irish population.” Penal Laws prohibited the native Irish from owning firearms, inheriting land, and attending universities; Catholic clergy were exiled. In 1700, only fourteen percent of the land was Irish-owned; by 1774, that fraction had been reduced to five percent.¹¹⁷ Because the English Parliament held a legislative monopoly, taxes were used to crush the Irish wool industry.¹¹⁸ “As a result,” Bucholz and Key dismally conclude, “the eighteenth century was to prove, in many ways, the most miserable in Irish history.”¹¹⁹

The colonial ontology of Empire, therefore, captures the social ontology produced by English colonial practices in early modern Ireland without reference to phenotype-based racism.

The English certainly thought of the Irish as a lesser race, using their economic, political, and military power to sink them into the zone of nonbeing, but their Catholicism and Gaelic customs, not their phenotype, were used to justify their oppression. As the English substituted one mode of colonial oppression for the next – moving from domination to assimilation to elimination – the dividing line of colonial ontology took different forms. Cultural, economic, political, and military power and differences were always present, but their manifestations changed with each change in colonial policy. From the beginning of the sixteenth century to the end of the eighteenth century, Ireland was unquestionably subjected to the colonial ontology of Empire, and even after the Acts of Union in 1800, which united Great Britain and Ireland to create the United Kingdom, Ireland's non-tological status is persisted as it was transformed in to a domestic colony.¹²⁰ In a manner eerily close to Fanon's description of the colonized's feelings of inferiority, O'Beirne Ranelagh describes how colonialism affected the national character of the native Irish population, eliminating any doubt about the colonial nature of England's four-century long conquest:

over the centuries of increasingly powerful and centralized British government, ruling social and political pressures combined first to make Irish people feel and then to believe that they were inferior. This is one of the worst things that any nation or race can do to another. It results in the most terrible of paradoxes where in practical matters there is a desire equally to welcome and to oppose, thus ensuring that failure accompanies success, and despair and a sense of futility underlie the whole of life.¹²¹

Conclusion

Anticolonial political theory has important contributions to make to the both past and emerging scholarship on social ontology. Like Mills's social ontology of the racial contract, anticolonial social ontology offers an alternative to the individualist social ontologies like critical realism and limited class-focused social ontologies like Marxism. Unlike Mills, however, anticolonial social

ontology introduces the colonial relation between colonizer and colonized as a political and economic relation distinct from – and in some ways, prior to – class in the Marxist sense of the term. And unlike either postcolonialism or Afro-pessimism, anticolonial social ontology breaks free from the strictures of Western categories of thought. The colonial relation provides a concrete material foundation for the emergence of racist ideologies and programs of racial supremacy, which are designed to justify and sanctify colonialism. Following Du Bois, this anticolonial approach resolves the question of class-race analysis in the Amerikan context, recognizing the Western proletariat’s status as colonizer in the colonial ontology of Empire. Its not that the proletariat is divided by race; its that the colonizer is divided by class. Following Fanon, the anticolonial approach understand that, while the Western proletariat may be economically exploited, the colonized are relegated to the zone of nonbeing; while the Western proletariat may appeal to political, legal, and cultural norms in their fight for justice, the colonized have no such standing. Instead, economic destitution, political exclusion, and military ferocity symbolize the dividing line that separates the colonizer from the colonized. In some instances, colonizers practice domination, ruling over a subjected people through various forms of political and social control and extracting labor and wealth from their communities, but in other instances, colonizers decide that the colonized population are not economically useful, and they resort to elimination, clearing the nonbeings from the land through either gentrification or genocide. Finally, in those rare moments of optimism, when the colonizer believes that the colonized can be reformed and therefore civilized, the colonizer will practice assimilation, destroying the indigenous culture of the subjugated group and replacing it with the supposedly superior culture, language, and values of the colonizer. While the assimilationist mode of colonialism seems the most humane, it too see the colonized as non-tological beings; the only

difference between assimilationist colonizers and colonizers who prefer domination or elimination is that the assimilationist believes in both the malleability of the colonized and the universality of the colonizer's culture. The three modes of colonial relations manifest differently, but they all assume the same social ontology.

Though anticolonial social ontology offers a material basis for understanding racial oppression, English colonialism in early modern Ireland demonstrates the colonial ontology of Empire can be implemented – indeed, *has been* implemented – without reference to or reliance upon phenotypic differences between the colonizer and colonized. As we have seen, the Irish suffered in the zone of nonbeing as the English cycled through domination, assimilation, and elimination over the course of several centuries. But the Irish were not the only people to suffer the violence and intrusion of Anglo-Saxon imperialism. The Henrician Reformation, Henry VIII's break with the Roman Church in the 1530s, was the principle catalyst for the transformation of English colonial practices, first in Ireland and then in other areas of the world, ushering in several centuries of Anglo-Saxon Protestant Empire. The same colonists who made a name for themselves in Ireland continued their expansionist colonialism across the ocean, where whiteness would emerge in the modern Anglophone world. English colonization in Ireland was intimately connected to English colonization in North America, right down individual colonialists. As historian A. L. Rowse reminds us, “it was the very people most who were most deeply concerned with the plantation and colonization of Southern Ireland – Humphrey Gilbert, Walter Raleigh, Richard Grenville – who took the leading part of planting the first colonies in Virginia. It is as if Ireland were the blueprint for America.”¹²² Thus, understanding English colonialism in Ireland is a prelude to the wider anticolonial understanding of Anglo-Saxon

imperialism in the New World, where Anglo-Saxon ideology and an emerging white racial identity would battle for hegemony over the Amerikan Empire.

CHAPTER III

INVENTING WHITENESS IN AN ANGLO-SAXON EMPIRE, 1600-2000

“We are the most Aggressive, Invasive, and Exclusive People on the earth. The history of the Anglo-Saxon, for the last three hundred years, has been one of continual aggression, invasion, and extermination...The Anglo-Saxon has carefully sought to exterminate the savages from his territory...Yet the Anglo-Saxons are not cruel...The Anglo-Saxon simply shot down his foe, offered a reward for homicide, so much for a scalp, but tolerated no needless cruelty. If a problem is to destroy a race of men with the least expenditure of destructive force on one side, and least suffering on the other, the Anglo-Saxon, Briton, or American, is the fittest instrument to be found on the whole globe.”

– Theodore Parker, *Some Thoughts on the Progress of America* (1854)¹

“[W]hen you stop talking about ‘white people’ (you see, I was studying white people to try to find some way for black people to come to grips with them) – it became clear that we obscure something when we talk about ‘white people.’ We obscure the contradictions that exist between the various ethnic groups that compose ‘white’ people. History shows that the Irish and the English, the Anglo-Saxons, have been at each other’s throats for centuries.”

– Eldridge Cleaver, Lecture at UC Berkeley (5 Nov. 1968)²

Philosophy has a whiteness problem. This whiteness problem is not just the KKK-style white supremacy that pervades the hiring practices in the profession, as noted by Leonard Harris.³ Nor is this whiteness problem confined to the discipline’s protracted sentimental attachment to the philosophical heroes of the white race, to paraphrase Eldridge Cleaver.⁴ Rather, philosophy’s whiteness problem is also conceptual: race scholars have relied too heavily on an abstracted, static notion of whiteness that lacks historical nuance. The predominant way that race scholars in philosophy use the term “whiteness” derives from critical whiteness studies, a field of scholarship that has its roots among labor historians who sought to explain the process by which various groups of European immigrants integrated into American society. For example, David R. Roediger’s *Wages of Whiteness*, a paradigmatic and foundational text of critical whiteness studies, argues that nineteenth-century Irish immigrants – who are almost always the center of such analyses – were initially excluded from whiteness and thus had to *become* white and, in the process, become American. This use of whiteness eventually made its way from history to

philosophy through the work of Charles Mills, and in recent years, philosophical analyses of whiteness have proliferated, among other places, in a series of volumes edited by George Yancy. While critical approaches to whiteness and white identity vary widely, the basic idea is not just that whiteness is and has been a structuring feature of experience, knowledge, and social interaction for European-descended people in Amerika, but that whiteness is often the most salient causal force.⁵

Despite the insights offered by both critical whiteness studies and philosophers who investigate whiteness, treating the concept of whiteness as the central object of analysis has several shortcomings. Whiteness certainly plays many important roles in Amerikan cultural and political history, but many scholars tend to reify whiteness as a singular phenomenon and attribute it with too much explanatory power. As Peter Kolchin points out, the concept of whiteness can neither explain the exclusionary treatment of various European immigrants nor avoid conceptual indeterminacy. On the one hand, he argues that the hostility and discrimination directed at European immigrants cannot be explained by whiteness. Religion, culture, language, or class would be more salient explanations. For example, abolitionist New Englanders often slighted Irish immigrants for being Catholic (uncivilized) while simultaneously praising Black Protestants (civilized) for their gregarious and personable character, yet it would be rare for an abolitionist to proclaim the equality of the races in the sense we mean today. Furthermore, the 1790 naturalization law permitted Irish immigrants, as free white persons, to become citizens at the same time the *Scott v. Sandford* (1857) decision precluded native-born Black Americans from U.S. citizenship. Thus, the Puritan civilizing mission, which accepts (to a degree) Christianized Blacks but rejects Catholic whites, produces a contradiction that cannot be explained by the category of whiteness. On the other hand, Kolchin argues that whiteness is

often treated as a transcendental principle, “omnipresent and unchanging,” even when authors claim it is a social construct. Such a conception of whiteness cannot explain how or why a Confederate, a Northern apologist, a free soil politician, and a radical abolitionist might all conceive of whiteness in different ways in the same decade. Even if there was one monolithic conception of whiteness at a given time, Kolchin insists that “historical and geographical context” must be given more attention. After all, whiteness is not the same in both seventeenth-century Virginia and twentieth-century California. Thus, to argue that immigrants assimilated into “whiteness” fails to account for competing conceptions of white identity across ideologies, geographies, and chronologies.⁶

Not only does whiteness tend to be an idealized explanatory notion, the political strategies used by many whiteness studies scholars comes dangerously close to enacting a conservative disavowal of historical and contemporary white power and privilege. In her classic essay “Whiteness Studies and the Paradox of Particularity,” Robyn Wiegman acknowledges that whiteness studies scholars aim to understand whiteness and help white-skinned people who identify with whiteness detach themselves from that identity, creating space for the articulation of an identity or subjectivity that eschews white supremacy in favor of interracial anti-capitalist politics; however, through various strategies – the presentation of prewhite ethnic identities, positing the non-whiteness of white trash (poor/rural whites) – these scholars inadvertently provide minority identities for whites who want to distance themselves from white supremacy while perpetuating the capitalist social arrangement that perpetuates white colonial power. Though Roediger and others genuinely try to capture the process by which these prewhite ethnics *chose* to become white, by treating whiteness as a barrier to class consciousness rather than a structural feature of Amerikan Empire, whiteness scholars set up *whites* – and not the

racialized people subjected to racist terror, violence, and exploitation – as victims of whiteness.⁷ In the process, whites become people who do not want to be white and do not truly benefit from being so, and the result is, as Wiegman concludes, “a white identity formation that has no compensatory racial debt to pay.”⁸ While Wiegman does not make the connection explicit, this maneuver replicates the political contours of the New Ethnic Movement of the 1970s. As Howard F. Stein and Robert F. Hill observed in 1977, “The term *white ethnic*, though manifestly pluralist, is implicitly a way of maintaining or restating the black-white (caste) boundary.” “The white ethnic,” they add, “counterposes himself and his *kind* against the WASP-Jewish establishment on the one hand, and the minorities on the other.”⁹ Though whiteness studies scholars often emphasize, in Wiegman’s terms, “prewhite” ethnics and not white ethnics proper, the conceptual difference yields very little practical difference. In New Ethnic Movement, whites were able to claim oppressed or outsider status based on family lineage and avoid responsibility for the history of white social mobility; in whiteness studies, whites are able to claim oppressed or outsider status based on economic exploitation and avoid responsibility for the history of white social mobility. In fact, whiteness studies relies on an unconvincing inference from ethnic identification to class consciousness, the very movement that was resisted in the nineteenth century.¹⁰

Ultimately, it is important to remember that critical whiteness studies assumes one available model of assimilation among many, and whiteness scholars rarely offer an argument for why whiteness should be the governing concept in a theory of assimilation. From the start of the twentieth century through the 1960s, assimilation theory took three dominant forms: Anglo-conformity, melting pot, and cultural pluralism. The Anglo-conformity theory argues that European immigrants were “Amerikanized” by assimilating into the Anglo-Saxon values and

practices that constitute the core culture of the country. The melting pot theory argues that although European immigrants were “Amerikanized,” they changed Amerikan culture through positive contributions and joined a continually-evolving culture. The cultural pluralism theory argues that European immigrants were “Amerikanized” but nevertheless retained their ethnic heritages in the form of distinct cultural practices. After the 1970s, the Anglo-conformity model was abandoned completely, partly because it was viewed as too simplistic, while the melting pot and cultural pluralism theories took on new forms under the influence of poststructuralism, among other emerging theoretical traditions.¹¹ Whiteness studies appeared in this context, and it largely recreated the structure of the Anglo-conformity model by simply replacing “Anglo-Saxon” with “white.” Both the melting pot and pluralistic assimilation theories posit a central governing notion that decides who is in and who is out, and as Kolchin convincingly argues, this sort of model lacks the nuance necessary to explain political confrontations and social contradictions that produced what we call the phenomenon of whiteness in twenty-first-century Amerika.

Scholars developed their theories of assimilation to serve as descriptive models of how Amerikan society works or has worked, but by carefully attending to the competing notions of “whiteness” in Amerikan history, it becomes possible to see that these various theories closely resemble normative, political, and social practices developed by specific ethnic groups. From the late-eighteenth century, those white Amerikans, primarily located in New England, who identified as Anglo-Saxons pushed an Anglo-conformity model of assimilation, not just on European immigrants but on *all* peoples, often regardless of race or ethnicity. In response, non-Anglo-Saxon groups of European immigrants – the Scotch-Irish, Gaelic Irish, Italian Catholics, to name a few – countered by asserting a melting pot model of assimilation, which worked for

the incorporation of European immigrants on *equal* grounds with the Anglo-Saxons. While the Anglo-Saxons believed that their language, political institutions, economic practices, religious beliefs, and cultural norms represented the vanguard of civilization and therefore expected other people – including other Europeans – to adapt themselves to these institutions of liberty, non-Anglo-Saxon Europeans refused to be treated in the same way as the colonized barbarians around the world. In anticolonial terms, the conflict between Anglo-Saxons and other whites was a dispute about who was a colonizer and who was the colonized, and non-Anglo-Saxon Europeans insisted on being recognized as *human*. The Anglo-Saxons were not primarily concerned about whiteness because they championed their Teutonic heritage and the perceived ancient practices of freedom they inherited, though they did sometimes use “white” as shorthand for “Anglo-Saxon.” The non-Anglo-Saxon Europeans, however, responded to Anglo-Saxon attempts to enforce Anglo-conformity by inventing an inclusive alternative criterion for civilization: *whiteness*. As I demonstrate, neither Anglo-Saxonism nor whiteness operated as the only master signifier of assimilation in American history; instead, they developed as competing notions between competing groups of colonizers who were in a struggle for control and autonomy. Whiteness is not equivalent to Anglo-Saxonism, nor is whiteness a product of Anglo-Saxonism. For most of American history, whiteness and Anglo-Saxonism were diametrically opposed.

This chapter presents a novel interpretation of the connections between imperialism, assimilation, and whiteness from an anticolonial perspective. In form, it is modeled on Robert Kelley’s “Ideology and Political Culture from Jefferson to Nixon,” which traces the connection between political parties, ethno-religious conflict, economic competition, and political ideology from 1800 to the 1970s. However, I modify Kelley’s approach in two basic ways. First,

following the “invention of ethnicity” approach to assimilation introduced by Werner Sollors, Kathleen Neils Conzen, and others, I take a constructivist approach to race and ethnicity; though my analysis is grounded in anticolonialism rather than poststructuralism, it also argues that whiteness is a product of ethnicization, not an alternative as many whiteness studies scholars assume. To this end, I also point out the connection between nineteenth-century and early-twentieth-century “human sciences” (including ethnology, eugenics, sociology, and anthropology) and the competing constructions of Anglo-Saxonism and whiteness. Second, following Amy Kaplan and Donald E. Pease’s *Cultures of United States Imperialism*, which urges scholars to study the ways in which foreign policy and imperialism shapes domestic politics and culture, I place this discussion of race and ethnicity within the context of Anglo-Saxon imperialism.¹² The first section traces Anglo-Saxonism through its emergence in early modern England, its transplantation to Amerika, and its role in nineteenth-century conflict and expansion. The second section follows the Scotch-Irish and the Gaelic Irish from their colonies on the Emerald Isle to the New World, demonstrating their opposition to Anglo-conformity through the creation of whiteness in the nineteenth-century. The third and fourth sections explain the two transliterations of Anglo-Saxonism during the twentieth-century: first, the re-articulation of the Anglo-Saxon civilizing mission in terms of Amerikan exceptionalism, which becomes the new justification for Empire; and second, the decline of Anglo-Saxon domestic power after the Great Depression and the rise of a sublimated Anglo-Saxonism in the conservative backlash to the social unrest of the 1960s. By understanding the struggle between Anglo-Saxonism and whiteness in Amerikan history, not only do we better understand the social and political trajectory of racial and imperial issues in the U.S., we also better understand the contemporary political landscape of neocolonial Amerika.

*Saxons and Normans in the New World: The Origins and Contradictions of Amerikan Empire,
1600-1900*

The so-called discovery of the New World radically transformed European imperial practices, and this was especially true in England. As soon as the English learned of Columbus's voyage, Henry VII issued the Charter of Conquest, authorizing English explorers to colonize any lands not already occupied or controlled by Christians. While domestic and international politics impeded English colonization in North America for over a century, the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries witnessed the rapid development of English colonies along the Atlantic coast. From the 1580s, when Elizabeth sent her most loyal colonists in Ireland – Sir Walter Raleigh and Sir Humphrey Gilbert – to establish a colony at Roanoke Island off the coast of present-day North Carolina, to the 1780s, when the American colonists won their war for independence, the American colonies were infused with the spirit of Anglo-Saxonism. In *Race and Manifest Destiny: The Origins of American Racial Anglo-Saxonism*, Reginald Horsman explains that “The American colonists of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries inherited in full measure the myth of a free Anglo-Saxon past.”¹³ In Great Britain, the colonies were viewed as portending the fulfillment of a global Anglo-Saxon Empire. In the mid-eighteenth century, Englishman Andrew Burnaby proclaimed that “empire is traveling westward; and everyone is looking forward with eager and impatient expectation to that destined moment when America is to give law to the rest of the world.”¹⁴ Across the Atlantic, the colonists generally saw themselves as equal participants in this project of global conquest. The colonists not only believed that they were indispensable for the economic success of the empire, they also believed that, as Englishmen, they were entitled to all the natural political rights of the commonwealth. Parliament made it very clear that it would not recognize these rights, and by the end of the

eighteenth century, the colonists had fought and won a war for their independence.¹⁵ “The Revolutionary generation,” Horsman observes, used Anglo-Saxon ideology “to justify their exceptional actions in breaking away from Great Britain and reshaping their government.”¹⁶

The newly established United States of Amerika adopted both the Anglo-Saxon civilizing mission, which developed into the notion of Manifest Destiny, and the Anglo-Saxon colonial practices of assimilation, domination, and elimination. While the term “Manifest Destiny” was not coined until the 1840s, the notion was deeply embedded in the Amerikan Anglo-Saxon worldview, for they believed that they would civilize the whole world through a combination of Protestant Christianity and virtuous self-government.¹⁷ “From the Pilgrims forward,” Kelly Brown Douglas notes, “the idea of Manifest Destiny, even if the precise phrase was not used, was the driving force behind the founding, building, and expansion of the nation.”¹⁸ George Bancroft’s *History of the United States of America* (1834), widely read and highly-regarded work of history, translated Calvinist predestination from a provincial creed into a secular, democratic doctrine for the Amerikan nation as a whole, and, as Eric Foner tells us, “public orators amalgamated Anglo-Saxon superiority...and manifest destiny into a single account of the nation’s mission.”¹⁹ As a chosen nation, the Amerikans felt obligated to take up the Anglo-Saxon civilizing mission. John Quincy Adams once expressed the notion of Manifest Destiny in continental terms: “The whole continent of North America appears to be destined by Divine Providence to be peopled by one *nation*, speaking one language, professing one system of religious and political principles, and accustomed to one general tenor of social usages and customs.”²⁰ However, this mere continental aspiration pales in comparison to the more ambitious understandings of Amerikan Manifest Destiny that sought to conquer the globe. On the one hand, many believed that Mexico, the Caribbean, and all of South American would inevitably fall

under the control of Amerika. On the other hand, China specifically, and Asia more generally, were seen as inevitable destinations of Amerikan rule. As one Southern writer put it in 1850, “The eagle of the republic shall poise itself over the field of Waterloo, after tracing its flight among the gorges of the Himalaya or the Ural mountains, and a successor of Washington ascend the chair of universal empire!”²¹ Those Amerikan writers of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries who accepted the moral mission of the Anglo-Saxons – and this was most writers – the United States was destined to govern the world.²²

Despite the almost universal acceptance of both Amerika’s imperial mission and the Anglo-Saxon rhetoric that justified it, Amerikan’s disagreed about *how* the Empire should be formed, which meant that debates about the uses of assimilation, domination, and elimination (and the corresponding levels of violence associated with each form of the colonial relation) would shape national discourse about Amerikan foreign policy and ultimately lead to the Civil War. The original bifurcation of Amerikan political culture – the regional cultural differences of the North and South – was the foundation for the disagreements over imperial policy and practice. “Virginia and Massachusetts,” writes historian A. L. Rowse, “were the seed-beds of the American nation,” and a number of writers both past and present have viewed the North-South sectional divide as the difference between the Cavalier and the Puritan, the aristocrat and the democrat.²³ As early as 1633, a resident of Salem, Massachusetts wrote that, unlike the Puritans in the north, “Virginia went not forth upon the same reasons nor for the same end.” The New England religious mission, to bring the “Gospel to those heathen that never heard thereof,” did not exist in the South, since, in his view, the Virginians sought only economic gain.²⁴ More recently, Sacvan Bercovitch described the North as millenarian and the South as utopian. The Puritans in the North believed they had been given a divine mission to establish a New Jerusalem

in the New World, the presence of which would precipitate the transformative redemption of the world. The planters of the South, on the other hand, desired to use the ostensible open land of the New World to establish a harmonious, perfectly structured agrarian society.²⁵ In the North, Bercovitch explains, “The American Puritan elaborated his rationale from one generation to the next with all the energy of one who must defend his selfhood not only in the face of a harsh environment but against the opinion of the world.”²⁶ Bercovitch traces the Puritan legacy to mid-nineteenth-century Amerika, when Whig historians looked back to the Puritans in England and Amerika as the progenitors of liberalism, and when Amerikan Renaissance writers, such as Ralph Waldo Emerson and Walt Whitman, argued that Amerika, the “empire of empires” (Whitman), should “should speak for the human race” (Emerson).²⁷ Unlike the North, the South eschewed egalitarian religiosity in favor of a makeshift agricultural aristocracy. Virginia and the southern colonies were influenced by Southern England’s aristocratic culture, and they attempted to recreate that social hierarchy in the colonies. Yet they were compelled to adapt, producing a newly forged aristocracy out of the social elements available in the colonies. One’s family name or bloodline ceased to be the determining factor of class belonging, at least in the early colonial period, and eventually, the heterogeneity of various European nationalities blended into an elite white aristocracy. Thus, the result was an aristocracy but one forged by assimilating various newcomers who proved themselves worthy of carrying on planter class culture and defending planter class interests.²⁸

The difference in temperament between the Puritan and the Cavalier resulted in different conceptions of Amerikan Empire, especially when it came to Amerika’s relationship to Indians, Mexicans, and Blacks. “By the 1850s,” Horsman explains, “two ideas were firmly engrained in American thinking: that the peoples of large parts of the world were incapable of creating

efficient, democratic, and prosperous governments; and that American and world economic growth, the triumph of Western Christian civilization, and a stable world order could be achieved by American commercial penetration of supposedly backward areas.”²⁹ How such penetration would be achieved, however, was first a matter of party politics and then the cause for sectional conflict. The Puritan approach to expansion emphasized legalism and moralism and deemphasized violence, which means it expressed a “soft racism” and an affinity for assimilation through acculturation or elimination through gradual extension. This approach manifested itself in the policies of the major political parties of the Northeast: Federalist and Whig. The Cavalier approach to expansion emphasized paternalism and racialism, which means it expressed a “hard racism” and a willingness to either dominate the conquered people and use them as labor or eliminate them through military violence. This approach manifested itself in the policies of the major political party of the West and South: the Democrats. In 1800, the Puritan approach to expansion was the prevailing attitude regarding the relationship of the United States to the Native Americans; both the Federalist John Adams and the Democrat Thomas Jefferson shared the hope that Native Americans would or could be integrated into American society, even if Jefferson has some reservations. By the 1830s, however, Native American resistance to American expansion and the emerging ethnological sciences combined to inspire widespread doubt about assimilating the Indians. The Whigs, who inherited the soft racism of the Federalists, became cautious about expansion, while the Democrats, who had no reservations about falling back on their preferred method of violent elimination, continued to push the national border westward.³⁰ Beginning with the administration of Andrew Jackson, Native Americans would be increasingly subjected to various forms of elimination. Most initially preferred removing them from the land through displacement, but David Levy of Florida insisted, “If they cannot be emigrated, they should be

exterminated.”³¹ As is well known, by the end of the nineteenth century, the Native Americans had suffered under a gradual genocide that culminated in the Dawes Act of 1887, which broke up most of their remaining communal lands, and the Massacre at Wounded Knee in 1890, in which the U.S. military slaughtered hundreds of men, women, and children.³²

Not only were those who subscribed to the Puritan approach to expansion trepid regarding expansion into Native American territory, they were also concerned about annexing Texas and other land after the Mexican-American War (1846-1848). Many Americans were convinced that, like Native Americans, Mexicans were a mongrel race of mixed Spanish-Indian blood that could not and should not be assimilated into Anglo-Saxon society, but the Whigs and the Democrats – increasingly representing two *regions*, North and South – differed regarding the solution to this problem. In the South and West, leading Democrats believed that the Mexicans could be either dominated as colonial subjects, much like the Black slaves already under their control, or they could be eliminated, much like the Native Americans. Either way, the Mexicans would provide useful labor or disappear before the unrelenting march of civilization. In the North, however, many leading Whigs believed that elimination would be impossible and that domination would be undesirable. While they saw it as logistically unfeasible to try to remove the Mexicans from their land, they also saw it as structurally undesirable to govern them as colonial subjects because such governmental structure threatened republican political principles of Anglo-Saxon culture. So, Northerners and Southerners agreed that the Mexicans were a lesser race, but they disagreed about which modes of colonialism should be used. Northern Mexican land was, of course, annexed, and those who found themselves on the north side of the new border would be only the first generation of Mexicans in the United States subjected to displacement, deportation, and racial violence.³³ In the 1840s, Alexander Saxton states,

“Democrats North and South could rejoice together in the most visibly dramatic usage of federal power – national expansion. The disparate coalition that composed the Democracy rose the high tide of manifest destiny.”³⁴

Behind Northern Whig concerns about violent or “unjust” expansion was another concern that reveals the general Puritan aversion to domination as a colonial practice – they feared the spread of slavery. When Jefferson completed the Louisiana Purchase in 1803, he doubled what he called “the Empire of Liberty,” but this expansion worried the Federalists, who feared that slavery would spread into the new territories and increase the power of the slaveholding states.³⁵ The national debate about the spread of slavery reached its first crisis with the Missouri Compromise in 1820, which temporarily resolved the dispute about the spread of slavery by establishing specific slave and non-slave territories. After the annexation of Texas and other Mexican lands, the same process of negotiation over the spread of slavery led to the Compromise of 1850, which once again determined a balance for slave and free territories in the West. In October 1852, Frederick Douglass delivered a speech in which he expressed this Whig concern perfectly. “The Purchase of Louisiana, the annexation of Texas, the war with the Seminoles, and the war with Mexico,” he said, “were all measures commenced and carried on for the purpose of giving prosperity and perpetuity to slavery and for maintaining the sway of the slave power over the republic.”³⁶ As the colonial practice of domination, embodied in the institution of slavery, became the prevailing political question of the nation, North and South unified themselves in opposition to each other, the former moving from the Whigs to the Know-Nothings to the Republicans, and the latter setting aside class and ethnic distinctions among whites to create a coalition in the party of Jefferson.³⁷

The sectional disagreement over the use of domination fostered a schism in the Anglo-Saxon consensus of the previous decades, and the old opposition between North and South, Massachusetts and Virginia, Puritan and Cavalier, developed into an antagonism between *Anglo-Saxons* and *Anglo-Normans*. As the story went, the Anglo-Normans were an aristocratic people who favored a form of caste rule over their cultural, political, and (perhaps) racial inferiors, while the Anglo-Saxons were a freedom-loving democratic people who opposed the tyranny embodied by Normanism. The mythology regarding the English Civil War as a battle between Saxons and Normans was familiar in antebellum society. Jefferson imitated the English antiquarians, equating royalists with Normans and republicans with Saxons, and in the 1850s, this conception was accepted by many on both sides of the conflict. In the North, many prominent writers, including Ralph Waldo Emerson, Nathaniel Hawthorne, and Theodore Parker, argued that the Northerners had descended from the Puritans, the vanguard of Anglo-Saxonism in England who escaped the Norman yoke by coming to the New World. For Emerson, the Puritan heritage was the moral foundation of New England, and like other writers, he believed America had a moral purpose. Some writers even romanticized Cromwell's Commonwealth as the highpoint of Anglo-Saxon Protestant freedom. In their identification with the Saxons, Northerners believed that they were the vanguard of moral progress in the nation and the world.³⁸ In the South, the centuries-old conflict between Saxons and Normans was also thought to be the primary reason for the conflict between North and South. In *De Bow's Review*, a prominent Southern journal, one writer grounded his understanding of the section conflict in seventeenth-century English politics: "The cavaliers and puritans of that age were undoubtedly the ancestors, and, to a great extent, the *prototypes* of this [age]... The puritan hatred of the cavalier was deep and bitter, but neither deeper nor more bitter than that of the mass of the Northern, for the people

of the Southern States, especially that portion of the North known as New England.”³⁹ Through their identification with the Normans, Southerners cultivated the idea that they were elite defenders of traditionalism against the vicious Saxon plebeians. In what was seen as a replay of the English Civil War, the Northern states faced off against the Southern states in a fight for control over the destiny of the Amerikan Empire.⁴⁰

The South lost the war. Anglo-Normanism receded into the dustbin of history. And Anglo-Saxonism went on to dominate Amerikan domestic and foreign policy. From the end of Reconstruction to the Great Depression, Anglo-Saxonism was the dominant force shaping Amerikan society, combining *laissez-faire* economics and a global moral mission into a civilizational quest to remake the world in its image. It began domestically, focusing on reforming the North, industrializing the South, and developing the West. In the North, Anglo-Saxonists wanted to use the Republican Party as a vehicle for Anglo-conformity, for assimilating immigrants into the virtues of liberty. Even though religion was the single most important factor for determining one’s party affiliation in the North and Midwest and most Catholics joined the Democrats, the Anglo-Saxonists sometimes believed their aims were being realized. As one Saxonist wrote during the Gilded Age, “the American Irishman, or German, or Frenchmen, notwithstanding his love for fatherland, soon loses somewhat of his former nature, under the potent influence of new conditions and of the dominant Saxon temper.”⁴¹ In the South, the Republicans used federal government power and the demise of slavery to begin industrialization, something the planter elites had opposed.⁴² But economic changes were not the only thing the Anglo-Saxonists sought in the south. One 1865 editorial in the *New York Independent*, an Anglo-Saxon publication of there was one, argued, “the North must remain the absolute dictator of the Republic until the spirit of the North shall become the spirit of the whole country.”⁴³ In the West,

the Republicans used a racially integrated army of white and Black soldiers to remove the Native Americans by force. Having adopted the “hard racism” of the Jacksonian Democrats, the post-Civil War Republicans pursued hardline anti-Chinese policies.⁴⁴ Since the Cavalier, the primary rival to the Puritan, had been defeated, the nation was theirs to shape.

Invigorated by their victory over the South and having run out of frontier in the West, the Anglo-Saxonists of the North sought to take the next step in forging their global Empire. “Having demonstrated their special aptitude for liberty and self-government on the North American continent,” Eric Foner notes, “Anglo-Saxons would now spread these institutions and values to less fortunate people throughout the world.”⁴⁵ The Anglo-Saxon world mission combined racial, religious, and economic rhetoric to justify the formal inauguration of the Amerikan colonial expansion. Racially, as ethnology was replaced with Social Darwinism and eugenics, Northern Anglo-Saxonists reinterpreted their mission as a confrontation of races, a confrontation in which the Saxons would prevail. Religiously, Anglo-Saxonism revived the Millenarian impulse brought to the New World by the Puritans, extending the dominion of the New Jerusalem beyond the boundaries of the continent. Josiah Strong, a leading figure of late nineteenth-century Anglo-Saxonism, expressed this racial-religious worldview succinctly: “It seems to me that God...is training the Anglo-Saxon race for an hour sure to come in the world’s future...the final competition of races...Then this race of unequaled energy, with all the majesty of numbers and might of wealth behind it...having developed peculiarly aggressive traits calculated to impress its institutions upon mankind, will spread itself over the earth.”⁴⁶ The Amerikan public demonstrated their support for the nation’s Anglo-Saxon colonial ideology in 1896, electing Republican William McKinley, a preeminent Anglo-Saxon imperialist, to the presidency. Not only did the U.S. take colonial territory in the Caribbean and the South Pacific, it

once again turned its attention toward China, hoping to penetrate the economies of East Asia. While Anglo-Saxons of the North appeared to have overcome their pre-Civil War trepidation regarding domination as a form of colonial rule, they claimed their agenda was, in the words of McKinley, “benevolent assimilation.”⁴⁷ Though the Great Depression would periodically discredit Anglo-Saxonism as the dominant ideology in Amerika, Anglo-Saxon confidence was so strong at the turn of the twentieth century that the “high-profile Wall Street lawyer” John Randolph Dos Passos proclaimed it “The Anglo-Saxon Century.”⁴⁸

The Echoes of Empire: Immigration, Assimilation, and Whiteness in Amerika, 1700-1900

Despite some internal contradictions and sectional conflict, Anglo-Saxonism dominated discourse around the Amerikan identity, especially during the nineteenth century. But as the United States began to receive immigrants from places outside Britannia, a new conflict between those who identified as Anglo-Saxon and those who identified as non-Saxon emerged. Between 1730 and 1830, many Presbyterians from the Ulster plantation in the north of Ireland made their way to Amerika, and between 1830 and 1930 many Gaelic-speaking Catholics from western Ireland followed. These two groups – who would become known as the Scotch-Irish and the Irish Catholics – paved the way for later immigrants, not merely because they successfully “assimilated” into Amerikan society, but because they created the conditions for that assimilation – they *created* whiteness. As Robert Kelley notes, “The Ethnic minorities resented the New Englanders’ belief in their superior moral righteousness, their assumption that...they were the true Americans, and their urge to reshape the nation in the Yankee image.”⁴⁹ In response, they created an inclusive Amerikan identity, one not reliant on Anglo-Saxon ideology or identity. Scholars who view the relationship between the assimilation of European immigrants and the construction of white identity in the United States in one-dimensional terms – either as a process

of Anglo-conformity or as a melting pot process of amalgamation – fail to account for the complex interactions between national origin, class bias, religious affiliation, party politics, social science, and regional conflict.⁵⁰ After having already been formed by English colonial policies in the Old World, the Scotch-Irish and the Gaelic Irish Catholics would arrive in the New World and create a white identity for white Americans in opposition to Anglo-Saxon elitism.

The Scotch-Irish were the first non-English immigrants to come to America in large numbers, and they would have a lasting impact on the construction of white identity. Originating in the Ulster plantation, which is present-day Northern Ireland, the Scotch-Irish who traveled to North America were the progeny of an earlier colonial people. Elizabeth's plantation policy succeeded in removing many native Irish from their land, but after James I became king in 1603, he intensified her plantation policy, targeting the north of Ireland for systematic elimination. James's advisors published a document called "Project for Plantation," which laid out a detailed plan for compelling lowland Scots to immigrate to Ulster and establish farms. Though some English settlers went to Ulster, James favored the lowland Scots because they represented the synthesis of the emerging "British" empire. Not only did the lowland Scots speak English, they were also more enthusiastic colonists and, as Presbyterians, more enthusiastic evangelists. In the words of historian James G. Leyburn, "there is no suggestion that their consciences troubled them about dispossessing the Irish. The attitude seems to have been parallel to that of the pioneer on the American frontier: the rich lands are in better hands now."⁵¹ Thus, though the few English planters in Ulster began with a greater portion of the land, the Scots eventually overtook the English, achieving economic, religious, and political dominance. An estimated 100,000 Scots

moved to Ulster during the seventeenth century, and because the Irish were being eliminated, there was little to no mixing; thus, the Ulster Scots “formed virtually another nationality.”⁵²

Though the Ulster Scots achieved relative success in their colonial plantation, the ambivalence about their role and place in the British Empire inspired many to immigrate to the North American colonies, where they left a lasting impression on the culture. Like the colonists in North America, the Ulster Scots saw themselves as an integral part of the British Empire; also like the colonists in North America, the Ulster Scots did not always enjoy the full rights of British citizens. Occasional lapses in religious freedom and the periodic imposition of tariffs caused the Ulster colonists to look westward, setting their eyes on the frontiers of the expanding Empire. During the eighteenth century, Ulster Scots constituted the largest immigrant population in the North American colonies, with an estimated quarter million arriving between 1715 and 1775. There was an apparent mutual affection between the colonists in North America and the migrating Ulster Scots; as American colonists sought to attract more planters from Ulster, the Scots began to romanticize America. The Ulster Scots primarily settled in the South and along the frontier, specifically in western Pennsylvania, the Carolina backcountry, and Appalachia.⁵³ In 1775, Lord Simon Harcourt, Viceroy of Ireland under George III, observed the fondness for America in Ulster, writing, “The Presbyterians of the North are in their hearts Americans.”⁵⁴ Scotch-Irish immigration from Ulster continued after the War for Independence, and by the 1830s, a significant fraction of the American public were of Ulster descent. Looking back from the twentieth century, Woodrow Wilson acknowledged the Ulster Scots, calling the Anglo-Saxons and the Scotch-Irish “partners of Providence.”⁵⁵

The Scotch-Irish were never a minority group of immigrants like later groups; in fact, they helped create American culture, including the concept of whiteness. In the realm of religion,

the Scotch-Irish participated in the Great Awakening, and many Presbyterians in the South and on the frontier joined to Methodist and Baptist churches. As contributors to the fundamentalist tradition of American Christianity, they have been described as “the Puritans of the Middle and Southern colonies.”⁵⁶ In the realm of politics, they participated in the creation of the U.S. Constitution. And in the realm of culture, they are said to have started the tradition of rugged frontier individualism.⁵⁷ But during the century between the 1730s and 1830s, their conflicts with the Native Americans on the frontier produced a racial awareness that resulted in a distinct white identity. The Scotch-Irish were already seasoned colonists, so they had no scruples about their aggressive expansionist policy. As Carlton Jackson writes, “The Ulster Scots had already removed one people, the native Irish, to make room for themselves, and in the same way did not regard the Indians as the rightful owners of these lands but obstacles in the way of Christian progress.”⁵⁸ But as they pushed west toward the Mississippi River, they established solidarity with the smaller number of German and English settlers, creating a mixed group of “whites” in distinction to the “red” Natives. Racial conflict forced the Scotch-Irish to eschew “ethnic” isolation in favor of “racial” camaraderie. “In Kentucky forts,” writes Patrick Griffin, “what ‘ethnic,’ national, or linguistic group settlers belonged to...paled in comparison to the whiteness they shared.” What really matter was “what they were not. Above all, they were not Indians.”⁵⁹ Thus, the Scotch-Irish, with their “anti-ethnic ethnic identity,” have been credited with producing white American identity.⁶⁰

Given their regional and social position, the Scotch-Irish became an important constituency of the Democratic Party, especially in the South. Because Jefferson had established bonds with the United Irishman movement in the 1790s, the Scotch-Irish were immediately drawn to the Democrats.⁶¹ In the North, the Scotch-Irish sometimes clashed with the groups of

English descent, and they were the faction of the Democratic Party most responsible for conflict with the Whigs. In Pennsylvania, for example, the legalistic, pietistic, pacifistic Quakers rued the Scotch-Irish presence. “In all of American politics,” Robert Kelley remarks, “few peoples have been more wedded to Republicanism than the Quakers; few have more consistently disliked Democrats. Tory in the Revolution, they were Federalist and Whig thereafter. In the 1850s, they helped found the Republican party.” Not only were the Quakers “ethnically English,” they were “the very model of the WASP cultural archetype which lay at the core of Republicanism.” The Quakers referred to the Scotch-Irish as “barbarians, whiskey-drinkers, disloyal and violent men,” and they opposed the Scotch-Irish tendency to pursue openly aggressive Indian policies.⁶² In the South, however, the makeshift white aristocracy of the seventeenth century readily welcomed more Europeans. In the upper South, the English and the Scotch-Irish general cooperated against the Native Americans, while in the deep South, the Scotch-Irish mixed with English planters, Caribbean Huguenots, and other Europeans, creating a relatively homogenous white body politic. As a result of these processes, the Scotch-Irish became leaders in the Southern Democratic Party. During the antebellum period, several Democratic presidents descended from Ulster families, including James Polk and James Buchanan, but by far the most important Scotch-Irish Democrat was Andrew Jackson.⁶³

Jackson’s life and works epitomize the Scotch-Irish influence on American politics and culture, for he was the embodiment of their egalitarian white republican proclivity.⁶⁴ He was born in the Carolina backcountry in 1765, two years after his parents emigrated from Ulster. In his early political career, he helped settle Appalachia, participating in Tennessee’s state constitutional convention in 1796 and co-founding Memphis in 1819. As a military officer, he fought a series of wars against the Native Americans in the years following the War of 1812, and

later as president, he signed the Indian Removal Act and forcibly removed the Cherokee in what is known as the Trail of Tears. Jackson's election and presidency ushered in the age of the "common man," sometimes called Jacksonian democracy. But true to the Scotch-Irish approach, this seeming inclusiveness was restricted by racial boundaries. Like the Scotch-Irish who opposed the Native Americans on the frontier, Jacksonian democracy united white men, first by breaking down class barriers to political participation and second by unleashing a wave of racial violence.⁶⁵ Between 1830 and 1860, Jacksonian populism defined American politics, and the various political parties that formed in opposition to the Democrats – Whig, Know-Nothing, and Republican – were each informed by Anglo-Saxon ideology. Thus, the Anglo-Saxonists of the Northern parties were opposed to not only a so-called Anglo-Norman aristocracy of the South, but rather to the coalition between the white populism of the Scotch-Irish and the aristocracy of the Anglo-Normans that defined the Democrats in the two decades before the Civil War.⁶⁶

The growing political divide between parties and regions during the antebellum period can be better understood by understanding the role that competing ethnological theories played in the national schism. While ethnology was used to argue that Blacks and Native Americans were inferior, it was also used to define who counted among the civilized races. In the North, the Anglo-Saxonists' racial theory tended toward the Teutonic or Germanic thesis of Anglo-Saxon exceptionalism, creating an exclusive space for the Saxons over and against the other races of Europe. Commenting on racial theories in the British context, Reginald Horsman explains that Caucasian theories were unpopular because it placed the Anglo-Saxons too close to undesirable races. "Although many were happy to accept scientific theories maintaining that a nation's power and prosperity stemmed from inherent physical and mental differences between races," he explains, "they were less enthusiastic about accepting racial categories which lumped Anglo-

Saxons together with Jews and other groups considered undesirable...Throughout the 1840s praise of the Teutons was a stronger theme in England than praise of the Caucasians.”⁶⁷ The same was true among the Puritanical Anglo-Saxons in New England. Northern clergyman Robert Baird argued that “our national character is that of the Anglo-Saxon race...essentially Germanic or Teutonic [are] the chief supports of the ideas and institutions of evangelical Christianity.”⁶⁸ Baird believed that Christian evangelism and the Anglo-Saxon project of civilizing the world were one in the same as a part of the Teutonic cultural heritage. The Transcendentalists Ralph Waldo Emerson and Theodore Parker shared Baird’s emphasis on the Teutons. In *English Traits*, Emerson wrote that “The Teutonic tribes have a national singleness of heart, which contrasts with the Latin races,” clearly distinguishing virtuous Germanic peoples from lesser European races.⁶⁹ Expanding on Emerson, Parker believed that the Celtic race would eventually disappear, not as a result of violent conquest but as a result of Anglo-Saxon superiority, which was inherited from the group’s Germanic past.⁷⁰

Unlike the Northern writers, who were committed to exclusive Germanic theories of Saxon superiority, most writers in the South and West subscribed to Caucasian theories of racial superiority. One group, the Southern landed elites, those who began to call themselves Anglo-Normans in the 1850s, drew the line of assimilation not around Germanic peoples but around all white people. Influenced by their identification with the aristocratic Normans and the romantic novels of Sir Walter Scott, the Southern gentry saw it as their duty and their nature to assimilate various European whites into cavalier culture while simultaneously excluding individuals of inferior races. Scott’s novel *Ivanhoe* portrays an aristocratic Norman culture that is able to subdue and assimilate their Saxon inferiors while maintaining racial purity through the exclusion of non-white groups.⁷¹ Like the self-described Anglo-Normans, the Scotch-Irish rejected

Teutonic theories of racial superiority in favor of Caucasian theories of racial superiority. Because the Scotch-Irish were not racially of Anglo-Saxon background, they would be excluded from an Amerika defined in Anglo-Saxon terms. They thus sought to make a place for all people European descent in the Amerikan Empire at the exclusion of all non-whites. Stephen A. Douglas, a leading Northern Democrat, expressed this resentment in 1853, stating, “I cannot recognize England as our mother...Our ancestry were not all of English origin. They were of Scotch, Irish, German, French, and of Norman descent as well as English. In short, we inherit from every branch of the Caucasian race.”⁷² Douglas, however, insisted on excluding non-whites; as he stated a few years later, “I am in favor of confining citizenship to white men...instead of conferring it upon negroes, Indians, and other inferior races.”⁷³ While those who identified as Anglo-Norman believed that the Scotch-Irish were assimilating to the Cavalier way of life, the Scotch-Irish suggested that a new Amerikan race was drawing from the best features of all Europeans. Yet this subtle difference was overshadowed by their shared commitment to universal white assimilation.⁷⁴ By contrast, the Anglo-Saxonists often attempted to assimilate or “Saxonize” even those individuals from the lesser races. The sectional crisis that caused the Civil War, then, was not only about slavery, nor was it only about the colonial practice of domination – it was also about the nature of the Amerikan racial identity, and those various non-Saxon Europeans, lead by the Scotch-Irish, protested against Anglo-Saxon exclusivism, insisting upon a more inclusive conception of white identity and a more rigorous exclusion of all others.

Like the Scotch-Irish of the eighteenth century, the Gaelic Irish Catholics of the nineteenth century immigrated from the Emerald Isle, but whereas the Scotch-Irish came as seasoned colonists, the Irish Catholics came as refugees of Anglo-Saxon colonialism. Even though Ireland’s formal status as a colony ceased with the Acts of Union in 1801, it was not

politically equal to the other members of the United Kingdom. It would be more accurate to say that Ireland became a domestic colony, or what Christine Kinealy has called “colonialism under another guise”; even nineteenth-century thinkers, including Karl Marx, John Stuart Mill, and Alexis de Tocqueville, recognized it as such.⁷⁵ The Famine was the most obvious sign that Ireland remained a colony, for it was not a result of nature but a result of British policy. To be sure, crop failings did contribute to the food shortage, but throughout The Famine, Ireland remained a net exporter of food. The landless and poor Catholics suffered disproportionately. Between 1845 and 1855, approximately 1.5 million died of starvation and disease, and another 1.5 million emigrated, most of them destined for the United States. In proper colonial fashion, the English blamed the Irish for their condition. Charles Edward Trevelyan, who was later knighted for his role in “managing” The Famine, said, “The great evil with which we have to contend is not the physical evil of the famine, but the moral evil of the selfish, perverse and turbulent character of the people.” Sir Charles Wood called the mass deaths and mass graves “a necessary part” of Anglo-Saxon conquest.⁷⁶ One might expect that, upon arriving in the New World, the Irish would recognize the similarities between their colonial experience and that of the Black and Native Americans in the United States. As Theodore W. Allen notes, “No immigrants ever came to the United States better prepared by tradition and experience to empathize with African-Americans than were [the] Irish who were emerging directly from the historic struggle against racial oppression in their own country.”⁷⁷ Yet, they didn’t. Instead, the Irish in Amerika found the germs of a white racial identity, an identity that would lift them out of the zone of nonbeing and make them human. In 1852, Martin R. Delany noticed that the Irish in Amerika was “a decidedly different being” than back at home under colonial rule.⁷⁸ The situation of the Irish in the nineteenth century – “colonized at home...colonizers abroad.”⁷⁹

Given the political and ethnological divisions in the United States between 1840 and 1860, the assimilation process was different for the Irish who went to the South than for the Irish who stayed in the North. Unlike the Anglo-Saxonists who dominated the Whigs, Know-Nothings, and Republicans, the Scotch-Irish used the Democratic Party to assimilate the new arrivals. Though there was tension between the Ulster Scots and the Gaelic Irish in the United Kingdom, Andrew Jackson's presidency represented a reconciliation of Scotch-Irish and Irish Catholics in America. In the South, there were far fewer Irish Catholics than in the North, and though their population doubled during the 1850s, they were easily assimilated. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, Catholics were feared as much or more than Blacks and Native Americans in all of the colonies, but by the nineteenth century, the Southern states generally welcomed European immigrants because they buttressed the white population in the region. Though the northern press was replete with anti-Catholic propaganda anti-Irish ethnologies, many Southerners distrusted nativism due to its association with abolition.⁸⁰ Because the Civil War and the subsequent period of Reconstruction were framed as a war of Anglo-Saxon aggression against the Southern people, the newly arrived Irish were able to transpose their hatred of the English at home onto the "English" of the North, joining the Anglo-Normans and the Scotch-Irish in their disdain for fanatical Puritanism. Thus, ethnology inclusive of all Europeans and logistical demands of the Civil War allowed Irish Catholics to avoid the threat of Know-Nothing nativism, support slavery, and assimilate with Southern whites.⁸¹ "No matter how poor or how rough their work was," David T. Gleeson writes, "their white skin made the Irish automatic citizens of the ruling race and put them above the wealthiest people of color."⁸² By the late-nineteenth century, new Irish immigrants could easily assimilate into Southern society.

In the North, Irish Catholics joined and ultimately dominated Democratic Party institutions, particularly the political machines and labor unions in the large cities. “Inside the labor movement, the Catholic church, and the political organizations of many working-class communities,” James R. Barrett writes, “the Irish occupied vital positions as Americanizers of later groups.”⁸³ Politically, the Republicans of the Gilded Age, representing “old Yankee Protestant Stock,” carried on the nativist and moralist sentiments of their forebearers; they passed a series of voter registration laws to limit the political participation of newly naturalized citizens and attempted to use their political power to transform their values into law. In opposition to the Anglo-Saxon moralizing and civilizing mission of the Republicans, the Democrats, Paul Kleppner writes, “portrayed the Republicans as a party devoted to the principle of paternalism, and themselves as the party which enshrined ‘personal liberty.’”⁸⁴ As leaders in the political machines of the Democratic Party, the Irish gradually facilitated the assimilation of the “new immigrants” from Southern and Eastern Europe. Between 1880 and 1920, the Irish Democrats took over both New York City and Boston, formerly Republican strongholds. Once the restrictions were lifted in the 1920s, the Democrats recruited the majority of these new voters. Because the political machines of the North maintained solidarity across sectional lines – first through a proslavery message and then through a “white man’s government” ideology – the Democratic Party’s ability to assimilate European immigrants into whiteness had a national scope.⁸⁵

As leaders in the labor movement and the unions, Irish organizers not only led the campaign for recruitment, they also “remade” the working class by acculturating immigrants. The Irish leaders in the Democratic Party had inherited the Jeffersonian suspicion the economic elite. “To Jeffersonian [r]epublicans,” Eric Foner observes, “the greatest threat to American

freedom lay in the alliance of a powerful central government and an emerging class of commercial capitalists.”⁸⁶ But in the Gilded Age, there were strong correlations between economic status, party affiliation, religion, and ethnicity. As Robert Kelley notes, “bankers were usually English or at least British in their ethnic origins; workers were often Irish or German. The wealthy were overwhelmingly English and of the socially prestigious Protestant Sects.”⁸⁷ The emerging anti-Wall Street, anti-corporate populism, then, was not only a political and economic phenomenon; it was also largely an ethnic disposition. In this context, the Irish took a leading role in organizing European immigrants into labor unions. Although there was much inter-ethnic conflict, in many cases, sharing union membership mitigated such conflict among white workers.⁸⁸ As sociologists Hans Gerth and C. Wright Mills observed in 1953, “for some sections of the metropolitan masses, it has become more relevant to status whether the family head is a ‘union man’ than whether he is a ‘Hungarian’ or an ‘Italian,’ a ‘Pole’ or an ‘Irishman.’ Association with a functional class organization has thus for many overshadowed affiliation with organizations along nationality lines.”⁸⁹ Because Republicans increasingly supported *laissez-faire* ideology and corporate power while opposing any social programs, union membership among immigrants and their descendants also exacerbated tensions between Democrats and Republicans.

Thus, the state of American politics at the end of the twentieth century demonstrates that whiteness was not a product of Anglo-Saxon ideology but a white-pluralist *response to* Anglo-Saxon elitism. While Kelly Brown Douglas argues that “It was the exertion of the narrative of Anglo-Saxon exceptionalism that fostered the construction of whiteness,” we can see that the opposite is in fact true.⁹⁰ The same is generally true in both domestic and foreign policy. If the Anglo-Saxonists of the Republican Party believed that the twentieth century was going to be

“The Anglo-Saxon Century,” the non-Saxonist Democrats were committed to challenging that narrative. From 1890 to 1930, Kelley notes, “Anglo-Saxonism as an almost tribal mood flourished in Republican foreign policy.”⁹¹ Unlike the Republicans, who in classic Anglo-Saxonist form argued that the world was to become Saxonized, the Democrats argued that the Pacific Coast was natural boundary of the Amerikan Empire. Democrats, for example, opposed the acquisition of the Philippines in 1898. Drawing on their so-called knowledge of Negroes, who by then had been formally subjected to the domination of Jim Crown segregation, “Southern Democrats,” Christopher Lasch writes, “were almost unanimous in condemning ‘imperialism’ on the grounds that Asiatics, like Negroes, were innately inferior to white people and could not be assimilated to American life.”⁹² Northern Democrats, especially labor leaders, voiced similar concerns; in their eyes, lesser races were willing to work for less and would thus drive down wages. In 1900, then, those who most directly identified as white refused to take on the so-called white man’s burden; such a task was, in Amerika, a task of the Anglo-Saxons. If Republicans aspired to a global paternalism, saving the lesser races from despots and tyrants, the Democrats insisted on leaving the lesser races to their fates.

*The Transliteration of Anglo-Saxonism I: A Reconsideration of the American Century,
1900-2000*

Amerikans no longer speak of the Anglo-Saxons or their divine mission because, in the twenty-first century, Anglo-Saxon exceptionalism underwent two transliterations, one in the realm of foreign policy and the other in the area of domestic social and political power. While Anglo-Saxon political ideals survived the twentieth century, they had to disguise themselves in a different script. “The narrative of Anglo-Saxon exceptionalism,” Kelly Brown Douglas correctly asserts, “*is* America’s exceptionalism.”⁹³ It is necessary, however, to examine the process by

which Anglo-Saxon mission not only gets transliterated into an “Amerikan” mission – for, as we have seen, the Anglo-Saxon ideologists already believed these were synonymous – but also how the non-Anglo-Saxon groups came to take up the Anglo-Saxon mission. This section, which focuses on the global element of Anglo-Saxon exceptionalism and serves as the international context for the following section, traces the Amerikan imperial inclination from the closing of the frontier around 1890 to the advent of the War on Terror. The acquisition of the Philippines in 1898, the advent of World War II, the beginning and the end of the Cold War, and 9/11 all represent important points of reference along they way. Between 1900 and 2000, the imperial mission of the Anglo-Saxons is transferred from an elite group of the Teutonic race to the Amerikan nation as a whole. The Amerikan public, under the leadership of the Amerikan government, became charged with defending “the empire of liberty,” which was no longer confined to the North Amerikan continent but rather embraced the whole world.

During the 1890s, the justification for Amerikan Empire underwent two significant transformations. In the first transformation, the old debate between the Caucasianist anti-imperialists and the Anglo-Saxonist imperialists was ruptured by the emergence of a third group that mediated this division. This group, which combined the global moral mission of the Anglo-Saxonists with the white anthropology of the Caucasian theorists, argued that the Amerikans, not the Anglo-Saxons, were responsible for spreading freedom and justice across the globe. Old school anti-imperialists like William Jennings Bryan continued to join the Democratic Party’s opposition to the annexation of foreign lands, arguing that the country had to decide if it was going to “remain a homogenous [white] republic or become a heterogeneous empire.”⁹⁴ But others who were committed to a Caucasianist melting pot understanding of the Amerikan public rejected the anti-imperial restraint. Echoing Stephen A. Douglas’s earlier claim that Amerika’s

homeland was all of Europe and not just Britain, John Fleming argued in 1891 that “Europe, not England, is the mother of America.” But Fleming added a new internationalist element to his anthropology, which called on the American people to recognize their destiny to guarantee the spread of civilization: “we should all be content with our Caucasian origin and American citizenship, and we should be proud to see even in this generation a type developing itself which is destined to pass into the future as essentially American...a type which while still new will so spread and assert itself as to render impossible a Cossack or Chinese destruction of the world’s civilization.”⁹⁵ No longer would the Anglo-Saxonists have a monopoly on universal morality and global civilizing duty, for the American race, as Theodore Roosevelt called it, would increasingly take responsibility for ensuring the spread of Western ideals as the vanguard of civilization.

In the second transformation, overt economic and racial articulations of American expansion would increasingly give way to idealist articulations that sought to tutor barbaric peoples in the lessons of discipline and self-government. From Thomas Jefferson to Frederick Jackson Turner, many Americans believed that westward expansion was the only way to avoid the inevitable class antagonisms of a developed national economy. Likewise, from Theodore Parker to Theodore Roosevelt, many Americans believed that racial contact meant inevitable racial conflict, resulting in the disappearance of the lesser of the two races. By the 1890s, the Native Americans had been nearly exterminated, the United States had reached the Pacific, and the frontier was essentially closed. Political leaders began to demand an “open world” accessible to American institutions.⁹⁶ But the economic emphasis of what would be perceived as a crude materialism and the biological emphasis of what would be perceived as a crude racialism gradually gave way to the moral emphasis of a political idealism, which sought to bring freedom

to the lesser races of the world. This political idealism resurrected the universal Anglo-Saxon civilizing, assimilationist mission of the nineteenth century. Woodrow Wilson, the chief proponent of this “liberal idealism,” argued that “All mankind deem us the representatives of the moderate and sensible discipline which makes free men good citizens... We should lose heart ourselves, did we suffer the world to lose faith in us as the champions of these things.” For Wilson, this newfound mission of Amerika was a direct extension of the frontier thesis framed in moral language: westward expansion had been a moral project, not an economic one, and this moral project would continue beyond the shores of North Amerika. In Wilson’s grand vision, Americans would win over the people of the world “by giving them, in the spirit of service, a government and rule which shall moralize them by being itself moral, elevate and steady them by being itself pure and steadfast, inducting them into the rudiments of justice and freedom.”⁹⁷ Though Americans may be imperfect or reluctant, Wilson urged the country to acknowledge its unavoidable duty in the transformation of humanity.⁹⁸

American internationalists eventually offered an explicit synthesis of Fleming’s appeal to the American type and Wilson’s appeal to a national moral duty. There is no clearer example of this synthesis than magazine magnate Henry R. Luce’s landmark essay, “The American Century.” In early 1941, as World War II raged on, Luce urged Americans “to accept wholeheartedly our duty and our opportunity as the most powerful and vital nation in the world and in consequence to exert upon the world the full impact of our influence, for such purposes as we see fit and by such means as we see fit.” Though Luce was confident that the United States would remain impervious to the twin totalitarian threat of fascism and communism even if the allies lost the war, he argued that Amerika had a “manifest duty” to become “the Good Samaritan of the entire world.” He sharply criticized Roosevelt’s “materialistic and nationalistic”

conception of Amerika. Offering an alternative vision for the nation, Luce insisted that “Our only chance now to make [democracy] work is in terms of a vital international economy and in terms of an international moral order.” For Luce, then, joining the war was not a matter of necessity, for Amerika would survive regardless of the outcome; rather, joining the war was an acknowledgement that the spirit of Amerikan democracy will not thrive unless the nation accepts its destiny as a chosen nation. As “the inheritors of all the great principles of Western civilization” and “the sanctuary of the ideals of civilization,” Luce concluded that Amerika must “be the powerhouse from which the ideals spread throughout the world and do their mysterious work of lifting the life of mankind from the level of the beasts to what the Psalmist called a little lower than the angels.”⁹⁹ Luce’s essay represents the concrete transliteration of Anglo-Saxon exceptionalism into Amerikan exceptionalism.

As we know, the United States ultimately joined World War II, which was followed by the advent of the Cold War, and historians have noted the survival of Luce’s transliteration during the Truman era. The foreign policy of the Truman administration was a healthy mix of idealism and realism. On one side, historian Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., the chief ideologist of postwar liberalism, expressed his moral mission for Amerika; on the other side, George Kennan, Truman’s ambassador to the Soviet Union, expressed a realist foreign policy paradigm that urged suspicion of the Soviets. Despite the tensions that might arise from these differences, Michael J. Hogan explains that Truman and his administration remained committed to “the belief that leadership of the free world was a sacred mission thrust upon the American people by divine Providence and the laws of both history and nature.”¹⁰⁰ William A. Williams makes the same observation: “The Truman Doctrine seemed an almost classic statement of the thesis that the security and well-being of the United States depended upon the successful execution of

America's unique mission to defend and extend the frontier of democracy throughout the world."¹⁰¹ Following Kennan, Truman believed that the Soviets were deceitful and conniving enemies who could not be trusted; he also believed they desired world domination, an aim diametrically opposed to Amerika's global moral duty. Because the Soviets had to be defeated at any cost, the United States developed its first national security apparatus, which included the Pentagon and the Central Intelligence Agency, and it reorganized all branches of government, including congressional committees, to defend against the imminent but elusive Communist threat. The United States also restructured both Germany and Japan in its own image, using both countries as satellites to control the expansion of Russia and China.¹⁰² The Eisenhower administration continued Truman's creations, ensuring the longevity of a permanent war society.¹⁰³ In order to carry out Amerika's sacred mission, Americans were required to submit to a military worldview that would last for over four decades in a bipolar world.

The fall of the Berlin Wall and the end of the Cold War called for a new iteration of Amerika's exceptional role in the world, and though Amerikan political leaders would disagree on the best methods for executing the special role of the "indispensible nation," there was consensus about Amerikan exceptionalism "across the entire spectrum of opinion deemed respectable."¹⁰⁴ When the United States led the fight against Iraq in the first Gulf War, it was not a proxy war like so many Cold War-era conflicts were; instead, Amerika marched to victory unopposed by its former rival, and a new generation of neoconservatives argued that Amerika ought to take advantage of its "unipolar moment."¹⁰⁵ Romanticizing the national security build up of the Truman administration and looking to Luce's discourse for moral guidance, the representatives from the neocon think tank Project for a New American Century insisted that the United States become "a European power; an Asian power; a Middle Eastern power and, of

course, a Western Hemispheric power.”¹⁰⁶ But neoconservatives were alone neither in their celebration of American exceptionalism nor in their determination to extend America’s influence. “Since 1989,” historian Maria Ryan astutely reminds us, “there has been a virtually unchallenged bipartisan consensus that the United States should remain the world’s sole super power.” Noting that the differences between Democrats and Republicans are “more stylistic than substantive,” she concludes that “the policies advocated by the neoconservatives and their unipolarist allies were firmly within the mainstream historical tradition of American foreign relations and different only in degrees from others within that mainstream tradition.”¹⁰⁷ Every administration from George H. W. Bush to Barack Obama expanded the American sphere of influence through various means: ground invasions, NATO expansion, air strikes, economic leverage, coups, CIA operations, nuclear rearmament, and drone bombings.¹⁰⁸

Thus, in the first decade of the twenty-first century, Americans continued to espouse a narrative of exceptionalism, but this narrative no longer relied on the racial excellence of the Anglo-Saxons but on the national character of the American race. This transliteration of Anglo-Saxon exceptionalism even made its way into the founding document of the War on Terror. In 2002, the George W. Bush administration published a report titled *The National Security Strategy of the United States (NSS)*, in which it announced that “The U.S. national security strategy will be based on a distinctly American internationalism that reflects the union of our values and our national interests. The aim of this strategy is to help make the world not just safer but better.” In the aftermath of 9/11, the *NSS* proposed that “the United States will use this moment of opportunity to extend the benefits of freedom across the globe” and “actively work to bring the hope of democracy, development, free markets, and free trade to every corner of the world.” Flaunting the administration’s intent to undertake “the largest government reorganization

since the Truman Administration,” the report repeated the paternalistic aspirations of the Anglo-Saxonists of the 1890s, warning that “History has not been kind to those nations which ignored or flouted the rights and aspirations of their people.” Because the United States was dedicated to eradicating “the evil designs of tyrants,” it accepted its responsibility “to lead in this great mission.” Even though more than two hundred years separate the earliest Anglo-Saxonists and today’s Amerikan exceptionalists, twenty-first-century Amerikan exceptionalism could have come straight from Thomas Jefferson himself. “By enlarging the empire of liberty,” Jefferson decreed, “we multiply its auxiliaries, and provide new sources of renovation, should its principles, at any time, degenerate, in those portions of our country which gave them birth.”¹⁰⁹ Amerikan exceptionalism no longer relies on Anglo-Saxon ideology, however, because the transliteration of Anglo-Saxonist internationalism is complete.

*The Transliteration of Anglo-Saxonism II: A Reconsideration of the White Republic,
1900-1968*

Amerikans have ceased speaking about Anglo-Saxon exceptionalism in the realms of foreign policy and imperial ideology, but they have also stopped speaking of Anglo-Saxons as a sociological and political group. Looking at the turn of the twentieth century, Kelley writes, 1890 to 1930 “were to be pre-eminently the years of Northern WASP America, in politics, law, and government, in the arts and the world of learning, in the national economy, and in the values which comprised the predominant national creed.”¹¹⁰ But by 2013, Joseph Epstein could write in *The Wall Street Journal* about the disappearance of white Anglo-Saxon Protestants (WASPs). “The U.S. once had an unofficial but nonetheless genuine ruling class, drawn from what came to be known as the WASP establishment,” he comments, but “The WASPs’ day is done.”¹¹¹ While Epstein may be correct that WASPs no longer constitute an establishment class of elites, the

WASP legacy has lingered on through a second transliteration of Anglo-Saxonsim in American society. First, the term “Anglo-Saxon” was replaced by the term “white Anglo-Saxon Protestant” (or WASP) after the Great Depression discredited much of Anglo-Saxon ideology and drove the Saxons out of power.¹¹² In the process, Anglo-Saxons ceased to be curators of a home culture for ethnics and immigrants and became just another ethnicity among others.¹¹³ Second, as a group, the Anglo-Saxons experienced a schism in the first half of the twentieth century, for some WASPs doubled down on their caste’s power, while others abandoned caste in favor of universal assimilation.¹¹⁴ These processes culminated in the ability of the Richard M. Nixon admiration to redefine Anglo-Saxonist ideals as “white” ideas, changing the political and ideological meaning of whiteness and setting the stage for what in Chapter VI will be called “neocolonial Amerika.”

Between the end of Reconstruction and the beginning of the Great Depression, the class of old Anglo-Saxon elites went through two important changes. First, in response to the increasing number of Irish Catholics, many Scotch-Irish in the North abandoned the Democratic Party and became Republicans, prioritizing religion over ethnicity. The Scotch-Irish started to blend with the Anglo-Saxons – even in places like Pennsylvania, where the Scotch-Irish and Quaker rivalry was strong – and by the early-twentieth century, many of Scotch-Irish descent were considered WASPs. Second, the Northern Anglo-Saxon elites began to split in the 1880s, with reform-minded Saxons migrating to the Democratic Party and caste-minded Saxons remaining in with the Republicans. This process began with the presidencies of Grover Cleveland, continued through the Populist movement of William Jennings Bryan and the Woodrow Wilson administration, and culminated with the election of Franklin D. Roosevelt. As the old Puritan compulsion for reform began to populate the Democratic Party through the Social Gospel movement, the Populist movement, and the Progressive intellectual movement, two

different factions of the Anglo-Saxonists gained control of the two major parties. These two factions pursued their agendas quite differently. The caste-minded Anglo-Saxonists did everything they could to retain exclusive control over American politics and economics; the reform-minded Anglo-Saxonists accepted the diversity created by the presence of European immigrants and created programs designed to uplift and, more importantly, “Americanize” them.¹¹⁵

The divergent strategies of the two WASP factions can be understood by the confrontation between eugenics and the new social sciences in the first decades of the twentieth century. Eugenics is often connected to the progressive movement, and to some extent this connection is true, but Anglo-Saxonists were the most fervent advocates of eugenic policies and racial sciences in the early-twentieth century. The Saxonists who gathered around the northern wing of the Republican Party pursued their agendas through their positions of power as professors, researchers, museum curators, and politicians, and like their predecessors in the 1850s, they were fixated on preserving the Teutonic races. Houston Stewart Chamberlain’s best-selling work *Foundations of the Nineteenth Century*, for example, took up the Teutonist obsession of mid-nineteenth century writers like Emerson, Parker, and Baird, arguing that the Anglo-Saxon diaspora represented the spread of Teutonic values and culture across the world.¹¹⁶ During the Gilded Age, the *laissez-faire* ideology of the Republican Party drew its principles of competition and struggle from Social Darwinism, which was summed up in the slogan “survival of the fittest.” As an extension of Social Darwinism, eugenics was simply the idea that the Anglo-Saxon elites could cultivate desirable genetic stock through public policy rather than wait for “natural selection” to eliminate the poor, disabled, and unfit. Centered in New York City, an emerging stronghold of the Democratic Party’s immigrant-base, the eugenicists operated out of

established institutions like Columbia University and the American Museum of Natural History, and they established well-funded organization, including the Galton Society and the American Eugenics Society. In 1911, the eugenicists used their political power to force Congress to establish the U.S. Immigration Commission, and the commission's findings were used as the basis for the 1924 Immigration Reform Act. They also pursued sterilization policies, which largely took effect in the Northeast and Midwest. These eugenicist Republicans were not marginal figures in the party; even leading Republican Party figures, including Calvin Coolidge and Herbert Hoover, openly praised these eugenic policies, and they remained popular until the 1930s, when the Great Depression and the advent of fascism in Europe largely discredited the movement and forced the few remaining adherents out of the public eye.¹¹⁷

While the Anglo-Saxonists who dominated the Republican Party were pursuing their genetic obsession, a group of progressive intellectuals in the North emerged in opposition to these racial sciences, a movement that has been called the New Social Science. In 1919, historian Charles A. Beard left his position as a professor of political science at Columbia University because the administration had imposed a loyalty oath on the faculty. In protest, he joined with economist Thorsten Vablen, among others, and formed the New School for Social Research. Unlike the eugenicists and other proponents of biological racial sciences, the social scientists who gathered at the New School subscribed to a form of “environmentalism,” which insisted upon the potential for humans to be shaped by their social surroundings – in other words, reformed or assimilated. Influential scholars and public intellectuals emerged in nearly every discipline, and together they constructed a new paradigm for social thought and public policy. In anthropology, Franz Boas dismantled the prevailing equivocation of race, language, and culture, denying that one's biological or phenotypic traits in any way determine one's capacity for

civilization. In philosophy, Horace M. Kallen introduced the notion of “cultural pluralism,” the idea that in a democracy of immigrants, such as the United States, each ethnic group can maintain a distinct subculture and share their practices with the nation. In education, John Dewey put these ideas into practice, insisting upon “the power of public schools to assimilate different races to our own institutions, through education given to younger generations.”¹¹⁸ By the early 1930s, the New Social Science has become a significant force in American intellectual life, and eventually joined the New Deal coalition.¹¹⁹ As E. Digby Baltzell writes, “the New Social Science, with its emphasis on environment and faith in reform, was indeed compatible with the aspirations of the urban immigrants of non-Anglo-Saxon ancestry.”¹²⁰

The 1932 presidential election represented the definitive confrontation between exclusive, racialist Anglo-Saxonism of the Republicans and the inclusive, environmentalist Anglo-Saxonism of the Democrats, and in many ways, Roosevelt’s victory over Hoover represented the overthrow of Gilded Age Anglo-Saxonism. Since the 1880s, the Anglo-Saxonists controlled the nation’s politics from the corporate boardrooms of the cities and the boarding schools and country clubs of the suburbs, but by the 1920s, their caste-like exclusivism had increasingly alienated much of the rest of the country. In 1928, New York Governor Al Smith ran against Hoover in the presidential election. As an Irish Catholic with connections to Tammany Hall, labor unions, and progressive intellectuals, Smith represented everything that stood against Anglo-Saxonism, and though he lost the election, his nomination foreshadowed the victory of Roosevelt. After the Great Depression, Roosevelt was swept into office, and “Just as Andrew Jackson had once transformed the Democrats into a majority status as the hero of the Scotch-Irish immigrants to the Middle Western frontier,” Baltzell comments, “so Franklin Roosevelt became the hero...of the heterogeneous mass of new arrivals on the Urban

Frontier.”¹²¹ Roosevelt’s opponents in both parties hated him not merely because they disagreed with his economic policies but because they thought it was abandoning the Anglo-Saxon national project – which, in many ways, he was. During the campaign, the arch-Saxonist Hoover even denounced Roosevelt’s proposed New Deal and antithetical to every Amerika stood for, namely, Anglo-Saxon values. Many Anglo-Saxonists called Roosevelt a traitor to his class, not just economically but ethnically as well. Over the next several decades, however, the Republicans were generally marginalized in national politics and the moderate wing of the party in turn marginalized the radicals inside the party. The election of John F. Kennedy in the 1960 presidential election represented, according to Baltzell, “the ethnic revolution at the elite level of leadership.”¹²² Though the Anglo-Saxons, now called WASPs, remained ensconced in the corporations and the suburbs, their more radical exponents faded from the limelight.¹²³

The Democratic Party and its New Deal coalition shaped national politics through the 1960s, and its policies homogenized whites to a greater extent than any period in the party’s history. As a matter of public policy, New Deal programs like the Federal Housing Administration, Civilian Conservation Corps, and the Works Progress Administration provided opportunities for white citizens to have a livelihood while largely excluding Blacks. As a matter of cultural policy, religious and ethnic pluralism facilitated the assimilation of European-descended citizens. During World War II and the early years of the Cold War, Amerika celebrated its tripartite religious pluralism (Protestant-Catholic-Jew) and all white citizens increasingly became “Amerikans.”¹²⁴ Finally, as Ira Katznelson argues, with the help of the Servicemen’s Readjustment Act, or G.I. Bill, millions of white citizens “bought homes, attended college, started business ventures, and found jobs commensurate with their skills.” The G.I. Bill did not merely facilitate suburbanization and consumerism, it “created middle-class America.”¹²⁵

Post-WWII prosperity was further facilitated by unprecedented access to foreign markets, and the growing power of U.S. corporations created a thriving white middle class.

While a number of socio-economic factors played a role in the homogenization of whiteness in the mid-twentieth century, two of the most important were the emergence of a white-collar middle class and suburbanization.¹²⁶ “Over the last hundred years,” C. Wright Mills wrote in 1951, “the United States has been transformed from a nation of small capitalists into a nation of hired employees.”¹²⁷ Because the centralized corporation was quickly replacing the small business of the rugged entrepreneur, the majority of Americans in the mid-twentieth century worked for others. Less than three percent of the population owned almost fifty percent of the property.¹²⁸ “No longer is there the effective will to power of the old middle class,” Mills describes, “but rather the tenacious will to fight off encircling competitive menaces.”¹²⁹ The development of this new service economy, replete with corporate bureaucracies, transformed the relationship between ethnicity, property, and social status. Between the property-owning old middle classes (which were predominantly WASP) and the wage workers of the industrial labor (which were predominately ethnic) there emerged a class of managers, office clerks, salespersons, and other white-collar workers. While the Irish-controlled labor unions of the early-twentieth century helped incorporate European immigrants into the industrial economy, gradually breaking down ethnic barriers and reducing ethnic conflict, the new middle class of white-collar workers began leveling the caste stratification between WASPs and ethnics. Segregation and discriminatory employment practices ensured the racial exclusivity of the workplace.¹³⁰ “The new middle class,” C. Wright Mills observed in 1951, “contains a greater portion of white people than any other occupational stratum.” While over ninety percent of white-collar workers were born in the United States, this did not mean, according to Mills, that

they were all WASPs. In fact, immigration restrictions helped transform former immigrants into natives. As ethnics and WASPs in the new middle classes intermarried, the caste status of Anglo-Saxon heritage began to dissolve. “If the ‘American’ stature of a group may be judged by the proportion of its native-born members,” Mills concludes, suggesting that ethnicity was increasingly irrelevant, “white-collar workers have been the most American of all occupational strata.”¹³¹

In addition to the workplace, New Deal housing policies under the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) accelerated the social integration of European ethnics by making it possible for them to move out of the ethnic enclaves of the cities and into the WASP-dominated suburbs. From the 1870s to the 1930s, upper-middle-class Anglo-Saxons fled the cities where immigrants were becoming increasingly numerous and therefore powerful. Culturally speaking, the suburbs were distinctly Anglo-Saxon: country clubs, golf courses, and private yards defined suburban social and spatial arrangement. But the FHA, which facilitated movement into the suburbs, contributed to the social mobility of white ethnics. Just as the white-collar workplace enabled marriage between WASP and non-WASP whites, the distinction between WASPs and ethnics broke down in the suburbs. In his landmark study of suburbia, Kenneth T. Jackson observes that “Suburbia is both a planning type and a state of mind based on imagery and symbolism.”¹³² In the post-WWII period, this state of mind was increasingly white. As Robert O. Self puts it, “‘white flight’ was less a flight than a complex and ideological process of state-building within discrete spatial boundaries.”¹³³ FHA practices had taught homeowners to expect low property taxes, and as homeownership was conflicted with upward mobility, these expectations became defined as the socio-economic prerogatives of whites. Just as the makeshift aristocracy of the colonial South blended various ethnicities into a white racial caste opposed to

the slaves, just as the Scotch-Irish merged with their white counterparts opposite the Native Americans, just as the Irish Catholics expanded labor unions and political machines by letting in European immigrants and keeping out others – the suburbs provided a context for the next stage of white amalgamation, which finally included WASPs.¹³⁴ Sociologist Andrew Barlow describes these dramatic transformations of Amerikan society:

As the tens of millions of descendants of European immigrants left the central cities for the middle-class suburbs during the 1950s and 1960s, their ethnic affiliations were radically transformed and, often, destroyed. Gone were the ethnic neighborhoods [of the large cities], defined by their relationship to another nation, with ethnic ties maintained by a large network of community organizations. Gone were the non-English-language schools, churches, and newspapers. In their place arose a new middle-class culture, based on the private home, the car, and the mall. Many people surrendered their ethnicity entirely, rejecting the cultures of their immigrant parents or grandparents as “old-fashioned” in favor of “modern” living.¹³⁵

Once in the suburbs, whites found their social interaction facilitated by corporations and shopping malls. As the former racial ambiguity of urban life was replaced by the simple concept of whiteness, ethnicity became an individual issue, a matter of personal choice to be expressed through consumerism. “In ways that had not existed in urban areas stamped by European ethnicities,” Barlow concludes, “whiteness reigned supreme.”¹³⁶

By the 1960s, then, whiteness had triumphed over Anglo-Saxonism, but this triumph was predicated on the exclusion of non-white racial groups, especially Blacks. In other words, the New Deal coalition and its successful reforms were made possible only because of segregation. Sociologist Randolph Hohle has argued that most whites are not in principle opposed to public services and social programs; instead, most whites simply oppose sharing those services and programs with Blacks. It is no coincidence that official Jim Crow segregation emerged alongside the populist movement, which demanded social reforms for working class whites in the South and West. For Hohle, whites accept and even seek out social programs, so long as they are

conceptualized under the notion of “white-public” (with “Black-public” being either separate or non-existent). When Roosevelt was elected in 1932, his primary base consisted of populist whites in the South and West; by 1936, the three coalition parties in the North – recent immigrants, white labor unions, and Northern Blacks – began to exert more influence over the party. White Southerners vehemently opposed Blacks joining the coalition, and race was “the single most important issue dividing the New Deal coalition.”¹³⁷ Though Roosevelt made a few half-hearted attempts to include Blacks in the New Deal benefits, he did not dare risk losing the South.¹³⁸ Roosevelt’s reluctance to alienate the South, however, did not stop paranoid Southerners from using “Rooseveltism” as a code for racial revolution. After the advent of the Cold War, however, Democratic Party leaders were armed with Henry Luce’s moral mission to protect the world from tyranny, but Amerika could not defeat the Communists in the battle for hearts and minds around the world if it systematically excluded the people it needed to win over. Thus, in *Brown v. Board of Education*, the Supreme Court overturned the “separate but equal” doctrine, and in 1964, Lyndon B. Johnson signed the Civil Rights Act outlawing discrimination. For the Southern wing of the party, decades of suspicion had been confirmed.¹³⁹ Johnson recognized the implications of the Civil Rights Act, for as he intimated to his press secretary, “we just delivered the South to the Republican Party for a long time to come.”¹⁴⁰

While the Democrats were testing the racial limits of Amerikan pluralism, the Republicans were forging a new tripartite coalition that would become the New Right. Resurgent conservative Republicans constituted first constituency of this coalition. After Hoover’s loss in 1932, the radical Anglo-Saxonists receded and the Republican Party was taken over by the moderate “Eisenhower Republicans” of the northeast. Meanwhile, the radical wing of the Republican Party began to rebuild its base in the southwest. In the 1940s, a steady tide of citizens

began migrating to Arizona and Orange County, California. Corporate elites came from the northeast and started the first venture capital firms in Silicon Valley. Evangelicals, a reformed group of fundamentalists, came from the inland south and organized a series of new churches. Self-described Jeffersonian Democrats came from the Midwest looking for work in the defense sector. By 1960, less than forty-percent of Orange County's population had been born there. Though there was an eclectic mix of ideologies, anticommunism unified them all: the libertarians opposed a socialized economy, the evangelicals opposed atheism, and the traditionalists opposed egalitarianism. William F. Buckley, Jr.'s *National Review* magazine provided a platform for this fusion of conservative ideologies. Grassroots organizing eventually led to Barry Goldwater's 1964 presidential nomination, Ronald Reagan's 1966 election as California governor, and Richard Nixon's presidential election in 1968. Even one of the right's most influential Supreme Court Justices, William Rehnquist, hailed from Arizona. "In Southern California," Mel Piehl writes, "social conservatism was blended with entrepreneurial animal spirits, moral passion was combined with physical toughness, and a fierce individualism was ironically nurtured within strong local communities that valorized such qualities while thriving on federal defense spending."¹⁴¹ As Lisa McGirr has aptly demonstrated, the New Right's national base would look much like its grassroots origin – suburban.¹⁴²

Despite its regional strength, however, the resurgent conservative Republicans could not take over national politics without establishing a coalition with a second group, the recently alienated Southern Democrats. In the 1920s, conservative Republicans and Southern Democrats were political opponents, but the nationwide changes wrought by the New Deal created the conditions for their alliance. In the 1930s, Southerners were primarily concerned about maintaining two things: an agrarian economy and white supremacy. Agrarianism was the idea

that Southern culture and tradition were rooted in economic practices, which revolved around land. White supremacists were primarily concerned about maintaining the white man's democracy, as they called it. By the 1960s, however, economic changes had eliminated the material base for agrarian ideology, and it thus transformed into a set of values, a cultural identity independent of geography. Likewise, political expediency and the need for interregional coalitions caused the white supremacists to change their rhetoric; they were no longer openly concerned about segregation but instead implied the protection of segregation through the principle of states' rights.¹⁴³ Southerners appealed to Northern whites for sympathy regarding segregation, and they were not disappointed. After standing down federal troops white resisting school integration, Alabama governor George Wallace received letters of praise from all over the country. "They all hate black people, all of them. They're all afraid, all of them," he exclaimed. "Great God! That's it! They're all Southern! The whole United States is Southern!"¹⁴⁴ "Being a Southerner is no longer geographic," Wallace later argued. "It's a philosophy and an attitude."¹⁴⁵ Whereas Wallace attempted to stage a coup within the Democratic Party, Strom Thurmond, a Democratic senator from South Carolina, led an exodus from the party, coordinating with the Republicans and supporting Goldwater. In 1964, Thurmond traveled to Orange County where he networked with emerging conservative Republicans, including Ronald Reagan, Pat Robertson, and Barry Goldwater. Much like the coalition between the various ideologies of the Southwest, the West-South Republican coalition was built on an opposition to government intervention and hostility to Communism. By conflating states' rights rhetoric with limited government ideology, the libertarians of the West and the segregationists of the South were able to work together and begin dismantling the New Deal and Civil Rights gains.

The final group to join the New Right's white "conservative" coalition was the urban ethnics who opposed racial integration in Northern cities, such as Chicago. Between 1915 and 1970, millions of Black people moved out of the South and into the industrial centers of the northern cities. These Great Migrations resulted in constant racial tension and periodic racial violence between the newly arrived Black laborers and the white ethnics that dominated the cities. Although by the 1960s Blacks were more politically incorporated in Chicago than any other city in the United States, Mayor Richard J. Daley, an Irish Catholic, ran the city from his seat at the head of the Democratic Party's political machine. Fueled by popular white ethnic opposition to racial integration, Daley employed an anti-Civil Rights law and order operation through the police. Because they believed that Blacks were responsible for crime, almost all white Americans supported the police violence of Daley's crackdown – including the infamous police riot at the 1968 Democratic National Convention. Not only did urban ethnics oppose integrated neighborhoods, they also began to feel betrayed by Democratic Party leaders. These white ethnics had supported the Democratic Party for all these years because they subscribed to the idea that "white-public" meant whites would be the beneficiaries of governmental programs, but by the end of the 1960s, two-thirds of whites believed that Blacks were more likely to get government aid. The white ethnics of the major cities became increasingly suspicious of "liberal elites," as they came to be called, who seemed to have abandoned the groups that constituted what Nixon called the silent majority of forgotten Americans. "Rocked by massive disorders in the cities and frightened at the swiftly rising crime rate, which in traditional fashion had been linked to minorities," Kelley writes, "the white majority in the Northern and Western states began to respond to the same white supremacy beat that had for generations been the basic rhythm of Southern politics."¹⁴⁶ As Southerners appealed to the northern Urban ethnics' desire

for segregation and the Western libertarians appealed to their desire for law and order, the reformist Anglo-Saxons like Franklin Roosevelt no longer appeared as responsible and trustworthy political leaders. Instead, because they became *too* inclusive, they were seen as traitors to the white race.¹⁴⁷

If Andrew Jackson's life and works embodies the Scotch-Irish role in nineteenth-century Amerika, the presidency of Richard M. Nixon represents a tectonic shift in Amerikan white ethnic conflict: the uneasy reconciliation of the caste-minded Anglo-Saxons with whiteness. Standing in the shadow of the post-Civil War reconciliation of the Scotch-Irish and Quakers in Pennsylvania, Nixon inherited a mixed heritage of Scotch-Irish and Quaker. Nixon's grandfather was from a Scotch-Irish settlement in western Pennsylvania, and Nixon's father, Francis A. Nixon, married a Quaker woman from Ohio, Hannah Milhous; they moved to Orange County, CA, where Nixon was born. In true Quaker fashion, Nixon was a Republican from childhood, proclaiming his support for Warren G. Harding when he was only seven. Nixon "had only one mode," Kelley muses: "he was the consummate moralist in politics. Cultural politics in domestic affairs was his only stock in trade."¹⁴⁸ In the 1968 election, Nixon overcame both his association with the Eisenhower administration and the media's unfavorable coverage of his campaign, appealing to both the economic elites in the corporate boardrooms and the foot soldiers in the police and National Guard. Most importantly, he abandoned the classic Anglo-Saxon obsession with exclusivity. By bringing together the conservative Republicans, the urban ethnics, and the South (in 1972), Nixon's presidency represented the white repudiation of social reform and sociological environmentalism and the adoption of moralism and traditionalism. For the first time in Amerikan history, conservative white Catholics and white Protestants reconciled in the face of the liberal-Black threat. "The enemies were clear," Kelley tells us: "agitators, law

breakers, hippies, the culturally deviant. Intellectuals, Jews, blacks, writers and artists, certainly the disorderly and irreverent members of the press – these comprised the opposition.”¹⁴⁹ As a nod to their white suburban base, Vice President Spiro Agnew became the first suburban politician to rise to national office.¹⁵⁰ As a gesture toward their urban ethnic constituency, presidential advisor Daniel Moynihan recommended that Nixon treat the race question with “benign neglect.”¹⁵¹ “In simple language,” Eldridge Cleaver wrote in a draft of an essay on “The Nixon Question,” “Nixon conceives of himself as speaking for the majority of the white people of America. He makes no pretense of speaking for the blacks, Puerto Ricans, Mexicans, and Indians.” This white conservative coalition was a somewhat successful political strategy, but conflict between the various factions remained a problem until the end of the twentieth century, illustrated by the feud between the neoconservatives and the paleoconservatives in the 1990s.¹⁵² This conflict, however, was not merely an ideological dispute; it represented the vestiges of ethnic conflict between Anglo-Saxons and their white Others. Cleaver saw this right from the beginning: “Nixon’s aim is to shatter the structure that grew out of the melting pot, and consolidate anew an Anglo-Saxon view of what the United States is.”¹⁵³

Conclusion

Attending to the history of Anglo-Saxonism in Amerika forces philosophers to temper their reliance on whiteness studies, for one monolithic form of whiteness has not always been the most salient determining factor of colonial practices in Amerikan history. This history of Anglo-Saxonism and whiteness resolves the problems of whiteness studies as pointed out by Kolchin and Wiegman. First, as Kolchin observes, whiteness is not singular but plural, for all forms of whiteness in the Amerikan context represent different and competing strategies of colonialism. Whiteness emerged in competition with Anglo-Saxon chauvinism and elitism as a means by

which non-Saxon whites could carve out their own place of belonging in the Amerikan Empire. The seventeenth-century makeshift southern aristocracy, the eighteenth-century Scotch-Irish immigrants, the nineteenth-century Irish Catholics, and the twentieth-century New Deal coalition each represent important stages in the development of whiteness in Amerika. As Anglo-Saxon ideology waned and power slipped from the hands of the old stock WASP elites, Anglo-Saxon values underwent two important transliterations. On the international level, the Anglo-Saxon's universal civilizing mission was transferred from blood to nation when Anglo-Saxon exceptionalism became Amerikan exceptionalism in the mid-twentieth century. On the domestic level, a sublimated Anglo-Saxonist inclination reappeared in the post-World War II Republican Party and high jacked "whiteness" from the Democratic Party, the party that had spent over 150 years constructing whiteness as a salient political identity. Thus, even if we were to simply denote Anglo-Saxonism as a specific type of whiteness – as I think we should – the lesson for contemporary philosophy is clear: whiteness has different meanings for different groups of whites, and unless these differences are attended to, it will be impossible to render an adequate assessment of historical, political, or ideological understanding of how Empire operates.

Second, as Wiegman warns, positioning European ethnics outside the hegemonic power of whiteness – whether as prewhite ethnics, off white ethnics, or new ethnics – threatens to obscure and conceal the role that European ethnics played in constructing whiteness in the first place, absolving their responsibility for pursuing a form of social mobility predicated on colonialism. For example, whiteness studies and the neo-confederate movement view non-Anglo-Saxon Europeans in a similar way. According to neo-confederate thinkers, the Civil War was not a conflict between Anglo-Saxons and Anglo-Normans, as many antebellum southerners argued at the time; rather, it was a conflict between *English* and *Celt*.¹⁵⁴ This reconfiguration of

Amerikan ethnic history positions “Celts” outside of and subject to the hegemonic power of English (read: white) power. James P. Cantrell, a proponent of the neo-confederate literary movement, argues this point explicitly: “white peoples are not monolithic but are divided into a myriad of ethnic, cultural, religious, and socio-economic groups, some of whom, like Celts, have been victims of a longstanding ethnic-cultural discrimination and violence not all that dissimilar from those of Native Americans, Africans, and Jews.”¹⁵⁵ In this retelling of white ethnic history, Cantrell’s “Celts” are vaguely but surely placed alongside various colonized groups, and groups like the Scotch-Irish and the Irish Catholics are mysteriously absolved of their role in the creation of white supremacy. Whiteness studies scholarship – which starts from the premises that (1) whiteness has always been the hegemonic source of power in Amerika and (2) that the Irish were at one time “not white” – cannot reply to the neo-confederate claim precisely because they share almost identical starting principles. To resolve this impasse, anticolonial social ontology shows not only that different forms of whiteness permeate Amerikan political history but also that these competing forms of whiteness pursue different assimilationist practices. As a form of whiteness, Anglo-Saxonism thinks of itself as universal and often seeks to assimilate all peoples into its cultural logic, include European ethnics and non-European racial groups, such as Black Amerikans. The form of whiteness that emerged in opposition to Anglo-Saxon whiteness rejected the Anglo-conformity model of cultural diffusion, positing instead a melting pot model that welcomed all Europeans but excluded all non-Europeans. Though they pursue conflicting colonial relations, they assume the same colonial ontology.

Chapter II and Chapter III have attempted to resolve the shortcomings of Charles Mills’s racial contract theory by constructing an anticolonial social ontology and re-thinking the various roles of whiteness in Amerikan history. Chapter II responded to Mills’s insufficient criticism of

capitalism and his problematic reading of Du Bois as a mere “critical race theorist” by developing a conceptual apparatus for understanding the colonial ontology of Empire. Chapter III responded to Mills’s reliance whiteness studies by providing a more dynamic conception of whiteness as it has emerged in the Amerikan Empire. As a result, we can now understand the material conditions of colonialism as the basis for racism and track the patterns of colonial domination, assimilation, and elimination in the world of Anglo-Saxon imperialism. But anticolonialism has far reaching implications in the areas of political and social theory, which is why we must now turn to the anticolonial philosophies of Martin R. Delany and Eldridge Cleaver, who reconceived sovereignty and sex/gender/sexuality in their attempt to resist the zone of nonbeing from within the belly of the imperial beast.

CHAPTER IV

“WE HAVE NOT ADDRESSED YOU AS *CITIZENS*”: MARTIN R. DELANY, COLONIAL SOVEREIGNTY, AND BLACK POSITIVISM IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERIKA

“The words ‘people of the United States’ and ‘citizens’ are synonymous terms, and mean the same thing. They both describe the political body who, according to our republican institutions, form the sovereignty and who hold the power and conduct the Government through their representatives. They are what we familiarly call the ‘sovereign people,’ and every citizen is one of this people, and a constituent member of this sovereignty... But it is too clear for dispute that the enslaved African race were not intended to be included.”

– Chief Justice Roger B. Taney, *Scott v. Sandford*, 60 U.S. 393 (1857)

“Madam, you do not know the gentleman with whom you are conversing; if there be one man among us to whose opinion I would yield on the subject of government generally, that man is before you now.”

– Frederick Douglass, regarding Martin R. Delany¹

“Fellow countrymen!” he exclaimed, standing before the delegates of the National Emigration Convention of Colored Men in 1854. “Our task... shall be to place before you our true position in this country – the United States –, the improbability of realizing our desires, and the sure, practicable and infallible remedy for the evils we now endure.” As he stood before his audience – his hands gripping the wooden edge of the podium, his eyes squinting in the late-summer sun – the thirty-eight-year-old physician delivered a seven-hour report on the “Political Destiny of the Colored Race on the American Continent.” In a direct response to Frederick Douglass, who had emphatically greeted his audience as “fellow citizens” at the Colored National Convention the previous year, Martin R. Delany had chosen his greeting carefully – “countrymen,” not “citizens.” Unlike those, including Douglass, who advanced a legalistic conception of citizenship, Delany argued that true citizenship was not a product of the law but a product of sovereignty. As an expert on the history of modern political theory, Delany understood the principle of legislative sovereignty, namely, that the primary power of a sovereign entity is the power to make law. In Delany’s conception of legislative sovereignty, citizenship was not a

product of law; rather, law was a product of sovereignty, and true citizenship meant real participation in sovereign power. Because his task at the Emigration Convention was to explain the true political condition of Black people in Amerika, Delany could not, in good conscience, address the delegates as citizens. After all, Black people had never enjoyed access to the legislative process. “We have not addressed you as *citizens*,” he forcefully and frankly explained to his attentive audience, “because such you have never been.”²

Despite Delany’s insightful and elaborate theorization of the intricate connections between law, sovereignty, and citizenship in the colonial context, contemporary political philosophy in general and Africana political theory in particular remain ensnared by the shortcomings Carl Schmitt’s theory of sovereignty. In *Political Theology*, Schmitt argues that the sovereign is the political figure, often the executive, entrusted with the power to announce a “state of exception” – a situation in which the juridical order is suspended without being abolished. As Schmitt concisely puts it, “Sovereign is he who decides on the exception.”³ In the early 1990s, theorists turned to Schmitt’s work in an effort to give new life to leftist political theory, and as a result, his definition of sovereignty has become the cornerstone of politics among poststructuralists and critical theorists.⁴ Giorgio Agamben, Jacques Derrida, and Judith Butler have all developed criticisms of sovereign power based on the formulation provided by Schmitt, all of which insist upon the extralegal positioning of sovereignty.⁵ More recently, Africana political theorists have engaged with Schmitt and Agamben’s formulations of extrajudicial sovereign power. Utz McKnight’s *Race and the Politics of the Exception: Equality, Sovereignty, and American Democracy*, Alexander G. Weheliye’s *Habeas Viscus: Racializing Assemblages, Biopolitics, and Black Feminist Theories of the Human*, and Michael Hanchard’s *Party/Politics: Horizons in Black Political Thought*, for example, each present analyses of race

through the lens of Schmitt and Agamben's accounts of the state of exception.⁶ In his now famous essay "Necropolitics," Achille Mbembe draws a parallel between Schmitt's state of exception and the political ontology of subjugated peoples around the world. On the one hand, he argues that "the very structure of the plantation system and its aftermath manifests the emblematic and paradoxical figure of the state of exception." On the other hand, he contends that "colonies are the location par excellence where the controls and guarantees of judicial order can be suspended – the zone where the violence of the state of exception is deemed to operate in the service of 'civilization.'" ⁷ Likewise, in *Agamben and Colonialism*, Marcelo Svirsky and Simone Bignall have even argued that "Agamben's thought provides us with an essential set of concepts for critical debates around colonialism and colonial states of exception."⁸

While the state of exception has become the dominant paradigm in contemporary theories of sovereignty, it is predicated on theoretical confusions and empirical mistakes. The theoretical confusion is embedded in Schmitt's inaccurate genealogy, in which he traces the state of exception back to Jean Bodin's 1576 work *Six Books of the Commonwealth*, arguing that Bodin primarily defined sovereignty by its "authority to suspend valid law."⁹ In fact, Bodin defined sovereignty in the exact opposite way: by the power to make law. "The first attribute of the sovereign prince," Bodin writes, "is the power to make law binding on all his subjects."¹⁰ Against Schmitt, political theorist Daniel Engster observes that Bodin's "theory of sovereignty represented a conceptual breakthrough in the history of political thought that shifted the fundamental ground of legitimate order from the existing laws to the law-making prince."¹¹ The empirical mistake emerges in applications of the "state of exception" to contemporary politics, which leads scholars to falsely claim that contemporary politics is primarily defined by the absence of law. In *State of Exception*, for example, Agamben argues that there has been a

suspension of the law under the War on Terror, but when he confronts the reality of law, he is forced to acknowledge that the War on Terror is not pursued outside the law but through the law. Explaining the executive powers exercised by Woodrow Wilson during and after World War I – censoring and imprisoning various “seditious” individuals – Agamben notes how Wilson operated differently from other presidents, such as Abraham Lincoln: “instead of ignoring Congress, as Lincoln had done, Wilson preferred each time to have the powers in question delegated to him by Congress. In this regard, his practice of government is closer to...the current one, which instead of declaring the state of exception prefers to have *exceptional laws* issued.”¹² Agamben cannot claim an absence of law because that is empirically false, but his now-exposed liberal proclivities force him to imply a distinction between “exceptional laws” (which he never defines or explains and never returns to in his analysis) and “regular laws” (which he does not seem to have a problem with). Because Agamben cannot conceive of law as a tool of power and oppression *as such*, he cannot explain the legal practices of the War on Terror without recourse to dubious distinctions between exceptional and regular laws. From within the “state of exception” paradigm, there is no possible way to analyze law *as such* as a tool of oppression, in colonial contexts or otherwise.

Unlike the “state of exception” tradition, Delany understood the history of Western political thought, and he recognized the centrality of what can be called *legislative sovereignty*. The modern conception of legislative sovereignty, which Engster names “the central principle of modern state theory,”¹³ first appeared in Bodin’s *Six Books of the Commonwealth*. While Bodin’s conception of sovereign power was original when it first appeared, nearly every political theorist who followed him either explicitly or implicitly adopted the principle of legislative sovereignty.¹⁴ By the beginning of the nineteenth century, the power to make law was the defining feature of all

political power. Indeed, John Austin's *The Province of Jurisprudence Determined*, one of the most influential works of nineteenth-century Anglophone political theory, defined sovereignty as the power to make law. An avid reader, Delany immersed himself in the texts of any area he studied, and that is especially true of political theory. As Delany biographer Victor Ullman notes, Delany "had absorbed more of ancient and modern social and political philosophy than most whites or blacks."¹⁵ Delany had already begun to develop his political theory while editing his newspaper *The Mystery* in the mid-1840s, and in 1848, after joining with Frederick Douglass to start *The North Star*, Delany intensified his study of political philosophy during his promotional tour for the paper across the Midwest. By the early 1850s, when Delany published some of his most important and influential works in political theory, the connection between law and sovereignty occupied the center of his thinking.

Despite Delany's reputation among his contemporaries for being a skilled political thinker, scholars have largely failed to investigate, elucidate, or analyze his conceptions of law, sovereignty and citizenship in any rigorous manner. Setting aside the literary scholarship on Delany's only novel, *Blake; or, The Huts of America*, Delany scholarship has developed in two basic phases. During the first phase (1960-1985), scholars contributed biographical and historical understandings of Delany, establishing the details of his life and celebrating his contributions to Black Nationalism and Pan-Africanism.¹⁶ During the second phase (1985-2010), scholars challenged the celebratory image of Delany, alternatively arguing that he was a conservative elitist who ignored the perspective of working class Blacks or a pragmatic anti-essentialist who abandoned his Black Nationalism in favor of a more hopeful integrationist program.¹⁷ In over fifty years of scholarship on Delany, only three scholars have seriously discussed the Delany's political philosophy. Tommie Shelby and Tommy J. Curry have debated the nature of Delany's

Black Nationalist thinking, disagreeing about Delany's descriptive and normative aims, but neither attends to the complexity of his larger political theory.¹⁸ Only Robert M. Khan's "The Political Ideology of Martin R. Delany" provides insights into Delany's approach to Constitutional interpretation, criteria for citizenship, and the primacy of nations.¹⁹ Although Khan does offer some helpful and accurate insights regarding Delany's overall political thought, he does not contextualize Delany's ideas by placing them within the history of political philosophy broadly or Africana political theory in particular.

This chapter explores the political theory of Martin Delany, placing the development of his thought in its historical context and demonstrating its resonance with the anticolonial tradition of Africana political thought. The first section provides the historical context for understanding Delany's reflections on national and international political trends from within the expanding American Empire. Delany carefully observed the transformations and trends in American legal thought and understood the political and ethnological battles going on between the elitist Federalist and Whigs (who tended to subscribe to an Anglo-Saxonist ethnology) and the populist Democrats (who tended to subscribe to a Caucasianist ethnology). Unlike Frederick Douglass, Delany knew that the former maintained a fidelity to the common law and natural law traditions while the latter increasingly embraced positivism. The second section explains Delany's empiricism, which also inspired his turn to positivism. Because Delany distinguished between the moral realm and the practical realm, he argued that natural law arguments, which were simply moral appeals, were unable to transform the state of legal affairs in the United States. Sovereignty is a central concept of positivism, but unlike other sovereignty theorists, Delany correctly understands sovereignty as a product of colonialism. As international law scholar Antony Anghie reminds us, "no adequate account of sovereignty can be given without

analyzing the constitutive effect of colonialism on sovereignty. Colonialism was not an example of the application of sovereignty; rather, sovereignty was constituted through colonialism,” which is why “sovereignty can be understood only in terms of its complex relationship with the colonial encounter and the constellation of racial and cultural distinctions it generated and elaborated.”²⁰ The third section turns to Delany’s comment that Black people in Amerika constitute “a nation within a nation.” Many scholars, including Tommie Shelby, have mistakenly viewed Delany’s statement as a normative claim, when in fact Delany was offering an empirical claim based on both his sociological understanding of the Black *condition* in Amerika and his observation that subjugated internal nations within nation-states is the historical norm. In positivist terms, internal nations are excluded from the exercise of legislative sovereignty. The fourth section explains Delany’s views on citizenship, including both his description of Black citizenship as it existed and his normative ideal for what a citizenship looks like for a liberated Black nation. Only by understanding Delany’s advocacy for republican citizenship, which would entail Black participation in legislative sovereignty, is it possible to understand why he ultimately recommends emigration for Black people in Amerika. Delany’s political theory represents an anticolonial contribution to the debates surrounding law, sovereignty, and citizenship, and by drawing on his pioneering social and political thought, anticolonial theory can translate the colonial ontology of Empire into the language of political theory.

Political and Legal Theory in the Works of Douglass and Delany, Ethnologically Considered

From the colonial period to the Civil War, natural law theory was the dominant mode of Amerikan legal thought, but during the antebellum period, positivist theories began to challenge the unquestioned supremacy of natural law. Having inherited the natural law and natural rights traditions from their eighteenth-century forebearers, many Americans of the early-nineteenth-

century articulated their politics with reference to an unchanging and eternal order, and though it appeared in various permutations, such appeals remained the most common form meta-legal analysis before the Civil War. Nevertheless, party politics, ethnic conflict, democratic ideals, and an emerging scientific disposition fostered a transformation in Amerikan legal thought.

Increasingly suspicious of the Federalists' elitism and their connections to England, law reformers began to gravitate toward the Democratic Party; from the administration of Thomas Jefferson to Stephen A. Douglas's call for popular sovereignty in the 1850s, these reformers worked to limit the power of lawyers and judges by initiating constitutional and legal reforms designed to strengthen the statute law of the legislatures at the expense of the common law of the courts. Between 1845 and 1860, both Frederick Douglass and Martin Delany engaged in legal discourse they thought would both accurately describe and ultimately resolve the racial problems faced by Blacks in the United States, but their different methods of understanding resulted in divergent theories of law and competing diagnoses of white supremacy. Douglass, who lived his entire free life among the Anglo-Saxonists of the Northeast, adopted Anglo-Saxon ways of speaking and thinking, including natural law theory and Anglo-Saxon universalism. Delany, on the other hand, lived much of his life in western Pennsylvania, a Scotch-Irish stronghold, and the Midwest, which means he observed firsthand the development of antebellum whiteness based on the rejection of Anglo-Saxon elitism. Given his close proximity to the emerging ethnic, political, and legal trends of the day, Delany understood the nuances in ethnology and was therefore able to identify, explain, and respond to the legal trends of the day in a way Douglass could not.

During the early-nineteenth century, Americans held a near consensus that natural law was the proper foundation of the Amerikan legal system. Natural law has a long history in Western political thought, stretching back to Greek and Roman philosophy, but it was the

modern natural law theory of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries that inspired most American thinkers of the antebellum period. “Based upon commonly assumed principles of morality,” Peter J. King explains, natural law and natural rights philosophy of the nineteenth century “had emphasized equality, individual volition, and government by contract as an expression of consent. Rights were derived from nature and society; and the state or government was viewed basically as an instrument of convenience rather than as one of necessity.”²¹ In constitutional law, most writers assumed that the Constitution existed for two reasons: to protect the basic natural rights of individuals and to limit the government’s powers. In statute law, it was assumed that legislation reflected natural law principles. Though there was some disagreement regarding the political and economic content of these rights, few seriously questioned the existence of natural law or the legitimacy of appealing to it as a ground for legal argument.²² Appealing to natural law was not merely a strategy for terminating discussion by pointing to absolutes; rather, natural law and natural rights were assumed to derive from human nature. Because political theorists of the day believed that political science required a proper understanding of human nature, appeals to natural law and natural rights were unavoidable.

Despite the ubiquity of natural law discourse, ethnic and political tensions began to emerge over the proper understanding of law – natural or otherwise – and thus grafted itself onto the division between Federalists and Democrats. The Federalists tended to look to England as a model political culture, and the common law was a central component in this identification. Because they were, in many ways, political and cultural elitists, the Federalists tended to be suspicious of popular power and democracy. When framing the Constitution, the Federalists granted more power to the executive as a way to check the legislature; as Clement Fatovic writes, according to the Federalists, “whenever individuals act together in large numbers, the

violent passions tend to overwhelm the voice of reason and the better inclinations of the calm passions.”²³ After the Constitution was ratified, the Federalists tended to look to the courts as the site where the natural law could be translated into common law.²⁴ Richard H. Helmholz notes that “the law of nature was cited as providing a rationale for judicial decisions with a fair degree of regularity, including cases where what we would describe as human rights were at stake.”²⁵

Against the Anglo-Saxonist Federalists’ fascination with and support for natural law and common law understandings of the American legal system, antebellum law reformers turned to codification, constitutional conventions, and popular sovereignty to reinforce white political power broadly construed. The codification movement, which began in the late-eighteenth century and culminated in the 1850s, represented an attack on both the natural law and common law traditions. As legal historian Lawrence M. Friedman writes, there was “no greater affront to the common-law tradition” than the codification movement.²⁶ “For many Americans,” King observes, “the Common Law was suspect simply because it was British...Such feelings were held especially by the Jeffersonian [r]epublicans, who tended to be more anti-British than their Federalist counterparts.”²⁷ During the Jacksonian period, law reformers became increasingly encouraged by the populism of the day, and they gradually turned to the work of Jeremy Bentham for inspiration. Bentham, the intellectual father of legal positivism, despised both natural law thinking and common law practices. He considered the former intellectually muddled and the latter practically incoherent. In an effort to rationalize and simplify law, Bentham advocated the creation of legal codes, a process he called codification. “Codification was the culmination of Bentham’s legal theory and his legal reforms,” King describes. “The very word itself was Bentham’s invention, a sure indication that Bentham looked upon it in a unique and quite distinctive light” and as “the final triumph of law as a conscious and deliberate creation of

the sovereign.”²⁸ The Jacksonian reformers who took up this Benthamite thinking offered several explicit reasons. First, they opposed the continued influence of English law in the United States and desired a distinctly American legal code. Second, they also opposed the “legal aristocracy” consisting of judges and lawyers, and they advocated for a more democratic structure in the legal system. Third, the growth of America was too rapid and therefore confusing, but a code would facilitate democratic access to the law. Finally, a code would place limitations on the government and circumscribe state power, thereby promoting individual liberty.²⁹ Between David Dudley Field’s 1848 codification efforts in New York and the Civil War, twelve states adopted legal codes on the Bentham-Dudley model.³⁰

While the legal reformers were pushing their codification initiatives, many states were revising their constitutions to expand white populist political ideals. Just as the spirit of Jacksonian populism inspired the codifiers, the revisers of the state constitutions thought of themselves as perfecting the democratic structure of the state governments. They revised the qualifications for voting, circumscribed the scope of state legislative power, and included provisions governing state-level political economy. “State constitution-makers,” writes G. Alan Tarr, “came to view constitution making as a progressive enterprise, requiring the constant readjustment of past practices and institutional arrangements in light of changes in circumstance and political thought.”³¹ The new circumstances, however, were saturated with racial concerns. It is here that the Jacksonian legacy is most visible. For example, New England, which was largely isolated from Jacksonian ideas, amended but did not rewrite its constitutions; these states not only opposed universal white male suffrage but also refused to place racial barriers on voting rights. By contrast, in the South, Midwest, and Appalachia, universal white male suffrage was the rule of the day. The “campaign to extend the franchise to white males was paralleled by an

effort to disenfranchise African-Americans and other people of color,” Tarr notes. “In some states, the decision to exclude African-Americans was made by popular referendum...In others convention delegates followed the developing practice of disenfranchisement in revising their constitutions.”³² Between 1800 and 1860, thirty-seven states wrote new constitutions and fifteen others revised their constitutions, and during the crucial years between 1844 and 1853, more than half the existing states had constitutional conventions.³³

As existing states were revising their constitutions to include white men but exclude everyone else, entering states were turning to popular sovereignty to resolve the question of slavery in the territories. While the legal reformers were pushing their codes and the constitutional reformers were revising their state documents, Midwestern Democrats were advocating the use of white populism to decide whether slavery would be permitted in new states, such as Missouri and Kansas. Michigan Senator and Democratic Party member Lewis Cass began pushing the notion of popular sovereignty during his 1848 presidential campaign, but Stephen A. Douglas would become famous for his support of the principle by including it in the 1854 Kansas-Nebraska Act. With the sectional crisis growing and westward expansion slowing down, Douglas was eager to get Manifest Destiny moving again. To resolve the debate regarding slavery in the territories, he appealed to the spirit of Jacksonian populism, arguing that those living in the territories should decide the question.³⁴ Of course, as a champion of the white race, Douglas excluded Black people from his definition of popular sovereignty. According to biographer James L. Huston, Douglas “divided the world into Europeans and non-Europeans; democracy only belonged to the European part of the human family. At a time of rising prejudice aimed at immigrants and especially the Irish, Douglas stood as a stalwart champion of their inclusion in American politics and economic life...democracy was a system inclusive of people,

and Douglas's democracy did not include all people."³⁵ Thus, during the 1840s and 50s, a wave of legal, constitutional, and political reform resulted in a number of important changes to the governmental structure of Amerika, and under the spell of Jacksonian democracy, these changes largely reflected the growing white supremacy of the day, which was opposed to both Black political participation and Anglo-Saxon cultural elitism.

Given the political differences between the Northeast and the rest of the country during the two decades before the Civil War, it makes sense that Douglass and Delany would develop different analyses of the white supremacist situation in Amerika. But the differences between Delany and Douglass on law are rooted in the differences between their understandings of the trends in antebellum Amerikan ethnology. Gregory D. Smithers has claimed that "By far the most articulate exponent of black abolitionism and evolutionary ethnology was Frederick Douglass," but when Douglass's commentary on ethnology are placed in context – a context in which Anglo-Saxonists and Caucasianists disagreed about the boundaries and sources of racial superiority – we can see the claim is false.³⁶ For example, Douglass's widely praised speech "The Claims of the Negro Ethnologically Considered" is often credited with debunking the pseudo-scientific claims of white superiority and Black inferiority advanced by Amerikan ethnologists, but Douglass failed to grasp the distinction between Teutonic and Caucasian ethnologies.³⁷ Though Douglass is responding to ethnologists who, like Josiah C. Nott and George Gliddon, argued that Caucasians were, as Reginald Horsman puts it, "the sole standard-bearers of civilization," Douglass failed to even use the word "Caucasian" in his speech. Instead, he makes repeated reference to the "Anglo-Saxons," whom he envisions not as a biological race but as a cultural embodiment of Protestant, republican civilization.³⁸ Part of the reason that Douglass emphasized Anglo-Saxons was that he believed in the universality of Anglo-Saxon

civilization. As Douglass biographer Waldo E. Martin Jr. notes, Douglass “believed in both racial equality and cultural hierarchy,” especially “the common nineteenth-century belief in and admiration for a reputed Anglo-Saxon genius for republican government...Douglass unequivocally advocated total Negro assimilation into the white, Anglo-Saxon Protestant-dominated political culture.”³⁹ Douglass was unquestionably an Anglo-Saxonist at heart: he believed that the United States was ultimately a force for good in the world, but that it could not live up to its potential until slavery was ended and race prejudice was eliminated from the heart of all Americans. From the 1850s to the 1880s, Douglass continued to appeal to the “good white people” of his day – those Anglo-Saxonists who eventually gravitated into the Republican Party – to stop the “bad white people” of his day – the white populists and slaveholders who gravitated to the Democratic Party.⁴⁰ Douglass’s commitment to Anglo-Saxonism, then, prevented him from understanding the contestation of whiteness among the ethnological thinkers of his day.

Unlike Douglass, Delany expressed an astute understanding of the ethnological and political tensions between various white ethnicities during the antebellum period. On the one hand, in the 1830s and the 40s, Delany engaged in a series of studies in medicine and ethnology, and by the 1850s, Delany was offering lectures in these fields.⁴¹ These studies became the basis for his last book, *Principia of Ethnology: The Origins of Races and Color*.⁴² On the other hand, Delany observed the development of white political populism first hand, first during his 1839 travels in the American South and second during his Midwestern tour for the *North Star* in the late-1840s. Combining his ethnological training with his direct observation of political events, Delany discerned the differences between the political manifestations of Caucasianist and Anglo-Saxonist ethnologies. In an 1852 letter, Delany chastised Douglass for refusing to review his book on Black emigration, but in the course of his criticism, he took the opportunity to rebuff

Douglass's appeals to Anglo-Saxonism, referring to the "*Anglo-Saxon race*" as "the most inveterate enemy of the *colored* races, of whatever origin – whether African, Mongolian, Malayan, or Indian."⁴³ Delany followed up on his remark in "Political Destiny of the Colored Race on the American Continent," differentiating the Anglo-Saxons and the Anglo-Americans. "[F]or more than two thousand years," Delany protested, "the determined aim of the whites has been to crush the colored races wherever found. With a determined will they have sought and pursued them in every quarter of the globe. The Anglo-Saxon has taken the lead in this work of universal subjugation. But the Anglo-American stands pre-eminent for the deeds of injustice and acts of oppression, unparalleled perhaps in the annals of modern history."⁴⁴ Not only does Delany display his awareness of the difference between Anglo-Saxonists and Caucasianists, he also demonstrates, contra Douglass, his opposition to Anglo-Saxon assimilation. As Tunde Adeleke comments, Delany "portrayed this worldwide assault on blacks as a co-operative venture between the two dominant sections of the Caucasian race – Anglo-Saxons and Anglo-Americans. While Anglo-Saxons sought 'universal subjugation' through imperialism, Anglo-Americans took care of the rear by defending white supremacy in America."⁴⁵

The debates between Delany and Douglass have been widely explored, but by placing those debates in the context of antebellum political trends, we gain a new perspective on their disagreements. While Delany was observing the trends in white Jacksonian populism in Western Pennsylvania, the Midwest, and the South, Douglass was sequestered in the Northeast with the Anglo-Saxonists. While Delany was studying ethnological sciences and determining their varied tendencies, Douglass wrongly subsumed all ethnology under the Anglo-Saxon rubric. Thus, Delany, unlike Douglass, understood the how the political and ethnological battles of the 1840s and 50s converged and coalesced, and he was able to anticipate direction that American legal

thought was heading. Natural law approaches were increasingly unpopular among white Jacksonian populists, and appeals to substantive, universal, and transcendent principles were regarded as suspect. They turned to codification campaigns, constitutional conventions, and call for popular sovereignty as alternatives to natural law thinking, and if they accepted any principles of natural law at all, it was the idea that a “people” have a right to create the laws that will govern their political community. In the context of Jacksonian democracy, however, the “people” were conceived of as exclusively white, which meant that non-white people did not constitute part of the sovereign people invested with the power to make their own positive law. Delany saw this trend and developed a Black radical legal positivism in response.

*From Natural Law to Positive Law: Delany’s Legal Positivism and the Empirical Turn in
Nineteenth-Century Black Jurisprudence*

Delany was trained in several sciences, so it should be no surprise that he developed a scientific way of seeing the world, and unlike Douglass, who favored a specifically moralistic approach to social and political issues, Delany was an empirically minded social thinker. Though his scientific disposition has not received proper scholarly recognition, understanding this aspect of Delany’s thought is essential for understanding his positivistic legal philosophy. Douglass never wavered in his commitment to natural law arguments, and even of the Civil War, he argued, “By that law [of natural justice], universal, ‘unchangeable and eternal,’ everyman is the rightful owner of his own body, and to dispossess his of this right, is, and can only be, among the highest crimes which can be committed against human nature.” Most importantly, Douglass added: “The only foundation for slavery is positive law against natural law.”⁴⁶ Charles Mills has criticized Douglass for not abandoning his naturalism in favor of a more empirical philosophy of law. “Douglass could theoretically have taken a positivist position and conceded that proslavery

legislation was *legally* valid while still condemning it from a *moral* point of view,” he insists. “It is obviously far easier for us,” Mills nevertheless concedes, “with the benefit of more than a century of intervening legal theory, to appreciate the wide range of possible positions, with their respective implications, on the relationship between morality and law.”⁴⁷ We need not give Douglass the historical benefit of the doubt, however, for Delany *did* develop a positivist account of law, based in an empirical approach to political theory, and he did so without the benefit of more than a century of intervening legal theory.

Even though Delany disagreed with Douglass’s natural law strategy for achieving citizenship rights for Black people in America, he acknowledged the basic validity of the claim. In *The Condition, Elevation, Emigration, and Destiny of the Colored People of the United States, Politically Considered*, Delany provides all the evidence one might need to substantiate natural law justifications for Black citizenship rights. “The legitimate requirement, politically considered,” Delany avers, “necessary to the justifiable claims for protection and full enjoyment of all the rights and privileges of an unqualified freeman, in all democratic countries is, that each person so endowed, shall have made contributions and investments in the country.”⁴⁸ Black people had, of course, done so. Not only did Black men and women literally build the United States as slave laborers, Delany argues, they also contributed to the social, economic, and political development of the country, past and present. He dedicates nearly one hundred pages – approximately half of the book – to recounting the Black soldiers, business owners, mechanics, farmers, scholars, theologians, physicians, and poets who had made “contributions and investments” in the United States, from the founding of Jamestown to the 1850s.⁴⁹ “We are Americans,” Delany concedes, “having a birthright citizenship – natural claims upon the country – claims common to all others of our fellow citizens – natural rights, which may, by virtue of

unjust laws, be obstructed, but never annulled,” and if these facts do not establish such a natural right, then nothing will.⁵⁰ By any meaningful standard, he concludes, the evidence unquestionably demonstrates the natural right of Black people in North America to claim and be granted full and unabridged rights as citizens of the nation.

The problem with this argument, Delany insists, is that it rests on a confusion of moral and physical laws. In chapter four of *The Condition*, Delany identifies three types of law – spiritual, moral, and physical – and each type of law governs a distinct aspect of the universe. According to Delany, each type of law demands a specific means for actualizing desires within the various spheres. For example, if one desires “spiritual blessing,” then they ought to pray. This distinction means that the moral and physical realms require different means for achieving the desired results. Political considered, Delany denies that political questions can be solved or resolved through moral means. “Moral theories have long been resorted to by us, as a means of effecting the redemption of our brethren in bonds, and the elevation of the free colored people in this country,” he laments. “Experience has taught us,” however, “that speculations are not enough; that the *practical* application of principles adduced, the thing carried out, is the only true and proper course to pursue.”⁵¹ Appealing to moral principles might cultivate moral good or even a sense of justice on the part of the individual, but political problems are not resolved through the laws of morals, Delany writes. Political problems are practical problems, and the only way to solve a practical problem is through action, through work. “We have speculated and moralized much about equality,” he observes, “all of which, may do very well in ethics – but not in politics.”⁵² Given this separation of the moral and the physical, the speculative and the practical, Delany denies natural law arguments any efficacy in the realm of politics.

While political questions must be resolved through practical action in the realm of physical laws, Delany also argues that Black people must use their intellects to diagnose the problem and understand their *condition*. In *The Origin and Objects of Ancient Freemasonry*, Delany argues that the human is made of three distinct systems: physical, moral, and intellectual. He refers to the intellect as “a mind, the constituent principles of which he is capable of analyzing or comprehending.”⁵³ In the physical realm, the intellect is used to observe empirical data and synthesize such data into a coherent analysis using inductive reasoning. In the preface to *The Condition*, Delany explains that his argument is built upon two sources: first, “fragments of history, pamphlets, files of newspapers”; and second, “living facts known to the writer in his travels through the United States, having been from Canada and Maine to Arkansas and Texas.”⁵⁴ While much scholarly attention has been given to Delany’s emigrationism – almost to the point of obsession – the title of the work clearly delineates the ordinal relationship between the several themes of the book. First, we must understand the *condition* of Black people in Amerika. Second, having derived an adequate empirical description of the Black condition, we may inquire about the means of their *elevation*. Third, *emigration* may be proposed as a remedy to their degraded condition and as a practical means of elevation. And finally, after this process, it becomes possible to discuss the *destiny* of the colored people of the United States. For Delany, then, “condition” is a technical philosophical term – it refers to the processes of observation and induction, what we might call social science today. Hence, Delany can claim that “Experience has taught us” that moral appeals in the political realm are pointless, for they do not begin with an empirically-based assessment of conditions, the prerequisite of all programmatic political platforms. “We must abandon all vague theory,” Delany demands, “and look at *facts* as they really are; viewing ourselves in our true political position in the body politic.”⁵⁵ And for Delany,

this scientific approach is distinctly Black, for the Egyptians and the Ethiopians were the first to reflect on the science of government inquire into their people's "true state and condition."⁵⁶

Delany intended for *The Condition* to be read by a wide audience and therefore "studiously avoided using political and legal phrases,"⁵⁷ but he develops the legal and political theory implied in *The Condition* his "Political Destiny of the Colored Race on the American Continent." In this speech, Delany reiterates his empirical commitments to the study of the Black condition: "For years we have been studiously and jealously observing the course of political events and policy on the part of this country, both in a national and individual State capacity, as pursued toward the colored people. And he who, in the midst of them, can live without observation, is either inexcusably ignorant, or reprehensibly deceptive and untrustworthy."⁵⁸ But Delany translates this empirical position into a tenant of legal philosophy, arguing, "When the condition of the inhabitants of any country is fixed by legal grades of distinction, this condition can never be changed except by express legislation."⁵⁹ For Delany, the positive law created by the legislature determines the legal status of the members – and non-members – of a political community, and such law is announced and enforced by a sovereign body with legislative authority. "Where there is no *acknowledged sovereignty*," he declares, "there can be no binding power."⁶⁰ Consistent with his rejection of natural law arguments, Delany places legislative sovereignty, the practical means of political power, at the center of his legal theory.

While the debate between Delany and Douglass was, at least partly, about emigration and integration, it was also about competing philosophies of law. From the 1850s onward, Douglass maintained his naturalism and continued to appeal to the force of moral obligation that natural law principles were thought to impose. Delany, however, rejected moralistic thinking in the practical realm, insisting that political rights could only be achieved through political power. His

conception of law reflected the emerging positivism of the day. “Every positive law, or every law simply and strictly so called,” John Austin wrote, “is set, directly or circuitously, by a sovereign person or body, to a member or members of the independent political society wherein that person or body is sovereign or supreme.”⁶¹ Delany would have readily agreed, for he understood that legislative power – not moral ideals – determined the political and civil rights of a people. Delany would have also agreed with Douglass’s statement that “The only foundation for slavery is positive law against natural law”; however, Delany would have replied that positive law is the only thing that matters in the practical political realm. By any reasonable standard of natural law, Black people in the United States had an unquestionable natural right to the full and unfettered rights of the citizen under the Constitution and under the law, but Delany observed the meaninglessness of such appeals, arguing that power not justice, might not right, determined the shape of the political community and proscribed Black claims to citizenship. In place of moral speculations, Delany preferred empirical observation, and when applied in the area of law, he developed a legal positivism both of and ahead of his time. But unlike the other legal positivists of his day, Delany was trying to determine the best means to achieve Black political power, which required him to solve the question of citizenship outside positivism itself.

“A Nation Within A Nation”: Colonial Sovereignty and Black Subjugation

“We are a nation within a nation,” Delany wrote in an often-misinterpreted passage in the appendix to *The Condition*.⁶² The idea that Black people are a nation within the United States has a long history of debate. Some thinkers, including W. E. B. Du Bois, who endorsed the idea in his 1935 essay “A Negro Nation Within the Nation,” but others have either rejected it or misunderstood it.⁶³ Frederick Douglass, for one, rejected the idea, arguing that “A nation within a nation is an anomaly. There can be but one American nation under the American government,

and we are Americans. The constitution of the country makes us such, and our lines of activity should accord with our citizenship.”⁶⁴ More recently, Tommie Shelby incorrectly argues that Delany is using the phrase “nation within a nation” normatively rather than descriptively. Shelby says that it is “somewhat puzzling” why Delany would chose the term “nation” to describe Black people in Amerika, offering “to clarify Delany’s conception of black nationality.”⁶⁵ The problem with Douglass’s response to Delany is that he persists in his idealism, which is fundamentally at odds with Delany’s empiricism. The problem with Shelby’s response is that he overlooks Delany’s empirical reasons for using the term descriptively. Despite Shelby’s claims to the contrary, Delany’s phrase is sociological, not programmatic. In fact, Delany’s argument rests on a combination of historical sociology and legal positivism. On the one hand, Delany argues that there have always been nations within nations and that, in the nineteenth century, Black people in Amerika were *not* the only internal nation; on the other hand, he argues that the status of an internal nation is both determined and marked by the subordinate nation’s lack of political power, namely, its lack of legislative sovereignty. In capturing the relationship between nationhood, the state, and legislative sovereignty, Delany theorizes the colonial nature of modern European politics through the lens of “a nation within a nation.”

In the first two chapters of *The Condition*, Delany reconceives the relationship between the nation and the state, observing that this relationship is has rarely been universal or organic. Looking to history for antecedents of internal national oppression, he discovers that internal nations have always existed within powerful states, from the ancient period to the modern. “That there have been in all ages and in all countries, in every quarter of the habitable globe, especially among those nations laying the greatest claim to civilization and enlightenment,” Delany announces, “classes of people who have been deprived of equal privileges, political, religious

and social, cannot be denied.” In the present day, he explains, “the Poles in Russia, the Hungarians in Austria, the Scotch, Irish, and Welsh in the United Kingdom” are all subjugated as internal nations within more powerful nation-state territories. Though these groups reside within the territorial boundaries of a given state, they have been systematically excluded from the institutions of power and denied their right to self-governance through a usurpation of legislative sovereignty. “It is not enough,” Delany continues, “that these people are deprived of equal privileges by their rulers, but, the more effectually to succeed, the equality of these classes must be denied, and their inferiority by nature as distinct races, actually asserted.” On this view, ideologies that assert the natural racial inferiority of a particular subjected group are created to justify their dispossession from political power. Oppressor nations, Delany argues, create ideologies attesting to their own superiority so they may continue their despotism unabated by logical contradictions or guilty consciences.⁶⁶

Turning to the United States and the condition of Black people residing in North Amerika, Delany draws the connection between the internal nations of Europe and the Black internal nation in Amerika. “The United States, untrue to her trust and unfaithful to her professed principles of republican equality,” he writes, “has also pursued a policy of political degradation to a large portion of her native born countrymen, and that class is the Colored People.” Importantly, Delany says “Colored People,” not “slaves,” because in his analysis, “those of their descendants who are freemen even in the non-slaveholding States, occupy the very same position politically, religiously, civilly and socially, (with but few exceptions,) as the bondsman occupies in the slave States.”⁶⁷ For those antislavery and abolitionist activists who emphasized the institution of slavery, Delany’s comments may have seemed misguided; after all, free Black people like Delany were not directly owned and exploited by white oppressors. Delany never

denied the horror and oppression of slavery, but he did insist in seeing slavery as merely one manifestation of a deeper social logic in American society. White southern aristocrats did not merely rule over enslaved Black individuals and families; rather, whites *as a group* ruled over Blacks *as a group*. Thus, Delany desired to see an end to slavery, but unlike Douglass, he thought that was only one step in a much longer, complicated process of overcoming internal nationhood and securing Black political power and civic rights.

As a “nation within a nation,” Black people as a group – whether free or slave – were subjected to whites, and Delany came to this conclusion through his observation of two key legal events: *Giltner v. Gorham et al.* (1848) and the 1850 Fugitive Slave Act. The *Giltner v. Gorham et al.* case was a critical test of the Fugitive Slave Law of 1793, which expanded the Fugitive Slave clause of the Constitution (Article IV, Section 2) by imposing a penalty for “any person who shall knowingly and willingly obstruct or hinder” the repossession of an escaped slave. In August 1843, Adam and Sarah Crosswhite escaped from slavery. Taking their four children, they fled the plantation of Kentucky farmer Francis Giltner and made their way to Marshall, Michigan. Several years later, Francis’s son David Giltner arrived in Marshall to claim the Crosswhite family and return them to Kentucky, but they were met by a crowd of locals – approximately two hundred white and Black citizens – who refused to let Giltner kidnap the family. The apparent leader of the crowd, a white man named Charles T. Gorham, was said to have told Giltner that he could not take the Crosswhites “by moral, physical, or legal force.” During the standoff, which lasted two days, the crowd stalled Giltner while the Crosswhite family made their way to Canada. Having been denied what he perceived as his property, Giltner sued Gorham and several other members of the crowd for damages of \$2,752, the supposed value of the Crosswhites. Presiding over *Giltner v. Gorham et al.* in the Seventh Circuit Court,

Justice John McLean informed the jury that “This...important case...involves great principles, on which in a degree depend the harmony of the States, and the prosperity of our common country.” He warned them to decide the case not on “the abstract principle of slavery” but on the merits of the claims made by the plaintiff. “In the law is found the only safe rule by which controversies between man and man can be decided,” McLean professed. The first jury could not agree on a verdict, so a second jury was created, ultimately deciding in favor of Giltner. Under the Fugitive Slave Law of 1793, they awarded him \$1,926 plus compensation for court costs and attorney fees.⁶⁸

During his Western tour for the *North Star*, Delany stopped in Michigan and observed the first hearing of the *Giltner v. Gorham* trial in Detroit. Beyond the obvious reasons, Delany was interested in the case because McLean had developed a reputation as an “independent and liberal-minded jurist,” but in a letter printed in the *North Star*, Delany expressed his two criticisms of the case and of McLean. On the one hand, McLean never took the opportunity to criticize slavery. Though McLean “asserted the wrongs of slavery in the abstract,” Delany protests, he “did not once express his abhorrence of slavery, but modestly evaded commitment on that point, by simply saying, ‘Whatever may be our feelings,’ and so forth.”⁶⁹ On the other hand, McLean was willing to grant the would-be slave catcher the benefit of the doubt and uncritically accept his claim to the Crosswhites. In other words, Giltner’s assertion that the Crosswhites were indeed his slaves was taken for granted by the court, and the truth or falsity of his claim was not up for debate. As McLean wrote in the case proceedings, “From the facts proved, there seems to be no doubt of the right of the plaintiff to the services of the fugitives.”⁷⁰ Delany saw this as McLean’s most important offense, for it meant that neither the Black person being claimed nor on-looking white citizens who might be inclined to help a Black person resist

an unlawful kidnapping had any legally recognized course of action in the moment. As Delany put it:

it was not necessary to the offense that the person interfering with the rights of the slave-catcher should *know* that the person or persons so claimed were slaves. If the slave-catcher did but *assert* his intention, declaring that the persons so claimed were his property...it was sufficient...Though, says the Judge, a person aims at the rescue of a freeman from the hands of a kidnapper, he must be responsible for an unlawful interference between *master* and *slave!*⁷¹

According to Delany, McLean's remarks foreshadowed the grim events of the 1850s, for Black people did not need to wait for the Dred Scott case to know that "they had no rights which the white man was bound to respect." Before *Giltner v. Gorham*, Delany had determined that Black people in the free states had some political rights, including the right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty. But McLean destroyed this view, and Delany concluded – a decade before Dred Scott – that Black people would be permanently excluded from the political community and therefore from any exercise of citizenship. "Previous to this decision," Delany proclaimed, "colored persons had some slight semblance of liberty, but now every vestige has been wrested from us – each and all of us reduced to the mercy or discretion of any white man in the country, and like the colored man in the South without a 'Pass,' as is it termed, may at any moment be arrested as the property of another!" "I declare that every colored man in the nominally free States," he added, "is reduced to abject slavery; because all slavery is but the arbitrary will of one person over another. This law is nothing more nor less."⁷² In this legal context, any white person could make a claim on any Black person, and the former would be believed unless and until evidence to the contrary emerged. And as Delany saw it, *Giltner v. Gorham* revealed the true *condition* of the Black nation within the Amerikan nation.

Not long after Delany's return from Michigan, Congress passed the 1850 Fugitive Slave Act, which codified the legal implications of McLean's judicial pronouncements. The act

essentially reiterated the previous constitutional and statutory regulations for capturing runaway slaves, but it also reified the lack of rights about which Delany was most concerned. By three provision of the act, Black people were stripped of their Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendment rights to due process and a public trial. First, slave catchers could justify their seizure of a Black person “either by procuring a warrant...or by seizing and arresting the fugitive, where the same can be done without process.” Second, they could provide “satisfactory proof,” “made, by deposition or affidavit...or by other satisfactory testimony” that the arrested person is indeed a slave. Third, “In no trial or hearing under this act shall the testimony of such alleged fugitive be admitted in evidence.”⁷³ The law essentially confirmed Delany’s view – that Black people within the United States had no reasonable expectation to the privileges and immunities of citizenship, whether enshrined in the Bill of Rights or elsewhere. Because the law permitted any white person to seize any Black person and claim them without giving them the benefit of a proper legal defense, Delany reiterated his earlier conclusion. “By the provisions of this bill,” Delany argued in *The Condition*, “the colored people of the United States are positively degraded beneath the level of whites – are made liable at any time, in any place, and under all circumstances, to be arrested – and upon the claim of any white person, without the privilege, even of making a defense, sent into endless bondage.”⁷⁴ Even slaves were more secure than free Blacks, Delany thought, because the slaves knew who their masters were; under the provisions of the new law, free Black people would have to live in constant fear, not know who might attempt to seize them nor when such an attempt might take place.

In “Political Destiny of the Colored Race on the American Continent,” Delany expanded his criticism of the legal degradation of the Black internal nation, pointing out that many white people sought to re-enslave all free Blacks and that they were willing to commit violence against

other white people to do it. “We forewarn you,” Delany cautioned, “that the general enslavement of the whole of this class of [free Black] people, is now being contemplated by the whites.”⁷⁵

Quoting from a letter provided to him by an attendee of the Emigration Convention, Delany offered demonstrable proof that some slaveholders had already begun to hire poor whites to go North, meet Black people, take down their descriptions, and send them back to the plantation. Once the descriptions are received, the slaveholder could go North and claim the Black person described, and because a commissioner would generally take the white man or woman’s word for it, and because the seized Black person had no chance to testify to their freedom, there would be no remedy for the unlawful capture of a nominally free Black citizen. Delany also observed that white people who helped resist slave catchers, as they did in the famous Anthony Burns case of 1854, would be subjected to violence. Delany understood white violence against Blacks, but he thought the lack of protection for white protestors was indicative of something even more serious on the part of the Amerikan government. As he concluded, “if free, white, high-born and bred gentlemen of Boston and New York, are smitten down to the earth, refused entrance on professional business, into the Court Houses, until inspected by a slave hunter and his council; all to put down the liberty of the black man; then, indeed, is there no hope for us in this country!”⁷⁶ When white people offered any assistance to free Black people or put up any resistance to slave-catching white people, Delany suggests, they implicitly and practically resigned themselves to the mercy of the slaveholding power of the Amerikan government. Thus, “this is precisely our condition,” Delany exclaimed: “Any one of us, at any moment, is liable to be *claimed, seized and taken* into custody by any white, as his or her property – and be *enslaved for life* – and there is no remedy, because it is the *law of the land!*”⁷⁷

Delany's remark about Black people being a nation within a nation, then, was not a naïve normative argument for *building* Black nationhood; instead, it was a phrase used to describe the existing state of racial, political, and legal affairs in the United States, especially as they pertained to Black people. For Delany, the context created the conditions, and the conditions required explanation. In his effort to offer a cogent explanation of the Black condition, he put empirical data into a systematic inductive analysis and created a label for the phenomena he observed. Not only should Delany's argument have been persuasive at the time, it should also be persuasive now, for he tapped into the global trend of legal thinking in the mid-nineteenth century. "The history of sovereignty doctrine in the nineteenth century," Anghie explains, "is a history of the processes by which European states, by developing a complex vocabulary of cultural and racial discrimination, set about establishing and presiding over a system of authority by which they could develop the powers to determine who is and is not sovereign."⁷⁸ "Within the positivist universe," he adds, "the non-European world is excluded from the realms of sovereignty, society, law; each of these concepts which acted as founding concepts to the framework of the positivist system was precisely defined...in ways that which maintain[ed] and police[d] the boundary between the civilized and uncivilized."⁷⁹ Delany's analysis captures the dynamic described by Anghie: if Europeans were using legal positivism to justify their power over colonized people internationally, then white Americans were doing the same domestically in the United States. As members of the internal nation, Black people had no claims to citizenship, which is why Delany also set out to describe how Black citizenship worked in the United States and to propose what Black citizenship would need to become.

From One Empire to Another: Republican Citizenship and the Right to Sovereignty

In an effort to mediate between his legal positivism and his theory of the internal nation, Delany articulated a theory of citizenship that described both the actual political status of existing Black citizens and the criteria for *full* citizenship rights in a political community. On the one hand, legal positivism of the nineteenth century struggled to reconcile its language of sovereignty with the democratic spirit of the time. In a representative system, it was not always clear, in theory, whether the people were sovereign or whether the legislative branch of a parliamentary system was sovereign. On the other hand, while all members of an internal nation may be excluded from sovereign power, there might be various grades of political status among subgroups within the internal nation. In the case of Black Americans, the basic distinction was between enslaved and non-enslaved Black people. Thus, Delany was compelled to theorize citizenship in such a way that allowed him to not only acknowledge the political difference between slave and free Blacks, despite their shared membership in the internal nation, but also explain what Black citizenship would have to look like in order to terminate their dependent and subjugated political status. To accomplish this task, Delany described the limited citizenship imposed upon free Blacks as a version of *imperial citizenship* or *liberal citizenship*, which consisted of rights granted by a politically-superior power, and he advocated the ideal of *republican citizenship*, which unlike imperial citizenship is defined by participation in legislative power rather than as a permitted legal status. For Delany, citizenship was not a product of law, law was a product of citizenship, which meant that Black citizenship and therefore liberation depended upon gaining access to legislative power and therefore access to sovereignty. Because Delany believed such access was impossible in the United States, he advocated emigration.

In the history of Western philosophy, there are two basic traditions of citizenship: the republican tradition and the imperial tradition. The republican tradition defines citizenship through direct participation in the legislative process. On this model, citizens must take part in creating the laws that will govern the political community, for citizens are equals who rule and are ruled simultaneously. Because laws give shape to the community, granting rights and protecting immunities, republican citizens cannot depend on others for the protection of their freedom; rather, their consent is gained, and their liberty ensured, through their participation in and access to, legislative sovereignty. By contrast, the imperial tradition defines citizenship through bestowed legal status. On this model, citizens do not necessarily have to share in legislative power; in fact, distinctions between citizens may exist such that some citizens may vote and hold office, others may merely be permitted to vote, and others still may be prevented from voting but may nevertheless appeal to legal rules and procedures for protection from arbitrary harm or punishment. In the classical world, the difference between the Roman Republic and the Roman Empire illustrates the difference between republican and imperial modes of citizenship. In the Roman Republic, only citizens could participate in law-making power and only those who participated in law-making power were citizens. But as the republic expanded into an empire, a new form of citizenship was created: even though these new citizens never participated in legislation for the empire, they were nevertheless granted a protected legal status so the Roman armies and governors occupying their territories were restrained from governing despotically.⁸⁰

The modern form of imperial citizenship, the liberal tradition, operates in much the same way. Although modern liberal democracies ostensibly guarantee political participation, including the legislative process, such participation is not a defining feature of liberal citizenship. Instead,

the liberal tradition, like the imperial tradition, creates citizens through the extension of legal protections. For example, the Bill of Rights provides a list of things that the United States federal government may not do to a citizen, whether or not that citizen even voted, held office, or participated politically in any way at all. The problem with the imperial or liberal model of citizenship is that, without direct participation, the legal rights of the citizen are always at the behest of some other power and are therefore tenuous. As political scientist Richard Bellamy has noted, “the rule of law is only ever rule through law by some person or persons...If the law’s empire depends on an emperor, then the danger is that law becomes a means for imperial rule rather than rule of and for the public.”⁸¹ Whenever citizenship rights are dependent upon some superior power, those rights are persistently in jeopardy, for there would be no higher power to which citizens might appeal in the event their rights are infringed, abridged, or revoked.

To understand and explain the seemingly empowered but actually disempowered position of free Black people living in the non-slaveholding states, Delany turns to the Roman model of imperial citizenship, identifying its various grades of citizens and arguing that free Black people occupy a dependent position analogous to the Roman citizens who were allowed to vote but not hold office. “The *political policy* of this country,” Delany emphatically declares, “was solely borrowed from, and shaped and modelled after, that of Rome.” And Rome, he adds, created several classes of citizens, each with different privileges. The *cives ingenui*, the full citizens of freeborn status, were the only class of citizens “unrestricted in their privileges,” which meant, for example, that they were permitted to both vote and hold office. There was another class of citizens, however, the *quirituim*, who depended on the *cives ingenui* for aid and protection; as Delany explains, the *quirituim* was “the wailing or *supplicating* citizen – that is, the one who was continually *moaning, complaining, or crying for aid or succor.*” Among the *quiritites* were those

citizens who were permitted to vote (*ius suffragii*) and those who were not; yet, even those *quirites* who enjoyed voting privileges did not necessarily have the right to hold office (*ius honorum*). In the Roman system, these privileges were distinct and distributed by through different law. By drawing the distinction between the full privileges of the *cives ingenui* and the limited privileges of the *quirites* with mere voting rights, Delany can explain why free Black people are not *full* citizens, despite their nominal status as such. Just as the *quirites* have the ability to vote for the *cives ingenui*, Delany argues that this is “the condition, precisely, of the black and colored inhabitants of the United States...having the privilege of *voting*, to elevate their superiors to positions to which they need never dare aspire, or even hope to attain.”⁸²

Given the subordinate status of Black citizens in Amerika, Delany argued that there were two fundamental problems with this situation. The first problem is that it placed Black people in a state of perpetual dependence upon white people. While many Black intellectuals celebrated the *right* to vote, Delany denied that voting was a right at all – for him, it was a mere privilege granted by seemingly benevolent superiors. “There has, of late years, been a false impression obtained, that the privilege of *voting* constitutes, or necessarily embodies, the *rights of citizenship*,” Delany complains; yet, “A more radical error never obtained favor among an oppressed people.” If Black people were only aspiring to citizenship as it is gifted to the subject of Empire, then Delany would see nothing wrong, for at least they would have the facts right, but because his interlocutors have believed themselves holders of full citizenship *as such*, he insists they are gravely mistaken. “To have the ‘right of suffrage,’ as we rather proudly term it, is simply to have the *privilege* – there is no *right* about it – of giving our *approbation* to that which our *rulers may do*, without the privilege, on our part, of doing the same thing.” “Like the indented apprentice,” he remarks, “who is summoned to give his approbation to an act which

would be fully binding without his concurrence,” Black citizenship in Amerika, including its voting privileges, is merely the means by which white rulers simultaneously create the illusion of Black political participation and sanctimoniously congratulate themselves for their ostensible benevolence.⁸³ According to Delany, when Black people vote for white candidates, it merely reinforces the false idea that white political power actually represents Black interests.

The second problem with the subordinate citizenship of Black Americans is that it is held only at the beneficence of powerful white citizens. Though Delany appreciated the work of some white abolitionists, he knew that the very few white people who genuinely opposed white supremacy in all its forms and manifestations were not powerful enough and could never be powerful enough to mitigate the dangers of the violent poor whites, the greedy Southern aristocrats, and the opportunistic Northern white liberals. After all, McLean, known as a liberal judge, was willing to set aside his opposition to slavery in order to preserve the union in the *Giltner* case, and the United States Congress was able to put together a bipartisan coalition large enough to pass the Fugitive Slave Act. Thus, Black people have no reason to expect that even the most well-intentioned white person would sacrifice his or her own self-interest in the name of Black freedom. “The rights of no oppressed people have ever yet been obtained by a voluntary act of justice on the part of the oppressors,” Delany maintains. “Christians, philanthropists, and moralists may preach, argue and philosophize as they may to the contrary; fact are against them.” Notwithstanding the desires of many of his Black interlocutors, who were holding onto the hope that Amerika would ultimately grant Black people their deserved rights of full citizenship, Delany insisted that “we are not permitted, despite our willingness and stupidity, to indulge even the most distant glimmer of a hope of attaining to the level of a well protected slave.”⁸⁴

Against the imperial model of citizenship offered to Black people by the state governments, Delany defended a republican model of citizenship because it would guarantee full access to political power by guaranteeing full access to legislative sovereignty. “Where there is no *acknowledged sovereignty*, there can be no binding power,” Delany writes. “Consequently, the colored man in the United States, being deprived of the right of inherent sovereignty, cannot *confer* a suffrage, because he possesses none to confer.” The only way to remedy the fundamental powerlessness of the Black internal nation, Delany says, is to invest it with a sovereignty of its own. In a famous passage, Delany announces the centerpiece of his legal positivism and his civic republicanism:

Let it then be understood, as a great principle of political economy, that no people can be free who themselves do not constitute an essential part of the *ruling element* of the country in which they live...this position is necessary to personal safety. The liberty of no man is secure, who controls not his own political destiny...A people, to be free, must necessarily *be their own rulers*: that is, *each individual* must, in himself, embody the *essential ingredient*...of the *sovereign principle* which composes the *true basis* of his liberty.⁸⁵

In Delany’s political theory, sovereignty is the seat of political power because the sovereign creates the law. Unlike the natural law, which operates in the moral realm, the positive law is the source of political rights because it operates in the practical realm. To ensure, therefore, one’s own rights, the citizen must participate in sovereignty, otherwise they will persist day-to-day merely with the permission of their superiors. Without direct access to legislative sovereignty, either personally or through a “true representative,” Black Americans will never achieve political and civil equality.

Delany’s aspirations and his realism, however, collide here, for he must create a plan – a practical means – for obtaining Black political power. As we have seen, he acknowledges that oppressors never freely give up their power over the oppressed, so he does not hope for a miracle

of white benevolence. But he also argues that violence will never work. In a direct affront to the Magna Charta, that favorite ill-begotten creature of Anglo-Saxon mythology, Delany points out that even the most liberating documents of the celebrated English common law were taken “only by force and extortion.” The thirteenth-century barons living under rule of King John demanded the restoration of their rights “at the unsheathed points of a thousand glittering swords,” a feat easily accomplished because of “their *superiority of numbers*.” Black Americans living in the internal nation, however, have insufficient numbers and insufficient arms to accomplish such a revolution. While a thousand barons pointed their swords at one heart, Delany says, “in our case, there is but a handful of the oppressed, without a sword to point, and *twenty millions of Johns*...with as many hearts, tenfold more relentless than that of Prince John Lackland.”⁸⁶ The ruling element and the sovereign principle in the United States, then, is whiteness. Black people will never embody the essential ingredient of American sovereignty, Delany concludes, because they are racially excluded from doing so. But not all hope is lost for the West Indies, Central America, and South America are primarily populated with “colored persons, who constitute, from the immense preponderance of their numbers, the *ruling element* as they ever must be, of those countries.”⁸⁷ And in the end, with all political and revolutionary options eliminated, Delany proposes “a sovereign remedy” – emigration.⁸⁸

Because he approached political questions through a practical mindset and excluded moral considerations from the development of his strategies, Delany emphasizes the power of positive law and, more importantly, the sovereign power *behind* positive law. In the United States, free Black people had only achieved a limited citizenship status, which allowed them to ceremoniously approve the actions of white politicians but forbid them to actually exercise political power themselves. Delany argues that this imperial model of citizenship was

insufficient for any group seeking political power, especially Black Americans. As members of a nation within a nation, Black people were categorically excluded from the exercise of sovereign power in the United States. Though transforming their citizenship from the existing imperial model into a republican model would theoretically solve the problem and provide them with political rights, the opportunity to exercise republican citizenship was unavailable in America. And because violent revolution was strategically impossible, emigration to a majority-colored political community became Delany's best recommendation. If Black people desired to truly terminate their subordinate status as supplicating citizens, Delany argued that emigrating to a country where they would share in the sovereign principle must be their political destiny.

Conclusion

Against the prevailing paradigms within both contemporary mainstream political theory and Black political thought, Delany's theories of law, sovereignty, and citizenship avoid the conceptual pitfalls of those who rely on facile theories of sovereignty like Carl Schmitt's "state of exception." On the one hand, Delany moves legal thinking away from speculative thinking about rights toward a concrete and empirical understanding of legal power. On the other hand, he reminds us that law is not the limitation of power but an expression of it. Schmitt and his followers betray their liberal ideology when they fetishize the suspension of law that defines the state of exception, for they thereby imply that the law is a neutral arbiter of social and political disputes, placing important checks on state officials and protecting the rights and welfare of marginalized peoples within the democratic polity. Yet Delany's analysis shows us that nothing could be further from the truth: law is a tool of the powerful, and they use it as a means to rule over others. In the specific case of the Black internal nation, the white majority – riddled with factions as they may be – nevertheless stake their claim to a piece of legislative sovereignty

precisely on their whiteness, an appeal wholly unavailable to Black people. As Delany saw it, there was an anthropological barrier to political power in the United States. As Richard H. King has written, “Delany uncovered – or at least made explicit – one of the traditional assumption underlying republican government: the existence of a homogenous population rooted in a particular place. Because Afro-Americans were aliens, Delany had to bleakly conclude that they would never be incorporated into the polity. To assume otherwise was to be complicit in one’s own degradation.”⁸⁹ And this practice of anthropological exclusivity was part of the broader trend in positivist legal theory and practice. “In Europe, nineteenth-century positivism created a situation in which sovereignty was supreme and a sovereign’s actions within its own territory were beyond scrutiny,” Anghie observes. “In contrast, lacking sovereignty, non-European states exercised no rights recognizable by international law over their own territory.”⁹⁰ Delany’s insight regarding Black people’s exclusion from legislative sovereignty was part of a global trend in imperialism. It was not merely that Black people were barred from political participation in Amerika – it was that non-European peoples *as such* were not seen as having any inherent sovereignty at all. Though Delany died before the onslaught of colonization in Africa in the 1880s, he nevertheless observed and explained the theoretical and philosophical trends that would ultimately justify European domination of the continent. And unlike contemporary Black political theory, he did not feel compelled to rely on ideologies that decried the suspension of law, for *law was and would be the very means by which imperialists would justify their power.*

The preceding discussion, of course, cut off before 1857, the year that the United States Supreme Court handed down the Dred Scott ruling, which claimed that Black people “had no rights which the white man was bound to respect, and that the negro might justly and lawfully be reduced to slavery for his benefit.” While Delany might have held out hope for progress in his

younger years, the political and legal trends he observed in the 1840s and 50s forced him to abandon – on empirical, realist grounds – any idea that the United States would extend full rights to Black people. He saw that the white Jacksonian populists were turning to positivist legal strategies. He understood what codification, constitutional conventions, and popular sovereignty meant for Black people. And he carried no illusions about the supposed “right” to vote. “To Delany,” Ullman explains, “the Supreme Court action merely stamped an obvious fact with the white man’s rationale that all violations of professed ideals must have legal approval.”⁹¹ In Delany’s view, the few political rights Black people were granted existed solely at the beneficence of some group of white people who would, if it were in their interest, repeal those rights and sacrifice Black interests and well being. Unlike Douglass, he never trusted the Anglo-Saxon elitists of the Northeast, whom he denounced for trying to strip Black people of their culture and assimilate them into Anglo-Saxon “civilization.” Delany knew that these supposedly enlightened whites were less interested in Black rights and more interested in advancing the imperial spread of “universal” Anglo-Saxon values. Thus, though they opposed slavery and rhetorically gestured toward racial equality, they were different from the Jacksonian Democrats only in their mode of imperialism, favoring assimilation over domination or elimination. In Delany’s view, the only remedy to the condition of the Black internal nation was republican citizenship with full self-determination and legislative sovereignty, either in the United States or elsewhere. Based on this understanding, Delany urged his contemporaries – and by implication urges scholars today – to abandon the overemphasis on slavery as a form of domination and understand the boarder structure of the colonial ontology of Empire.⁹²

Writing over a century after Delany made his arguments regarding law, sovereignty, and citizenship, Eldridge Cleaver observed, in similar language, that the question of Black

sovereignty had never been resolved. “Black Americans are too easily deceived by a few smiles and friendly gestures, by the passing of a few liberal-sounding laws which are left on the books to rot unenforced, and by the mushy speechmaking of a President who is a past master of talking out of the thousand sides of his mouth,” Cleaver rebuked.⁹³ Uncannily, he rejected the “unctuous supplications of the sleek Black Bourgeoisie” and insisted that “which laws get enforced depends on who is in power.”⁹⁴ Pondering the historical and present possibilities for Black liberation, Cleaver explained that “black people long ago would have readily identified themselves with another sovereignty had a viable one existed.”⁹⁵ Between Delany’s protestations of white supremacy and Amerikan imperialism and Cleaver’s philosophical and political intervention, Western Empires had consumed the entire world. If Black people had wanted to leave the United States, they would have merely ended up in another colony. Clarifying the demands of the Black radical movement of the 1960s, Cleaver insisted upon Black sovereignty. “Not for a single moment or for any price,” Cleaver roared, “will the black men now rising up in America settle for anything less than their full proportionate share and participation in the sovereignty of America.”⁹⁶ Just as Delany has insisted upon understanding law through a positivist paradigm and concluded that Black people would require full republican citizenship as a means of participating in legislative sovereignty, Cleaver knew that the law in Amerika would only protect the rights and privileges of Black people if they held power over the law. Paternalistic white handouts would be no substitute. But Cleaver never developed his theories of law, sovereignty, and citizenship to the extent that Delany did because Cleaver was more interested in theorizing another threat to the Black internal colony – the white woman.

CHAPTER V

“I, A BLACK MAN, CONFRONTED THE OGRE”: ELDRIDGE CLEAVER, SEXUAL IMAGE, AND THE REJECTION OF IMPERIAL SOMATOCENTRICITY

“In what other quarter of the globe shall we find the blush that overspreads the soft features of the beautiful women of Europe, that emblem of modesty, of delicate feelings, and of sense? What nice expression of the amiable and softer passions in the countenance; and that general elegance of features and complexion? Where, except on the bosom of the European woman, two such plump and snowy white hemispheres, tipt with vermillion?”

– Charles White, *An Account of the Regular Gradation in Man* (1799)¹

“A man cannot commit so great an offense against his race, against his country, against his God, in any other way, as to give his daughter in marriage to a negro – a *beast* – or to take one of their females for his wife. As well might he in the sight of God, wed his child to any other beast of forest or of field.”

– Bruckner H. Payne, *The Negro: What is His Ethnological Status?* (1867)²

“I believe that I know a little something about the relationship between blacks and whites in America,” he wrote from in his cell at Folsom Prison on May 26, 1965. “I have spent a great deal of time studying and thinking about the various aspects of this relationship,” he explained, especially regarding “sex in relation to the white woman and the black man.” As he sat before the typewriter – his fingers hammering away upon the keys, his mind rehearsing the terms of his plea – the twenty-nine-year-old inmate composed a nine-page letter requesting legal assistance from California attorney and activist Beverly Axelrod. “The title of my book is: *White Woman, Black Man*,” Eldridge Cleaver continued, desperate to get his writings to the outside world. “I know the associations which that title has in the American mind. But I believe that we are living in a time when certain things must be openly discussed if we as a nation are ever going to revolve some of our historic problems,” he added. Cleaver’s problem, however, was that the prison officials repeatedly censored his writings and even confiscated his book. On June 4, Axelrod replied to Cleaver, agreeing to take his case and provide legal assistance in Cleaver’s quest for parole. During their first visit, Axelrod asked Cleaver about his motivations for

becoming a writer. Unsatisfied with the “superficial” answer he offered in the moment, Cleaver sat down to pen a more substantive explanation of his authorial motivations. In a June 25 letter, which later appeared as “On Becoming,” the first chapter of his best-selling work *Soul on Ice*, Cleaver explained that he began to write to save himself, not merely as a convict who supposedly owes a debt to society, but as a Black man subjected to the psychological distortions generated by a white supremacist culture. “What must be done,” Cleaver grimly declared, “is that...the sickness between the white woman and the black man...must be brought out into the open, dealt with and resolved. I think all of us, the entire nation, will be better off if we bring it all out front,” he insisted. “A lot of people’s feelings will be hurt, but that is the price that must be paid.”³

Though Cleaver’s theoretical insights offer a novel perspective on the question of gender in a colonial context, academic discourse regarding the relationship between race and gender continues to be dominated by inadequate theories of intersectionality. As “a pathbreaking analytical framework for understanding questions of inequality and injustice,” Ange-Marie Hancock writes, “intersectionality demands a rearticulation of the relationships between what are traditionally perceived as conceptually distinct analytical categories of difference.”⁴ Legal scholar Kimberle Crenshaw has been credited with coining the term “intersectionality” in her 1989 article “Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics,” where she argues that “single-axis” analyses mistakenly treat racial oppression and gender oppression as mutually exclusive categories of experience.⁵ In *Intersectionality: Origins, Contestations, Horizons*, Anna Carastathis offers a recent articulation of intersectional analysis. “In contrast to unitary or additive approaches to theorizing oppression,” she explains, “which privilege a foundational

category and either ignore or merely ‘add’ others to it, intersectional approaches insist that multiple, co-constituting analytic categories are operative and equally salient in constructing institutionalized practices and lived experiences.” Furthermore, “intersectionality can theorize the convergence, co-constitution, imbrication, or inter-wovenness of systems of oppression.” Because the “ontological anchor for experiences of multiple oppression and fragmented identity is the system of interlocking social structures,” Carastathis insists, “these systems or axes are seen to mutually construct lived experiences at the individual and group levels and are given equal explanatory salience in intersectional approaches.”⁶ According to intersectionality theorists, then, this approach remedies the shortcomings of hegemonic, single-issue theories of oppression and experience by revealing and describing the ways in which various systems of oppression interact to produce complex modes of subordination. Whereas other major theories of oppression often prioritize only one practice of domination – for example, Marxism’s focus on economic class – intersectionality not only observes multiple systems of oppression at once but also explains how those systems of oppression are combined into structures that multiply the subordination of subjected identities.

Despite the popularity of intersectionality as an analytical paradigm, three basic conceptual shortcomings undermine its explanatory power and its philosophical force. First, intersectionality does not account for colonialism. As Carastathis admits, “intersectionality lacks an explicit consideration of the coloniality of U.S. law and of the colonial and anticolonial dynamics in U.S. social movements.”⁷ While Carastathis argues plausibly that intersectionality can expand its conceptual purview by drawing on María Lugones’s decolonial feminism to incorporate understandings of colonialism, Hancock dubiously casts a wide net using the term “intersectionality-like thought” to argue that, because some women of color have talked about

colonialism in some times and places, critiques of colonialism were always already a part of the tradition.⁸ Second, intersectionality relies on an unsophisticated conflation of sex and gender. In Crenshaw's work, for example, the terms "sex" and "gender" are used interchangeably and synonymously, even though the former ostensibly refers to human biology and the latter refers to a socially constructed practice. As Crenshaw writes in one paradigmatic passage, "For white women, claiming *sex* discrimination is simply a statement that but for *gender*, they would not have been disadvantaged."⁹ In more recent works on intersectionality, the term "sex" rarely appears, with "gender" having taken the place of "sex" without abandoning the biological extension of that word. Third, intersectionality theorists break their own professed principles when they construct the intersectional canon. On the one hand, intersectionalists insist that they do not prioritize any identity category over another, which means they are all given equal explanatory and experiential weight; on the other hand, intersectionalists prioritize race and sex (disguised as race and *gender*) when explaining who invented intersectionality and "intersectionality-like thought." Hancock, for example, argues that intersectionality emerged from "a Black female intellectual and sociopolitical tradition."¹⁰ Likewise, Carastathis argues that "intersectionality is fruitfully situated in a trajectory of Black feminist thought that begins in the nineteenth century," originating "in social-movement discourses that identified the manifold manifestations of oppression, discrimination, and violence that structure the conditions in which women of color live in the United States, Britain, and other white settler and imperial states."¹¹ According to intersectionality theorists, then, the prioritization of identity categories obscures our analysis and criticism of oppressive social systems but clarifies our intellectual genealogies. It would be one thing if they argued that intersectionality emerged among some specific group or groups of women of color, but instead they argue that, categorically, non-white females share a

coherent global intellectual tradition regardless of actual distinctions, differences, and disputes along other identity axes, such as ethnicity, nationality, language, religion, class, and sexuality.¹²

In light of these shortcomings with intersectionality, Cleaver's absence from contemporary discourse becomes quite conspicuous, given that he – not a woman of color – theorized the relational nature of race and gender in a colonial context two decades before Crenshaw's coinage, and he did so without re-inscribing biological essentialism into his theory. Douglas Taylor has noted that Cleaver's theory of race and gender was far ahead of its time. "At a time when the overwhelming majority of discussions on race displayed a distinct lack of consciousness in regard to issues of gender," Taylor writes, "Cleaver, in however flawed a manner, attempts to interrogate the intersectionality of gender, race, and class oppression. By working out of this problematic of tripartite oppression at such an early moment, Cleaver, almost accidentally, uncovers observations that put him far in advance of the 'race relations' theorists of his day."¹³ Cleaver understood that race and gender not only "intersect" but also that the various race-gender configurations that exist do so relationally rather than in isolation. And Cleaver places this understanding within a colonial context. Noting "the link between America's undercover support of colonialism abroad and the bondage of the Negro at home," Cleaver argues that "Those who are primarily concerned with improving the Negro's condition recognize, as do proponents of the liquidation of America's neo-colonial network, that their fight is one and the same."¹⁴ Cleaver's reflections on the relationship between the Black man and the white woman, announced in his letters to Axelrod, emerge therefore as an analysis of colonial gender relations. And as we will see, he does this without conflating sex and gender.

Unlike contemporary identity theories, which rely on Western-derived vocabularies of "gender" and "sexuality," Cleaver offers a theory of the "sexual image," which encapsulates both

of what are often called “gender” and “sexuality” and which is situated within a colonial political economy. According to Cleaver, gender-sexuality norms are produced within a colonial and capitalist social structure that distributes economic, political, and intellectual power based on the position of males and females of different class-race groups. In other words, males and females are placed into the economy and then sorted out into groups based on their economic roles or labor functions; in a racialized society, males and females of racially subordinate groups are given different labor functions than the males and females of racially superior groups. Sexual images emerge within this context, and their form depends on how biological sex (maleness of femaleness) is modulated through the class-race positioning of the individual. For example, the sexual image of an elite white male in Amerika will be different from the sexual image of a working class white male, even though both are white males. The “gender” identities and sexual proclivities of these men will manifest themselves differently, with the elite white male being more “refined” in his masculinity and his sexual habituations and the working class white male more “crude” in his. The sexual image, then, is not an essentialist or binary phenomenon but rather a complex identity expression that is directly grounded in the social structure.

Even though Cleaver’s social and political thought holds much promise and offers much potential for our understandings of sex, gender, sexuality, and race, the thin body of existing scholarly work on Cleaver has failed to investigate his theory of the “sexual image.” Other than a few rare pieces that attempt to grapple with Cleaver’s political thought on its own terms – such as E. S. Miller’s “Cleaver and Juminer: Black Man and White Woman” (1977) and Sean L. Malloy’s “Uptight in Babylon: Eldridge Cleaver’s Cold War” (2013)¹⁵ – the scholarly output on Cleaver largely revolves around denunciations of his criticisms of James Baldwin, his normative remarks on masculinity, and his ostensible homophobia.¹⁶ Even Kathleen Rout’s *Eldridge*

Cleaver, the sole manuscript-length study of Cleaver's life and works, is less a scholarly analysis and more a work of anti-Black male and anti-Black Panther propaganda.¹⁷ Recently, however, two scholars have offered fresh perspectives on Cleaver. In "Plato in Folsom Prison: Eldridge Cleaver, Black Power, Queer Classicism," Josh Vandiver argues that Cleaver offers a queer critique of Western anthropology, calling into question the ontological distinction between mind and body that has been politically mapped onto master and subject groups since the ancient Greeks.¹⁸ In *The Man-Not: Race, Class, Genre, and the Dilemmas of Black Manhood*, Tommy J. Curry argues that Cleaver not only reveals the racist contours of Black male sexual victimization at the hands of white men and white women in Amerika but also explains the fundamental malleability of Black male flesh under oppressive erotic colonial power.¹⁹ The works of Vandiver and Curry gesture toward a new way of reading Cleaver, one that places his analyses of gender and sexuality at the center of discussion without reducing his descriptive theories to whatever undesirable normative claims he otherwise makes and then dismissing the entirety of his thought.

This chapter explores Eldridge Cleaver's theory of "sexual image" as an anticolonial theory of gender and sexuality, offering a critical exegesis of his most philosophically rich texts and demonstrating their strengths in comparison to the paradigms that dominate contemporary scholarship. Though there are important things to say about homoeroticism in colonialism generally and homoeroticism and homosexuality in Cleaver's work particularly, I will largely bracket those questions here.²⁰ The first section provides a close reading of "The Primeval Mitosis," the often-ignored or misinterpreted theoretical framework for *Soul on Ice*, which has been called "anticolonialism behind bars."²¹ In his sociological and philosophical reflections on what he called the "sexual image," Cleaver overcomes the essentialism of feminist theory by

viewing gender and sexuality as grounded in colonial capitalism rather than biological sex. In this way he avoids what Oyèrónké Oyewuémì calls “Western somatocentricity” or body-reasoning, which places bodies at the center of ontological descriptions.²² Because feminism and the intersectionality theories derived from it conflate biological sex and social gender, it would be more accurate to graphemically render it gen[sex]der. In Cleaver’s descriptive work, gender is tied to the social structure rather than the body. The second section provides the historical context for many of Cleaver’s concerns about the power of colonizing females over colonized males in a colonial context. Because white womanhood has been the gender configuration or sexual image used to grant white colonial females their social, political, and sexual power in the Amerikan Empire, this section specifically traces this history in nineteenth and twentieth century Amerika, implicating feminism in white women’s desire for imperial power. The final section turns to the character structure of white females who internalize the gender and sexual norms associated with white womanhood. Though much attention has been paid to Cleaver’s quest to overcome his attraction to white women, less has been said about his insights regarding white women’s sexual psychology. By connecting white women’s sexual desire for Black men with their political power as colonizing females, it becomes possible to understand the historical pattern of Black male sexual abuse at the hands of white women in Amerika. Cleaver’s theory of gender provides an anticolonial contribution to the debates surrounding gender and sexuality, and by excavating his most important insights, anticolonial theory can develop language to describe sex, gender, and sexuality as they manifest inside the colonial ontology of Empire.

Cleaver’s Primeval Mitosis as Philosophical Anthropology and Gender Theory

Cleaver originally planned to write a book called *White Woman, Black Man*, but by the time he was connected to a publisher, his editor exerted influence over the topic and the structure

of the text, which became the book we know as *Soul on Ice*. There is a disparity, therefore, between Cleaver's original project and the structure of the work he ultimately produced, and because scholars have rested their interpretations of Cleaver on the structure of *Soul on Ice*, they have failed to grasp the fundamental insights of the book. For example, Jared Sexton's reading of *Soul on Ice* proceeds linearly from beginning to end, and he argues that "the complicated mix of desire, identification, and aggression that motivated [Cleaver's] earlier account of rape-on-principle is not sufficiently worked through."²³ The problem with Sexton's argument is that he is reading the chapters forward, which is really a way of reading the chapters backward. In a letter to his editor, Dave Welsh, Cleaver states, "I am very concerned about Primeval Mitosis." He was concerned because Welsh had proposed cutting the essay from *Soul on Ice* completely, and for Cleaver, "The Primeval Mitosis" was supposed to be the theoretical framework for the entire book. As he appealed:

The way that I originally put *White Woman, Black Man* together was with Primeval M[itosis] serving as a broad theoretical framework with the following pieces providing specific illustrations of applications of the theory to our American facts. The ideas expressed in Primeval Mitosis provide the point of view underlying all the other pieces. [Thus] it seems a little out of order for people to like the other pieces without recognizing that they rely specifically upon Primeval Mitosis. *Black Eunuch, Convalescence, Lazarus*, and all the other [chapters] are based upon that perspective.²⁴

Though Cleaver's drafts of the table of contents have the section "White Woman, Black Man" first, this section and therefore "The Primeval Mitosis" ultimately appeared at the end of *Soul on Ice*, as if it were an afterthought and not Cleaver's self-described "sociological" model.²⁵ Against the scholarly grain, then, which often interprets "The Primeval Mitosis" through the lens of Cleaver's "earlier" statements in the book, we must invert this practice and interpret the rest of the book through "The Primeval Mitosis." By understanding Cleaver's gender cosmology as

embedded in a colonial and capitalist political economy, it becomes possible to understand his commentary on “sexual image” as an anticolonial theory of gender.

As Cleaver sees it, the fundamental problem for gender theory is articulating the way in which capitalist class stratification undermines the potential for individuals to achieve a “Unitary Sexual Image” by imposing a “fragmented sexual image” based upon economic classes. Because Cleaver was writing before the term “gender” became widely used in academic and popular discourse, he used the term “sexual image” to describe a similar phenomenon, but the term “sexual image” is also construed more broadly than mere gender, for it also encompasses what we would call “sexuality.” According to Cleaver’s gender cosmology, a “Primeval Mitosis” divided “the male and female hemispheres of the Primeval Sphere” in which “some unknown forerunner of Homo sapiens” had embodied both sexes. Having been alienated from each other, the male and female elements are driven by the “Primeval Urge” to reunite “and achieve supreme identity in the Apocalyptic Fusion.” In order to follow through this desire for the unity of the sexes, each sex must take on the proper gender “by achieving a Unitary Sexual Image,” or “a heterosexual identity free from the mutually exclusive, antagonistic, antipodal impediments of homosexuality.”²⁶ In the primordial state of humanity, which Cleaver describes as an innocent Garden of Eden, the male and female hemispheres of the human element each retained their respective Unitary Sexual Images, but with the advent of the historical division of labor, these Unitary Sexual Images became fragmented, with each social class being assigned different portions of the total images. As Cleaver writes, “Class Society projects a fragmented sexual image. Each class projects a sexual image coinciding with its class-function in society. And since its class-function will differ from that of other classes, its sexual image will differ also and in the same proportion.”²⁷ As males and females are sorted into economic roles through the division of

labor, they take on different sexual images or gender identities. For example, a female in a ruling class position will take on a different fragment of the whole female sexual image than will a female from a laboring class position; however, neither female will represent femininity *as such*, for each will represent merely one aspect of the unitary feminine sexual image. Thus, in a society divided into at least two classes, Cleaver implies, there will be at least four “genders.”

In a class-stratified society, the primary existential gender split occurs with the bifurcation of the mind and the body, which applies to both males and females. Once males are split into elites and laborers, the former take on the function of the mind and the latter are identified with the body; the “Omnipotent Administrator” governs from the top of society with sovereign intelligence but exudes a physical frailty or weakness, while the “Supermasculine Menial” is relegated to an unthinking labor position and defined by the power and virility of the body. “Weakness, frailty, cowardice, and effeminacy are, among other attributes, associated with the Mind,” Cleaver describes. “Strength, brute power, force, virility, and physical beauty are associated with the body. Thus the upper classes, or Omnipotent Administrators, are perennially associated with physical weakness, decay, underdeveloped bodies, effeminacy, sexual impotence, and frigidity. Virility, strength, and power are associated with the lower classes, the Supermasculine Menials.”²⁸ Like the males of this class-stratified society, the females are divided into two classes, the “Ultrafeminine” and the “Subfeminine.” The elite males have renounced their bodies and have, in turn, created a weaker sexual images of themselves; to maintain a distinction between the elite males and the elite females, the latter are required to abandon their “Domestic Function,” which corresponds to the “Brute Power” function of the male hemisphere. Conversely, the laboring class females are forced to absorb the Domestic Function of the elite women while relinquishing their other feminine traits. “In effect,” Cleaver

explains, “a switch is made: the woman of the elite absorbs into her being the femininity of the woman below her, and she extirpates her domestic component; the woman below absorbs the elite woman’s cast-off domestic component and relinquishes her own femininity.”²⁹ In other words, just as the elite males have abandoned the body in favor of the mind, the Ultrafeminine females of the elite classes also “take flight from their bodies” and “stamp out all traces of strength.”³⁰ And just as the laboring males are denied their minds and forced to become *the* body, the Subfeminine females of the laboring classes are forced to become *the* body, taking on the “awesome burden and shame” of the “rejected domestic function.”³¹ According to Cleaver, then, one’s sexual image is inextricably linked with their economic position in society.

The bifurcation of the male and female Unitary Sexual Images along class lines creates the conditions in which the lower classes want to emulate the elites. “Each social structure,” Cleaver writes, “projects onto the screen of possibility the images of the highest type of male and female sexual identities realizable within the limits of that society.”³² The sexual images of the elite males and females – fragmented as they may be – become the gender ideals for all the males and females from the lower, alienated classes. On the one hand, “All the males in the classes beneath *the* Omnipotent Administrator,” Cleaver elaborates, “perceive their alienation in terms of their distance from the apex,” and because Omnipotent Administrators “despise their bodies and glorify their minds,” a class-stratified society will teach males to strive for mental prowess and economic power.³³ On the other hand, “since the standards of beauty are set by the elite, the Ultrafeminine personifies the official standard of feminine beauty of society as a whole.”³⁴ The Subfeminine, therefore, “envies the pampered, powderpuff existence [of] the Ultrafeminine and longs to incorporate these elements into her own life” because the elite female sexual image has been promoted as the ideal gender expression of femininity.³⁵ “The people at the base of

society,” Cleaver concludes, “where the Supermasculine Menial is, are well known for their reflex in attempting to conform to the style, pattern, manners, and habits of the upper classes, of the Omnipotent Administrators and Ultrafeminines.”³⁶ For Cleaver, this class mimesis is an understandable but ultimately misguided impulse, for the sexual images of the Omnipotent Administrator and Ultrafeminine are fragmented and therefore sick. Rather than striving to emulate the elites, he argues, they should be striving to achieve a Unitary Sexual Image. In a way, then, false consciousness about gender and sexual identities plays a central role in the perpetuation of class society and, in this case, capitalist exploitation.

It is important to note that, thus far, Cleaver has not mentioned race at all. In fact, his entire analysis of sexual images – or gender-sexual identities – in “The Primeval Mitosis” is modulated entirely through a purely class analysis. However, at the end of the essay, he differentiates the class-based fragmentation of sexual images and the race-based fragmentation of sexual images. “In a society with a racially homogenous population,” Cleaver begins, “in which the people at the top are racially the same as the ones at the bottom, the competing [sexual] images are not mutually exclusive.” Assuming that there is some chance for (bi-directional) social mobility, in the male hemisphere, a Supermasculine Menial might have the chance to develop his mind and ascend to the elite classes of society, and an Omnipotent Administrator can develop his muscles and take up manual labor. Likewise, in the female hemisphere, the Ultrafeminine and the Subfeminine can change places to the degree that they alienate themselves from either femininity or domesticity. “But in a society where there exists a racial caste system,” Cleaver continues, “where the people at the top are sharply distinguished from those at the bottom by race as well as social image, then the two sets of competing images can come to be considered mutually exclusive.”³⁷ When the attributes of mind and body are

respectively mapped onto supposedly superior and inferior races, the distinction is no longer seen as a social distinction. Instead, this mind-body dualism reflects a biological distinction between the races, the civilized and the barbarous, and any attempt to breach this “natural” divide will be prohibited, policed, and punished. This threat is especially imposing for the males of the “inferior” race, who will be subjected to any number of violent punishments – including death – for attempting to either develop his mind or mate with a protected female of the “superior” race.

When we read Cleaver’s class and race analyses side-by-side, we can see how the number of possible sexual images proliferates. Cleaver’s articulation of sexual images or gender-sexual identities in “The Primeval Mitosis” takes both class-based and race-based forms, which means that not only will two races – in the case, white and Black – have divergent gender identities and norms, but the various economic classes internal to each racial group will have their own gender formations. In *Soul on Ice*, Cleaver distinguishes between the Black masses and the Black bourgeoisie, and he differentiates the white power elite from the white student activists and protestors. He expands this proliferation of classes in *On the Ideology of the Black Panther Party*. Making internal distinctions within the white and Black laboring classes, Cleaver writes, “Just as we must make the distinctions between the mother country and the colony when dealing with Black people and White people as a whole, we must also make this distinction when we deal with the categories of the Working Class and the Lumpenproletariat. We have, in the United States, a ‘Mother Country Working Class’ and a ‘Working Class from the Black Colony.’ We also have a Mother Country Lumpenproletariat and a Lumpenproletariat from the Black Colony.”³⁸ While Cleaver does slightly qualify the class distinctions within the Black colony, saying that “the leveling effect of the colonial process” tends to distort class differentiations, he nevertheless provides the means of recognizing no fewer than six race-class sociological groups.

Coming back to *Soul on Ice*, Cleaver reveals further classes. “But in his quest for confirmation in his masculinity,” Cleaver writes, explaining the homoerotic overtones of the Omnipotent Administrator’s exercise of power, “his attention is attracted...to the potent Bodies in the classes beneath him...He may exploit the white-collar Bodies at the office; then...he may be drawn to the blue-collar Bodies of the plant.”³⁹ Having added this class of (white) white-collar workers, Cleaver ultimately recognizes seven classes: a middle class, working class, and poor class within the white mother country; a middle class, working class, and poor class within the Black colony; and a white power elite to rule over them all. Given that, for Cleaver, one’s sexual image is a product of the complex interactions between one’s race and economic function, and given that each of these classes will contain males and females with divergent sexual images, Cleaver’s sociology of the sexual image recognizes no fewer than fourteen “genders.”

Despite Cleaver’s emphasis on the material foundations of sexual image formation and expression, using his analysis in “The Primeval Mitosis” to re-read *Soul on Ice* reveals that sexual image is also intimately connected to politics. The political modulations of gender identity in Cleaver’s thought appear in his discussion of both Blacks and whites. Cleaver is an unrelenting critic of the Black bourgeoisie, who he sees as a “soft,” “counter-revolutionary,” “ridiculous nuisance.”⁴⁰ In “Lazarus, Come Forth,” Cleaver brings his gender analysis to bear on a boxing match between Floyd Patterson and Muhammad Ali, who each represented a political ideology. According to Cleaver, Patterson represented the Uncle Tom foolery of the Black bourgeoisie, which is why white people supported him, and Ali represented the independently minded Black masses, which is why white people opposed him. “The white hope for a Patterson victory was,” Cleaver explains, “a counterrevolutionary desire to force the Negro, now in rebellion and personified in the boxing world by Ali, back into his ‘place.’ The black hope,”

Cleaver counters, “was to see Lazarus crushed, to see Uncle Tom defeated, to be given symbolic proof of the victory of the autonomous Negro over the subordinate Negro.”⁴¹ Even though Patterson and Ali were both Black male athletes, their political commitments and their symbolic meanings rendered their gender or sexual images different. Turning his attention to the white mother country, specifically the “young white rebels,” Cleaver suggests that the 1960s generation of white youth were learning to reject the history of white imperial violence through Black politics and, most importantly, Black music. In “Convalescence,” Cleaver interprets The Twist, a popular dance among white people, as evidence of young white people reconnecting with their bodies and thus moving toward Unitary Sexual Images. “The Omnipotent Administrator and the Ultrafeminine responded so dramatically, in stampede fashion, to the Twist,” he writes, “precisely because it afforded them the possibility of reclaiming their Bodies again after generations of alienated and disembodied existence.” “The Omnipotent Administrators and Ultrafeminines,” he insists, “were discovering new aspects of the Body, new possibilities of rhythm, new ways to move.”⁴² The political implications here are clear: having rejected the sexual images bequeathed to them by their white parents and grandparents, these white youth were creating an entirely new set of sexual images that not only introduced new gender and sexual practices but also began the ideological or cultural movement away from race-class stratifications and therefore away from fragmented sexual images.

Cleaver’s theory of sexual image thus disrupts the somatocentricity of imperial feminist paradigms, Black and white, because he drives a theoretical wedge between gender formations rooted in a racialized political economy and biological sex. To be sure, my analysis has focused almost solely on Cleaver’s descriptive account and had largely set aside his normative account. Cleaver’s normative statements regarding masculinity, femininity, and homosexuality have

drawn much criticism – some of it warranted, and some not. But I have not bracketed his normative statements simply to avoid having to criticize him; instead, by separating his descriptive and normative accounts of gender and sexuality, it becomes easier to learn from his most important sociological and philosophical insights. For example, in *The Sexual Demon of Colonial Power*, Greg Thomas offers an interpretation of E. Franklin Frazier’s sociology, especially its implications for gender and sexuality. While Frazier himself was quite conservative in his views regarding gender and sexuality, his sociological descriptions nevertheless identified “at least twelve genders,” Thomas explains, because according to Frazier, the old middle class, the new middle class, and the working class each had distinct gender norms and sexual proclivities, and these class differences were also race differences between whites and Blacks within the same economic class. In Frazier’s work, “There are never, ever merely girls and boys, men and women, without race and class. Analytically speaking,” Thomas elaborates, “there are instead a legion of genders and sexualities, so to speak; and they cannot be reduced to the anatomy of any one white racist elite.”⁴³ Cleaver offers a similar level of descriptive sophistication, even if his normative positions, like Frazier’s, do not necessarily comport with the contemporary moral dispositions of the liberal academy.⁴⁴ And, again like Frazier, the unquestionable distinction between sex and gender in Cleaver’s work is imperative for an anticolonial understanding of sex, gender, sexuality, and race. According to this anticolonial approach, power does not revolve around the “universal” biological male-female axis; instead, anticolonialism identifies the origins of power right inside history, the colonial ontology of Empire forming the basis of racial formation, class antagonism, gender identity, and sexual expression. And given that the “success” of European imperialism has historically relied upon the active participation of colonizing European females, it is necessary to further disrupt

somatocentric theories of power by tracing the role of white women and white womanhood in the development and perpetuation of Amerika's Anglo-Saxon Empire.

The Stampede of The Ogre: White Women as Colonial Oppressors

In a May 1869 speech in New York City, Elizabeth Cady Stanton set the terms of what would become the dominant feminist understanding of “woman’s” oppression in the United States and around the world. Condemning the Fifteenth Amendment to the Constitution, which extended voting rights to males of all races – including Black males – and which would be ratified the following year, Stanton argued that such “manhood suffrage” would create “an aristocracy of sex” in Amerika. This “most odious and unnatural” aristocracy, she insisted, would allow the savage men of Negro and immigrant background to set the policies governing virtuous and civilized Anglo-Saxon womanhood, thereby “subjugating, everywhere, moral power to brute force.” In lamenting the supposed “dangerous excess of the male element,” Stanton implied that there is a universal and unified class of “men” who, despite their differences, share an antipathy toward “women” and seek to impose themselves upon “her” through the acquisition of patriarchal power and authority.⁴⁵ Though over a century-and-a-half has passed, Stanton’s social ontology has persisted, appearing at the foundation of modern feminist texts including Carole Pateman’s *The Sexual Contract* and Catherine MacKinnon’s *Feminism Unmodified*.⁴⁶

The notion that power primarily revolves around the male-female axis is untenable from an anticolonial perspective, for it not only pretends that the history of modern European empires never occurred, it also conflates sex and gender and positions social power outside society, in biology. In “Toward a Decolonial Feminism,” María Lugones rejects this line of thought, offering a view of gender that accounts for colonialism and demystifies the implicit essentialism in feminism. As she writes:

the colonized became subjects in colonial situations in the first modernity, in the tensions created by the brutal imposition of the modern, colonial, gender system. Under the imposed gender framework, the bourgeois white Europeans were civilized; they were fully human. The hierarchical dichotomy as a mark of the human also became a normative tool to damn the colonized. The behaviors of the colonized and their personalities/souls were judged as bestial and thus non-gendered, promiscuous, grotesquely sexual, and sinful.⁴⁷

Because colonized males were related to colonial males as “not-human-as-not-men” and colonized females were related to colonial females as “not-human-as-not-women,” Lugones concludes that the gender categories “woman” and “man” cannot be applied to or describe non-whites; in other words, “no women are colonized; no colonized females are women.”⁴⁸ By extension, we can also say that *no men are colonized; no colonized males are men*. Translating Lugones’s observation into the anticolonial language used here, in a sociogenic world in which colonialism fashions social practices and political relationships, there can be no universal male-female axis of power because colonizing females have power over colonized males as non-tological entities in the zone of nonbeing.

Rather than maintain a fidelity to the superficial feminist narrative of universal male patriarchy, an anticolonial analysis requires us to interpret the history sex and gender relations in the Amerikan Empire in a manner similar to that of Lugones. By turning away from white female *oppression* toward white female *oppressors*, an anticolonial theory of sex and gender can explain the power that the sexual image “white womanhood” bestows upon colonizing females in Amerikan history. While white women were not always active colonists, they were also not simply passive participants without agency, for many white women played a decidedly active role in both domestic white supremacy and Amerikan imperial expansion. Importantly, white women’s role in the Amerikan Empire and the subjugation of the darker races goes back to the founding. As Martin R. Delany notes, Queen Elizabeth, the “Virgin Queen” after whom the

colony of Virginia was named, chartered the first English settlements in North America. Not content with mere land, Delany scoffs, she also initiated the English branch of the slave trade: “John Hawkins, and unprincipled Englishman – whose name should be branded with infamy – was the first person known to have engaged in so inhuman a traffic, and that living monster his mistress, Queen Elizabeth, engaged with him and shared in the profits.”⁴⁹ Far from being the victim of sixteenth-century sexist attitudes, Elizabeth created the imperial rubric for Anglo-Saxon Empire in both Ireland and North America, profiting from the enslavement of Africans along the way. During the antebellum period, elite white women North and South exerted political, economic, and sexual power over colonized Black males. Under U.S. law generally, Delany explains, *every* white person was held superior to *every* Black or colored person. Under the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850 specifically, he adds, “Any one of us, at any moment, is liable to be *claimed, seized and taken* into custody by the white as his *or her* property.”⁵⁰ From the founding of Jamestown to the Civil War, then, white women exercised political and sexual power over their colonized male subordinates, even though they may not have held political office.

In the century between Reconstruction and Civil Rights, white womanhood transformed from an elite class gender formation into a broad concept of white American Empire, and many white women used the myth of white womanhood to justify their participation in America’s colonial Empire.⁵¹ After the Civil War, white womanhood transformed from an elite gender ideology and social status into a universal status for white females as such, bringing white females from different economic classes under the purview of white patriarchal protection and establishing common bonds between white women north and south. During the antebellum period, white womanhood was a restricted status, applying in different ways only to elite Anglo-

Saxon women in the North and to elite plantation mistresses in the South. But as the Civil War and Reconstruction initiated the breakdown of patriarchy in the North and the South, white women began coming out of the home and into public life in exponential numbers.⁵² In the North, these women worked for Anglo-Saxon Empire; in the South, they worked for white supremacy. As Hodes notes, however, “Without slavery to differentiate blacks from poor whites, it was equally important that ideas about the purity of white women included poor [white] women.” “Dominant ideas about white female purity,” she adds, “came to include poor white women more overtly, as those who expounded upon the threat of black men took care to include lower-class [white] women in their most sweeping statements.”⁵³ By the early-twentieth century, white women were considered “the pure flower of life”⁵⁴ and the cornerstone of American civilization, and lynching became the primary mode of violence by which whites enforced the prohibition of sexual relations between Black men and white women.⁵⁵ As A. J. William-Meyers explains, “lynching was in the defense of the inviolability of white womanhood, and [it targeted] the threat posed to it by the beast with the cloven hoof.”⁵⁶ Frederick Douglass and Ida. B. Wells-Barnett, among others, railed against the terroristic violence of “lynch law,” but as Hodes reminds us, “rape could be defined so broadly that an insult, a grimace, an unwanted glance, or an accidental touch might be transformed in white minds into sexual violence.”⁵⁷ The spectacle of the castrated and cannibalized, mutilated and murdered Black male became the symbol of psychological tranquility and community safety for vicious white men, women, and children.⁵⁸

Because white womanhood was viewed as the cornerstone or lynchpin of white supremacist rule and American civilization, white womanhood also provided additions to and transformations of American imperialism at home and abroad. Though feminism often describes domesticity as a normative ideal of the feminine and a spatial proscription of females imposed by

patriarchs, this limited understanding fails to capture the broader imperial implications of the concept. In “Manifest Domesticity,” Amy Kaplan describes the homomorphic relationship between the use of domesticity to describe the family and the use of domesticity to describe the nation. “When we contrast the domestic sphere with the market or political realm, men and women inhabit a divided social terrain,” she writes, “but when we oppose the domestic to the foreign, men and women become national allies against the alien, and the determining division is not gender but racial demarcations of otherness. Thus another part of the cultural work of domesticity might be to unite men and women in a national domain and to generate notions of the foreign against which the nation can be imagined as home.”⁵⁹ In white colonial culture, the home is the reserved space for virtue, represented by the purity of the white woman, who is responsible for raising the next generation of white colonists. Whenever the nation needs to reassert its moral standing and reaffirm its inherent goodness, however, it calls upon the white woman, drawing upon her moral standing as the embodiment of civilization. “If, on the one hand, domesticity draws strict boundaries between the home and the world of men, on the other,” Kaplan elaborates, “it becomes the engine of national expansion, the site from which the nation reaches beyond itself through the emanation of [white] woman’s moral influence.”⁶⁰ “The empire of the mother thus shares the logic of the American empire,” she concludes, since “both follow a double compulsion to conquer and domesticate the foreign, thus incorporating and controlling a threatening foreignness within the borders of the home and the nation.”⁶¹ Thus, while domesticity seems to merely place limitations on (white) woman’s liberty and autonomy, it is in fact the conditions by which she asserts her participation in the imperial civilizing mission. Just as the white mother raises the white children, she may also position herself as the mother of the child-like races, who lack civilization and must therefore be brought into the family of nations.

In the South, white women were at the forefront of organizing for the restoration of white supremacy, and as they enter the political arena, white women used party politics and lynching organization to subdue colonized males and females. Because white supremacy required the participation of white women, the Southern Democrats depended on white women's support; after the ratification of the Nineteenth Amendment, white women worked to outvote all Blacks and regain white power in the South.⁶² As the white activist Delia Dixon-Carroll proclaimed, "White Supremacy rests in woman's hands."⁶³ According to sociologist Kathleen M. Blee, "the entrance of women into the world of politics and business made divisions of race, social class, and religion more salient for, and among, women."⁶⁴ In the 1920s, nationalist white women began the Women's Ku Klux Klan, or WKKK, to implement their white supremacist politics, but Blee is clear that these women were not pressured or coerced by their husbands or even reluctant, for "married women in the Klan were not necessarily led into the movement by Klan husbands; in fact, it was their wives who sometimes convinced men to join the Klan."⁶⁵ These women were leaders in the white supremacist movement, taking an active and mostly independent role since "the WKKK worked to maintain some degree of autonomy from the male KKK."⁶⁶ While the WKKK did not unilaterally commit as much violence as the KKK, the women's Klan did support and advocate the lynching of Black men and the destruction of Black businesses. As Crystal N. Feimster observes, lynching and the issue of rape "provoked women to enter politics through a smoke screen of protecting their bodies from assault."⁶⁷ As the Klan declined, white women contented to advocate lynching through other organizations. In the early-1930s, for example, white women created the Women's National Association for the Preservation of the White Race "to counter a homegrown campaign against lynching" in Georgia.⁶⁸ The basic

purpose of the organization was to defend lynching not as a necessary evil but as a positive good, the perfect means of protecting the white nation, the white home, and the white woman.

Perhaps the most important manifestation of white women's white supremacist activity was the rehabilitation of Confederate ideology. After the Civil War, Karen L. Cox notes, "elite southern women, not men, led the way in constructing the Lost Cause image."⁶⁹ Through the United Daughters of the Confederacy, tens of thousands of white women fought "to sustain white supremacy" by assimilating immigrants, building Confederate monuments, and preserving the value of the Confederacy.⁷⁰ Using their position as white mothers, Cox adds, "southern [white] women were committed to instilling the region's white youth with a respect for the Confederate past and its heroes. Members believed that if white children were properly instructed, they would become 'living monuments' to the Confederacy. Unlike marble statues," she concludes, "these children served as future defenders of the 'sacred principles' for which their Confederate ancestors had died."⁷¹ By transforming Southern culture, schools, and politics, these Confederacy-celebrating white women played an important role in redefining the South's purpose in the Civil War. For them, it was about the Constitution and about principle, not slavery. This ideology provided the seeds for segregationist politics in the 1950s, so when we think of George Wallace, we have to think of the white women who made his politics possible.

Just as white women in the postbellum South organized for the defense of white supremacy, white women in the postbellum North organized for imperial expansion. In *White Women's Rights: The Racial Origins of Feminism in the United States*, Louise Michelle Newman traces the racialist and assumptions and imperialist aspirations of turn-of-the-century white feminism, which relied on evolutionist understandings of civilization, race, and gender, placed white (Anglo-Saxon) women at the top of the civilizational chain. As Newman explains,

“postbellum suffrage ideology stressed white women’s racial-cultural superiority to newly enfranchised male constituencies – not just black men, but also naturalized immigrant men.”⁷²

These white women cultivated a symbiotic relationship between feminism and imperialism that produced political alliances that worked to the benefit of both. On the one hand, “imperialism provided an important discourse for white elite women who developed new identities for themselves as missionaries, explorers, educators, and ethnographers as they staked out new realms of possibility and political power against the tight constraints of Victorian gender norms.”⁷³ On the other hand, “the multiple ways in which white woman’s rights activists made use of evolutionist racism—in their responses to scientific and medical literature, in their travel writing and ethnographies, in their fiction, poetry, essays, and letters—assisted the United States in carving out an identity as an imperial nation in an age of empire, allaying the nation’s doubts about its rightful place in the ‘civilized’ world.”⁷⁴ Thus, while white Anglo-Saxon women achieved political power and influence through their participation in Empire, the status of Empire itself was renewed through the participation of white feminists. Noting the “assimilationist legacies” of white feminism, Newman argues that “Assimilation and civilizing missions were conceived as humane alternatives to the violence and coercion that male politicians had condoned.” “By asserting their authority to act as *peaceful* agents of civilization,” she explains, “white women contributed a discursive innovation that was useful to those calling for the United States to embark on a more ambitious imperialist project—to eliminate ‘savagery’ not just within the borders of the United States but throughout the world.”⁷⁵ In anticolonial terms, these white women opposed elimination and supported domination on paternalistic grounds, arguing that they, as *white* women, could more easily and effectively exercise civilizational parentage over the lesser races until they were fit for assimilation.

Perhaps the most important manifestation of white women's imperial feminism at home and abroad was the Woman's Christian Temperance Union (WCTU), an international organization committed to social reform, (white) women's rights, and America's Anglo-Saxon Empire. From the 1890s to the 1930s, the WCTU rallied "thousands of northern and southern women in a common cause."⁷⁶ In domestic politics, the WCTU led the effort to reconcile Northern and Southern whites in the traumatic wake of the Civil War, and in the process, Black political and civil rights were sacrificed in the name of white nationhood and white Empire.⁷⁷ As Edward J. Blum remarks, "Reunion enabled the United States to focus its energies on foreign lands and in turn created stronger feelings of national identity at home."⁷⁸ On the international stage, Francis Willard led the WCTU's imperial project, drawing on "ideas of American moral superiority" and working to export "American moral power."⁷⁹ According to Ian Tyrrell, "Willard tied the ascendancy of Anglo-American culture to her spiritual vision of a global regeneration. The medium of this triumph would be imperialism and colonialism."⁸⁰ Willard "proposed to use this Anglo-Saxon hegemony," Tyrrell adds, "in a new age of imperialism to further the twin and for her inseparable goals of women's emancipation and social reform."⁸¹ The internationalism of Willard and the WCTU reflected the values of Anglo-Saxon imperialism at the time. Armed with a millenarian Anglo-Saxon mission, Willard and the reform-minded feminists of the WCTU embraced colonial paternalism and insisted that the colonized needed to be saved from their own barbaric cultures. More specifically, they employed orientalist and anti-Muslim rhetoric to argue that colonized females needed to be saved or protected from their own uncivilized males. Though white women north and south had slightly different programs for maintaining white imperial power, they each contributed to the continued colonial subjugation of

racialized peoples both inside and outside the United States, and in the process, worked to heal the sectional divide that had torn asunder Amerika's white nationalist identity.

Despite the unquestionable history of white women's participation in Anglo-Saxon imperialism, contemporary white feminist writers continue to obfuscate white women's role as colonizers. For example, in *Imperial Leather: Race, Gender and Sexuality in the Colonial Contest*, Anne McClintock maintains that white women were "ambiguously complicit" in colonial regimes because the white man's patriarchal power limited the political and cultural influence of white women. While admitting that "rationed privileges of race all too often put white women in positions of decided – if borrowed – power, not only over colonized women but also over colonized men," McClintock nevertheless suggests that "White women are both colonized and colonizers, ambiguously complicit in the history of African dispossession."⁸² According to her analysis, gender disrupts the colonizer-colonized binary, not because colonizing females have power over colonized males, but because we must contend with the simultaneity of white women's (racial) privilege and (gen[sex]der) oppression.⁸³ Likewise, in *Imperial Plots: Women, Land, and the Spadework of British Colonialism on the Canadian Prairies*, Sarah Carter explains that British and British-Canadian women "aspired to settle on... 'imperial plots' that would have otherwise gone to 'ignorant, uncouth, lawless foreigners,' or so they argued, so that refined and educated gentlewomen could contribute to the spadework of empire and plant British culture as well as crops."⁸⁴ Citing McClintock on white women's "ambiguous" complicity in colonialism, however, Carter insists that the white women engaged in expanding Anglo-Saxon imperialism in present-day Canada were often prohibited from full participation in the colonial project.⁸⁵ The work of McClintock and Carter offer paradigmatic examples of the continuation of white women's disavowal and perpetuation of European

colonialism. They acknowledge that white women *desired* to be imperial, but they argue that their imperialism was limited by patriarchal men. Thus, the ultimate irony shines through. White women are simultaneously oppressed by patriarchy and saved by it: but for their patriarchal masters (from whom they desired to free themselves), they would have been even more successful colonizers. Feminism claims to have emerged as a response to patriarchy, but as we can see, it now depends upon patriarchy to disown white women's colonial violence. Having reached an impasse between challenging patriarchy and depending on it to avoid responsibility for white women's colonial actions and power, the feminist historiography of McClintock and Carter merely recapitulate the historical obfuscation enacted by feminism, namely, asserting white women's victim status to absolve them of their genocidal existence.

Given this history of white women's role in the perpetuation of Anglo-Saxon Empire, it becomes increasingly impossible to accept the originary nature of the supposed male-female power axis advanced by feminist theory from Stanton to Pateman and MacKinnon. In the context of modern colonialism, the primary axis of power was not and is not organized around this biological dualism; rather, it was and is organized around the colonial relationship between colonizer and colonized. White men and women in the colonies acknowledged the colonial relationship as the basis of their mutual though differentiated power. Colonial practices depended on the participation of colonizing females because they not only made family life possible in settler colonies, but because they also made active contributions to imperial ideology and colonial practices. Because the Amerikan Empire positioned white women as the bastions of virtue, they were able to contribute in ways what white men never could. As Kaplan reminds us, "As women they could be more effective imperialists, penetrating those interior feminine colonial spaces, symbolized by the harem, that remain inaccessible to male missionaries."⁸⁶

These observations require us to reinterpret the history of both white women's social power and the nature of feminism. On the one hand, colonized people were often reluctant to criticize white women for their role on perpetuating colonialism. "African Americans in the region understood the serious repercussions of publicly criticizing white women in the Jim Crow South," Cox writes, for example. "They could criticize the message, but not the messengers."⁸⁷ On the other hand, even the supposedly emancipatory ideology of feminism was inextricably linked with colonial ideology. Newman is clear that "racism was not just an unfortunate sideshow in the performances of feminist theory. Rather it was center stage: an integral, constitutive element in feminism's overall understanding of citizenship, democracy, political self-possession, and equality."⁸⁸ This racism and imperialism of feminism continues today.⁸⁹ And because somatocentric essentialism persists in popular and academic discourses surrounding race and gender, the power that colonizing females have over colonized males is perpetually obfuscated. Just as every acknowledgement of Black male suffering is mitigated with declarations regarding his supposed patriarchal power,⁹⁰ every acknowledgement of white female colonial violence is mitigated with declarations regarding her supposed patriarchal subjugation.

White Woman, Black Man Redux: Cleaver on Ogre Psychology

White people do not like to be studied by Black people, but there is a long tradition within anticolonial philosophy – going back to at least W. E. B. Du Bois's "The Souls of White Folk" – that usurps the investigatory role that Europeans attempt to monopolize and turns the social scientific microscope back upon the self-appointed god-scientists themselves. Like Du Bois, who announces his ability to "see in and through" white folk, Cleaver declares that he is an "Ofay Watcher," "a member of that uncharted, amorphous league which has members on all continents and the islands of the seas."⁹¹ But unlike Du Bois, who is interested in the souls of white folk

generally, Cleaver is particularly interested in the Ultrafeminine, the white woman, The Ogre. While there is a tendency to focus on the psychological implications of *Soul on Ice* for Black males, there is much to be learned from Cleaver's insights into white women's sexual psychology, or as it could be termed, "Ogre Psychology." In "The Primeval Mitosis," Cleaver describes the inner psychological and existential conflict that comes along with internalizing the sexual image of white womanhood. He fundamentally rejects the myth of white womanhood as characterized by virtue, delicacy, and most of all chastity, and he gestures toward a novel understanding of this tortured – and torturing – social creature. As a product of white supremacy and economic function, the white woman of white womanhood becomes simultaneously sexually hungry and erotically starved. The genesis of white womanhood from the colonial social structure of Amerika reflects the mind-body dualism imposed by a colonial political economy. Because the white woman, as the Ultrafeminine, has repudiated the body in favor of the mind, she develops a mental disposition too powerful for her body to support. Because the men of her class do not and cannot resolve her inner sexual frustrations, The Ogre transforms the social structure into a coercive apparatus designed to extract sexual gratification from the paradigm of embodiment, the Supermasculine Menial – the Black male.

From the antebellum period through the end of Jim Crow, white women used their position of colonial power to coerce Black males into sexual intercourse. In the antebellum South, white women often forced enslaved Black males to submit to sexual advances under the threat of death. "The traditional denial of white women's sexual agency has contributed to our obscured view of those white women who sexually assaulted and exploited enslaved men," Thomas Foster notes. "Indeed, the abuse of black men at the hands of white women stands on its head the traditional gendered views of racialized sexual assault."⁹² In many documented cases,

the slave master wives would find a secluded area, instruct the enslaved man to have sexual intercourse with her, and threaten to claim that he raped her if he refused.⁹³ Some white women vowed to take violence into their own hands; as one Black man stated: “If I have connection with a white girl she knows that if she takes precautions she is safe, for if I should tell I should be murdered by her father, her brother, or herself.”⁹⁴ While “white women in the slave South, no matter what their class standing, could coerce black men into sex,” Martha Hodes explains, “a planter-class white woman...could more readily invoke images of chastity in order to allay trouble for herself...in a liaison with an elite white woman, it was not only more dangerous for a black man to consort, but also more dangerous for him to refuse.”⁹⁵ Such coercion would only be possible if white women understood their own status in the (colonizing) white family and were willing to use that status to impose their sexual demands upon relatively powerless Black males.

Foster explains this process succinctly:

Wives and daughters of planters who formed these sexual relationships were simply taking advantage of their position within the slave system. Having sex with their white counterparts in the insular world of the white planter class, if exposed, would certainly have risked opprobrium, and even gossip about their public actions might have marred their reputations. Daughters of planters could use enslaved men in domestic settings, however, and retain their virtue and maintain the appearance of passionlessness and virginity while seeking sexual experimentation. In other words, one of the ways that some southern women may have protected their public virtue was by clandestine relations with black men.⁹⁶

The typical image we are supposed to have of the plantation is a patriarchal white man ruling over his wife, children, and slaves like an Aristotelian citizen, but the testimonies of enslaved Black men force us to consider the place of white women in the plantation power structure.

During the Jim Crow period, white women continued their practice of threatening Black males and forcing them into sexual relationship, but instead of the white plantation master, the lynch mob was the key enforcement mechanism of these coercive relations. White women

understood their position within the apartheid state, and they used that position to pursue their sexual desires while placing willing and unwilling Black males in precarious and vulnerable positions. Calvin Hernton records a number of Black male testimonies from the Jim Crow period that echo those of Black males under slavery. “She told me that if I failed to show I had better not report to work at the bank anymore,” one Black man told Hernton. “She said: ‘If you run, I’ll scream and say you attacked me. So you best come back up,’” intimated another.⁹⁷ Perhaps the most famous and telling example is Willie McGee, who, in 1944, was forced into a long-term sexual relation with his white woman employer, Willametta Hawkins. The relationship between McGee and Hawkins initially began consensually. But eventually Hawkins began pressuring McGee into murdering her husband so she could collect the insurance money; McGee refused. Hawkins told McGee that she was pregnant with his child, and when that failed to convince McGee to go through with the conspiracy, she reported McGee as a rapist. The jury, of course, refused to believe the relationship was consensual on Hawkins’ part, and McGee was sentenced to death.⁹⁸ Through the affair, and especially after things took a dark turn, Hawkins exercised her power as a white woman over McGee, injecting terror into his daily life and refusing to let him end the affair. “I tried everything to get rid of her but she being a white lady I had to do what she said,” McGee revealed in a statement. “She kept me worried at all times.”⁹⁹

Thus, anti-Black male violence and the dominance of white womanhood are inextricable. White women wanted their sex and their safety, which meant that their lovers were positioned as the reservoir for white supremacist anger regarding sexual transgressions across the dividing line of colonial ontology. “When white women violated these Southern signposts,” Danielle L. McGuire observes, “it was not uncommon for them to sacrifice their black lovers to save themselves from the stigma of violating the South’s most sacred taboo.”¹⁰⁰ As A. J. Williams-

Meyers concludes, physical brutality was “not limited to white males.” While “white women found themselves securely atop the pedestal, and their men stood guard over their ‘womanhood,’” Williams-Meyers writes, “they were not immuned [*sic*] from the subliminally repressed myths about people of African descent. They acted out their aberrant behavior towards their slaves as a logical response to psychic stimuli driven by destructive impulses.”¹⁰¹ “Whether she performed the part of the ‘Fair Maiden violated and avenged,’ or a ‘Lady Macbeth’ who prodded and provoked the deadly act,” Feimster corroborates, “the female participant was not simply an object of chivalry, but a powerful new woman invested in both white supremacy and women’s rights.”¹⁰²

Cleaver is, in part, responding to this historical context in which white women seek out Black males and manipulate them into forced sexual relationships. Because this behavior is an expression of white womanhood as a sexual image, Cleaver offers a social psychological explanation. “The basic motion of the women of the elite is flight from their bodies,” Cleaver argues, positioning white women generally and elite white women specifically at the zenith of this flight. While the Omnipotent Administrator has eschewed the body in favor of the mind, the Ultrafeminine white woman take this move to the extreme, disassociating the mind and body and sheading any appearance of overt physical prowess or strength. In doing so, however, the white woman develops an existential impediment to sexual gratification. On the one hand, she is mind enough to develop complex sexual desires; on the other hand, she is so alienated from the body that communication between mind and body has broken down, which inhibits the fulfillment of those complex sexual desires. “In the realm of sex,” Cleaver writes, “because the act of sexual intercourse is both a physical and mental process, a joint venture between the Mind and the Body, her basic contradiction is that *she is physically inadequate while mentally voracious*, with

her mind in extreme conflict with her body” (emphasis added). The importance of Cleaver’s description cannot be overstated. In his view, white women are neither sexless nor dull – they are psychologically complicated beings whose physical existence is entire at odds with her mind. Given the breakdown of mind-body communication, she becomes increasingly sexually frustrated. “The mechanism of her orgasm, which begins in her body and ends in the psychic depths of her mind, becomes short-circuited in the struggle between her mind and her body,” Cleaver explains, noting the existential struggle at the heart of white women’s sexual psychology. Racked with the anxiety of living in a perpetual state of dissatisfaction, the Ultrafeminine fears her seemingly inevitable transformation into the “Ogre of Frigidity.”¹⁰³ On this view, those white females who express the sexual image of white womanhood live in a world of extreme sexual fantasy and extreme sexual deprivation.

Compelled by her sexual desire to seek out a mate who can satisfy her voracious and fantastic sexual needs, she finds that the Omnipotent Administrator is not body enough to do the job, and she is ultimately drawn to the Black Supermasculine Menial. White men cannot satisfy white women sexually because they too have given up their bodily element. As Cleaver puts it, “The Omnipotent Administrator, having repudiated and abdicated his body, his masculine component which he has projected onto the men beneath him, cannot present his woman, the Ultrafeminine, with an image of masculinity capable of penetrating into the psychic depths where the treasure of her orgasm is buried.” Because “social conventions and mores” inhibit the Ultrafeminine from “embarking on a quest for her sexual fulfillment,” she is trapped between her desires and her imposed social role. To quite the sexual tensions that haunt her everyday life, she suppresses desire and becomes “a psychic celibate.” But deep within the complex psychology of the white woman, she find her “psychic bridegroom,” the Black Supermasculine Menial, who is

for the Ultrafeminine the embodiment of embodiment, a “walking phallus symbol.” While the white woman may have never experienced sex with a Black male, she nevertheless is convinced that he – and *only* he – can collapse the bifurcation of her mind and body, reconciling the two halves of her human self and making orgasm possible. But she does not seek out the Black male as himself, for she can only seek out the Supermasculine Menial, the object of her desire and her hatred. She is at once drawn to and terrified of her psychic bridegroom.¹⁰⁴ As Hernton puts it, “Unable to experience the black man in fact, the Negro in fantasy becomes the center of the white woman’s sexual life – she elevates him to the status of a god-phallus; she worships, fears, desires, and hates him. Oh, how she hates him!”¹⁰⁵

In a white supremacist and colonial context, white women cannot pursue or even admit their sexual desire for Black men, which results in a series of projections that lead to anti-Black male violence. In “The Pathology of Race Prejudice,” Frazier expands upon the observations of Cleaver and Hernton, noting that “The energetic measures which Southerners use to prevent legal unions of white with colored people look suspiciously like compensatory reactions for their own frustrated desires for such unions.”¹⁰⁶ Commenting on what he calls “the Negro-complex,” Frazier remarks upon “those frequent hallucinations of white women who complain of attacks by Negroes when clearly no Negroes are involved.” “Hallucinations often represent unacceptable sexual desires which are projected when they can no longer be repressed,” he adds. “In the South a desire on the part of a white woman for a Negro that could no longer be repressed would most likely be projected...It is not unlikely, therefore, that imaginary attacks by Negroes are often projected wishes.”¹⁰⁷ In one example, a white female telephone operator accused a Black male doctor of making advances on her and even got the police involved. The Black doctor was saved by the intervention of a white doctor, who “had gone to the operator and found that she was only

‘nervous’ that day.”¹⁰⁸ The connotation is quite obvious: in a state of sexual arousal, the white woman was fantasizing about Black men, felt the sting of shame and transgression, and projected her desires onto the Black male doctor, whom according to her hallucinations had made sexual advances on her. Given the pattern of white women accusing Black men of sexual advances despite the lack of material evidence or circumstantial opportunity, Frazier concludes that “the delusion that the Negro is a ravisher can only be taken as a projection.”¹⁰⁹

Because the Ultrafeminine white woman both needs and fears the Black male, she expresses this tension through her coercive sexual violence and her advocacy of lynching. On the one hand, white women will use the apparatus of white supremacy to sexually abuse Black men. Hernton notes that “white women are not only sexually attracted by blacks, but it is they who are the aggressors.”¹¹⁰ From the plantation to segregation, whether “willingly”¹¹¹ or unwillingly, Black men were subjected to the power of white women. As Hernton writes, “in every case the black man is ‘trapped.’ It is as hazardous to ‘go along’ as it is to refuse, because throughout the duration of the affair there looms the possibility of being discovered or of the woman getting angry; in either case she can, to save face or to take vengeance, yell ‘rape.’ The best a black man can hope for,” Hernton reluctantly concludes, “is that the woman loves him, or that she is strong enough to keep the relationship a secret (or to deny it) no matter what happens.”¹¹² On the other hand, white women advocate lynching because it falsely reassures them that the prohibited desires they have for Black men have been effectively excised from their psyches. In “Allegory of the Black Eunuchs,” Cleaver uses the character of Old Lazarus to explain white men’s motivations for lynching: “you can seize the Body in a rage,” Old Lazarus warned, “string the Body up from the nearest tree and pluck its strange fruit, its big Nigger dick, pickle it in a bottle and take it home to the beautiful dumb blonde and rejoice in the lie that the not the Body but the

Brain is the man.”¹¹³ But white women also celebrated this affirmation of the status quo because it validated her sexual image. “While she did not actually lynch and castrate blacks herself,” Hernton explains, “she permitted her men to do so in her name. And she enjoyed, as certainly as white men did, the perverse sexual ecstasy of haring and knowing about lynching and castration.”¹¹⁴ As the Amerikan iteration of the Ultrafeminine, Cleaver and Hernton suggest, white women who internalize the sexual image of white womanhood are plagued with existential dualism and sexual frustration, which release their tensions through anti-Black male violence, whether in coercive sexual relationships or lynch mobs.

While Cleaver’s texts, aided by Hernton and Frazier, allow us to establish a broad framework for Ogre Psychology, Cleaver himself never worked out a full theory of the psychology of white womanhood. Once *Soul on Ice* was published and Cleaver was on parole, his attention turned to the Black Panther Party and matters of revolution. But besides the basic insights regarding the sexual psychology of white womanhood under Amerikan Empire, there is a final lesson to be learned about the anticolonial rejection of Western somatocentricity. In *Black Skin, White Masks*, Frantz Fanon distinguishes between white men who have sex with colonized females and white women who have sex with colonized men, and he presents a double standard. “Since he is the master and more simply the male,” Fanon writes, “the white man can allow himself the luxury of sleeping with many women. This is true in every country and especially in the colonies. But when a white woman accepts a black man there is automatically a romantic aspect. It is a gift and not a rape.”¹¹⁵ But Fanon is assuming that either the intention or the body of the white women *and not power* offers the proper criteria for defining rape. For decades, feminists have been arguing (with many naturalist and heteronormative overtones) that rape is about power, specifically males’ power over females. In their 1977 essay “Rape and Respect,”

however, Carolyn M. Shafer and Marilyn Frye offer a different conception: “Rape is a man’s act, whether it is a male or a female man and whether it is a man relatively permanently or relatively temporarily; and being raped is a woman’s experience, whether it is a female or a male woman and whether it is a woman relatively permanently or relatively temporarily.”¹¹⁶ They argue that, if the victim of a rape act is a male and the perpetrator is a female then, in that instance, the male is the woman and the female is the man. While this expression of the issue implies that rape and sexual assault are by definition not feminine acts, Shafer and Frye nevertheless present a radical separation between sex and gender. Translating their argument into anticolonial terms, it becomes possible to say that, in the history of colonizing white females using their social and political position to coerce colonized Black males into sex, the white females were the *men* and the Black males were the *women*. From this perspective, it would be possible to push beyond Cleaver and argue that Ultrafeminine white women not only reunite their mind and body through sex with the Black Supermasculine Menial, but that they also achieve a masculine sovereignty over their feminine colonial subordinates.

Conclusion

Cleaver’s notion of the sexual image contributes to anticolonial theory by departing from the somatocentric configurations of sex, gender, and sexuality offered by imperial Western ideologies of feminism. Theorists of intersectionality do not prioritize identity categories or axes of oppression over each other because they want to avoid subordinating analyses of one kind of oppression to another kind of oppression. As Carastathis put it, “Rather than reducing the phenomena of oppression to one foundational explanatory category (e.g., class) and ontologically privileging that category, intersectionality theorists argue that oppression is produced through the interaction of multiple, decentered, and mutually constitutive axes.”¹¹⁷ The problem here is

twofold. On the one hand, the theory categorically denies the possibility that one “axis” could causally determine or unilaterally influence another “axis”; this view, however, seems false. Changing one’s gender could in no way change one’s economic class or colonial status, but changing one’s economic class or colonial status can – and, if Cleaver’s argument is correct, *does* – change or influence one’s gender or sexual image. On the other hand, though intersectionality rarely mentions colonialism or class, it does not make sense to position these relations as “axes” of “identity.” Being colonized or exploited are not identities that call for expression; they are conditions of oppression that call for extirpation. Thus, it is not clear how identity categories like “gender” and “sexuality” can be placed on the same explanatory plane and therefore seen as “intersecting,” colonialism and class. Intersectionality relies on this indeterminacy to hide its gen[sex]der essentialism. “Gender” can be plausibly placed on the same theoretical level as colonialism only if it refers to some non-social foundation – biological sex. It is only when gen[sex]der oppression is moved outside history that intersectionality theorists can claim that it operates independently of the colonial context. Unlike intersectionality, which claims to provide a “social construction” interpretation of gender but in fact smuggles biological essentialism in through the backdoor, Cleaver’s anticolonial conception of gender and sexuality situates these social phenomena within the material conditions of a capitalist colonial Empire. And because gender configurations or sexual images are entirely contingent upon historical and social forces, colonizing females can have power over colonized males, an observation made impossible by the premises of intersectionality.

By moving anticolonialism to a theoretical space outside the confines of intersectionality, Cleaver opens the door to understanding the social position, political power, and psychological structure of colonizing females in a white supremacist Empire. Many white colonizing females

have exacerbated and expanded the power of Amerikan Empire through their enactment of the sexual image of white womanhood. From Queen Elizabeth to the 1960s, white women worked with white men to colonize much of the world, especially North Amerika, the continent that the current United States Empire uses as its base of operations. Whether they were establishing the legacy of the Confederacy or designing new projects of imperial penetration abroad, Amerikan white women have made possible the domination and elimination of colonized peoples at the hands of the United States. It is important to remember that for anticolonialism, there is nothing “natural” or “unnatural” about white women’s imperial behavior; as Cleaver argues, they are products of the very Empire they perpetuate. Cleaver does, however, provide a novel connection between sex, race, class, gender, and sexuality by laying the groundwork for a reinterpretation of the sexual psychology of white womanhood. Because white women are socialized into the values and identities of Empire, they accept the mind-body distinction as it is mapped onto the colonizer-colonized relation and thereby reject their own bodies. But after they take this existential flight from their corporeality, they become burdened by a voracious but insatiable sexual appetite. Having accepted the stereotype of Black male sexual proficiency, they develop a desire for Black male bodies, but this desire is in direct conflict with their revulsion of the colonized. Though their simultaneous love and hate of the Black colonized male, white women vacillate between using the power of white supremacy and patriarchy to coerce their subordinates into sexual relationships and using the power of white supremacy and patriarchy to eliminate the *objects* of their fear-desire. In a way, then, Cleaver’s theory of the sexual image complements Martin Delany’s theory of colonial sovereignty. While Delany construes the colonial relation as one of political sovereignty, Cleaver construes the colonial relation as one of

sexual sovereignty – with males *and* females of the colonizing group empowered over the males *and* females of the colonized.

Some readers may readily grant the historical relevance of Cleaver’s anticolonial philosophizing but also believe that the colonial empowerment of white women in the Amerikan Empire is no longer an issue. The record of Amerikan imperial aggression since the end of the Cold War, however, demonstrates the continued roles that white females and white womanhood play in Amerika’s colonial Empire. The first Gulf War stands at the beginning of this chapter of U.S. imperialism, and the sexual and racial themes of (white) women’s violation at the hands of dark rapists permeated the government’s war propaganda. “If in the [19]20s the evocation of ‘rape’ would lead to mass vigilantism and participation in violent lynching rituals,” Abouali Farmanfarmaian argues, “in 1991 the majority of the American people participated by voting for, and then watching, live on the networks, the exercise of military violence.”¹¹⁸ As Farmanfarmaian observes, not only was Iraq was treated as a nation-state-sized rapist who had violated Kuwaiti sovereignty by forcibly penetrating its national borders (pundits spoke of the “rape of Kuwait”), reports of Iraqi rapists in Kuwait saturated the airwaves via the corporate media. The symbol of white womanhood also played two roles. On the one hand, (white) male U.S. soldiers were constantly “reminded” that they were fighting the war to defend the noble (white) Amerikan family, represented by their (white) wives; on the other hand, (white) women directly participated in military action, just as their predecessors participated in lynchings. As Farmanfarmaian concludes, the Gulf War cannot be understood without acknowledging the overlapping racial and sexual meanings of this episode of U.S. imperialism. This “militarization of sexual violence,” as John Cerretti calls it, was not confined to the Gulf War but rather defined

U.S. intervention throughout the 1990s, including Amerikan military activity in Haiti and Kosovo.¹¹⁹

These themes are also present in the War on Terror and continued United States programs of toppling foreign governments that oppose Amerikan imperialism. In 2004, it was revealed that U.S. soldiers had tortured and raped Iraqi prisoners being held at Abu Ghraib prison. The male prisoners were forced to perform oral sex on each other, sodomized with objects, raped by male U.S. soldiers while women took photographs, and dragged by a rope tied to their penises. Among the offending soldiers were Sabrina Harman, Megan Ambuhl, and Lynndie England, three females empowered by the Amerikan Empire to violate and mutilate the bodies of colonized Iraqi males. The photographs of torture at Abu Ghraib acted as “trophy shots,” replying the postcards made from photos of lynched Black men in the Jim Crow South and reiterating the animalization of the colonized.¹²⁰ Other women, such as Alfreda Frances Bikowsky and Gina Haspel, worked for the Central Intelligence Agency torturing detainees in the War on Terror. Haspel oversaw operations at a CIA Black Site in Thailand, where she participated in the torture of at least two victims, and Bikowsky, having also personally tortured at least one victim, played a major role in covering up the CIA torture program.¹²¹ Finally, there is Hillary Clinton, who not only supported the war in Iraq in 2003 and thereby making it possible for horrors of Abu Ghraib to occur but also pushed the Obama administration to pursue regime change in Libya in 2011. In her campaign to topple the government of Muammar Gaddafi, Clinton used the State Department to amplify unsubstantiated claims that Gaddafi was distributing Viagra so his supporters could use rape as a device of terror. Such propaganda was directly connected to the racial politics of Libya because many anti-Black Arab Libyans were critical of Gaddafi for enforcing racial equality laws in the country. By conjuring up the menace of the vile Black rapist, Clinton

appealed to two audiences at once: the Amerikan audience whose ingrained fear of the Black male rapist was easily tapped and the anti-Gaddafi Libyans who opposed racial equality between Blacks and Arabs. The Viagra have proven to be completely unsubstantiated,¹²² and Gaddafi was deposed in lynching of international proportions. And when he was finally captured by the U.S.-backed Libyan rebels, Gaddafi was sodomized with a bayonet – that is, raped – before being tortured and executed in the street. When Clinton received the news of Gaddafi’s rape and murder, she exclaimed with laughter, “We came, we saw, he died!”¹²³

While Cleaver’s theory of sexual image may be incomplete, and these anticolonial reflections on the power of colonizing females unfinished, they at least take one step in the direction Du Bois was heading in “The Souls of White Folk,” namely, to demystify white womanhood and to show white women as Du Bois did white folk in general – to “see them ever stripped, – ugly, human.”¹²⁴

It would make perfect sense if the preceding chapters have seemed iconoclastic, for they level sweeping challenges to a number of academic orthodoxies. In Part One, I offered interventions into the discourses surrounding social ontology and critical whiteness studies, developing a distinctly anticolonial understand of the social structure and social ontology of modernity and demonstrating the shortcomings of monolithic conceptions of whiteness. Within the colonial ontology of Empire, colonizers assimilate, dominate, and eliminate the colonized while colonizers construct competing conceptions of whiteness in their conflict over who gets to claim status as colonizer. In Part Two, I turned to the works of Martin R. Delany and Eldridge Cleaver to intervene in discourses surrounding sovereignty and gender and to develop compelling anticolonial understandings of these political and social phenomena. Within the colonial ontology of Empire, colonizers exercise the exclusive rights of sovereignty over the

colonized, and because gender is distinct from biological sex and therefore conditioned by the colonial and class relations of a given society, even colonizing females can and do participate in the subjugation of colonized females and males alike. In the process of developing these ideas, I have explicitly and implicitly questioned many of the fundamental assumptions of several prevailing scholarly paradigms, including liberalism, Marxism, postcolonialism, poststructuralism, feminism, and intersectionality, among others. While the previous chapters have largely focused on pre-1970 Amerika, the next chapter turns to the present day, and by drawing on the anticolonial theory developed in preceding chapters, I argue that since 1970, the United States has been transformed from a colonial social structure into a neocolonial social structure; stated slightly different, I argue that the Black domestic colony has become a domestic neocolony. In the process, however, it is necessary to liberate this analysis from a concept that is ubiquitous but meaningless – “neoliberalism.”

CHAPTER VI

NEOCOLONIAL AMERIKA: RETHINKING THE DOMESTIC COLONY IN A TWENTY-FIRST-CENTURY EMPIRE

“Black people desire to determine their own destiny. As a result, they are constantly inflicted with brutality from the occupying army, embodied by the police department. There is a great similarity between the occupying army in Southeast Asia and the occupation of our communities by the racist police. The armies were sent not to protect the people of South Vietnam but to brutalize and oppress them in the self-interests of imperial powers.”

– Huey P. Newton, “A Functional Definition of Politics”¹

“What might it mean to consider the current moment as a time when the changing social logics of a historically genocidal and proto-genocidal racist nation have enabled a piecemeal *repopulation* of the ideological and political apparatuses of national white supremacy with the minds, spirits, and bodies of its onetime slaves, savages, and racial colonial subjects?”

– Dylan Rodríguez, “The Black Presidential Non-Slave”²

Over the past thirty years, no refrain, no catchphrase, no epithet as become more common, more ubiquitous, more pervasive among pseudo-radical liberal academics that the idea that we live in “the age of neoliberalism.”³ As economists Alfred Saad-Filho and Deborah Johnston have put it, “neoliberalism has become so widespread and influential, and so deeply intermingled with critical important aspects of life...it can be difficult to assess its nature and historical importance.”⁴ There is no scholarly consensus regarding the origins and basic features of “neoliberalism,”⁵ but the dominant approaches to defining and understanding it are grounded in Marxism, critical theory, and poststructuralism. The Marxist school of thought argues that “neoliberalism” was and is primarily a capitalist response, particularly by finance capital, to the New Deal welfare state of the mid-twentieth century. For example, in *Capital Resurgent: Roots of the Neoliberal Revolution*, Gérard Duménil and Dominique Lévy argue that “the neoliberal order aims to reaffirm the fundamentally capitalist nature of our societies,” and in *A Brief History of Neoliberalism*, and David Harvey argues that neoliberalism is “a vehicle for the restoration of class power.”⁶ The critical theory critics of “neoliberalism,” less orthodox in their

Marxism, expand their analysis beyond finance capital and view “neoliberalism” as a total method of organizing the state and society. In *The Terror of Neoliberalism*, Henry A. Giroux offers a critical theory interpretation of “neoliberalism,” which he defines as “an ideology and a politics buoyed by the spirit of a market fundamentalism that subordinates the art of democratic politics to the rapacious laws of a market economy that expands its reach to include all aspects of social life.”⁷ Like the critical theorists, poststructuralist critics see “neoliberalism” as a total method of organizing the state and society, but following Michel Foucault’s account of neoliberalism in *The Birth of Biopolitics*, they frame their analyses in terms of governmentality.⁸ In *Undoing the Demos: Neoliberalism’s Stealth Revolution*, Wendy Brown contends that neoliberalism is “an order of normative reason that, when it becomes ascendant, takes shape as a governing rationality extending a specific formulation of economic values, practices, and metrics to every dimension of human life.”⁹ “Neoliberalism is not about the state leaving the economy alone,” she clarifies. “Rather, neoliberalism activates the state on behalf of the economy, *not* to undertake economic functions or to intervene in economic *effects*, but rather to facilitate economic competition and growth and to economize the social, or, as Foucault puts it, to ‘regulate society by the market.’”¹⁰ Whether driven by a cabal of power-greedy finance capitalists or implemented as a means of achieving the marketization or economization of both civil society and the state – or a combination thereof – many scholars agree that “neoliberalism,” as the defining feature of our contemporary world, has taken over the economy and the government, the university and the media, and most everything in between.¹¹

While it is certainly true that we have witnessed a transformation of the global political economy in the last few decades or so, the critics of “neoliberalism” have neglected – and even obfuscated – the fundamental colonial nature of this transformation, and this manifests in at least

two ways. The first problem with concerns about “neoliberalism” is that these criticisms are often predicated on nationalist assumptions that preclude more sophisticated critiques of Amerikan Empire as a whole. This nationalism appears most often in the motivating ground for opposition to “neoliberalism”: the dismantling of the New Deal welfare state. “From World War II to the late 1970s, the decades of the Keynesian compromise,” Duménil and Lévy write, “full employment, social welfare protection, and universal access to education and health care had come to be accepted as important features of developed societies,” but since then, they lament, “neoliberalism has undertaken the destruction of this social order and has restored the strictest rules of capitalism.”¹² Similarly, Giroux insists that neoliberalism “represents a struggle designed to roll back, if not dismantle, all of the policies put into place over seventy years ago by the New Deal to curb corporate power and give substance to the liberal meaning of the social contract.”¹³ On this view, while the New Deal era represents a time in Amerikan history when democratic social and economic reforms inched the nation closer to justice, the age of “neoliberalism” represents the antithesis of that, since the military, political, and economic elites have reasserted their claim to unquestioned power over Amerikan civil society.

This romanticization of the New Deal on the part of opponents of “neoliberalism” stands in stark contrast to an anticolonial understanding of the welfare state. In 1935, at the height of Franklin D. Roosevelt’s push for economic and social reforms, W. E. B. Du Bois penned an essay titled “A Negro Nation Within the Nation” in which he examined the systematic exclusion of the Black domestic colony from these reforms. “No more critical situation ever faced the Negroes of America than that of today,” he wrote, “not in 1830, nor in 1861, nor in 1867. More than ever the appeal of the Negro for elementary justice falls on deaf ears. Three-fourths of us are disenfranchised,” he adds in a devastating blow, “yet no writer on democratic reform, no

third-party movement says a word about Negroes.”¹⁴ The policy of excluding Black people from the benefits of New Deal reforms was no coincidence, for white people were largely welcoming of social and economic assistance programs so long as they were the sole recipients of the benefits, as Ira Katznelson’s *When Affirmative Action Was White* and Randolph Hohle’s *Race and the Origins of American Neoliberalism* demonstrate.¹⁵ Not only were Black Americans excluded from the New Deal, the New Deal programs must be viewed from within the American imperial context. When we move from a nationalist perspective to an internationalist perspective, it become possible to see the colonial foundations of the welfare state. In *Color and Democracy*, Du Bois observes that when the Western proletariat demands “certain costly social improvements from their governments – the prevention of unemployment, a rising standard of living, health insurance, increased education of children” – the rich and elite classes are going to pass the costs onto the colonies, “where social services are at their lowest and standards of living below the requirements of civilization.” As a result, Du Bois concludes, “the disposition of parties on the left, liberal parties, and philanthropy to press for colonial improvements will tend to be silenced by the bribe of vastly increased help by the government to better conditions.”¹⁶ The strategy was so effective that it not only worked on white working classes in the 1930s and 40s but *still works* on critical theorists and Marxists who claim to champion all working people. Because criticisms of “neoliberalism” depend on “neoliberalism’s” supposed negation of welfare state justice, every scholar who romanticizes the New Deal merely perpetuates the colonial logic that sustained it at home and abroad.

The second problem with concerns about “neoliberalism” is that these criticisms only become possible under the erasure of the history of anticolonial theory and praxis. One instructive example of this theorizing-from-a-void appears in Brown’s *Undoing the Demos*,

where she refers to the scholarship of the 1970s as if anticolonialism never existed. When Foucault delivered his lectures on neoliberalism in 1978-79, “neoliberalism,” Brown argues, was “just then beginning to take shape.” In a passage worth quoting at length, Brown variously transliterates *colonialism* into *imperialism* and *neoliberalism* in way that betrays the shallow analysis involved in criticism of “neoliberalism.” She writes:

At the time, critical intellectuals mainly characterized neoliberalism as something the Global North imposed on the Global South—something that reconfigured as it intensified North-South inequalities, something that resecured the South as a source of cheap resources, labor, and production in the aftermath of colonialism, something that was perfectly compatible with coups, support of brutal dictatorships and other political interventions, and something that could also be carried out with the velvet glove of International Monetary Fund, World Bank, and World Trade Organization governance, and, eventually, NAFTA-like trade agreements. While students of neoimperialism in the 1970s and early 1980s grasped the importance of neoliberal economic experiments in parts of Latin America, Africa, Asia, and the Caribbean, they rarely detected its presence back in the metropole.¹⁷

This passage is so completely opaque it is difficult to unpack all of the mysteries. First, we do not know which “critical intellectuals” Brown is referring to, nor do we know who the “students of neoimperialism” were, for she provides no footnotes and no sources. Second, we cannot be certain about what she means when she refers to “the aftermath of colonialism,” but we can infer, however, that “coups, support of brutal dictatorships and other political [and velvet-glove economic] interventions” are, according to Brown, definitively *not colonialism*. Third, Brown suggests that scholars have long observed “neoliberal economic experiments” in the so-called formerly colonized regions of the globe without seeing those same policies implemented domestically, within the Empire.

Given the historical conflict between anticolonialism and Empire, which I outlined in Chapter I, it is easy to see that Brown’s analysis is made possible by the militaristic and capitalistic repression of anticolonialism in the 1970s. From at least Du Bois’s *Color and*

Democracy to the presidency of Richard M. Nixon, anticolonialism had a theoretical framework designed to make sense of the very phenomena that Brown mentions – coups, Western-supported dictators, formal political independence coupled with continued economic control, the use of political and economic international organizations to disguise colonialism – and that was the theory of *neocolonialism*. The term “neocolonialism” emerged in the 1950s as a way to describe the process of decolonization whereby Western powers granted formal political independence to their colonies but worked hard to retain economic control over the new nations’ economies, especially their natural resources. Though the explicit structure of the colonial relation changed forms, the imperial powers retained their control over the colonies. “Neocolonialism” eventually became popular enough to appear in passing reference in the works of Frantz Fanon, but the first complete treatments of neocolonialism were Kwame Nkrumah’s *Neo-Colonialism: The Last Stage of Imperialism* (1965) and Jack Woddis’s *Introduction to Neo-Colonialism* (1967).¹⁸

Anticolonial intellectuals in the United States were inspired by these treatments of neocolonial strategies and sought to apply the analysis to the Black domestic colony, the most important example of which is Robert L. Allen’s *Black Awakening in Capitalist America*. “In the United States today,” Allen argued in 1969, a full decade before the supposed crisis of neoliberalism identified by Brown and others, “a program of *domestic neocolonialism* is rapidly advancing. It was designed to counter the potentially revolutionary thrust of the recent black rebellions in major cities across the country.” “This program,” he continues, observing the corporate capitalist power behind the neocolonial shift in American politics, “was formulated by America’s corporate elite – the major owners, managers, and directors of the giant corporations, banks, and foundations which increasingly dominate the economy and society as a whole.”¹⁹ Allen understood the connection between external and internal colonies, for they both transitioned

from political colonial domination to economic neocolonial domination at the same historical moment. Embarrassingly for Brown, these anticolonials, these “critical intellectuals” and “students of [so-called] neoimperialism,” had a language to describe the supposed “aftermath of colonialism,” and it had nothing to do with “neoliberalism.”

This chapter uses Allen’s *domestic neocolonialism thesis* to develop a comprehensive theory of domestic racial politics in post-integration Amerika, and it places this theory in the larger context of Amerikan imperialism abroad. The first section provides an overview of anticolonial theories of neocolonialism and presents an overview of how the United States has developed its neocolonial practices at home and abroad for over two centuries. While the United States has always favored neocolonial strategies in the spread of its Empire beyond the boundaries of North Amerika, domestic neocolonial practices usually emerge in moments of crisis, such as the end of slavery in the 1870s and the end of formal segregation in the 1960s. When Richard M. Nixon became president, he harnessed economic and legal trends in Amerikan society and put into motion the development of a full-fledged system neocolonial control in the Black domestic colony. The second section describes the first pillar of post-Nixon domestic neocolonialism, namely, the neocolonial police state. Neocolonial policing relies on incarceration, surveillance, and executions to manage political dissent in the Black colony, and the War on Drugs was created as a legalistic cover story for the repression of anticolonial organizations and movements. The third section describes the second pillar of post-Nixon domestic neocolonialism, namely, the neocolonial Black bourgeoisie. After *Brown v. Board of Education*, racial integration became a real possibility for the first time in the history of the Amerikan Empire, but in their desire to maintain white imperial rule at home and abroad, the political, economic, and military elites designed a system of managed integration to differentiate

Good Negroes from Bad Negroes, letter only the former occupy subordinate positions in the imperial machinery. When the police state and the Black bourgeoisie are understood as interrelated and mutually dependent manifestations of the neocolonial social structure of contemporary Amerika, it becomes possible to see how and why the colonial ontology of Empire remains the foundation of Amerika's domestic neocolony.

Anticolonial Theory and Neocolonial Practice: Imperial Strategies and Amerikan History

The theory of neocolonialism – both external and domestic – is based on the observable historical trends in the colonial strategies of imperial powers, and in many ways, the United States has been the global leader in the cultivation and execution of neocolonial practices. When Robert Allen articulated his version of domestic neocolonialism, he identified two practices that constitute neocolonial rule. First, he argued that economic elites were intervening in the political movements of domestically colonized Black people in Amerika, and that the elites' fundamental strategy was the cooptation of the Black bourgeoisie. By equating Black capitalism with Black power, the white corporate elite could syphon off the energies of the Black middles class, bifurcating the Black domestic colony along class lines and buttressing the colonial and capitalist system with bourgeois Black individuals and families. In turn, the Black middle class would take the place of the white elites, playing the role of political and economic colonial rulers by proxy. "In effect," Allen writes, "this new [Black] elite told the power structure: 'Give us a piece of the action and we will run the black communities and keep them quiet for you.'"²⁰ Second, Allen noted the advent of militarized police repression within the Black internal colony. In times of political unrest, he observes, "the police mentality thinks in terms of police-state techniques such as sending large numbers of spies, police agents, and informers into the ghettos."²¹ While he noted the deployment of National Guard troops to suppress urban rebellions and the Federal

Bureau of Investigation's (FBI) authority to disrupt anticolonial political movements, Allen later admitted that he and others had seriously overlooked the deeper trend in police state tactics, such as the FBI's COINTELPRO and the advent of mass incarceration in the 1980s.²² Allen's assessment of neocolonialism in general and domestic neocolonialism in particular was not an *ad hoc* construction, for it reflects a broader and deeper history in the practices of Empire, especially in the United States. Here, it is necessary to trace out the basic anticolonial tenants of neocolonial theory and establish the history of Amerika's neocolonial practices inside and outside its borders. This discussion lays the foundation for understanding the neocolonial social structure of contemporary Amerikan society.

Anticolonial theories of neocolonialism identify three basic principles of neocolonial practices, and all three are present Kwame Nkrumah's original description. The foundation of neocolonialism is the transition from political to economic control over the colony. "The essence of neo-colonialism," Nkrumah writes, "is that the State which is subject to it is, in theory, independent and had all the outward trappings of international sovereignty. In reality its economic system and thus its political policy is directed form the outside."²³ When political dominance of a colony becomes too costly or too difficult to justify through public relations campaigns and ideological obfuscations, the colonial power cedes political independence under the condition that their economic interests remain in tact; the neocolony is expected to maintain and protect the empire's investments and capital, and in fact, this is seen as its primary function. To protect those investments, the neocolony needs a ruling individual or group beholden to the foreign corporate interests they serve. As Nkrumah puts it, "the rulers of neo-colonial States derive their authority to govern, not from the will of the people, but from the support which they obtain from their neo-colonial masters."²⁴ In this fundamentally anti-democratic context, the

neocolonial political system is comprised of Western puppets, usually a ruling party or dictator that rules the neocolony indirectly on behalf of imperial interests. But two things can go wrong here. On the one hand, the colonized masses may revolt against the neocolonial puppet government, and in that case, the imperial power floods the colony with “military aid.” “Once a neo-colonialist territory is brought to such a state of economic chaos and misery that revolt actually breaks out,” Nkrumah argues, “then, and only then, is there no limit to the generosity of the neo-colonial overlord, provided, of course, that the funds supplied are utilized exclusively for military purposes.”²⁵ On the other hand, the very neocolonial puppet governments may cease to cooperate with the imperial power, which inevitably leads to regime change through political or military intervention. “Africa, Asia and Latin America,” he observes, “have begun to experience a round of coups d’état or would-be coups, together with a series of political assassinations,” that destroy formal political resistance to neocolonial rule.²⁶ Nkrumah – who would himself be the victim of a coup backed by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in 1966 – names the United States’ role in the coups in Iran, Guatemala, and Iraq as examples of such neocolonial regime change. Thus, neocolonial rule disguises itself behind formal independence while maintaining economic control over the colony and, in the event of unrest or resistance, resorts to military repression or covert action to restore security to imperial investments.

While Nkrumah sees neocolonialism as a stage of imperial history, Jack Woddis correctly notes that neocolonialism is not merely “new” colonialism but in fact one among many different colonial strategies that have been used throughout the period of modern European imperial expansion. Turning to the history of colonialism, Woddis observes that “disguised methods of colonialism are not an entirely new form of colonial domination.”²⁷ In the period before formal political colonialism in the nineteenth-century, for instance, Western powers chartered trading

companies conferred with the power to set legal and political controls over its trading zones. As international law scholar Antony Anghie explains, “When companies such as the British East India Company, exercising sovereign rights, administered the territories of non-European peoples, they established systems of law and governance that were directed at furthering the commercial relations that were the very *sine qua non* of their existence. Commerce and governance were not merely complementary but identical: a corporation exercised the power of government.”²⁸ To achieve control over colonized peoples, the trading companies would seek the cooperation of some faction of local political leaders, either the rulers already in place or a class of rulers manufactured and imposed by the trading companies. The role of these rulers would be ensure economic stability, facilitate corporate access to natural resources, and legitimize the presence of Western economic power. When control in the colonies deteriorated, the Western power would send the military to support the corporation. As Woddis notes, such practices existed alongside formal colonialism, but in the wake of anticolonial resistance in the mid-twentieth century, he argues that we should understand neocolonialism as “a strategy which has become predominant in a particular new phase of imperialism.”²⁹ On this view, neocolonialism is not a new stage of imperialism but the predominate imperial strategy of Empire in this historical period.

Anghie’s description of trading company colonialism shows that neocolonial strategies are generally seen across imperialism, but neocolonialism has been primarily developed by the Anglo-Saxon empires, especially the United States, which Nkrumah named “the very citadel of neo-colonialism.”³⁰ Operating through the imperial method of what historian William Appleman Williams calls “anticolonial imperialism,” the United States has often eschewed formal colonial domination in favor of economic penetration buttressed by military intervention.³¹ Outside of

Manifest Destiny and continental expansion, the dominant ideology of American ruling elites has often insisted that the United States should expand through commercial rather than political ventures. “Without taking on the burdens of formal empire,” Reginald Horsman explains, describing the American emphasis on economic over political domination, “the United States could obtain the markets and raw materials its ever-expanding economy needed...and a stable world order could be achieved by American economic penetration of underdeveloped areas.”³² Throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, for example, the United States repeatedly intervened in Latin America under the guide of the Monroe Doctrine, which asserted U.S. preeminence in the Western Hemisphere, and the Roosevelt Corollary, which expanded the Monroe Doctrine to justify American intervention Latin America in the name of protecting “civilization” (read: economic investments).³³ Such intervention often took the form of initiating or supporting military coups and dictatorships through overt and covert state action. But as William J. Pomeroy argues, America’s neocolonial methods were perfected in the Philippines after the 1898 Spanish-American War. In *American Neo-Colonialism: Its Emergence in the Philippines and Asia*, Pomeroy explains that American colonial practice developed out of the debates between the imperialist and the so-called anti-imperialists. While the former had no reservations about exerting colonial domination in the Philippines, the latter insisted that the United States should only maintain an economic and military presence to ensure access to markets and raw materials. To achieve a compromise between the imperialist and anti-imperialists, successive presidential administrations from William McKinley to Franklin Roosevelt pursued the standard neocolonial agenda: coopt the ruling middle classes of the colonized group, suppress popular uprisings with brutal military violence, and establish an economic foothold through which U.S. corporations can control the local markets. According to Pomeroy, American

neocolonialism in the Philippines created a template for the post-World War II American presence in the Pacific, from the U.S. occupation of Japan to the Korean and Vietnam Wars.³⁴ From its founding to the present day, then, Amerika has often relied upon neocolonial methods rather than formal colonization as it pursued its global Empire.³⁵

While the United States was a leader in the development of neocolonialism abroad, it developed the outlines of a domestic neocolonialism starting with the backlash to Reconstruction. From the end of the Civil War to the New Deal, white supremacists appealed to the free market as a means of maintaining their colonial rule over the domestic Black colony. In *Black Reconstruction*, W. E. B. Du Bois shows how white Southerners in the 1870s anticipated segregationist strategies of the 1950s. As president, Andrew Johnson responded to the Radical Republicans in Congress by appealing to *laissez-faire* ideals. Insisting that the newly freed men and women must achieve prosperity “only through their own merits,” Johnson opposed any state-based assistance for Black people.³⁶ “The Negro will be thrown upon society,” Johnson insisted, “governed by the same laws that govern communities, and be compelled to fall back upon his own resources.” In words that could have come straight from twentieth-century “neoliberals,” Johnson proclaimed that “Political freedom means the liberty to work, and at the same time enjoy the products of one’s labor.”³⁷ Not only would structural assistance for emancipated Black people violate natural economic principles, it would also demonstrate government favoritism for Black people over white people. “Congress has never felt itself authorized to spend public money for renting homes for white people honestly toiling day and night,” Johnson complained, adding that “it was never intended that freedmen should be fed, clothed, educated, and sheltered by the United States.”³⁸ As Southern agrarians and Northern capitalists began to speak the same language of free market principles and *laissez-faire* policies, Du Bois argues, they reconciled the

differences that led to the Civil War and reaffirmed the rule of white over Black in the South and in the nation.

The neocolonial appeal to the market observed by Du Bois during the period of Reconstruction persisted into the mid-twentieth century, when segregationists were developing strategies to oppose both the New Deal and Cold War integration. In “Southern Dominance in Borrowed Language: The Regional Origins of American Neoliberalism,” historian Nancy MacLean argues that “nearly all the best-known American architects of what has come to be called ‘neoliberalism’ were conservatives from the West and South.”³⁹ According to MacLean, many of the political and economic phenomena associated with neoliberalism – such as anti-democratic politics, market power, and law and order rhetoric – can be traced to “America’s original neoliberals,” namely, the southern planters of the nineteenth century.⁴⁰ In the twentieth century, these Southern ideals appeared in organized form in opposition to the New Deal as early as 1937, setting the stage for the major political party realignment that would develop three decades later. As the power base of the Republican Party moved West and as the power base of the Democratic Party moved North, western libertarians like Barry Goldwater found common cause with southern segregationists like Strom Thurmond, allying to oppose state power that infringed upon market freedoms and states’ rights. In *Race and the Origins of American Neoliberalism*, sociologist Randolph Hohle extends McLean’s analysis, tracing “neoliberal” strategies to the Southern segregationist movement in the 1950s and 60s and arguing that “neoliberalism was forged in the postwar south.”⁴¹ As Hohle demonstrates, segregationists were using privatization of state functions, austerity measures, economic deregulation, and demands for tax cuts – all of which are normally described as “neoliberal” – in their efforts to prevent the integration of public schools. If state governments could defund, deregulate, or privatize public

school systems, the segregationists argued, then the racial integration of schools could be avoided. In other words, by shifting the prerogative of controlling racial interaction from the state to the private sector, segregationists would get to keep segregation and capitalists would be able to profit.⁴² When Johnson's comments on Reconstruction and Du Bois's historical observations regarding the preservation of white supremacy in nineteenth-century America are placed in relation to MacLean and Hohle's analyses regarding the emergence of "neoliberal" politics in the segregationist South, it becomes clear that strategies of domestic neocolonialism have much deeper colonial roots than critics of "neoliberalism" acknowledge.⁴³

But the neocolonial appeal to markets was only the first pillar in the history of American domestic neocolonialism, and the second pillar was, following Nkrumah's examination, the cultivation of a class of "safe" colonial subjects. Like its economic fundamentalism, domestic neocolonial practices of coopting the Black middle class can be traced back to the immediate postbellum period, in which white Southerners explored ways to "manage" the ostensibly dangerous new class of free Blacks. In *The White Savage: Racial Fantasies in the Postbellum South*, historian Lawrence J. Friedman argues that former Governor of Tennessee William Gannaway Brownlow developed a third-way racial politics for the South that mediated the two dominant ideologies of segregation and neo-slavery. After the end of Reconstruction, Friedman explains, the segregationists pursued a politics of exclusion in which Blacks would be rigorously separated from whites, while the advocates of neo-slavery insisted that Blacks should remain in close but subordinated contact with whites because such contact has a civilizing effect on the "lesser" race. Brownlow, however, advanced a policy of what Friedman calls "differential segregation," which requires whites to distinguish Good Negroes from Bad Negroes, assimilating the former and segregating the latter. As Friedman describes it, "Negroes who knew

their place could live within white society but those who reverted to their basic instincts and became assertive would have to be removed.”⁴⁴ Rather than give up on civilizing Negroes altogether, Brownlow’s strategy of differential segregation would allow whites to uplift the Black people who were capable of salvation while protecting themselves from those who were doomed to barbarism. This policy, of course, depended upon Black people knowing their place in subordination to whites. As Thomas Pearce Bailey, Professor of Psychology at the University of Mississippi, put it in 1914: “Individual Southerners look with approbation and sympathy upon the economic improvement of certain negroes, always provided these negroes are ‘white men’s negroes,’ and ‘know their place.’ As soon as these negroes begin to ‘put on style’ and express their social *dignity*, even if this exhibition is confined strictly to their own race, mutterings and murmurings begin.”⁴⁵ Brownlow was joined by many other Southern political and intellectual figures in his advocacy of differential segregation, but because whites would find it increasingly difficult to readily differentiate Good Negroes and Bad Negroes, the policy of differential segregation eventually gave way to total segregation under the Jim Crow regime. Nevertheless, the bifurcation of the colonized group circulated as a viable strategy of neocolonial rule for over eighty years in the Amerikan South.

Given the long history of neocolonial ideas in Amerikan foreign and domestic policy, it becomes possible to reinterpret the crisis of desegregation in the 1950s and 60s, for the segregationists maintained a colonial position while the integrationists advanced a neocolonial position. In the early years of the Cold War, the Truman Administration realized that segregation and racial discrimination at home no longer compatible with Amerika’s emerging imperial plans, and under the guise of progressive politics, the northern wing of the Democratic Party began to integrate the Empire. The first step was, of course, Truman’s desegregation of the military in

1948, but the most spectacular manifestation of this neocolonial policy was the *Brown v. Board of Education* decision in 1954. In the years leading up to the decision, the Justice Department and State Department tried to influence the Supreme Court by showing how the Soviet Union was using segregation against the United States in the Cold War. “Through filing amicus briefs in civil rights cases,” historical Mary Dudziak observes, “the Truman Administration stressed to the Supreme Court the international implications of U.S. race discrimination, and at times focused on the negative impact on American foreign policy that a pro-segregation decision might have.”⁴⁶ The Court eventually went along with this strategy, and the liberal Black leaders of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People celebrated the landmark decision. Du Bois criticized these leaders of the Black bourgeoisie for their seemingly blind acceptance of the Cold War narrative. “They proposed to make money and spend it as pleased them. They had beautiful homes, large and expensive cars and fur coats,” Du Bois wrote. And most of all, “They hated ‘communism’ and ‘socialism’ as much as any white American.”⁴⁷ While this alliance between the white imperial elites and the Black middle class was not complete in the mid-1950s, the conditions for the transformation of domestic colonialism into domestic neocolonialism has emerged.

Against the neocolonial strategy of the Truman Administration and the Supreme Court, Southern segregationists continued to defend colonial domination as a legitimate and desirable social arrangement. Not only did segregationists defend Jim Crow as a form of colonial domination, they did so explicitly through their identification and networking with white colonialists in southern Africa. For example, the Citizens’ Councils, a national and influential white supremacist network during the decades of desegregation, looked to white-ruled African nations like Rhodesia and South Africa for inspiration and hope. Through its television series

Citizens' Forum and its publication *Citizen*, the Citizens' Councils expressed "an intense identification with embattled whites in Africa's European outposts."⁴⁸ As historians Daniel Geary and Jennifer Sutton explain, "The Citizens' Councils strongly identified with an ideal of a racially homogeneous Europe, yet they sharply criticized European decolonization measures, which they perceived as an abandonment of civilization to the anarchy of majority black rule."⁴⁹ Because they understood "the international dimensions of white resistance to racial equality," contributors to Citizens' Councils publications repeated ideology similar to the neoslavery argument noted by Friedman: where white people ruled over Black people, even if close contact is being made, the white have a civilizing influence over their colonial subordinates. Once African rule came to Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe) in 1980, a contributor to *Citizen* complained that the country was deteriorating under "an arrogant black dictator."⁵⁰ Arguing in diametric opposition to American liberals, who saw neocolonial desegregation as the best defense against Communism, segregationists argued that white-ruled African nations like Rhodesia and the segregated state of the American South were represented the frontline of resistance to Communism and the last bastions of Western civilization. Just as Black anticolonial leaders within the United States found inspiration in anticolonial movements abroad, so too did their segregationist opponents find inspiration in the white colonizers of British-controlled southern Africa.⁵¹

Returning to Robert Allen's domestic neocolonialism thesis, we can see that his theory reflects a broader history of anticolonial theory and imperial practice, especially when it comes to American foreign and domestic policy. Not only does Allen's thesis about domestic neocolonialism reflect Nkrumah's more general theorization of global neocolonial pursuits, but American history itself suggests that American political culture already contained all the pieces

required for constructing an explicit neocolonial policy of the domestic variety. As the United States assumed world leadership as the sole Western capitalist superpower capable of challenging the Soviet Union, it demanded that the other Western European empires dismantle their colonial empires and reconstruct them in neocolonial fashion; at the same time, however, through the transition from segregation to integration, the United States was also at work refashioning its Black domestic colony into a Black domestic neocolony. Over the last fifty years, the political, economic, and military elites have produced a Black domestic neocolony through the simultaneous use of integration and police state tactics. As the Anglo-Saxon-dominated corporate elite reasserted capitalist class power, they worked with the political and military elites to differentiate Good Negroes from Bad Negroes, assimilating the former into the imperial power structures of the Amerikan Empires and subjugating the latter under a dynamic and militarized police state apparatus. Whereas critics of neoliberalism point to the election of Ronald Reagan as the official starting point of the neoliberal era, the anticolonial approach taken here begins with the administration of Richard M. Nixon, the architect of Amerika's domestic neocolonialism.

The Black Domestic Neocolony I: Constructing the Anglo-Saxon Police State, 1968-2018

In *The Protestant Establishment: Aristocracy & Caste in America*, sociologist E. Digby Baltzell observed that, by the 1960s, the old Anglo-Saxon elites had reverted to conspiracy theory politics and abandoned their historical role as the leadership of the Amerikan project. If the Anglo-Saxons wanted to maintain their control over the country, Baltzell argued, they had to make a choice: either resort to authoritarianism or “absorb the most prominent and polished families in the nation, regardless of their ethnic origins or religious convictions.”⁵² These options however, are not mutually exclusive, and though Baltzell could not have predicted it when he wrote in

1964, the Nixon Administration would pursue *both* authoritarianism *and* assimilation. On the one hand, Nixon campaigned as a law-and-order candidate in 1968 and, once elected, sought to make good on his law-and-order promises; on the other hand, Nixon advocated “Black capitalism” as a non-threatening form of Black Power that could be absorbed by the capitalist Amerikan Empire. By distinguishing between middle class Blacks who were fit for assimilation and poor and working class Blacks who continually agitated for political and economic rights, Nixon revived the ideology of “differential segregation” articulated by William Gannaway Brownlow in the postbellum South. In the shift to neocolonialism, Allen and Nkrumah argue, colonial powers distinguish between the obedient colonized elites and the potentially disorderly colonized masses, propping up the former to protect economic interests and controlling the latter militarily to maintain order and stability. When the Nixon administration simultaneously supported Black capitalism and created the War on Drugs, it provided the template for contemporary domestic neocolonialism in Amerika.

Before exploring the role of “Black capitalism” in Nixon’s neocolonial differential segregation, it is necessary to outline the ideological and institutional mechanisms of Amerika’s neocolonial police state. The standard narrative regarding contemporary racialized state violence emphasizes mass incarceration and explains it as a product of the drug war. For example, in *The New Jim Crow: Mass Incarceration in the Age of Colorblindness*, arguably the most popular text on the subject, Michelle Alexander argues that “Nothing has contributed more to the systematic mass incarceration of people of color in the United States than the War on Drugs.”⁵³ Despite the book’s favorable reception, Greg Thomas has leveled a series of devastating criticisms. In addition to completely excising the Black radical movement from her historical timeline, Alexander also “uses and consolidates the state’s definition or conceptualization of ‘crime’

without question.” “The state rhetoric of a ‘War on Drugs,’” Thomas concludes, “is thus centrally entertained by Alexander without entertaining it as a rhetorical disguise of capitalism, exploitation, militarism, mass/state murder, imperialism or a cultural and ‘political economy’ of white, anti-Black ‘racism.’”⁵⁴ In other words, by decrying only the perceived abuse or “excess” of the War on Drugs, Alexander legitimizes the basic premise of the police state apparatus. As an alternative to Alexander’s admittedly limited analogy, the domestic neocolonialism thesis explains the connections between the War on Drugs and mass incarceration by exposing the former as the moral and legal cover story for the latter, which itself constitutes merely one of the three modes used by the neocolonial police state against the Black domestic neocolony. Unlike Alexander, who resorts to a euphemism-laden analogy designed to comfort white liberals who have ostensibly “forgotten” about the incarcerated, an anticolonial understanding of contemporary Black oppression in Amerika demonstrates that the War on Drugs is the official narrative given to justify the proliferation of state agencies designed to police the Black colony. Through surveillance, incarceration, and execution, the neocolonial police state protection the colonial ontology of Empire by simultaneously pursuing the three modes of colonial relation: assimilation, domination, and elimination.

The War on Drugs provides the best heuristic for understanding the neocolonial police state, but we must remember that it was a conscious program of political repression designed to fit the growing cultural emphasis on legal solutions to perceived public disorder. From the 1950s to the 1970s, there was a growing demand for what is called “law and order” politics, but what is often forgotten is that law and order rhetoric requires the legalization of all practices designed to keep “order.” In *War Against the Panthers: A Study of Repression in America*, Huey P. Newton identifies the shift away from extra-legal modes of control and toward officially sanctioned read:

“lawful”) modes social control. Just as Martin R. Delany saw the 1850 Fugitive Slave Act as the use of the law for colonial ends, Newton argues that the late-twentieth-century Amerikan public preferred to have its colonialism mediated through the juridical system. “Direct and unconcealed brute force and violence—although clearly persisting in many quarters of society—are today less acceptable to an increasingly sophisticated public, a public significantly remote from the methods of social and economic control common to early America,” Newton argues. The public demand for state control of undesirables and subordinates has not disappeared, he notes, but “Americans today appear to be more inclined to issue endorsement to agents and agencies of control which carry out the task, while permitting the benefactors of such control to retain a semidignified, clean-hands image of themselves.” As the means of maintaining domestic colonialism were increasingly monopolized by the state from the 1960s onward, political, military, and economic elites relies more and more on “the use of the legal system to quell broad based dissent and its leadership.”⁵⁵ Given the revolutionary anticolonial mood of the Black radical movement of the 1960s, this legally validated force was used, as Newton shows, to destroy the Black Panther Party and other radical entities that posed a direct challenge to the Amerikan Empire.

The transformation of repressive state tactics could not have occurred, however, without a transformation of the justifications for such repression, and since the law may only target illegal activity and not political thought, the Nixon and Reagan administrations used the War on Drugs as a cover for their wars against political dissidents. Until the 1960s, federal policing agencies like J. Edgar Hoover’s Federal Bureau of Investigation operated as a kind of “ideological” police, most famously in its program to monitor suspected Communists during the early years of the Cold War. But as hunting ideological dissidents fell out of favor, policing

agencies constructed an alterative strategy. “This new cover for secret police operations was,” Newton notes, “a crusade against criminals and terrorists. Now, the administration would fight ‘crime,’ not ideologies.”⁵⁶ Top officials from the Nixon administration have acknowledged the truth of Newton’s observations. For example, John Ehrlichman, a Nixon aide and one of the architects of the War on Drugs, explained the political motives behind the campaign:

The Nixon campaign in 1968, and the Nixon White House after that, had two enemies: the antiwar left and black people... We knew we couldn’t make it illegal to be either against the war or black, but by getting the public to associate the hippies with marijuana and blacks with heroin, and then criminalizing both heavily, we could disrupt those communities. We could arrest their leaders, raid their homes, break up their meetings, and vilify them night after night on the evening news. Did we know we were lying about the drugs? Of course we did.⁵⁷

Writing in the 1990s, criminologist Michael Tonry made a similar observation regarding the Reagan administration’s intentions: “The white-shirted-and-suspended officials of the Office of National Drug Control Policy understood” he writes, “that drug abuse was falling among the vast majority of the population. They knew that drug use was not declining among disadvantaged members of the urban underclass. They knew that the War on Drugs would be fought mainly in the minority areas of American cities and that those arrested and imprisoned would disproportionately be young blacks and Hispanics.” Thus, Tonry concludes, “The war’s planners knew exactly what they were doing.”⁵⁸ Thomas is therefore correct in his criticism of Alexander: rather than constructing a woeful narrative about the plight of Amerika’s “forgotten” inmates, we must understand the contemporary police state and its propensity for incarceration as a state-sanctioned response to anticolonial politics. In other words, the War on Drugs is – as a form of anti-anticolonial politics – a War on Anticolonialism.

Anyone who understands the history of the Amerikan Empire would hardly be surprised about the choice of “drugs” as the cover story for neocolonial policing, for the puritanical quest

to purge society of mind-altering substances has long been a strategy of Anglo-Saxon imperialism. In the late-nineteenth century, male and female Anglo-Saxon reformers sought to extend their domestic and international colonial power by regulating drugs and alcohol. While the Chinese were associated with opium, Blacks were associated cocaine and Chicanos were associated with marijuana. The Women's Christian Temperance Union emphasized alcohol, but some organization's leaders insisted upon the elimination of "all stimulants and narcotics." Such polices were designed to not only reduce substance abuse among the lesser races but also protect white women from the ravages of intoxicated colonized males. The Anglo-Saxonist administration of Theodore Roosevelt also pursued prohibitionist policies designed to mitigate cocaine use among Black men, for many whites feared that cocaine made Black men more effective, more skilled criminals, murderers, and rapists. Regarding Black people in Amerika, the theme was consistent: drugs made Black men "forget their place" and put white women – and therefore the white Empire – in danger. Both policing policy and statue law changed in response to the ostensible threat of the cocaine-abusing scary Black man: on the one hand, police departments increased the caliber of their revolvers (so they could take down the supposedly pain-resistant Black addict); on the other hand, the Harrison Act of 1914, the first national drug control statute, criminalized cocaine. Given this long history of associating colonized peoples – especially Black Amerikans – with drugs, it is no surprise that Nixon and Reagan pursued a War on Drugs in their efforts to stabilize the Anglo-Saxon Empire.⁵⁹

Once the War on Drugs was in place as the justificatory metanarrative for the reassertion of colonial power, the neocolonial police state organized itself around three primary practices: incarceration, surveillance, and executions. Although incarceration is often condemned by reform-minded activists and scholars, it is merely one node in a larger system of social control

designed to allow the neocolonial police to monitor colonized populations. Lawrence J. Friedman has argued that “surveillance of Negro life” is a constitutive feature of white rule over Black people.⁶⁰ Under slavery, such surveillance was nearly total, but after emancipation, whites found it increasingly difficult to maintain their oversight. At the time that Brownlow advocated differential segregation, white society lacked the means to constantly oversee Black people, which contributed to the emergence of formal Jim Crow segregation; after the mid-twentieth-century revolution in surveillance technology, however, it became increasingly possible to construct a police state with the power to monitor suspect colonial subjects.⁶¹ But under such a system of control, placing Black people in prisons is accompanied by both more general practices of surveillance outside the prison and the practice of executing dangerous subjects – particularly Black males – when engaged by an agent of the neocolonial state.

Incarceration, the first neocolonial policing strategy, is characterized by the capture and confinement of colonized subjects, and when it is possible, economic benefits are extracted from this confinement through various means. It is a well-known fact that incarceration in the United States has skyrocketed since the 1970s; for instance, in 1972, approximately 200,000 people were incarcerated in state and federal prisons, while in 2014, that number had increased to roughly 1.56 million.⁶² But it is a lesser-known fact that incarceration is a symptom of the broader neocolonial world in which we live. Citing “statistical data documenting the incidence of imprisonment in relation to colonized peoples,” legal scholar Jeannine Purdy has shown that incarceration became a replacement for formal colonialism in places like Western Australia and Trinidad and Tobago. As Purdy explains, the prison population of Trinidad and Tobago tripled at the same time as global economic institutions like the International Monetary Fund the neocolonial intervened in the nation’s domestic economic and political policies. Likewise, as the

Australian government intensified the extraction of natural resources in remote territories, the incarceration rates of Aboriginal peoples nearly tripled.⁶³ In the United States, mass Black incarceration followed on the heels of desegregation, the previous form of domestic colonialism, and like other colonial populations, Black Americans are partly incarcerated for economic reasons. While there is a tendency to fetishize private prisons operated by profit-driven institutions like the Corrections Corporation of America, the prison-industrial complex, as it is known, generates for more profits for other sectors of the economy. Construction firms win contracts to build and remodel prisons, and Wall Street banks finance those projects. Service industries win contracts to provide food and clothing for inmates, while consumer products are sold in the commissaries at inflated prices. Furthermore, public sector unions, particularly correctional officers' unions, wield a disproportionate amount of power over state legislatures, from whom they can extract public resources. Perhaps most devastatingly, under the Thirteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution – which states that slavery or involuntary servitude may be imposed “as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted” – prisoners can be forced to work for substandard wages, operating as an unprotected and therefore infinitely exploitable labor pool. As the courts have repeatedly argued, prison labor is not protected by the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1934 because, like slavery, the state paternalistically ensures the well being of the inmates, who thus do not depend on a wage to survive.⁶⁴ By rethinking mass incarceration from an anticolonial perspective, it becomes possible to understand it as a product of a global political economy of colonialism.

Surveillance, the second neocolonial policing strategy, is characterized by the unrelenting vigilance of data collection, physical police presence, and psychological oversight.⁶⁵ From the 1920s to the 1970s, Hoover's FBI led the way in developing data surveillance methods over

political dissidents and “criminals,” and by the 1990s, the federal government had expanded the Bureau’s approach by creating a national computerized criminal records database that has increasingly networked with state and local authorities. Such databases provide a foundation for all other surveillance: once a person is in the system, government agencies can build a profile on them and subject them to exponentially rigorous oversight. Data collection works in direct relation with physical police presence; not only do police personally gather data and feed it into the national electronic databases, they also use recorded interactions as a justification for engaging subjects again. Through “over policing” and “street sweeps,” police agencies shutdown entire Black neighborhoods and search them for drugs and weapons, and the use of Terry stops allows police to randomly stop Black men and frisk them for weapons (and by implication, other contraband). Once the targeted colonial subject has been detained under the guise of an infraction, they may be placed in preventative detention to secure their presence at trial or to prevent the accused of posing a danger to the public. The variety of neocolonial surveillance methods also places mass incarceration in context, for single-day population counts do not reveal how many people have *passed through* prisons and jails during the year. To be sure, courts and legislatures have not shied away from handing down life sentences for drug offences, but short sentences are problematic in a different way. Unlike long sentences, which many have argued serve the purpose of separating colonized subjects from the larger society, shorter sentences serve the purpose of getting people *in the system* through their record, their data. Once a criminalized subject is released from state custody, they may be subjected to further oversight through parole or probation. Under intensive supervision parole programs, parole officers operate with complete authority over the daily activities of the subject; using a combination of in-person meetings, electronic tracking devices, house arrest, and curfews, state agencies can

monitor the activities and whereabouts of a person. For the past thirty years, the number of people on parole and probation has consistently been triple that of the incarcerated, which means that far more people are subjected to state control and surveillance outside the prison. With mandatory drug tests and polygraph tests, imperial authorities can extract data from within the subject, subjecting them to increasingly invasive surveillance and circumventing their testimony (read: the colonized are inherently untrustworthy).⁶⁶ Thus, the emphasis on mass incarceration misses the wider network of neocolonial policing – from the entry of the first data point to a release from probation, colonized subjects may be monitored, controlled, disciplined, and “reformed” by a series of state agencies authorized to socialize dangerous and disruptive outsiders to meet the needs of the Empire.

It is important to remember, however, that surveillance is never merely a state enterprise, nor is it merely a passive practice, for private sector authorities may access national computerized criminal records databases and police contact with subjects often involves active disruption of political movements and community life. On the one hand, corporations rely on the same databases for criminal background checks, and though the use of polygraph tests by employers has been limited by the Supreme Court, drug testing remains the primary means of exerting control over employees outside their working hours. Because employers may refuse employment or terminate employment for people who fail their background checks and drug tests, a system is created in which public and private sector institutions collaborate in the subjugation and exclusion of colonial subjects from the mainstream institutions of the Empire.⁶⁷ On the other hand, because the neocolonial police state is primarily about political control of colonized populations and political repression of anticolonial movements, physical surveillance by police blends with the more overtly disruptive practices that have killed, imprisoned, or exiled

so many. The Black Panther Party, for example, was not merely subjected to surveillance; it was infiltrated and its members were executed. Newton referred to the use of the FBI and CIA as the “superagency approach to crushing dissent,” for Nixon administration and every administration that followed has used official agencies – including the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA), the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), and the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), among others – to stop the momentum of oppositional movements before they gained too much influence. After operations like COINTELPRO were discovered, the superagency practices gradually disseminated into local police forces through the advent of SWAT teams. When Newton referred to the police as an occupying colonial army in the Black community, he was not offering an analogy – he was identifying a truth. Nearly every president since Nixon has incentivized the militarization of the police through grants, whether in money, training, or equipment, and since the 1981 Military Cooperation with Law Enforcement Act, the Pentagon and the police have become increasingly integrated their joint efforts to fight the “War on Drugs.” The United States government is not the only source of military training and weapons for police, for tens of thousands of dollars in private capital are being spent to send American police to learn “counterterrorism” skills from Israeli’s military division, including the national police, the Israel Defense Forces, and the border patrol.⁶⁸ Describing American police forces as a colonial army, then, is quite accurate, for they receive their training from the colonial militaries of Israel and the United States and use that training to occupy and subjugate the Black domestic neocolony.

Execution, the third neocolonial policing strategy, is characterized by the killing of colonized subjects – especially males – through court-imposed capital punishment, police-imposed violence, or vigilante-imposed violence. In the early-twentieth century, Black males

were summarily executed by lynch mobs, events that are often construed as “extralegal” killings, but by the end of the twentieth century, the murder of colonized Black males had gained official state sanction.⁶⁹ Though capital punishment cases remain one strategy by which neocolonial policing eliminates supposedly threatening colonized males, far more are murdered by police agents and white vigilantes. As a manifestation of what Kelly Brown Douglas calls “stand your culture”⁷⁰ and what Tommy J. Curry calls “the genocidal logics of American racism,”⁷¹ police and citizens justify the killing of Black males by appealing to trope of the Scary and Dangerous Black Man, which the Supreme Court legalized in *Tennessee v. Garner* (1985). In 1974, a fifteen-year-old Black teen named Edward Garner was fleeing from the Memphis police with a stolen purse when, anticipating his escape, the officer shot and killed Garner. The Supreme Court ruled that the officer had no authority to shoot Garner because he did not pose a threat to the officers or civilian bystanders.⁷² This decision, however, provided the legal criterion for police shooting, and as legal scholar Kenneth Lawson has shown, the police killings of Michael Brown, Tamir Rice, Levar Jones, Timothy Thomas, and John Crawford III, among others, have all been justified by appealing to the officers’ claims of self-defense against an immanent and deadly threat.⁷³ Of course, the Scary and Dangerous Black Man story is also available to average citizens who take the life of Black males, including George Zimmerman, who in 2012 killed Trayvon Martin, a seventeen-year-old Black teen. Even though the 911-dispatch call revealed that Zimmerman pursued Martin because the latter looked “real suspicious” and was perhaps “on drugs or something,” the killer successfully appealed to self-defense in court and was acquitted.⁷⁴ As the third pillar of Amerikan neocolonial policing, executions supplement incarceration and surveillance by providing a strategy of ongoing colonial control that can be used in the event that

the colonial subject – the Black male – cannot be reformed through surveillance or captured for incarceration.

When Nixon gave Amerika the War on Drugs, he initiated one-half of what would become domestic neocolonialism. Just as Nkrumah found that neocolonial empires resorted to military aid in the event that the colonized masses began to revolt, for the last fifty years, the United States government has resorted to militarization to quell the Black protest and Black resistance. As political theorist Sheldon Wolin has remarked, Black Americans are “by far the one group that throughout the twentieth century [have] kept alive a spirit of resistance and rebelliousness. In that context, criminal justice is as much a strategy of political neutralization as it is a channel of instinctive racism.”⁷⁵ Drugs offered a convenient cover story for neocolonial political repression, and because Black people were one of the principle targets named by Nixon admiration officials, legal scholar Kenneth Nunn has referred to the War on Dugs as a “War on Blacks.”⁷⁶ Expanding on Delany’s view that colonial sovereignty allowed whites to control legislation and therefore use the law as a tool of repression against colonized peoples, Newton argued that such legalism was the defining characteristic of state and federal law “enforcement” under the War on “Drugs.” Rather than pursuing the Black Panthers and other radical dissidents *outside* the law, the United States government has sought to criminalize dissent, using drugs as a pretext. Furthermore, when the three principle methods of neocolonial policing – incarceration, surveillance, and execution – are placed within the context of the colonial ontology of Empire, it becomes easy to see that they map onto the three principle modes of the colonial relation: domination, assimilation, and elimination. Incarceration represents the logic of domination because the state enforces control and separation over incarcerated populations. Surveillance represents assimilation because it is designed to “civilize” the colonized and make sure they are

fit for life among white colonizers. In her comparison of observation and incarceration, criminologist Diane R. Gordon implicitly suggests that they reflect a deeper colonial logic, writing that observation programs “are characterized by integrative strategies like surveillance, rather than segregative ones like arrest and prison.”⁷⁷ Finally, the connection between execution and elimination is quite obvious: if colonized subjects, especially males, are too dangerous to apprehend, they can simply be eradicated. It is worth noting that the Panthers, “bad Negroes” according to the logic of differential segregation, were seen as unfit for surveillance-assimilation and were therefore incarcerated or killed. The simultaneous presence of domination, assimilation, and elimination in neocolonial policing demonstrates that these modes are not mutually exclusive but in fact supplement each other in the colonizer’s pursuit of Empire. Rather than decry the “new Jim Crow,” therefore, we must confront the continuing colonial persecution of the Black domestic neocolony.

The Black Domestic Neocolony II: Cultivating the Neocolonial Black Bourgeoisie, 1968-2018

The neocolonial police state – violent and repressive as it is – is only half of the story, for the process of differential segregation that defines domestic neocolonialism in Amerika also depends on a coalition between imperial corporate interests and the colonized middle class.⁷⁸ In this case, that class is the Black bourgeoisie. In “Socialism and the American Negro,” Du Bois observed that class stratification in the Black domestic colony was already well underway in 1960. “A class structure began to arise within the Negro group,” he explained, “which produced haves and have-nots and tended to encourage more successful Negroes to join the forces of monopoly and exploitation and help victimize their own.”⁷⁹ Within a decade, Allen found that white corporate power was actively seeking out alliances with those “more successful Negroes” as a means to stabilize the economy. The American businessman, Allen argued, “is interested in maintaining

law and order, but he also knows that there is little or nothing to gain and a great deal to lose in committing genocide against the blacks. His deeper interest is in reorganizing the ghetto ‘infrastructure,’ in creating a ghetto buffer class clearly committed to the dominant American institutions and values.”⁸⁰ Just as Amerikan neocolonialism abroad sought to reinforce the rule of cooperative bourgeois nationalists in the former colonies, especially Latin America, Allen emphasized, Amerikan domestic neocolonialism incorporated the middle class values, interests, and politics of the Black bourgeoisie, giving many middle class Blacks a functional but subordinate role to play within the domestic colonial economy. From the advent of mass Black incarceration in the 1970s to the imperial wars of The First Black President™ forty years later, Amerika’s neocolonial Black bourgeoisie would fortify the Empire and its wars at home and abroad. While the military, economic, and political elites would all play their part in the assimilation of the neocolonial Black bourgeoisie, the Democratic Party has emerged as one of the most potent neocolonial institutions in the Amerikan Empire.

The alliance between the colonial power elites and the Black bourgeoisie was not a unilateral maneuver on the part of the form; rather, it was a bilateral process that worked itself out regionally over the course of several decades. For their part, the military, economic, and political elites of (white) Amerika creates a series of programs and opportunities designed to bring the Black bourgeoisie into the lower and middle levels of the national social structure. First, the elites aimed to integrate working class Blacks into the political economy of the military-industrial complex. While the Lockheed Corporation (now Lockheed Martin), one of the nation’s largest military contractors, began offering job-training programs in an effort to recruit minority laborers, local police departments were seeking out Black Vietnam veterans to hire as officers. The former tied Black economic wellbeing to the spoils of war, while the latter

deployed soldiers trained in Amerika's colonial wars abroad to fight in Amerika's colonial wars at home. Second, liberal business leaders organized the National Urban Coalition, which would, Allen explains, "generate a black capitalist buffer class firmly wedded (in both financial and ideological terms) to the white corporate structure."⁸¹ While the corporate elites promoted the idea of Black business ownership under the pseudo-Black-nationalist banner "Black capitalism," the aim was to have those Black business owners participate in integrated business associations and thereby assure a symmetry of interests with white business. Third, Nixon himself led the political elites in promoting "Black capitalism." Calling for the use of "private funds, private energies, and private talents," Nixon denounced dependency-inducing public programs, insisting that they turned Black people into "a colony within the nation." By integrating radicals and civil rights leaders, Nixon insisted, Black people would finally be able to partake of their share of the national economy.⁸² As Allen concludes, all of these strategies coalesced into the larger project of domestic neocolonialism, for if the Amerikan elites were successful, they would have made a partner in the Black bourgeoisie.

There is no reason to assume that the elites' neocolonial strategy was sure to work, but as it turned out, they found a willing partner in the Black middle class. Much as been said about the role of white backlash in the development of mass incarceration, but as Michael Javen Fortner has shown, the Black bourgeoisie played a leading role in the tough-on-crime policies that fed the War on Drugs. In "The 'Silent Majority' in Black and White: Invisibility and Imprecision in the Historiography of Mass Incarceration," Fortner examines "the class-based features of black attitudes toward crime" and finds that "neoliberal explanations of mass incarceration...do not clarify the role of middle-class African Americans in this history."⁸³ Citing polling data revealing that middle class Blacks advocated tougher penalties for criminal activities, Fortner explains that

a combination of class position, incremental political gains, and value commitments divided the Blacks views along class lines. Unlike poor Blacks, who were more likely to be victimized by police brutality, middle class Blacks felt victimized by criminals, not the police. “In the wake of newly won Civil Rights victories,” he writes, “the black silent majority did not consider, within the realm of crime policy, themselves victims of white racism but prisoners of black crime.” “Black crime threatened their businesses and children and prevented them from walking their streets and attending their churches,” he adds. “So they mobilized against it.”⁸⁴ In *Black Silent Majority: The Rockefeller Drug Laws and the Politics of Punishment*, Fortner shows that middle class Harlemites of the 1960s and 70s not only supported the draconian drugs laws signed into law by New York State Governor Nelson Rockefeller in 1973, but that they were the primary proponents of the legislation.⁸⁵ The Rockefeller Drug Laws, as they have become known, provided for life sentences for selling or possessing certain amounts of narcotics, and these statutes became the model for drug control legislation around the country. “In a moment of unrequited class solidarity,” Fortner concludes, “the black and white silent majorities mobilized against the insecurity and instability fomented by drug addicts, criminals, and radical activists.”⁸⁶ At the dawn of the War on Drugs and mass incarceration, then, the Blacks bourgeoisie spoke from their class position and demanded the state bring order to the Black domestic colony.

Black middle class support for the Rockefeller Drug Laws was only the beginning of this neocolonial alliance, and over the next three decades, rising Black political and economic leaders in major cities across the country expressed their support for tough on crime policies and market solutions. In *Locking Up Our Own: Crime and Punishment in Black America*, James Forman Jr., corroborates many of Fortner’s conclusions, explaining that Black police chiefs and local politicians in the nation’s large urban centers played a significant role in War on Drugs and mass

incarceration.⁸⁷ Black civilians, Black police chiefs, and Black police officers all saw policing and racial justice as two distinct issues: the former was about objective law enforcement and the latter was about proper integration. Many assumed that Black police officers would be less aggressive than white police officers toward Black civilians, but as police departments began to properly integrate, observers found that Black police officers were more aggressive toward the Black subjects they engaged. Not only did the Blacks bourgeoisie continue to support neocolonial policing, they also continued to advocate capitalist solutions to public policy. In “City Politics in an Era of Federal Devolution,” Peter Eisinger explains that, between 1970 and 2000, there was a bipartisan effort to restructure the relationship between the federal government and the states, which entailed changing and cutting federal grants for social programs. In the process, state governments were empowered at the expense of major city governments, forcing mayors to “seek guidance to accomplish their leadership tasks not first by reference to the moral compass of liberal reform but rather from the more neutral market.”⁸⁸ And again, like their white counterparts, the new Black mayors of major cities including Cleveland, Baltimore, New Orleans, Detroit, and Washington thought of themselves as “new public managers” who were less concerned about racial politics and protests and more concerned about fiscal responsibility. Finally, at the national level, Elaine Brown has criticized the Congressional Black Caucus for embracing the political and economic arrangements of the neocolonial. In the 1990s, for example, “the Congressional Black Caucus was providing extraordinary support for Bill Clinton,” she writes, just “as he was sending millions of blacks to prison and cutting off subsistence support to poor blacks” through his legislative initiative to intensify “crime control” and reduce public assistance programs.⁸⁹ By the turn of the century, then, the Black bourgeoisie had largely embraced neocolonial Amerika at every level of government.

In the fifty years of domestic neocolonialism in Amerika, both the Republican Party and the Democratic Party have developed neocolonial methods of rule; however, these methods are distinct and therefore must be separately analyzed in order to understand the racial contours of contemporary party politics. The Republican Party has largely followed Nixon's model of neocolonial integration by admitting only the most elite, non-threatening Blacks into its highest ranks. Clarence Thomas climbed the ranks of right wing politics through the support of rich white Republicans and was eventually appointed to the Supreme Court by George H. W. Bush. "Thomas had done more than show his gratitude," Brown protests, "voting over and over for the dismantling of affirmative action and school integration programs, doing his best to shred the tattered black agenda."⁹⁰ In 2000, Thomas's vote allowed Bush's son, George W. Bush, to walk into the White House and appoint two more elite Black figures: Colin Powell and Condoleezza Rice. Powell, whom Brown refers to as "Clarence Thomas with a gun," had long served as a functionary for Amerikan imperialism, from his role in covering up U.S. war crimes in Vietnam in the 1960s to invading Panama and "arresting" Manuel Noriega in 1989, but in his new position, he helped construct the War on Terror and made the 2003 invasion of Iraq possible. As Secretary of State, Powell gave a presentation to the United Nations Security Council in which he deliberately and skillfully presented false claims; nevertheless, he succeeded in convincing his audience that Saddam Hussein had weapons of mass destruction hidden in civilian buildings. (He didn't.)⁹¹ Alongside Powell, there is Rice, National Security Advisor to Bush and a principle architect of the Iraq War. Rice passed through both the corporate and academic worlds before arriving in Washington; she had an oil tanker named after her, and she hollowed out the Black Studies program at Stanford University. Most crucially, by "ventriloquising imperialism," as Carole Boyce-Davies puts it, Rice used her identity as a Black woman to deflect criticism of the

Bush administration's imperial policies; by presenting her "success" as the product of hard work and determination, she claimed to embody the Amerikan Dream, thus proving that social mobility was no longer fettered by race. Like other neocolonial Black elites, "Condoleezza Rice, Colin Powell, Clarence Thomas and a range of other political actors," Boyce-Davies concludes, "function publicly in the interest of the dominant state, and at the expense of the advancement of their communities, undoing previous and hard-won gains while repudiating these same communities' struggles."⁹²

Ever since they stole the title of "the white man's party" from the Democrats in the post-Nixon era, Republicans have struggled to turn out grassroots Black voters; thus, they have stuck with the elite model of neocolonial politics. The Democrats, however, have developed an entirely different model characterized by a broader program of colonial population control. The Democratic Party model of neocolonial rule is quite similar to the program of differential segregation used by Populist Party leaders in the 1890s. Like William Brownlow, Representative Thomas E. Watson, founder of the Georgia Populist Party, believed that Black people would be better controlled if they were integrated into white institutions, albeit in subordinate positions. Against the elitists and conservatives, who claimed to be most fit for administering Negro control, Watson argued that the Populist Party was a better means because it could bring Black labor under tutelage of white labor, imposing order and reducing the cost of Negro labor. "Populism was unconcerned with educational and religious elevation of the savage race," Friedman explains, "but would take the Negro as he was and ensure he behaved properly." Because Negroes imitate the whites, it was argued, bringing them into the Party would teach them the virtues proper to a civilized labor force. "If Populists invited blacks into politics," Friedman concludes, "it was only to dominate them more."⁹³ Though the rise of populism

occurred at a time when the number of lynchings was at its highest,⁹⁴ Watson had no sympathy for Negroes being chased by lynch mobs, for only Negroes who, as Friedman puts it, “obeyed white direction” were permitted inclusion and protection.⁹⁵ At a time when political and technological limitations impeded white surveillance of Black communities, Watson’s populist program of Negro oversight offered a means of keeping an eye on a supposedly dangerous and unpredictable colonized population.

Just like the Populists of the late-nineteenth century, the Democrats of the twenty-first century have pursued a policy of differential segregation under the direction of the Democratic Leadership Council (DLC). Beginning in 1968, Black politicians and activists gained a foothold in the Democratic Party structure. The New Politics coalition, which dominated the party from the 1972 nomination of George McGovern to Jessie Jackson’s Rainbow Coalition in the 1980s, advanced a left-wing attack on New Deal liberalism and insisted upon representation for various interest groups, including minorities, women, and youths, which they achieved through delegate quotas and formal recognition of party caucuses like the Congressional Black Caucus. In the mid-1980s, the New Democrats emerged as a coalition of technocrats, Southern Democrats, and neoconservatives seeking to take control of the party from the New Politics coalition. The DLC was created as a means of pushing the New Democrat agenda, which included courting corporate support while marginalizing labor unions and “special interest groups” like Blacks. Working with Democratic National Committee Chairman Paul G. Kirk, Bill Clinton, Al Gore, Joe Biden, Hillary Clinton, and other prominent DLC members helped dismantle the delegate quota system, making way for the DLC takeover of the party. Because the DLC needed “to convince political elites inside and outside the Democratic Party that the organization was not a southern, white, male, conservative caucus,” Kenneth S. Baer explains, it “actively pursued minority and female

elected officials.”⁹⁶ To swell its ranks with a diversity of faces, the DLC began recruiting members at the state and local levels, bringing middle class Black elected officials across the country under their wing and channeling their political momentum into the New Democrat project. Influential Black politicians like John Lewis (GA), Mike Espy (MI), William Jefferson (LA), Floyd Flake (NY), Tom Bradley (CA), and William Gray III (PA) joined the DLC and advanced its agenda at every level of government. Though Black voters had been substantially disempowered through the changes in the Democratic Party structure, they continued to overwhelmingly vote Democrat in elections for the next two decades. “At a deeper structural level,” historian Donna Murch explains, “the constraints of the two-party system have resulted in the political capture of black Americans inside the Democratic Party, in which no viable electoral alternative exists.” “In a depressingly familiar pattern,” she laments, “the support of an elite sector of the black political class helped to legitimize hard-line anti-crime policies that proved devastating for low-income populations of color.”⁹⁷ In a perfect confluence of neocolonial governance, the Democratic Party simultaneously advanced the neocolonial police state, integrated the Black bourgeoisie, and exerted control over grassroots Black politics.⁹⁸

There is perhaps no better evidence of the success of domestic neocolonial rule in Amerika than the presidency of Barack Obama, for he not only represents the “racial” revolution of elite power but also brought Amerikan neocolonial rule to new heights both at home and abroad. Just as Andrew Jackson represents the revolution in Scotch-Irish white populism, just as John F. Kennedy represents the revolution of Irish Catholic ethnic power, and just as Richard M. Nixon represents the revival of Anglo-Saxon elite power, Barack Obama stands as a testament to the assimilationist logic of imperial Anglo-Saxon exceptionalism. Born to a white mother from Kansas and a Black father from Kenya in Hawaii, the most recent territorial acquisition of the

U.S. Empire, he eventually made his way to Columbia University (former hub of the New Social Science during the New Deal) and Harvard Law School (a branch of the oldest institution of elite Anglo-Saxon assimilation, Harvard University).⁹⁹ Though Obama failed to gain Black support in his first electoral bid for Illinois state legislature, losing the nomination to former Black Panther Bobby Rush, he defied the odds and within eight years became Amerika's First Black President™.¹⁰⁰ In *The Audacity of Hope*, Obama explains how he gradually integrated with the elite: "as a consequence of my fund-raising I became more like the wealthy donors I met, in the very particular sense that I spent more and more time above the fray, outside the world of immediate hunger, disappointment, fear, irrationality, and frequent hardship of the other 99 percent of the population."¹⁰¹ Though he admits that he was predisposed to share values with the elites, given his own elite education, Obama makes it clear that his very socialization with the economic and political elites of the Amerikan Empire solidified his identification with his new class cohorts.

As an emblem of Anglo-Saxon assimilation, Obama demonstrated his commitment to the Empire ideologically and rhetorically. Historian James T. Kloppenberg notes that Obama's notion of freedom "descends from the Puritans through the Enlightenment, into the Whig and Republican parties of the nineteenth century and the progressive, New Deal, and civil rights movements of the twentieth century,"¹⁰² tracing what Baltzell might call "a continuous thread of aristocratic assimilation and reform."¹⁰³ In his speeches, Obama rhetorically maneuvered to use himself – his identity as a Black male – as a demonstration that Amerikan (Anglo-Saxon) values really are *universal*. As Dylan Rodríguez argues, Obama's speeches are replete with allusion to slavery and segregation but in a way that renders them "past-tense," suggesting that the Amerikan Empire has overcome the tension between its professed ideals and its systematic

production of the zone of nonbeing. “Obama’s rhetoric,” Rodríguez insists, “seems to magically resolve this fatal humanist contradiction by situating the Black presidential figure as the conduit for sanitizing the historical toxicities of national white supremacy and its singular productions of systemic antiblack violence.”¹⁰⁴ Thus, just as Allen predicted, the neocolonial assimilation of the Black bourgeoisie would legitimize Empire while simultaneously obscuring the continuation of domestic colonialism. Obama’s presidency perfectly embodies this strategy.¹⁰⁵

In addition to his ideological and rhetorical commitments to the Amerikan Empire, Obama demonstrated his material and military commitment to the Amerikan Empire through his intensification of both the War on Drugs and the War on Terror. While some have noted the slight reduction of incarceration, parole, and probation during the Obama administration, these reductions were accompanied by the largest military buildup of Amerika’s neocolonial police forces since the War on Drugs began.¹⁰⁶ In 2014, the Obama administration transferred 490,512 military-grade items valuing \$787 million to police, the highest number in the twenty-year history of the Pentagon’s 1033 Program. “President Obama oversaw a 24-fold (2,400%) increase in the militarization of local police between 2008 and 2014,” journalist Glen Ford summarizes. “Even with the scale-back announced in 2015, Obama still managed to transfer a \$459 million arsenal to the cops – 14 times as much weapons of terror and death than President Bush gifted to the local police at his high point year of 2008.”¹⁰⁷ Given that Obama’s vice president Joe Biden, DLC member and longtime advocate of neocolonial policing, had taken so much credit for Department of Justice’s Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS) program, it is no surprise that the Obama administration also dedicated over \$1.5 billion annually to the program.¹⁰⁸ But Obama’s domestic hawkishness pales in comparison to his expansion of the Amerikan Empire abroad. While deploying classic strategies of neocolonial regime change in

Honduras, Ukraine, Libya, and Syria, he also transformed the War on Terror, which was previously defined by large-scale ground invasions, into a global drone war.¹⁰⁹ While shifting the focus away from incarceration at Guantánamo Bay, Obama perfected the neocolonial practices of surveillance and execution, synthesized in what journalist Jeremy Scahill has called “the assassination complex.”¹¹⁰ In one practice called “signature strikes,” data analysts combine signals intelligence collected by the National Security Agency and human intelligence collected by the CIA to compile a profile, and if the pattern of behavior reflects the supposed patterns of behavior of a terrorist, then they are said to have a terrorist “signature” and may thereby become the object of a targeted killing.¹¹¹ Interestingly, just as police and white vigilantes justify their assassinations of Black men with legal appeals to cases like *Tennessee v. Garner*, the Obama administration does the same. A 2011 Department of Justice white paper, which argues that the United States may, in the name of self-defense, execute anyone without due process (including U.S. citizens), cites *Tennessee v. Garner* as part of its rationale.¹¹² Thus, Obama uses the very neocolonial legal apparatus sanctioning the murder of Black males to justify its neocolonial drone wars in North Africa and the Middle East. Cornel West was not being metaphorical when he said, “President Obama is a global George Zimmerman.”¹¹³

When C. Wright Mills published *The Power Elite* in 1956, there were no Black members of the elite; there were not even any Black members in the middle levels of power, such as Congress. By 2006, when Richard I. Zweigenhaft and G. William Domhoff published *Diversity in the Power Elite*, the elite had followed through on Baltzell’s recommendation and “absorb[ed] the most prominent and polished families in the nation, regardless of their ethnic origins or religious convictions.” Zweigenhaft and Domhoff found that Black integration into power happened more frequently in the middle levels of power, while a rare few made it into the

highest circles. This pattern describes exactly what we would expect under a successful program of neocolonial differential segregation: talented middle class Blacks can be incorporated into the power structure so long as they remain ultimately subordinated to whites. Following Allen, Zweigenhaft and Domhoff also find that class position and political values become a more salient factor than race as individuals move up the social ladder. “The new diversity within the power elite is transcended by common values and a subjective sense of hard-earned and richly deserved class privilege,” they write. “The newcomers to the power elite have found ways to signal that they are willing to join the game as it has always been played, assuring the old guard that they will call for no more than relatively minor adjustments, if that.”¹¹⁴ Fortner’s observations of the Black silent majority and Obama’s self-description represent the same process. But the gradual inclusion of Black middle class politicians and business owners is not cause for celebration because it does not translate into power for Black people as a group. In *John F. Kennedy, Barack Obama, and the Politics of Ethnic Incorporation and Avoidance*, political scientist Robert C. Smith argues that Kennedy’s election actually represented a revolution in ethnic political power because, in addition to controlling the Democratic Party for over thirty years, Irish Catholics were well represented as state governors and congressmen. Obama’s election, however, represented nothing of the sort.¹¹⁵ While Blacks comprise approximately thirteen percent of the population, Black elected officials count for only about 1.5% elected officials nationwide.¹¹⁶ And as this anticolonial analysis reveals, even those few Black politicians often end up in an alliance with the Amerikan neocolonial police state, which incarcerates, monitors, and executes subjects within the Black domestic neocolony. Observing the neocolonial role of the Black bourgeoisie, Greg Thomas asks: “Can Black enemies of Blacks

really be distinguished from white enemies of Blacks, under white colonial oppression of Blacks?”¹¹⁷

Conclusion

While “neoliberalism” remains a popular heuristic with which to interpret contemporary political and economic phenomenon, its confused conceptual and historical origins undermine its usefulness. The anticolonial focus on neocolonialism resolves such shortcomings because neocolonial practices and structures are grounded directly in the longer material history of colonialism itself. The major difference between colonialism and neocolonialism is the transformation of the political structure from one in which colonial rulers directly impose on the colonized as a whole into one in which the colonial rulers establish an alliance with the colonized bourgeoisie and turn over official political control. While Nkrumah and Woddis develop broader theories of neocolonialism, Allen translates their thought and synthesizes with the domestic colonialism thesis, developing a theory of domestic neocolonialism designed to describe the political, economic, and military changes within American society since Nixon. Because the United States had always favored neocolonial strategies of Empire over so-called classical colonialism, it is no surprise that the American imperial elites were able to draw upon a long history domestic and international neocolonial thought when laying the foundations for our contemporary social structure. Following the Brownlow tradition of differential segregation wherein white distinguish between Good Negroes and Bad Negroes, assimilating the former and segregating the latter, contemporary domestic neocolonialism has fostered two seemingly contradictory policies: police state repression and middle class integration. The neocolonial police state exercises a seemingly total power of the Black domestic colony, employing technologically and juridically sophisticated means for constant surveillance, which may lead to

incarceration or death if neocolonial agents deem it necessary. Meanwhile, the neocolonial state extends its hand in partnership to the Black bourgeoisie, establishing common values, converging mutual interest, and incentivizing cooperation in the larger neocolonial political economy. While Republicans and Democrats have each developed means for pursuing neocolonial rule, the Democrats have played the more important role. Not only have they managed to channel grassroots Black political energy into the party and thereby prevent the emergence of an independent Black political program, Democrats have also created the conditions for the ascendancy of Barack Obama, a Black neocolonial elite who took the reins of Empire and transformed Amerikan militarism under the War on Terror.

Two examples will help demonstrate the implications of the switch from the pseudo-radical signifier “neoliberalism” to the anticolonial notion of neocolonialism. While Greg Thomas’s criticism of *The New Jim Crow* reveals Alexander’s acceptance of the neocolonial War on Drugs as a legitimate and apolitical law enforcement enterprise, the further anticolonial critique presented here can actually resolve the two primary limitations of her study. Alexander argues that, unlike Jim Crow, mass incarceration developed without overt “racial hostility” and with “Black support for ‘get tough’ policies.”¹¹⁸ While these features would appear anomalous to an analysis that fails to account for either the evolving and various forms of racism or the class dynamics within the Black community, Allen’s domestic neocolonial thesis clarifies these observations. In fact, understanding mass incarceration as one manifestation domestic neocolonial policing is *clearer* when the contributions of the Black bourgeoisie are taken into account. If we draw a mere analogy between two types of racial institutions, as Alexander does between Jim Crow and mass incarceration, then the analysis will remain inconclusive because the emphasis on explicit form has impeded the investigation from the start. If we look to the

deeper logic of the social ontology and its specific historical transformations, however, then we can begin to understand what causes those different forms to emerge. In this case, the colonial ontology of Empire is the logic behind the institutions, and after the anticolonial struggles of the mid-twentieth century, the Amerikan Empire perfected its neocolonial methods and gave us both mass Black incarceration and Barack Obama.

Like Alexander's *The New Jim Crow*, David Theo Goldberg's *The Threat of Race: Reflections on Racial Neoliberalism* fails to capture the contours of Amerika's treatment of the Black internal neocolony. Goldberg attempts to provide "a broad, spatio-temporally sensitive *conceptual* mapping of race-making and racist structures" and "an inductive cartography of racial fabrication and racist exclusion across five regional terrains, historically indexed."¹¹⁹ Unfortunately, like other critics of "neoliberalism," his conceptual apparatus remains tied to the problematic lexicon of contemporary academic liberal nationalism, particularly "neoliberalism," which is transformed into an adverb (neoliberalizing) to describe just about every object discussed in the book. While he expresses concern for the devastation wrought by free market policies in the former colonies of the world, he fails to translate that concern to the Amerikan context. "The civil rights movement in the US," he writes, comparing the situation of Black Amerikans to the colonial victims of the rest of the world, "clearly has had significantly better if still decidedly mixed results. It has helped to consolidate a more ethnoracially diversified middle class with some economic access and local political power but with definitive limits at the broader national level. These *affirmations* are offset," he adds, having expressed his approval regarding the neocolonial integration of the Black bourgeoisie, "by the increasing numbers of impoverished and deprived families of color and a ballooning prison population overwhelmingly black and Latino."¹²⁰ Despite his supposedly radical disposition and ostensibly critical rhetoric,

Goldberg's analysis simply reverts to the mainstream liberal-nationalist impression of Amerika's racial politics: much progress has been made but we still have a long way to go. His inclination to find "neoliberalism" in everything has kept him from identifying the colonial logic of neocolonial Amerika, and his implicit liberal commitments to the Amerikan Empire, like Alexander's, have simply been sublimated through the dense rhetoric of an academician. Robert Allen's neglected theory of domestic neocolonialism, however, opens a space for the revival of the Africana anticolonial tradition and for a new understanding of the twenty-first-century colonial ontology of Empire.

CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSION: ANTICOLONIAL FUTURES

“[T]he Black Panther Party saw that the United States was no longer a nation. It was something else; it was more than a nation. It had not only expanded its territorial boundaries, but it had expanded all of its controls as well. We called it an empire.”

– Huey P. Newton, *In Search of Common Ground*¹

“As academics, we have been taught to criticize because we are denied the fruits of empire, rather than wage critique as a protest of empire’s existence.”

– Tommy J. Curry, “Back to the Woodshop”²

“Now, comrades, now is the time to decide to change sides,” he insisted, reflecting on the anticolonial struggle in the heat of the Tunisian desert in the summer of 1961. “We must abandon our dreams and say farewell to our old beliefs and former friendships. Let us not lose time in useless laments or sickening mimicry. Let us leave this Europe which never stops talking of man yet massacres him at every one of its street corners, at every corner of the world.”³ As he sat uncomfortably in his chair – his body fatigued and deteriorating from the debilitating effects of leukemia – the thirty-five-year-old revolutionary dictated what would become his final thoughts on revolutionary consciousness. “When I look for man in European lifestyles and technology,” Frantz Fanon explained, “I see a constant denial of man, an avalanche of murders.”⁴ Given the utter brutality with which European empires had bifurcated the modern world between colonizer and colonized, being and nonbeing, ontological and nontological, he was compelled to ask: “how could we fail to understand that we have better things to do than follow in that Europe’s footsteps?”⁵ For Fanon, there was no better evidence regarding the dangers of taking Europe’s path than Amerika, for this growing imperial power had brought the misanthropic logic of Europe to exponential heights. “Two centuries ago,” he stated, “a former European colony took it into its head to catch up with Europe. It has been so successful that the United States of America has become a monster where the flaws, sickness, and inhumanity of Europe have

reached frightening proportions.”⁶ Against those who proclaim Amerika’s exceptionalism, Fanon argued that Amerika, rather than overcoming its European origins, in fact represented the embodiment of Europe’s most inhumane values and practices. If “the European spirit is built on strange foundations,” he implied, then the Amerikan spirit is a new edifice on old foundations. Because the anticolonial struggle opposed Europe, it must also oppose the United States. Unable to turn to Europe, unable to turn to Amerika, Fanon gathered the little energy still in his dying body and urged his anticolonial comrades to “tense our muscles and our brains in a new direction.”⁷

Though almost sixty years have passed since Fanon uttered these words, most academics, activists, and intellectuals have failed to heed his call – and most of those who did so were murdered by the Empire. In *Colonialism’s Culture*, Nicholas Thomas complains that the leading academic discourses on colonialism remain dominated by Western thought. “The paramount irony of contemporary colonial studies,” he writes, “must be that critics and scholars, who one presumes wish to expose the false universality and hegemony of imperial expansion and modernization, seem unwilling themselves to renounce the aspiration of theorizing globally on the basis of particular strands of European philosophy.”⁸ This fact remains true today. Academic articles and manuscripts are saturated with mentions of Kant, Hegel, Marx, Heidegger, Foucault, Derrida, Agamben, and others who knew nothing of colonialism or actively participated in the creation of colonial Empires. Anticolonial theories did, of course, proliferate in the 1970s, but they were marginalized, cleansed, and expunged through a campaign of systematic opposition in the universities. The theories that replaced anticolonialism were screened to make sure they were sanitized of fundamentally critical thought. In our time, when postcolonialism and multiculturalism have replaced revolutionary intellectual paradigms, “the power of white

colonial rule, politically, economically, culturally,” Greg Thomas demurs, “goes largely unchecked, especially in U.S. academia. And, certainly,” he adds, “the critical rhetoric of ‘race, gender, class, and sexuality’ has done virtually no damage to Western empire in its North American-dominated phase.”⁹ Those who call for a return to the Black Radical Tradition in general or to anticolonialism in particular, are condemned as behind the times, stuck in the past, or simply construed as reactionary.

Against this grain, *Anticolonial Amerika* has sought to overcome the impediments of pseudo-radical, bourgeois theory and return to the anticolonial strain of the Black Radical Tradition. In a time when philosophy has failed to look beyond the edges of the discipline and outside its Eurocentric canons – in a time when one’s radicalism is determined by the hashtags they use – in a time when self-appointed authorities intuit ahistorical truths from ahistorical identities – in a time when identarians pile intersection upon intersection with no determinate beginning and with no end in sight – in a time when moralists sling vituperations at those who would prioritize facts over fantasy – and in a time when scholarship is censored because it challenges the uncritical reception of dubious truisms – in a time such as this, an anticolonial revival is much needed, though it will be widely opposed. Philosophers of all stripes claim to have thought down to the foundations of the world, but they consistently fail to think to the foundations of their own thought. Because their most deeply held convictions are derived from and sustained by the Western philosophical tradition, philosophers rarely attempt, let alone *desire*, to abandon the colonial presuppositions embedded in their thinking. Black radical thought never fails to trigger a response by the imperial power structure, and the discipline of philosophy retains its ever-vigilant guard over the possible encroachments of the Black Radical Tradition. In contemporary academic discourse, Thomas observes, “Black radical traditions are ironically seen

as anathema, even pathological, as if they were a social menace or scourge. This view is clearly in keeping with the logic of white colonial power itself.”¹⁰ *Anticolonial Amerika*, however, has attempted to depart from the current state of affairs, retuning to and building upon several major figures in the tradition of Africana anticolonialism.

The Anticolonial Present

Rather than dealing in superficial metaphors or fetishizing “race” as the primary or only phenomenon worthy of philosophical reflection, anticolonial theory, as I have argued, provides a rich philosophical framework for reinterpreting the our social and political world, including social ontology, race, sovereignty, sex/gender/sexuality, and (neo)colonial capitalism. In a field of thought relatively devoid of reflections on the global mechanisms of Empire, the work of Charles Mills stands out as exceptional, for he provides the basic guidelines for an historically and empirically informed non-ideal theory of modern Western imperialism. Despite his realist and materialist commitments, however, the language of the “racial contract” and his solution to it, “black radical liberalism,” are encumbered by inadequate opposition to capitalism and overdependence on a monolithic notion of whiteness. In Chapters II and III, I argued that these shortcomings could be avoided by situating race within the *colonial ontology of Empire*, which consists of a colonizer-colonized relation expressed through assimilation, domination, and elimination. This anticolonial social ontology retains the strengths of Mills’s social ontology by grounding race in the material – that is, *economic* – colonial relation, which is not reducible to class. Because the colonial relation is a site of power and the conditions for *racialization*, it allows us to separate race from “foundationalism” and recognize the plurality of ways that race and colonial status can exist in a single colonial Empire. For example, European colonizers in the United States have developed at least two distinct modes of whiteness, which reflect two

different conceptions of Empire. While the Anglo-Saxon universalists wanted to spread their culture to every corner of the globe, the Caucasianists thought of the United States as a standalone white republic. They both advocated white supremacy but in very different ways. Though my analysis is primarily concerned with Black people in Amerika, this anticolonial social ontology allows us to see the plurality of racializations in the zone of nonbeing. A number of other victims of Amerikan Empire were also mentioned in the course of the work: Native Americans, Mexicans, the Chinese, Filipinos, Libyans, Hondurans, Iraqis, and others. White these groups are all racialized differently, they are all relegated to the zone of nonbeing by the violence of Amerika's imperial expansion. Whether colonized groups will be assimilated, dominated, or eliminated depends on the combination of imperial strategy, conception of whiteness, economic interests, and access to political-military power. By building upon Mills's materialist and realist framework, therefore, anticolonialism provides the opportunity to both see race as a manifestation of colonial capitalism and understand the competing conceptions of whiteness that give shape to Amerikan Empire.

Moving beyond my anticolonial social ontology of race and class, I also argued that Martin R. Delany's theory of colonial sovereignty and Eldridge Cleaver's theory of the sexual image contribute important extension of anticolonial political theory, for they show that the Black Racial Tradition provides the tools for rethinking even our most widely accepted political concepts. Unlike the misguided theories of the state of exception, Delany points out that law itself, and not its suspension, is the principle tool of colonial violence precisely because it is controlled through the sovereignty of the colonial power. Amerika has always been a legalistic nation, and as Alexis de Tocqueville observed in *Democracy in Amerika*, the Amerikan colonial

model has relied on legalistic practices from the start. In a horrifying passage, Tocqueville compares Spanish and Amerikan violence against the Native Americans:

The Spaniards, despite acts of unparalleled monstrosity that left them indelibly covered with shame, were unable to exterminate the Indian race or even prevent the Indians from sharing their rights. The Americans of the United States achieved both results with marvelous ease, quietly, legally, philanthropically, without bloodshed, without violating a single one of the great principles of morality in the eyes of the world. To destroy human beings with greater respect for the laws of humanity would be impossible.¹¹

Tocqueville was writing before the bloodiest scenes in westward expansion took place, but he touches on the same truth that Delany did, namely, that Amerikans depend on the law to provide a moral cover story for their violent imperial actions and policies. Amerikan's will have their way, Tocqueville suggests, but they will do it *through* the law, not outside it, and this fact remains true today.¹² In *Outside the Law: Emergency and Executive Power*, Clement Fatovic explains that, since the eighteenth century, "there has been a dramatic shift away from reliance on extralegal exercises of prerogative toward the use of formal grants of legal authority when it comes to dealing with emergencies."¹³ As Delany understood, the "emergency" of the late-antebellum period was runaway slaves, and Congress passed the Fugitive Slave Act to address the problem; as Newton understood, the "emergency" of the 1960s and 70s was the Black Panthers, and the Nixon administration and its successors created the War on Drugs to address that problem. Thus, as I argued in Chapter IV, it is not enough to be on the lookout for declarations of martial law, for the real threat is not the suspension of law but its use as a tool of suppression and colonial rule. After all, the syntagm "law and order" begins with *law*.

Just as Delany's writings point us in new directions regarding the law, Cleaver's theory of the sexual image frees us from the backdoor essentialism of contemporary gender theory. In the contemporary academy, scholars who fail to invoke "intersectionality" or who fail to reprise

the catchphrase “race, class, gender” are doomed to moral condemnation despite the utter meaninglessness of these terms. The term “gender” emerged in the 1950s and was popularized in the mid-1980s, and though it is often presented as a socially constructed alternative to essentialized sex, the lexical transition from sex to gender was unaccompanied by a conceptual transition from essence to convention. Intersectionality, for example, imports two feminist habits: first, building a “universal” philosophical anthropology on the existence of elite white males and females; and second, subsuming non-white males and females under the concepts derived from that elite white anthropology. As Tommy J. Curry writes, “The category of maleness used by theory ultimately revolves around white maleness and patriarchy, a dynamic that most nonwhite men historically not only have been denied but also have been victimized by for centuries.”¹⁴ Despite their historical exclusion from and subjugation by colonial patriarchs, intersectionality sees colonized and racialized males *as* those patriarchs. This essentialist slight-of-hand is also at work for females. Because “‘female’ is thought to be conceptually and biologically distinct from patriarchy, despite being formulated, historically situated, and geographically located in many cases at the helm of empire, colonialism, militarism, corporatism, and classism,” Curry observes, “the sexual designation ‘female,’ meaning ‘not male,’ intuitively marks the modal boundary that indicates ‘the absence of patriarchy.’”¹⁵ In this way, contemporary feminist and intersectional discourses obfuscate rather than illuminate the basic social dynamics of our colonial world. By transferring the explanatory power of a sociogenic colonial social ontology onto bio-logical sex, feminism and intersectionality reinforce colonial relations and colonial ideologies while impersonating “radical” thought.

As I argued in Chapter V, however, colonizing (white) females have exercised much power over and perpetrated much violence against colonized (Black) males. Cleaver’s theory of

the sexual image makes possible an understanding of white women's colonial power in Amerika because, unlike feminism and intersectionality, he radically separates sex and gender. Because a person's sexual image (their gender/sexuality expression) is in part determined by their position within colonial capitalism, the power of a group is determined socially not biologically.

Cleaver's thought disrupts not only current theories of gender but also the regimes used to exclude radical criticisms of those theories. "While some anti-Black nationalist critics have made clichéd references to gender or sexuality and COINTELPRO," Thomas reminds us, "they do so in a campaign against militants which condemns militants more than it does J. Edgar Hoover, his FBI, and the U.S. imperialist state." "Rarely are Black militants imagined to reflect on this process themselves, in the spirit of a continuing Black militant praxis," he adds.¹⁶ Yet this is exactly what Cleaver has done: as a victim of the FBI and the U.S. imperial state, he theorized gender and sexuality decades before intersectionality was invented, a constellation of facts that contemporary academics insist is impossible. From an anticolonial perspective, Cleaver's theory of the sexual image is so powerful because it divorces gender theorizing from the imperial and colonial assumptions of feminism's "universalizing" bourgeois anthropologies.

After moving through the discussions of social ontology and whiteness, sovereignty and gender, Chapter VI explored the neocolonial contours of contemporary domestic American politics. The domestic colonialism thesis has largely been repudiated by scholars since the 1980s because it seemed to rely on a superficial metaphor rather than a substantial structural connection between different expressions of the colonial relation. In his 1984 essay "The Internal Colonial Concept," Robert J. Hind criticized the domestic colonialism model most completely (and most brutally), writing, "Many intractable problems confront the formulators of internal colonial theories." "Their imposition of an arguably artificial analogy upon a society can be considered to

be obscurantist and misleading,” he continues. “The lengthy chronological span covered in many interpretations leads to superficiality. In general, the theories offer too many explanations, and make too many deductions in an ad hoc or an ex post facto manner...a practice which leads to intellectual incoherence and a distortion of historical processes.¹⁷ Despite these criticisms, however, Hind argued that analyses of domestic colonialism were limited not by their premises but by their development. “In the present stage of formulation,” he explains, “theories of internal colonialism are in their infancy, possess intrinsic weaknesses, and make no attempt to exercise the full range of options offered by the concept from which they originate. These deficiencies appear to limit the effectiveness of the theories...rather than to invalidate the concept from which they derive.”¹⁸ Through the twofold strategy of combining Robert L. Allen’s domestic neocolonialism thesis with the colonial ontology of Empire, I demonstrated that the domestic colonialism thesis could be not only saved but also provide more compelling analyses of contemporary American politics that the confused analyses concerned about “neoliberalism.” Thus, rather than abandon the domestic colonialism thesis, I attempted to develop its core principles in new directions in an effort to derive the fullest conceptual power from the theory.

Though my examination of domestic neocolonialism was limited by space, I am not the first to notice the neocolonial outcome of the long history of racial struggle in twentieth-century United States. In *Black is a Country*, Nikhil Pal Singh traces the development of domestic neocolonialism in America from the immediate post-World War II emergence of integrationism to the neocolonial police state. “[I]f there was a great divide in the modern black freedom movement,” he notes, “it was between black activists and intellectuals who gravitated toward an identification with the U.S. state and social policy and the answer to black mass discontent, and those who eyed the rhetorical professions of American universality and inclusiveness from the

more exacting and worldly standpoint of subjugation to racializing power.”¹⁹ Using the term “differential inclusion”²⁰ – a construction uncannily similar to Lawrence J. Friedman’s use of “differential segregation” to describe William Gannaway Brownlow’s postbellum racial ideology – Singh argues that post-1970s Amerika sought to integrate those Black people who accepted Empire and punish those who did not. In a vivid description of the ghetto as an internal colony, he draws the parallels between domestic and foreign neocolonialisms:

The ghettoization of racial migrants in the United States might in this sense be fruitfully compared to neocolonialism. Just as the few formal rights of statehood and self-government have provided few, if any, answers to enduring global patterns of inequality, exploitation, and oppression that plague the peoples of many of the world’s former colonies, formal citizenship rights have not delivered economic opportunity and political empowerment for a significant portion of U.S. blacks. For the people of the ghetto, the internalization of neocolonialism reveals that the substance, if not the very notion, of common citizenship no longer holds sway (if indeed it ever did).²¹

In a profound reiteration of Delany’s nineteenth-century claim that formal citizenship rights like the right to vote were inadequate for the realization of political power, Singh captures the neocolonial obfuscation. Without sovereignty, Black political rights do not go very far, for they can be re-inscribed into the mechanisms of the neocolonial police state.

This revival and development of anticolonial analyses of neocolonialism can ultimately help us overcome our dependence on the erroneous complaints about “neoliberalism,” both domestically and internationally. Scholarly lamentations over “neoliberalism” depend upon an implied celebration of the New Deal welfare state; the only way to make sense of the opposition to market fundamentalism is to assume that its opposite, in form of Keynesian polices, were and are a good thing. “From the 1930s to the 1970s,” David Theo Goldberg insists in a representative passage, “the liberal democratic state had offered a more or less robust set of institutional apparatuses concerned in principle at least to advance the welfare of its citizens...including those

previously racially excluded within the state and new immigrants from the global south.” With the advent of so-called neoliberalism, however, “the state became increasingly troubled with securing privatized interests from the projected contamination and threat of those deemed for various reasons not to belong.”²² Anticolonialism resists such statements because, unlike Goldberg and other critics of “neoliberalism,” it refuses to bifurcate domestic and foreign policy. This is why William J. Pomeroy notes that “the passage of the Philippine Independence Act [in 1934] coincided with the ‘welfare state’ measures and centralized economic controls that preserved American capitalism in crisis. The welfare state at home and neo-colonialism abroad become twin supports of the contemporary imperialist framework.”²³ Pomeroy is merely observing the same thing Du Bois observed throughout his life: white European and American working classes are fine with imperialism, so long as they get their cut.²⁴ Anticolonials, therefore, have no need for celebrating the New Deal because it was merely a program designed to quiet the masses by redistributing the plunder of Empire.

Outside the United States, virtually every event described as “neoliberal” is far better understood within the long history of American neocolonialism, including the 1973 CIA-backed military coup in Chile. In 1970, socialist politician Salvador Allende was elected president of Chile as head of the Popular Unity Coalition, and after taking office, he initiated a series of reforms designed to redistribute economic resource and power away from U.S. corporations and Chilean economic elites. As might be expected, the Richard Nixon administration partnered with the economic and military elites of Chile to coordinate a military coup, which ended with Allende’s death and the rise of military dictator Augusto Pinochet on September 11, 1973.²⁵ Conspicuously, the Center for Latin American Economic Studies at the University of Chicago, run by the notorious “neoliberal” Milton Friedman, had for decades been training Chilean

economists in free market ideology and sending them back home to instigate “neoliberal” reforms; after Pinochet’s coup, the Chicago School offered economic advice to the new regime, which would transform the nation into a militarized playground for U.S. corporations. In *The Shock Doctrine*, Naomi Klein joins a chorus of scholars who have denounced the Chile coup as “neoliberal,” but this framing distorts and obscures the longer trajectory of American neocolonialism of which the Chile coup was a part.²⁶ In fact, the Chile coup has all the trappings of neocolonial regime change articulated by Kwame Nkrumah: military aid to suppress popular dissent and the installment of a native bourgeois class, all driven by the desire to keep markets open to Western capitalists. Just see economist and Latin Americanist Roger Burbach describe the events:

US corporations, which held a stake of \$1.1 billion in Chile, also kicked into the anti-Allende campaign...The Chilean military was the only government organization to receive increased US funding under Allende, rising from \$5.7 million in 1971 to \$15 million in 1973...The Chilean elite and business classes quickly closed ranks against Allende...To encourage the military to intervene, women from the upper-class neighborhoods of Santiago marched in front of the military garrisons and threw grain and corn kernels, chanting “You are a bunch of chickens, you are not defending the honor of the women of Chile.”²⁷

It does not get much more colonial than that. Even the bourgeois women of Chile were deploying their claim to virtue in order to compel the military to overthrow the government; certainly these women are, at least in part, responsible for the murder and torture of thousands of poor and working class men and women during the three-decade Pinochet regime. In *Color and Democracy*, Du Bois wrote, “Concerted attempt has been made recently to remove the discussion of India from the colonial category by calling it a dependency – just as other colonies are called protectorates or included in ‘spheres of influence.’ Change of name makes no essential change in fact.”²⁸ Here, we can easily paraphrase his insight: Concerted attempt has been made recently to remove the discussion of Chile from the colonial category by calling it a

neoliberalism – just as other colonies are called “neoliberal states,”²⁹ but a change of name makes no essential change in fact.

Klein’s “neoliberal” argument pretends that the Chicago School invented these practices and thereby relieves herself from having to know anything about the history of American Empire. By pretending that all of this began after World War II, she undermines any radical assessment of what happened in Chile. An anticolonial approach, however, can see that the Chile coup was in part based on the CIA coups in Iran (1953) and Guatemala (1954), which themselves were in part modeled on the United States’ policy in the Philippines and Cuba in the early-twentieth century, which were in turn run by the same military officers who oversaw the subjugation and destruction of the Native Americans in the 1880s, which was ultimately a product of Anglo-Saxon expansionism under the assertion of Manifest Destiny. If we are to take the anticolonial tradition seriously, then, we must not only develop anticolonial understandings of social ontology, race, sovereignty, and sex/gender/sexuality – we must also abandon the useless fetishization of “neoliberalism.”

In reality, the problem with concerns about “neoliberalism” is the same as the problems with everything else I have criticized – feminist ideology, the state of exception, monolithic notions of whiteness – namely, that they replace analyses of the colonial ontology of Empire with convenient scapegoats and prevent a critique of Western modernity as a whole. For example, in his grotesque lamentations about “neoliberalism,” Henry Giroux oddly asserts that after the advent of “neoliberalism,” “American imperial ambitions are *now* legitimized by public relations intellectuals as a part of the responsibilities of empire-building, which in turn is *now* celebrated as a civilizing process for the rest of the globe.”³⁰ *Now?* The long history of Anglo-Saxon imperialism apparently does not exist for Giroux. The ideological smokescreen at work

here is obvious: “neoliberalism,” and not Western modernity, is responsible for the problems of our day. With “neoliberalism” identified as the source of all our problems, there is no need to investigate the deeper colonial logic of modern imperial social ontology; no, all we have to do is stop the Republican Party. Meanwhile, we can search the history of Western thought for the resources we need to solve the most pressing social issues of our time. This is exactly what Wendy Brown does when she advocated the return of *homo politicus* (Aristotle’s “political animal”) as a remedy for the “neoliberal” anthropological construct *homo oeconomicus*.³¹ Like Giroux – and *unlike* Fanon – Brown sees no need to question the fundamental goodness of the Western philosophical tradition, and she assumes that the problems we face in the early-twenty-first-century are problems caused neither by the West nor its violent colonial ideologies and policies but by “neoliberalism.”

The same obfuscation is at work in the other discourses. Feminism fails to interrogate its own colonial origins and imperial commitments, and when colonialism and imperialism are discussed, it is claimed that “men” (read: males) are the cause. According to the feminist view, males – and as we have seen, *all* males, colonizer *and* colonized – are the problem, not the dehumanizing colonial ontology of Empire at the heart of the modern global social structure. Colonizing (white) females do not question the colonial ontology of Empire because that very ontology gives them their humanity. Colonized females can and often do question the colonial ontology of Empire, but many – including intersectionality theorists – accept that ontology and simply seek a place in the zone of being. In each case, colonized males end up being targeted by the Empire’s military apparatus. Likewise, theories about the state of exception find a scapegoat in political figures, usually some person or group in the executive branch of Western nation-states, to blame for their disregard of the law, which is assumed to be an otherwise fair and just

socio-political institution. Rather than see the law as a tool of colonial imperialism – as Delany, Newton, and Antony Anghie do – the scholars who are wrapped up in the state of exception discourse take a legalistic approach, implying that law properly applied is the remedy rather than the cause of violence and oppression. While the War on Drugs has been carried out through wholly legal(ized) means, liberal critics only go as far as questioning those *specific* laws as bad laws, rarely following the analysis to its logical end, namely, that law itself is the most insidious medium for colonial violence. Finally, condemnations of monolithic whiteness also protect the Western tradition from scrutiny by scapegoating an oversimplified modern identity category. Such arguments are often caught at an impasse. If whiteness *caused* colonialism and imperialism, as is often implied, the Western “civilization” can be saved by replacing whiteness with some other identity supplied by Western thought, such as “class consciousness.” If, however, whiteness is *caused by* colonialism and imperialism, as I argue, then whiteness can only be overcome by addressing its cause. Feminism, legalism, and whiteness do not and cannot provide causal explanations of colonialism, but colonialism can and does provide a causal explanation for feminism, legalism, and whiteness.

Essentially, every political paradigm based in Western modes of thought are engaged in a process of “villain rotation,”³² which allows individuals and groups to draw observers’ attention away from the fundamental colonial structure of the United States and the world and toward some localized entity that will be cast with the blame for all the problems of Western society. Marxists say, “But for the capitalists, we could create a communist utopia!” Liberals say, “But for the conservatives, we could create a liberal utopia!” Conservatives say, “But for the liberals, we would have order and tradition!” Libertarians say, “But for the overgrown state, we would live in a world harmonized by the laws of the market!” Feminists say, “But for the patriarchs, we

could live in a world where women have introduced justice into the world!” White nationalists say, “But for the dark people, we would have a great white civilization!” Integrationists say, “But for the white nationalists, we would have a pluralist democracy!” Despite the vast disparities between these various ideologies, they all share the same conceptual pattern, namely, that there is some feature, some aspect, some part, some trait, some entity in Western civilization that would *save the world* if it were not for some regrettable impediment. This fact explains why Western politics resolves itself into a mere competition between colonizers who are competing for their chance to navigate the trajectory of Empire and manage colonized populations. When white nationalists threaten the expulsion of the darker peoples, conservatives claim to be the saviors of the colonized by bringing them “civilization.” When conservatives become too explicitly paternalistic, liberals step in and promise the colonized a place within the Empire (as soon as they are “fit,” of course). When liberal assimilationism becomes too obvious, Marxists claim that they will lead colonized labor to socialism. When Marxists become hyper-masculinized, feminists intervene with promises of gen[sex]der justice. Everyone one of these ideologies claims to have the answer for the wretched of the earth, but insofar as none of them have the ability to understand or comprehend their own colonial origins, they will merely perpetuate the colonial ontology of Empire and thus the violence, exploitation, genocide, terror, suffering, and death that come along with it.

Anticolonialism provides a means by which scholars and intellectuals can circumvent this defend-the-West-at-any-cost mentality, for as Fanon urges, the anticolonial tradition turns its back on colonialism and therefore on Europe and its menagerie of competing colonialist ideologies. In *Discourse on Colonialism*, Aimé Césaire concisely articulates the anticolonial disposition: “A civilization that proves incapable of solving the problems it creates is a *decadent*

civilization. A civilization that chooses to close its eyes to its most crucial problems is a *stricken* civilization. A civilization that uses its principles for trickery and deceit is a *dying* civilization.”³³ The practitioners of the political ideologies bequeathed to us by Western “civilization” are incapable of solving the problem of colonialism, choosing instead to both shut their eyes and distract others using philosophical shadow puppets in a staged drama that replaces real politics. As such, Western “civilization” and the Amerikan Empire that emerged from it are unquestionably decadent, stricken, dying. Du Bois saw this clearly, for after witnessing a second global war over control in the colonies, he concluded that “we can no longer regard Western Europe and North America as the world for which civilization exists; nor can we look to upon European culture as the norm for all peoples.”³⁴ As an alternative, Du Bois spoke of “the values of primitive culture,” arguing that “in many respects these ways of living have solved social difficulties better than lands have been able to do.”³⁵ We do not need any more Marxists, liberals, feminists, or any other self-proclaimed saviors of the Western world. What we need are people who are willing and able to move beyond the confines of imperializing theories. What we need are people who are willing and capable of thinking outside the colonial ontology of Empire. What we need, more than anything else, are people who are no longer devoted to rescuing a violent world order that cannot be and should not be rescued. What we need is exactly what Fanon told us we need – “a new start...a new way of thinking...a new man.”³⁶

Anticolonial Politics

Anticolonial thinkers have always been skeptical of major Amerikan political parties. Since the 1840s, when Martin Delany jeered both Whigs and Democrats, the anticolonial tradition has sought an alternative to the two-party-dominated system in the United States. Toward the end of his life, Du Bois made his disdain for the major parties perfectly clear: “Today the rich and the

powerful rulers of America divide themselves into Republican and Democrats in order to raise ten million dollars to buy the next election and prevent you from having a third party to vote for, or to stop war, theft and murder by your votes.”³⁷ Less than a decade later, Eldridge Cleaver made the same point during an appearance on William F. Buckley’s *Firing Line*: “The Democratic Party and the Republican Party are criminal conspiracies against the people and... anyone who affiliates with them, supports them, speaks good about them, writes good about them, are aiding and abetting this criminality.”³⁸ This anticolonial tradition continues today, but the neocolonial strategy of differential segregation has undermined the drive to develop a distinctly Black political party with a distinctly anticolonial political disposition. The neocolonial mentality runs so deep in contemporary Amerikan politics that most people – white or Black – can think outside neither the boundaries of Amerikan exceptionalism nor the narrative of inevitable racial progress. As a result, the standard liberal view of contemporary Amerikan politics, including the 2016 election, is that Democratic Party ideologues like Barack Obama and Hillary Clinton are the vanguard of Amerika’s moral *telos*, while Republicans like Donald Trump represent the “backward” politics of white supremacy. There is no question that Trump’s politics are only the most recent manifestation of white nationalism that first appeared in Andrew Jackson white populism, but an anticolonial view of contemporary Amerikan politics has the power to disabuse liberals of their claim to moral and political righteousness. From an anticolonial perspective, the only way out of Amerika’s two-party Empire is independent anti-imperial organizing.

In Chapter VI, I argued that Obama represented the culmination of neocolonial integration in the United States, but he also represents the most recent iterations of the imperialist strategy of using Black Amerikans as a wedge into Africa. When Black political scientist Ralph

Bunche was helping the U.S. government propagandize itself in Africa during the 1940s, he argued, “Carefully chosen American Negroes could prove more effective than whites, owing to their unique ability to gain more readily the confidence of the Native on the basis of their right to claim blood relationship.”³⁹ Obama must have read these words, for in his 2009 address in Accra, Ghana, he used his African ancestry to prepare the way for the Amerikan neocolonial police state in Africa. Telling heartfelt stories about his grandfather living under British colonial rule in Kenya, Obama reminded his audience, “I have the blood of Africa within me,” before chastising the continent, accusing it of being a destitute backland replete with “systematic rape” and violent “terrorists” and lacking respect for the “rule of law” and “good governance.” But these imperial code words were merely a preface to the point of the speech, namely, Obama’s promise to dramatically expand Amerika’s military presence on the continent. Before 2007, the U.S. military had divided its operations in Africa between United States European Command (EUCOM) and United States Central Command (CENTCOM), but with the creation of United States Africa Command (AFRICOM), which went operational under the Bush administration in October 2008, all African countries except Egypt were brought under the jurisdiction of a single unified combatant command zone. “Africa Command is focused not on establishing a foothold in the continent,” Obama promised, “but on confronting these common challenges to advance the security of America, Africa and the world.”⁴⁰ Yet, Obama established a foothold anyway. As *VICE News* reports, “In 2006, just 1 percent of all U.S. commandos overseas were deployed to Africa. But by 2017, it jumped to 17 percent, meaning there are more U.S. Special Operators on the continent than anywhere else in the world outside the Middle East. Today these operators are carrying out almost 100 missions at any given time in at least 20 African countries.”⁴¹ The crown jewel of AFRICAM is Camp Lemmonier, the 600-acre “forward operating base” in Djibouti that

houses 4,000 U.S. military personnel and provides a launch point for surveillance and strike drone missions across East and North Africa. Housing over 800 U.S. military personnel, the second largest U.S. outpost in Africa is the new \$100 million drone base in Agadez, Niger, which “is technically the property of the Nigerien military, though it is paid for, built, and operated by Americans.”⁴² The Agadez outpost will serve another launch point for MQ-9 Reaper drones with surveillance and striking capabilities. In all, the United States has created a militarized corridor cutting straight through the heart of Africa, with forty-six outposts (fifteen of which are “enduring locations”) stretching from Senegal to Kenya.⁴³ In addition to the expanding number of bases, the U.S. military cooperates with military personnel from France, Germany, and Italy, who have deployed a combined total of hundreds if not thousands of troops on the continent in a coordinated neocolonial effort to maintain Western access to Africa’s natural resources. While many African nations distrusted the Bush administration, especially Libya’s Muammar Gaddafi, Obama oversaw the 2011 Libya coup that deposed Gaddafi and put an African face on Amerikan Empire.⁴⁴

Though liberals celebrated Obama in spite of his neocolonial policies at home and abroad, they expressed horror of the election of Trump. The liberal reaction to Trump, however, fails to place him in the broader context of Amerikan colonialism and competing notions of whiteness. In “The First White President,” essayist Ta-Nehisi Coates argues that Trump is “America’s first white president” because his aim is “the negation of Obama’s legacy.” Mentioning Thomas Jefferson, Andrew Jackson, Jefferson Davis, Franklin Roosevelt, Richard Nixon, and David Duke, Coates accurately situates Trump in the long line of white populism that represents the Caucasianist strain of whiteness in the U.S. In his opposition to the Caucasianist version of whiteness, Coates does not merely overlook the Anglo-Saxonist tradition of whiteness

– which strives for the universal assimilation of all (fit) peoples into universal Anglo-Saxon values – he actively *identifies with it*. The reader will notice that Coates fails to extend his criticisms to those *other* white supremacists in the Anglo-Saxonist tradition; unlike the white populists, he fails to criticize or even mention Ralph Waldo Emerson, Walt Whitman, Teddy Roosevelt, Woodrow Wilson, Henry Luce, Harry Truman, or anyone from George H. W. Bush to Barack Obama (the neocon age). Referring to “those who want a more inclusive America,” Coates places himself within the Anglo-Saxon tradition of assimilation alongside the neocolonial Black bourgeoisie and Trump’s electoral opponent, Hillary Clinton. Not only does Coates suggest that a Clinton victory in 2016 would have been preferable, by implication, he suggests that a Clinton victory would have been *not white*. The only way Coates’s argument becomes plausible is if he assumes, like the critical whiteness studies scholar David Roediger, whom he cites as the source of his conception of whiteness, that whiteness is a single, monolithic phenomenon.⁴⁵

White liberals, of course, celebrated Coates’s essay as a validation of their righteous indignation over Trump’s election, but their alternative was no less white supremacist – it was just a *different kind* of white supremacy. “Today no better proof of American universalism is offered than the idea that dominated or excluded groups have struggled against discrimination and inequality in the name of the superior ideas and values of the nation,” Singh observes; in particular, “there is no more powerful way to represent the political universality of the U.S. nation-state than to have black people stand in for the nation at large.”⁴⁶ Beginning with Truman’s strategy of Cold War integration, passing through Nixon’s strategy of neocolonial integration, and culminating in Obama’s election and subsequent administration, the enduring liberal strategy for the last seventy years has been to obfuscate the racial contours of American

imperialism by bringing the racialized victims Amerika's Empire into the fold. Extending what legal studies scholar Aziz Rana calls "national security citizenship," Bill Clinton invited Muslims into the Democratic coalition provided they support the aggression against Muslims justified by the War on Terror. "If you're a Muslim and you love America and freedom and you hate terror," Clinton offered during his 2016 Democratic National Convention speech, "stay here and help us win and make a future together."⁴⁷ By this logic, the humanity of Muslims will only be recognized insofar as they cooperate in the dehumanization of other Muslims – classic Anglo-Saxon logic. This same Anglo-Saxon logic is manifest in rhetoric of the party's presidential nominee, Hillary Clinton, who told Goldman Sachs in a private speech that, if elected, she would enforce a no-fly zone in Syria knowing it would "kill a lot of Syrians" and then turned around and declared at the Democratic National Convention that "America is great – because America is good."⁴⁸ The only way these two utterances can be reconciled is by placing them within the long history of Anglo-Saxon exceptionalism. Thus, we should not be fooled when liberals like Obama, Clinton, or Coates position themselves as the progressive alternative to Trump's white supremacy, for if my arguments in Chapters III and VI are correct, then their program is simply a veiled but equally insidious white supremacy designed to obscure its own imperial mechanisms.

In his reflections on the long history of imperialized integration, Tommy J. Curry concludes that "The danger of citizenship was that it gave to Blacks a freedom to participate in America's colonial imperialist drive toward empire."⁴⁹ Fortunately, recent political movements have emerged that seek to revive the anticolonial tradition in Amerikan public policymaking. On the one hand, there is the Black Alliance for Peace, organized by Du Boisian activist Ajamu Baraka, which "seeks to recapture and redevelop the historic anti-war, anti-imperialist, and pro-peace positions of the radical black movement" and works "to oppose both militarized domestic

state repression, and the policies of de-stabilization, subversion and the permanent war agenda of the U.S. state globally.” Rejecting the “high-sounding proclamations of liberalism and enlightenment thought,” Black Alliance for Peace “concentrate[s] its efforts on not only opposing the U.S. war agenda globally but the war and repression being waged on Black and Brown communities domestically.”⁵⁰ On the other hand, there is the Movement for Black Lives, “a collective of more than 50 organizations representing thousands of Black people from across the country,” which “demand[s] an end to the wars against Black people.” While the coalition focuses on domestic policies, such as economic justice and an end to the neocolonial police state, it situates its activity within a broader anti-imperialist vision. “We stand in solidarity with our international family against the ravages of global capitalism and anti-Black racism, human-made climate change, war, and exploitation,” the platform reads. “We also stand with descendants of African people all over the world in an ongoing call and struggle for reparations for the historic and continuing harms of colonialism and slavery. We also recognize and honor the rights and struggle of our Indigenous family for land and self-determination.”⁵¹ The demands of Black Alliance for Peace and the Movement for Black Lives are, therefore, anathema to the continued colonial violence and exploitation perpetuated by the hands of the two-party imperialist machine. Anticolonial politics in the twenty-first century must follow the legacy of Delany, Du Bois, and Cleaver in developing independent means to political organization and revolutionary action.

Anticolonial Futures

In addition to providing a novel framework for reinterpreting American domestic and foreign policy, African anticolonialism must pursue its future development in two ways: first, it must engage in dialogue with other academic discourses that are also concerned with colonialism and

imperialism, especially Anglo-Saxonism; and second, it must continue to develop its own political theory.

On the one hand, Pan-African anticolonialism can and should build constructive dialogues with other fields of colonial studies, including postcolonialism, the decolonial tradition of Latin American philosophy, and settler colonialism studies. Though I criticized postcolonial theory in Chapter II, my criticisms were primarily directed at the later iterations of the tradition, which are saturated with references to Foucault and Derrida. But a return to early postcolonialism, specifically Hamza Alavi's "The State in Post-Colonial Societies: Pakistan and Bangladesh" (1972), might yield fruitful results, for Alavi was concerned with understanding the relationships between the native bourgeois classes, the native landholding classes, and the former colonial power. Similar to a neocolonial analysis, Alavi argues that the colonized bourgeoisie collaborates with the former colonial power but does not become a part of the colonial bourgeois class, partly because it remains in a subordinate position.⁵² Likewise, the decolonial tradition has much in common with the Africana anticolonial tradition, which is suggested by my use of María Lugones's "Toward a Decolonial Feminism" in Chapter V. Further investigations should seek to understand the possible connections between, on the one hand, the colonial ontology of Empire and Anibal Quijano's notion of "coloniality" and, on the other hand, the Africana emphasis on Black thinkers and Walter D. Mignolo's emphasis on the historical legacy of Latin American resistance to colonialism.⁵³ Finally, the recent emergence of settler colonialism studies has opened new pathways for interrogating the nature of colonialism. Whereas I have referred to colonialism as one type of phenomenon, settler colonialism studies distinguishes between *colonialism*, which is defined as the classic political imposition of one nation onto another people, and *settler colonialism*, which never decolonizes but in fact naturalizes the presence of

the colonials.⁵⁴ As a part of this naturalization, settler colonials pursue what Patrick Wolfe calls “the elimination of the native,” which refers to what I have called assimilation and elimination (particularly genocide).⁵⁵ Given their similar concerns, anticolonial theory could work with (old school) postcolonial theorists, decolonial scholars, and the emerging field of settler colonial studies to develop new insights into colonial history and the colonial present.

On the other hand, anticolonial theory is also poised to contribute new perspectives to the disparate field of what might be termed Imperialism Studies. Beginning with the work of William Appleman Williams and his “Wisconsin School” colleagues at the University of Wisconsin, Madison in the 1950s, studies of U.S. imperialism have sought to collapse the distinction between American foreign and domestic policy and situate them within a long-term trajectory of Empire. Williams’s *The Tragedy of American Diplomacy* opened a new focus of historians of the late-twentieth century. Decades later, Williams’s work would be developed by political scientist Chalmers Johnson, historian Andrew Bacevich, and American Studies scholars Amy Kaplan and Donald E. Pease, most notably their 1993 collection *Cultures of United States Imperialism*. After the start of the War on Terror, historian Alfred W. McCoy and his colleagues revived the spirit of Williams’s “Wisconsin School” through the “Empires in Transition” project, a collaborative program that placed America “into the comparative history of world empires.”⁵⁶ The “Empires in Transition” project resulted in several edited volumes on American imperialism, and most recently, McCoy published his *In the Shadow of the American Century*. Despite the growing developments in understanding the American Empire, these studies have almost completely neglected the African tradition of Pan-African Anticolonialism. Amy Kaplan’s *The Anarchy of Empire in the Making of U.S. Culture*, for example, gestures toward the anticolonial tradition with its treatment of W. E. B. Du Bois’s *Darkwater* (1920), but its analysis

is not situated within the longer history of Pan-Africanism.⁵⁷ Not only could an anticolonial intervention in to Imperialism Studies change the dynamics of anti-imperial scholarship, it could also move the discussion back toward the colonial logic that underlies every institution of the Amerikan Empire.

In addition to making contributions to the scholarship on colonialism and imperialism in general, anticolonialism should place its efforts into investigations of Anglo-Saxonism, a project that can help dismantle the ridiculous notion of Amerikan Exceptionalism. As I have shown, Reginald Horsman's *Race and Manifest Destiny* is a foundational text for drawing the connections between Anglo-Saxonist ideologies and Amerikan imperialism, but anticolonial analysis must rethink the history of the United States in particular and the history of the West in general. While most scholars and laypersons tend to treat Western history as a pluralistic set of loosely connected nation-states and therefore and independent and conceptually distinct projects, anticolonialism has the ability to reveal the deep colonial logic that lies at the heart of the modern Western project. It is widely accepted the Nazi movement and its genocidal policies of racial purity and its violent militaristic expansionism are the paradigmatic manifestation of evil. Because the United States fought against the Nazis in World War II, it is often thought that Nazism and Amerikanism are diametrically opposed, each one standing as the complete antithesis of the other. But when both Amerikanism and Nazism are viewed from an anticolonial perspective, it becomes possible to see the shared origins and logics of these ostensible opposites. Historically speaking, Horsman shows that the Anglo-Saxons looked to Tacitus's *Germania*, an ancient text describing the ancient Germanic peoples as "free," as the source of their racial stock and cultural traditions. In *A Most Dangerous Book: Tacitus's Germania from the Roman Empire to the Third Reich*, Christopher B. Krebs traces the uses of Tacitus's writings

from early modern German nationalism to the Nazis.⁵⁸ According to Krebs, the mythology of a ancient and free Germanic people motivated German nationalism right through the Holocaust. That same myth also motivated the Anglo-Saxons through their elimination of the Native Americans and into their twentieth-century imperial endeavors. Thus, it should not be surprising, as James Q. Whitman demonstrates in *Hitler's American Model: The United States and the Making of Nazi Race Law*, that the Nazi's modeled their racial policies on the immigration laws, segregation laws, and eliminatory logic of the United States.⁵⁹ Fanon, Du Bois, and other anticolonial theorists were arguing this in the 1940s and 50s, and contemporary scholarship is only now catching up with them.⁶⁰ Thus, anticolonialism has much work to do in exposing the fascistic nature of the colonial ontology of Empire, especially as it has been expressed in the Amerikan Empire.

Finally, anticolonialism must ultimately grapple with the later work of Huey P. Newton and his theory of Intercommunalism. In its early days, the Black Panther Party operated under the assumption that Black people in the United States were a domestic colony, standing in a colonial relation to the white Mother Country, but by 1971, Newton had abandoned the language of internal colonialism in favor his theory of Intercommunalism. According to Newton, there were two principle reasons that Black people were not a colonized people. On the one hand, Black people were not deprived of sovereignty over the land they had always lived upon; they were "forced transplants" brought from Africa to North Amerika, which meant they could not merely "decolonize" to regain their sovereignty and their freedom.⁶¹ On the other hand, there were no such things as nations any longer; rather than consisting of mutually recognized sovereign nations, the world system consisted of the (Amerikan) Empire and a variety of communities subjected to its political, economic, and military power.⁶² From this perspective,

Newton concludes, the aim of the revolutionary should be to oppose reactionary intercommunalism (elite-controlled U.S. imperialism) and bring about revolutionary intercommunalism (a cooperative global socialist system). Newton argues that Intercommunalism is distinct from Pan-Africanism, which he criticizes for being “Black capitalism” on a global scale, but this is only because he equated George Padmore’s Pan-Africanism with Pan-Africanism as such. To be sure, in the closing pages of *Pan-Africanism or Communism*, Padmore does solicit the help of Western capitalists in general and the United States in particular, but as I have argued, there is a strain of Pan-Africanist socialism that runs through thinkers like Du Bois and Fanon that avoids Newton’s concerns.⁶³ In fact, the sort of Pan-African anticolonialism offered here was been socialist by necessity, for it assumes that colonial and class relations are structural manifestations of the capitalist colonial ontology of Empire. Nevertheless, insofar as Newton’s puzzling commitment to standard the Marxist language of class conflict, capitalism’s “inevitable” demise, and a universal working people’s movement can be avoided, his more important observation regarding the global ubiquity of Amerikan Empire would be a useful addition to the anticolonial repertoire provided in the preceding chapters.

As he stepped foot onto the soil – his hand clasped on his cane, his eyes squinting to ward off the hot West African sun – the elderly man of ninety-three wondered in a silent curiosity what futures his journey had made possible. For a Black man living in the mid-twentieth century, traversing the Atlantic Ocean aroused in him contentment, for because he was traveling from New York to West Africa as a free man in the winter of 1961 and not from West Africa to the New World as a prisoner in 1700, he could not elude the historical symbolism of his situation. Having briefly escaped the clutches of a global Anglo-Saxon empire, the anguished souls of the

African victims of colonialism resting in the soil below his feet, W. E. B. Du Bois reflected on his destination – the free state of Ghana, where he went “to witness the last act (or the first?) of a great world drama.”⁶⁴ By this time, Du Bois’s vocal criticism of Amerika’s Cold War neocolonialism and his demands for global peace and economic security had earned him a spot on government watch lists. Because empires cannot tolerate opposition coming from their own “citizens,” the U.S. government systematically harassed Du Bois and monitored his activities and contacts. Having been persecuted and prosecuted in the land of his birth, he decided to return to the land of his ancestors. “Today, the United States is fighting world progress,” Du Bois had proclaimed several years prior, “progress which must be towards socialism and against colonialism.”⁶⁵ For decades, Black anticolonial activists and intellectuals inside and outside the U.S. had struggled against colonialism, and for the next two decades, they would continue those struggles. But the Amerikan Empire refused to go down without a fight, and in an effort to put an end to its anticolonial rivals, it initiated a series of militaristic campaigns at home and abroad, resulting in the subjugation and death of untold numbers. Du Bois had the luxury of dying in his sleep in Accra, but most of his anticolonial comrades were not so fortunate. Many were – and *are* – executed in the streets. Many have died – and *continue to die* – in prison. But it is for this reason that we must look for ideas, strategies, and inspiration not in Europe, but deep within the heart of Anticolonial Amerika.

NOTES

Chapter I: Introduction

¹ Charles W. Mills, *Black Rights/White Wrongs: The Critique of Racial Liberalism* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2017), 200.

² William A. Williams, "The Frontier Thesis and American Foreign Policy" *Pacific Historical Review* 24 (1955), 379

³ Taken from W. E. B. Du Bois, *The Souls of Black Folk: A Norton Critical Edition*, ed. Henry Louis Gates, Jr. and Terri Hume Oliver (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1999), 17 and also 33. The original statement is in W. E. B. Du Bois, "To the Nations of the World," in *The Oxford W. E. B. Du Bois Reader*, ed. Eric Sundquist (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), 625.

⁴ This dramatized account, and the remaining discussion, of the origins of Pan-Africanism and its connection to anticolonialism is based on the following works: J. R. Hooker, *Henry Sylvester Williams: Imperial Pan-Africanist* (London: Rex Collings, 1975); Markia Sherwood, *Origins of Pan-Africanism: Henry Sylvester Williams, Africa, and the African Diaspora* (New York: Routledge, 2011); George Padmore, *Pan-Africanism or Communism* (New York: Anchor Books, 1972); Markia Sherwood, "Pan-African Conferences, 1900-1953: What did 'Pan-Africanism' Mean?," *The Journal of Pan African Studies* 4.10 (2012): 106-126; David Levering Lewis, *W. E. B. Du Bois: Biography of a Race, 1868-1919* (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1993); David Levering Lewis, *W. E. B. Du Bois: The Fight for Equality and the American Century, 1919-1963* (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 2000); W. E. B. Du Bois, *The Autobiography of W. E. B. Du Bois: A Soliloquy on Viewing My Life from the Last Decade of Its First Century* (New York: International Publishers, 1968); Anthony Ratcliff, "The Radical Evolution of Du Boisian Pan-Africanism," *Journal of Pan-African Studies* 5.9 (2013): 151-170; George Shepperson, "Notes on Negro American Influences on the Emergence of African Nationalism," *The Journal of African History* 1.2 (1960): 299-312; and Jesse Weaver Shipley and Jemima Pierre, "The Intellectual and Pragmatic Legacy of Du Bois's Pan-Africanism in Contemporary Ghana," in *Re-Cognizing W. E. B. Du Bois in the Twenty-First Century: Essays on W. E. B. Du Bois*, ed. Mary Keller and Chester J. Fontenot, Jr. (Macon, GA: Mercer University Press, 2007), 61-87. However, it is important to note that the historical picture is far more complicated. For example, see Harold Cruse, "Revolutionary Nationalism and the Afro-American" and "Behind the Black Power Slogan," in *Rebellion or Revolution?* (New York: William Morrow & Company, 1968); T. Denean Sharpley-Whiting, "Femme négritude: Jane Nardal, *La Dépêche africaine*, and the Francophone New Negro," *Souls* 2.4 (2000): 8-17; T. Denean Sharpley-Whiting, *Négritude Women* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2002); and Frantz Fanon, "West Indians and Africans," in *Toward the African Revolution*, trans. Haakon Chevalier (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1967). On the U.S. and Britain as Anglo-Saxon empires in 1900, see Iestyn Adams, *Brothers Across the Ocean: British Foreign Policy and the Origins of the Anglo-American "Special Relationship" 1900-1905* (New York: Tauris Academic Studies, 2005).

⁵ Padmore, *Pan-Africanism or Communism*, 83-163; Frantz Fanon, *Toward the African Revolution*, trans. Haakon Chevalier (New York: Grove Press, 1967), 170-190; Kwame Nkrumah, *Africa Must Unite* (London: PANAFA, 1963); Guy Martin, *African Political Thought* (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2012), 55-69; and Sabelo Sibanda, "Pan-Africanism and Afrikan Nationalism: Putting the Afrikan Nation in Context," in *Pan-Africanism/Afrikan Nationalism: Strengthening the Unity of Africa and Its Diaspora*, ed. B. F. Bankie and K. Mchombu (Trenton, NJ: The Red Sea Press, Inc., 2008), 237-249.

⁶ The reader may, no doubt, be confused by the spelling "Amerika." This spelling was popularized in the 1960s among the counterculture and the New Left, and I think it is appropriate to use in this context. The Amerika that I refer to in this thesis is not the America that most people imagine: the latter is the fictional land of the free and the home of the brave, while the former is the land of the corporate elite and the home of the war profiteers. But the difference in spelling is not meant to denote a mere reversal designed to produce a rational response from the reader. I have in mind something more like the Situationist International's method of *détournement*: "The distortions introduced in the detoured elements must be as simplified as possible, since the main impact of a *détournement* is

directly related to the conscious or semiconscious recollection of the original contexts of the elements” (17). Thus, replacing “America” with “Amerika” follows the “two fundamental laws of détournement”: the original meaning is displaced, but at the same time it is changed through its dialectical relation with the new object and the new context (67). Guy Dabord and Gil Wolman, “A User’s Guide to *Détournement*” in *Situationist International Anthology*, Revised and Expanded, ed. Ken Knabb (Berkeley, CA: Bureau of Public Secrets, 2006). Plus George Jackson did it.

⁷ W. E. B. Du Bois, *Dusk of Dawn* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014), 48.

⁸ W. E. B. Du Bois, “American Negroes and Africa’s Rise to Freedom,” in *The World and Africa and Color and Democracy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 215-218; W. E. B. Du Bois, “Whites in Africa After Negro Autonomy,” in *The Oxford W. E. B. Du Bois Reader*, ed. Eric J. Sundquist (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), 667-675; W. E. B. Du Bois, “An Address to the Black Academic Community,” *The Journal of Negro History* 60.1 (1975): 45-52; and W. E. B. Du Bois, *In Battle for Peace: The Story of my 83rd Birthday* (New York: Masses & Mainstream, 1952).

⁹ Edward J. Blum, *Reforging the White Republic: Race, Religion, and American Nationalism, 1865-1898, Updated Edition* (Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State University Press, 2015), 237-243; Betina M. Johnson, “African-Americans and American Foreign Policy: Voices in the Wilderness: The Role and Influences of African-American Citizens in the Development and Formation of Foreign Policy 1919-1944,” *The Journal of Pan African Studies* 1.8 (2007): 33-51; Mary L. Dudziak, *Cold War Civil Rights: Race and the Image of American Democracy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001); Penny M. Von Eschen, *Race Against Empire: Black Americans and Anticolonialism, 1937-1957* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1997); Lindsey R. Swindall, *The Path to the Greater, Freer, Truer World: Southern Civil Rights and Anticolonialism, 1937-1955* (Gainesville, FL: University Press of Florida, 2014); Cathy Bergin, ed., *African American Anti-Colonial Thought, 1917-1937* (Edinburgh, UK: Edinburgh University Press, 2016); and Du Bois, *The Autobiography of W. E. B. Du Bois*, 361-395.

¹⁰ Von Eschen, *Race Against Empire*, 3.

¹¹ Von Eschen, *Race Against Empire*, 149-150; Kevin Gaines, “E. Franklin Frazier’s Revenge: Anticolonialism, Nonalignment, and Black Intellectuals’ Critiques of Western Culture,” *American Literary History* 17.3 (2005): 506-529.

¹² E. Franklin Frazier, *Black Bourgeoisie* (New York: Free Press, 1997), 112, 173.

¹³ Frazier, *Black Bourgeoisie*, 192.

¹⁴ Frazier, *Black Bourgeoisie*, 191.

¹⁵ E. Franklin Frazier, “The Failure of the Negro Intellectual,” in *The Death of White Sociology*, ed. Joyce Ladner (New York: Random House, 1973), 9.

¹⁶ Frazier, “Failure,” 65.

¹⁷ Sterling Stuckey, *The Ideological Origins of Black Nationalism* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1972); Charles Pinderhughes, “Toward a New Theory of Internal Colonialism,” *Socialism and Democracy* 25:1 (2011): 235-256; W. E. B. Du Bois, “A Negro Nation Within the Nation,” in *The Oxford W. E. B. Du Bois Reader*, ed. Eric J. Sundquist (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), 431-438.

¹⁸ Malcolm X, “The American Negro: Problems and Solutions (March 24, 1961),” in *Collected Speeches, Debates & Interviews, 1960-1965*, ed. Sandeep S. Atwal (2015) 63; Malcolm X, “After the Firebombing (February 14, 1965),” in *Collected Speeches, Debates & Interviews, 1960-1965*, ed. Sandeep S. Atwal, (2015), 1100; Harold Cruse, “Revolutionary Nationalism and the Afro-American,” in *Rebellion or Revolution?* (New York: William Morrow & Company, 1968), 76.

¹⁹ Eldridge Cleaver, "Revolution in the White Mother Country and National Liberation in the Black Colony," *The North American Review* 253.4 (1968), 13.

²⁰ To be sure, there is a difference between the early Black Panthers (approximately 1966-1971) and the later Black Panthers (approximately 1971-1976), and if the domestic colonialism thesis is an important part of the earlier period Panther theories, then Intercommunalism replaces it in the later period. According to Intercommunalism, the Black community cannot be a colony because there are no more colonies or nation-states. The U.S. represents the power center of a global Empire, and all other territories are communities within that Empire. While Intercommunalism does not rely on the domestic colonialism thesis, it is clearly a modification and an extension of anticolonial thought. See Erik H. Erikson and Huey P. Newton, *In Search of Common Ground: Conversations with Erik H. Erikson and Huey P. Newton* (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1973).

²¹ Kenneth Clark, *Dark Ghetto: Dilemmas of Social Power* (New York: Harper & Row, 1965).

²² Robert L. Allen, *Black Awakening in Capitalist America: An Analytic History* (Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press, 1992).

²³ Robert Blauner, "Internal Colonialism and Ghetto Revolt," *Social Problems* 16.4 (1969): 393-408; Robert Blauner, *Racial Oppression in America* (New York: Harper & Row, 1972); and Robert Blauner, *Still Big in the News: Racial Oppression in America* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2001).

²⁴ Joyce Ladner, ed., *The Death of White Sociology* (New York: Random House, 1973).

²⁵ Taking the domestic colonialism thesis beyond the boundaries of Black America, Pablo Gonzalez Casanova constructed a sociological model for analyzing the "internal" colonies of indigenous peoples in Latin America. Over the following decades, Gonzalez Casanova's essay became a foundational text for scholars using the notion of domestic colonialism in Chicano and Latin American studies. See C. Wright Mills, "The Problem of Industrial Development," in *Power, Politics, & People: The Collected Essays of C. Wright Mills*, ed. Irving Louis Horowitz (New York: Oxford University Press, 1963); Pablo Gonzalez Casanova, "Internal Colonialism and National Development," *Studies in International Comparative Development* 1.4 (1965): 27-37. For work on Chicanos, see Rodolfo Acuña, *Occupied America: The Chicano Struggle Toward Liberation* (New York: Harper & Row, 1972); Mario Barrera, Carlos Muñoz, and Charles Ornelas, "The Barrio as an Internal Colony," in *People and Politics in Urban Society*, Vol. 6, ed. Harlan Hahn (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications, 1972), 465-498; and Mario Barrera, *Race and Class in the South West: A Theory of Racial Inequality* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1979). For Latin America more generally, see Andre Gunder Frank, *Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America: Historical Studies of Chile and Brazil* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1967); Rodolfo Stavenhagen, "Classes, Colonialism, and Acculturation," in *Masses in Latin America*, ed. Irving Louis Horowitz (New York: Oxford University Press, 1970), 235-288; A. Eugene Havens and William L. Flinn (eds.), *Internal Colonialism and Structural Change in Columbia* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1970); and Nelson Maldonado-Torres, "Colonialism, Neocolonialism, Internal Colonialism, the Postcolonial, Coloniality, and Decoloniality," in *Critical Terms in Caribbean and Latin American Thought: Historical and Institutional Trajectories*, ed. Yolanda Martínez-San Miguel, Ben. Sifuentes-Jáuegui, and Marisa Belausteguigoitia (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016). For the Celts, see Michael Hechter, *Internal Colonialism: The Celtic Fringe in British National Development* (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1999). Several scholars have already created extensive bibliographies covering the vast literature in other areas of study. See Robert J. Hind, "The Internal Colonial Concept," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 26.3 (1984): 543-568; Jack Hicks, "On the Application of the 'Internal Colonial' Metaphor to Inuit Societies" (paper presented at the Western regional Science Association conference, Santa Fe, New Mexico, February 23-25, 2006); John R. Chavez, "Aliens in Their Native Lands: The Persistence of Internal Colonial Theory," *Journal of World History* 22.4 (2011): 785-809; and Pinderhughes, "Toward a New Theory of Internal Colonialism."

²⁶ See *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, Volume 2, Issue 3, July 1979. Internal colonialism was a reoccurring theme in this journal, both before and after this special issue.

²⁷ Huey P. Newton, *War Against the Panthers: A Study of Repression in America* (Baltimore, MD: Black Classics Press, 1996). Rod Bush reiterates this point well: “J. Edgar Hoover and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) had made their point rather well. Those Black people who identified with and attempted to unite with the ideals, sentiments, and practices of the revolutionaries of the three continents should realize that they would be subjected to the same lethal disincentives that U.S. imperialism’s iron fist offered to its Third World opponents. Malcolm X, George Jackson, Fred Hampton, Alprentice Bunchy Carter, Jonathan Jackson and even Martin Luther King Jr. were all victims of U.S. imperialism’s iron fist.” See Rod Bush, “The Revival of Black Nationalism and the Crisis of Liberal Universalism,” in *The Quest for Community and Identity: Critical Essays in Africana Social Philosophy*, ed. Robert E. Birt (New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2002), 162.

²⁸ Radley Balko, *Rise of the Warrior Cop: The Militarization of America’s Police Forces* (New York: PublicAffairs, 2013).

²⁹ Dan Baum, “Legalize It All: How To Win the War on Drugs,” *Harper’s Magazine*, April 2016, 22.

³⁰ Copies of Lewis Powell’s memo can be found online. David Harvey, *A Brief History of Neoliberalism* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 43-44. See also Marc Bousquet, *How the University Works: Higher Education and the Low-Wage Nation* (New York: New York University Press, 2008); C. Wright Mills, *The Power Elite* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000); and Patrick Anderson, *Bedtime for Democracy: The Power Elite as Sovereign Aristocracy in Neoliberal Amerika* (master’s thesis, Texas A&M University, 2016).

³¹ Martha Biondi, *The Black Revolution on Campus* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2012), 250.

³² Ibram H. Rogers, *The Black Campus Movement: Black Students and the Racial Reconstitution of Higher Education, 1965-1972* (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2012); Noliwe M. Rooks, *White Money/Black Power: The Surprising History of African American Studies and the Crisis of Race in Higher Education* (Boston: Beacon Press, 2006); Fabio Rojas, *From Black Power to Black Studies: How a Radical Social Movement Became an Academic Discipline* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2007); Khadijah Costley White, “Fade From Black: Becoming Africana,” *Journal of Pan African Studies* 6.10 (2014): 185-208; Hortense J. Spillers, “The Crisis of the Negro Intellectual: A Post-Date,” *boundary 2* 21.3 (1994): 65-116; Stephen C. Ferguson II, *Philosophy of African American Studies: Nothing Left of Blackness* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015); Biondi, *The Black Revolution on Campus*.

In addition to Black Studies, Black theory in general has been suppressed. See Leonard Harris, “Believe It or

³³ Robert L. Allen, “Politics of the Attack on Black Studies,” *The Black Scholar* 6.1 (1974), 5.

³⁴ The connection between political repression and intellectual repression is not as tenuous as it may seem on the surface. For example, Robert L. Allen was placed on the FBI’s “Security Index,” which he describes as “as secret list of people who were to be arrested and detained by the FBI in case of a ‘national security emergency.’” He was not placed on this list for only activist reasons; rather, the FBI had also read and summarized *Black Awakening in Capitalist America*, which led Allen to conclude that “the FBI considered what black intellectuals were writing and doing as dangerous enough to warrant keeping track of – progressive writers journalists, and scholars.” See Allen, “Forty Years Later: Reflections on the Writing of *Black Awakening in Capitalist America*,” *The Black Scholar* 40.2 (2010), 6-7.

³⁵ Allen, *Black Awakening*, 227-231.

³⁶ Perkins, W. Eric, and J. E. Higginson. “Black Students: Reformists or Revolutionaries?” In *The New American Revolution*, edited by Roderick Aya and Norman Miller, 195-222. New York: The Free Press, 1971. Quote 197-198

³⁷ Turner, James, and W. Eric Perkins. “Towards a Critique of Social Science.” *The Black Scholar* 7.7 (1976), 7.

³⁸ Harold Cruse, "The Integrationist Ethic as a Basis for Scholarly Endeavors," in *Black Studies in the University: A Symposium*, ed. Armstead L. Robinson, Craig C. Foster, and Donald H. Ogilvie (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1969), 4-12.

³⁹ William R. Jones, "The Legitimacy and Necessity of Black Philosophy: Some Preliminary Considerations," *Philosophical Forum* IX (1977-78): 149-60; William R. Jones, "The Crisis in Philosophy: The Black Presence," *Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association XLVII* (1973-74): 118-25; Curry, "The Derelictical Crisis of African American Philosophy"; Curry, "On Derelict and Method"; and Tommy J. Curry, "Beyond the Heuristic Posit: William R. Jones and the 'Legitimacy and Necessity of Black Philosophy' Reconsidered towards a More Radical End," *APA Newsletter: Philosophy and the Black Experience* 13.1 (2013): 15-19.

⁴⁰ Robert E. Birt, "Introduction," in *The Quest for Community and Identity: Critical Essays in Africana Social Philosophy* (New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2002), 10.

⁴¹ Anthony Bogues, *Black Heretics, Black Prophets: Radical Political Intellectuals* (New York: Routledge, 2003); Michael Hanchard, *Party/Politics: Horizons in Black Political Thought* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006); and Maurice St. Pierre, *Eric Williams and the Anticolonial Tradition: The Making of a Diasporan Intellectual* (Charlottesville, VA: University of Virginia Press, 2015).

⁴² Bernard Boxill *Blacks & Social Justice, Revised Edition* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1992), 66-68; Charles W. Mills, *Blackness Visible: Essays on Philosophy and Race* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998), 120; Michael C. Dawson, *Black Visions: The Roots of Contemporary African-America Political Ideologies* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001), 97; Tommie Shelby, *We Who Are Dark: The Philosophical Foundations of Black Solidarity* (Cambridge: The Belknap Press, 2005), 106.

⁴³ For those who mention the domestic colonialism thesis only in passing, see John P. Pittman (ed.), *African-American Perspectives and Philosophical Traditions* (New York: Routledge, 1997); Lewis R. Gordon, *Her Majesty's Other Children: Sketches of Racism from a Neocolonial Age* (New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1997); Cathy J. Cohen, *The Boundaries of Blackness: AIDS and the Breakdown of Black Politics* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999), though she cites two articles on it, she does not discuss it; and Ricky K. Green, *Voices in Black Political Thought* (New York: Peter Lang, 2005). For an example of a Marxist version of the domestic colonialism thesis, see Lucius T. Outlaw's "On Race and Class (Or, On the Prospects of 'Rainbow Socialism')," in *Critical Social Theory in the Interests of Black Folks* (New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2005), 61-79.

While there is a tendency to reduce Pan-African anticolonialism to Marxist anticolonialism, it is important to maintain this distinction. For more on this distinction, see George Padmore, *Pan-Africanism or Communism*; Harold Cruse, *The Crisis of the Negro Intellectual: From Its Origins to the Present* (New York: William Morrow & Company, 1967); Kwame Nkrumah, *The Spectre of Black Power* (Bedford, UK: Panaf Books, 1968); Cedric J. Robinson, *Black Marxism: The Making of the Black Radical Tradition* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1983); Kwame Nimako, "Nkrumah, African Awakening and Neo-colonialism," *The Black Scholar* 40.2 (2010): 54-70; Robert Staples, "Race and Colonialism: The Domestic Case in Theory and Practice," *The Black Scholar* 7.9 (1976): 37-48; Gail Omvedt, "Towards a Theory of Colonialism," *Critical Sociology* 3 (1973): 1-24; and Patrick Anderson, "Pan-Africanism and Economic Nationalism: W. E. B. Du Bois's *Black Reconstruction* and the Failings of the 'Black Marxism' Thesis," *Journal of Black Studies* 48.8 (2017): 732-757.

⁴⁴ Cruse, *Crisis of the Negro Intellectual*, 223, 320.

⁴⁵ Sampie Terreblanche, *Western Empires, Christianity, and the Inequalities Between the West and the Rest, 1500-2010* (Johannesburg: Penguin Books, 2014), 3.

⁴⁶ Anthony Bogue, "Radical Anti-Colonial Thought, Anti-Colonial Internationalism, and the Politics of Human Solidarities," in *International Relations and Non-Western Thought: Imperialism, Colonialism, and Investigations of Global Modernity*, ed. Robbie Shilliam (New York: Routledge, 2011), 211.

⁴⁷ Ngūgĩ wa Thiong'o, *Something Torn and New: An African Renaissance* (New York: BasicCivitas Books, 2009), xi.

⁴⁸ See also Kathleen Wilson, "Introduction: Histories, Empires, Modernities," in *A New Imperial History: Culture, Identity, and Modernity in Britain and the Empire, 1660-1840*, ed. Kathleen Wilson (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 1-26.

⁴⁹ Terreblanche, *Western Empires*, 63-66.

⁵⁰ Terreblanche, *Western Empires*, 65.

⁵¹ Terreblanche, *Western Empires*, 114-115.

⁵² H. V. Bowen, "British Conceptions of Global Empire, 1756-1783," *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* 26.3 (1998): 1-27.

⁵³ Michael W. Doyle, *Empires* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1986), 258-275; Jane Burbank and Frederick Cooper, *Empires in World History: Power and the Politics of Difference* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010), 293-294.

⁵⁴ P. Eric Louw, *Roots of Pax Americana: Decolonization, Development, Democratization, and Trade* (New York: Manchester University Press, 2010), 135-169

⁵⁵ Henry Veltmeyer puts it nicely: "The United States still serves as the major source of imperial power, particularly in its political and military dimensions, but also economic. It is the United States state that backdrops the institutions of economic power, paving the way for the operations of these institutions and creating the facilitating conditions." Qtd. in Terreblanche, *Western Empires*, 72. And Terreblanche adds, "There is no longer pressure on the USA to behave in exemplary ways in the international arena. When the track-laying vehicle in empire building does not give moral leadership, then the military power of the empire building country becomes a danger to itself and to the rest of the world." *Western Empires*, 506.

⁵⁶ K. R. Dark and A. L. Harris, *The New World and the New World Order: US Relative Decline, Domestic Instability in the Americas, and the End of the Cold War* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996), 3; Charles S. Maier, *Against Empire: American Ascendancy and Its Predecessors* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2006), 69.

⁵⁷ Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, *Empire* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2001), xiii-xiv.

⁵⁸ Alfred W. McCoy, *In the Shadows of the American Century: The Rise and Decline of US Global Power* (Chicago: Haymarket Books, 2017), 21.

⁵⁹ Peter Gowan, "Forward," in Vassilis K. Fouskas and Bülent Gökay, *The New American Imperialism: Bush's War on Terror and Blood for Oil* (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2005), ix.

⁶⁰ Terreblanche, *Western Empires*, 116.

⁶¹ Chalmers Johnson, *Blowback: The Costs and Consequences of American Empire* (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 2004); Chalmers Johnson, *The Sorrows of Empire: Militarism, Secrecy, and the End of the Republic* (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 2004); Chalmers Johnson, *Nemesis: The Last Days of the American Empire* (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 2006); William Blum, *Killing Hope: U.S. Military and CIA Interventions Since World War II*, revised edition (Monroe, ME: Common Courage Press, 2003); William Blum, *Freeing the World to Death: Essays on the American Empire* (Monroe, ME: Common Courage Press, 2004); William Blum,

Rogue State: A Guide to the World's Only Superpower (Monroe, ME: Common Courage Press, 2005); William Blum, *America's Deadliest Export: Democracy – The Truth About US Foreign Policy and Everything Else* (New York: Zed Books, 2013); Carl Boggs, *Imperial Delusions: American Militarism and Endless War* (New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2005); Carl Boggs, *The Crimes of Empire: Rogue Superpower and World Domination* (New York: Pluto Press, 2010); Carl Boggs, *Empire Versus Democracy: The Triumph of Corporate and Military Power* (New York: Routledge, 2011).

⁶² Andrew J. Bacevich, *American Empire: The Realities and Consequences of U.S. Diplomacy* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2002).

⁶³ Ronald W. Cox, "Corporate Finance and US Foreign Policy," in *Corporate Power and Globalization in US Foreign Policy*, ed. Ronald W. Cox (New York: Routledge, 2012), 11-30; Ronald W. Cox and G. Nelson Bass, "The Foreign Policy of Organized Labor in the Context of Globalization," in *Corporate Power and Globalization in US Foreign Policy*, ed. Ronald W. Cox (New York: Routledge, 2012), 56-78; Susanne Soederberg, *The Politics of the New International Financial Architecture: Reimposing Neoliberal Domination in the Global South* (New York: Zed Books, 2004).

⁶⁴ Steve Coll, *Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and Bin Laden, from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001* (New York: Penguin Books, 2004); Thomas W. Walker, *Nicaragua: Living in the Shadow of the Eagle*, Fourth Edition (Cambridge: Westview Press, 2003); Nick Cullather, *Secret History: The CIA's Classified Account of Its Operations in Guatemala, 1952-1954*, Second Edition (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2006); Thomas G. Patterson, *Contesting Castro: The United States and the Triumph of the Cuban Revolution* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994); Oscar Guardiola-Rivera, *Story of a Death Foretold: The Coup Against Salvador Allende, September 11, 1973* (New York: Bloomsbury Press, 2013); Gary A. Donaldson, *America at War Since 1945: Politics and Diplomacy in Korea, Vietnam, and the Gulf War* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1996); Ann Rogers and John Hill, *Unmanned: Drone Warfare and Global Security* (Toronto: Between the Lines, 2014); Jeremy Scahill, *Dirty Wars: The World is a Battle Field* (New York: Nation Books, 2013); Chalmers Johnson, *Dismantling the Empire: America's Last Nest Hope* (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 2010), 109-132; Tudor A. Owen, *US Foreign Policy in the Post-Cold War Era: Restraint versus Assertiveness from George H. W. Bush to Barack Obama* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013).

⁶⁵ Robert Dallek, *Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy, 1932-1945* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995); Stephen Roskamm Shalom, *Imperial Alibis: Rationalizing U.S. Intervention After the Cold War* (Boston: South End Press, 1993).

⁶⁶ Qtd. in Bacevich, *American Empire*, 26.

⁶⁷ For more on the United States' uses of the IMF, World Bank, proxy wars, CIA coups, and the Reagan Doctrine, see Terreblanche, *Western Empires*, 450, 452, 459, 484, 488, and 497.

⁶⁸ Robert Vitalis, *White World Order, Black Power Politics: The Birth of American International Relations* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2015), 19.

⁶⁹ Boxill *Blacks & Social Justice*; Shelby, *We Who Are Dark*; and Cohen, *The Boundaries of Blackness*. See also Howard McGary, *Race and Social Justice* (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 1999) and *The Post-Racial Ideal* (Milwaukee, WI: Marquette University Press, 2012); Bogues, *Black Heretics, Black Prophets*; Hanchard, *Party/Politics*; and Dawson, *Black Visions*.

⁷⁰ Amy Kaplan, "'Left Alone with America': The Absence of Empire in the Study of American Culture," in *Cultures of United States Imperialism*, ed. Amy Kaplan and Donald E. Pease (Durham: Duke University Press, 1993), 16.

⁷¹ Paul A. Kramer, "Empire, Exceptions, and Anglo-Saxons: Race and Rule between the British and United States Empires, 1880-1910," *The Journal of American History* 88.4 (2002), 1319 [1315-1353]

⁷² Charles W. Mills, *The Racial Contract* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1997), 2.

⁷³ Mills, *Black Rights/White Wrongs*, (191-192); See Charles W. Mills, “The Racial Contract as Methodology (Not Hypothesis),” *Philosophia Africana* 5.2 (2002): 75-99.

⁷⁴ Mills, *Black Rights/White Wrongs*, 202.

⁷⁵ Mills, *Black Rights/White Wrongs*, 14.

⁷⁶ Mills, *Racial Contract*, 92.

⁷⁷ Mills, *Racial Contract*, 5.

⁷⁸ Mills, *Black Rights/White Wrongs*, 82-84.

⁷⁹ Mills, *Black Rights/White Wrongs*, 82-83.

⁸⁰ Mills, *Black Rights/White Wrongs*, 8-9, 206.

⁸¹ Mills, *Black Rights/White Wrongs*, 69.

⁸² Mills, *Black Rights/White Wrongs*, 9.

⁸³ Tommy J. Curry, “Will the Real CRT Please Stand Up? The Dangers of Philosophical Contributions to CRT,” *The Crit: A Critical Legal Studies Journal* 2.1 (2009): 1-47; Curry, “On Derelict and Method.”

⁸⁴ Mills, *Black Rights/White Wrongs*, 203-204.

⁸⁵ W. E. B. Du Bois, *Black Reconstruction in America, 1860-1880* (New York: Free Press, 1992), see “To The Reader.”

⁸⁶ The topic of Kant’s racialism and racism has become the subject of much debate over the last two decades, beginning with Emmanuel Chukwudi Eze’s classic essay “The Color of Reason: The Idea of ‘Race in Kant’s Anthropology” [in *Postcolonial African Philosophy: A Critical Reader*, ed. Emmanuel Chukwudi Eze (Cambridge: Blackwell Publishers, 1997), 103-131]. Mills has, of course, engaged this conversation [See “Kant’s *Untermenschen*,” in Andrew Valls (ed.), *Race and Racism in Modern Philosophy* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2005), 169-193, and reprinted in *Black Rights/White Wrongs*]. Mills, however, holds a contradictory position on the usefulness of Kant’s ethics for a program of racial justice. On the one hand, he presents a spirited defense of the position that Kant’s racial views are indeed not incidental but in fact continuative of Kant’s moral philosophy (“Kant’s *Untermenschen*”); on the other hand, he holds out the possibility that Kant’s moral theory can be “purged of [its] racism” (*Black Rights/White Wrongs* 203). If Mills’s aim is to construct a truly de-racialized deontological ethics, then it would make more sense, even according to Mills’s own arguments, to start somewhere other than Kant. As Mills writes, “the moral and political agenda of those persons not originally seen as full persons will be significantly different from the agenda of those whose personhood has traditionally been uncontested, and we need concepts, theories, and narratives which register this crucial difference” (*Black Rights/White Wrongs* 112). Thus, starting with Kant is puzzling. Furthermore, Mills’s hope that Kant’s ethics can be “corrected” assumes a universality of reason that my historicist and materialist anticolonial approach categorically rejects. While Mills believes that Kant’s denial of moral agency to non-whites depends on the empirical falsehood that non-whites lack reason, my anticolonial approach argues that, while non-whites do have reason, there is no universal structure to reason because, in Frantz Fanon’s terms, the process of sociogeny makes humans the kinds of beings they are, and thus reason takes on different forms in different contexts. On this view, and against Kant (and apparently Mills), a truly de-racialized deontological ethics cannot be grounded in the universal structure of reason, since the latter does not exist. Hopefully my reasoning will be clarified by the argument of Chapter II.

⁸⁷ Anderson, “Pan-Africanism and Economic Nationalism.”

⁸⁸ Mills, *Racial Contract*, 1-3.

⁸⁹ Charles W. Mills, *Radical Theory, Caribbean Reality: Race, Class, and Social Domination* (Kingston: University of the West Indies Press, 2010), 179. See also Mills, *Blackness Visible*, 100.

⁹⁰ I borrow the term “bio-logic” from Oyèrónké Oyewuémì, *The Invention of Women: Making an African Sense of Western Gender Discourses* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997).

⁹¹ Mills, *Racial Contract*, 78-79.

⁹² Mills struggled to avoid indeterminacy on this issue in “Dark Ontologies: Blacks, Jews, and White Supremacy,” in *Blackness Visible*.

⁹³ Mills, *Racial Contract*, 127.

⁹⁴ Allen, *Black Awakening*, 274.

⁹⁵ Manning Marable, *How Capitalism Underdeveloped Black America: Problems in Race, Political Economy, and Society, Updated Edition* (Cambridge, MA: South End Press, 2000), xxxviii.

⁹⁶ Du Bois, *Dusk of Dawn*; Du Bois, “Address to the Black Academic Community.”

⁹⁷ Charles W. Mills, “Red Shift: Politically Embodied/Embodied Politics,” in *The Philosophical I: Personal Reflections on Life in Philosophy*, ed. George Yancy (New York: Rowan & Littlefield Publishers, 2002), 171-172; Mills, *Racial Contract*, 35.

⁹⁸ Mills, “Kant’s *Untermenschen*,” 169-193.

⁹⁹ Chris Hayes, *A Colony in a Nation* (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2017)

¹⁰⁰ See essays by Charles Pinderhughes, Jared A. Ball, Robert L. Allen, Andrew L. Barlow, Michael Calderón-Zaks, and Robert Chrisman in *The Black Scholar* 40.2 (2010). See also Pinderhughes, “Toward a New Theory of Internal Colonialism”; Allen, “Reassessing the Internal (Neo) Colonialism Theory”; and Allen, “Forty Years Later.” For other contemporary uses of the domestic colonialism thesis, see John R. Chavez, “When Boarders Cross Peoples: The Internal Colonial Challenge to Borderlands Theory,” *Journal of Borderlands Studies* 28.1 (2013): 33-46; Natsu Taylor Saito, “Tales of Color and Colonialism: Racial Realism and Settler Colonial Theory,” *Florida A&M University Law Review* 10.1 (2014): 1-109; and Sandeep Kaur, “Resisting Internal Colonialism,” *International Journal of English and Literature* 5.4 (2015): 55-64.

¹⁰¹ Charles Pinderhughes, “How *Black Awakening in Capitalist America* Laid the Foundation for a New Internal Colonialism Theory,” *The Black Scholar* 40.2 (2010): 71-78; and Pinderhughes, “Toward a New Theory of Internal Colonialism.”

¹⁰² Nathan Glazer, “Blacks and Ethnic Groups: The Difference, and the Political Difference It Makes,” *Social Problems* 18.4 (1971): 444-461; Donald J. Harris, “The Black Ghetto as Colony: A Theoretical Critique and Alternative Formulation,” *The Review of Black Political Economy* 2.4 (1972): 3-33; Donald J. Harris, “Capitalist Exploitation and Black Labor: Some Conceptual Issues,” *The Review of Black Political Economy* 8.2 (1978): 133-151; and Michael Burawoy, “Race, Class, and Colonialism,” *Social and Economic Studies* 23.4 (1974): 521-550.

¹⁰³ Michael Omi and Howard Winant, *Racial Formation in the United States: From the 1960s to the 1990s*, Second Edition (New York: Routledge, 1994), 44-47. See also Eduardo Bonilla-Silva, *White Supremacy and Racism in the Post-Civil Rights Era* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Reiner Publishers, 2001), 28-30. For commentary on these criticisms, see Michael Calderón-Zaks, “Domestic Colonialism: The Overlooked Significance of Robert L. Allen’s Contributions,” *The Black Scholar* 40.2 (2010): 39-48; and Pinderhughes, “How *Black Awakening in Capitalist America* Laid the Foundation for a New Internal Colonialism Theory.”

¹⁰⁴ Robert Staples, *The Urban Plantation: Racism & Colonialism in the Post Civil Rights Era* (San Francisco: Black Scholars Press, 1987), 11.

¹⁰⁵ Blauner, *Racial Oppression in America*, 82n.

¹⁰⁶ For example, William K. Tabb writes, “There are two key relationships which must be proved to exist before the colonial analogy can be accepted: (1) economic control and exploitation, and (2) political dependence and subjugation.” William K. Tabb, *The Political Economy of the Black Ghetto* (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1970), 23.

¹⁰⁷ Allen, “Forty Years Later,” 8.

¹⁰⁸ Peter Kolchin, “Whiteness Studies: The New History of Race in America,” *The Journal of American History* 89.1 (2002), 170-171.

¹⁰⁹ Cyril E. Griffith, *The African Dream: Martin R. Delany and the Emergence of Pan-African Thought* (University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1975), 1.

¹¹⁰ Nell Irving Painter, “Martin R. Delany: Elitism and Black Nationalism,” in *Black Leaders of the Nineteenth Century*, ed. Leon F. Litwack and August Meier (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1988), 154. See also Victor Ullman, *Martin R. Delany: The Beginnings of Black Nationalism* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1971), 140.

¹¹¹ Ishmael Reed, “Preface,” in Eldridge Cleaver, *Soul on Ice* (New York: Delta Publishing, 1992), 10.

¹¹² Jerome McGann, “Introduction,” in Martin R. Delany, *Blake; or, The Huts of America*, A Corrected Edition, ed. Jerome McGann (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2017), ix, xv.

¹¹³ Nikhil Pal Singh, *Black is a Country: Race and the Unfinished Struggle for Democracy* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2004), 14.

¹¹⁴ Greg Thomas, *The Sexual Demon of Colonial Power: Pan-African Embodiment and Erotic Schemes of Empire* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2007), ix.

Chapter II: Toward and Anticolonial Ontology

¹ Charles Kingsley, *His Letters, and Memories of His Life, Volume I*, ed. Frances Eliza Grenfell Kingsley (New York: J. F. Taylor and Company, 1899), 374-376.

² Roy Bhaskar, “Theorizing Ontology,” in *Contributions to Social Ontology*, ed. Clive Lawson, John Latsis, and Nuno Martins (New York: Routledge, 2007), 196.

³ Edward Feser, *Scholastic Metaphysics: A Contemporary Introduction* (Seelscheid, Germany: Editiones Scholasticae, 2014); John P. Doyle, “Heidegger and Scholastic Metaphysics,” *Modern Schoolman* 49.3 (1972): 201-220; Martin Heidegger, *Ontology – The Hermeneutics of Facticity*, trans. John van Buren (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1999); Michael Allen Gillespie, *The Theological Origins of Modernity* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2008); John Symons, “Ontology and Methodology in Analytic Philosophy” in *Theories and Applications of Ontology, Volume 1*, 349-394, ed. J. Seibt and R. Poli (New York: Springer, 2010).

⁴ Christian List and Laura Valentini, “The Methodology of Political Theory,” in *The Oxford Handbook of Philosophical Methodology*, ed. Herman Cappelen, Tamar Szabó Gendler, and John Hawthorne, 525-553 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016), 529.

⁵ György Lukács, *The Ontology of Social Being, Volumes 1-3* (London: Merlin Press, 1978/1980); Carol C. Gould, *Marx’s Social Ontology: Individuality and Community in Marx’s Theory of Social Reality* (Cambridge: MIT

Press, 1980); and Adrian Johnston, *Zizek's Ontology: A Transcendental Materialist Theory of Subjectivity* (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 2008). Daniel Krier and Mark P. Worrell, ed., *The Social Ontology of Capitalism* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016) makes no mention of colonialism, and though it makes passing reference to race and imperialism, there is no analysis.

⁶ Clive Lawson, John Latsis, and Nuno Martins, eds., *Contributions to Social Ontology* (New York: Routledge, 2007)

⁷ For Mills, social ontology refers to “the basic struts and girders of social reality in a fashion analogous to the way ‘metaphysics’ *simpliciter* refers to the deep structure of reality as a whole. So there are basic existents that constitute the social world, and that should be central to theorizing about it.” Charles W. Mills, *Blackness Visible: Essays on Philosophy and Race* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998), 44.

⁸ List and Valentini, “The Methodology of Political Theory,” 529.

⁹ Charles W. Mills, *The Racial Contract* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1997), 78.

¹⁰ Charles W. Mills, *Black Rights/White Wrongs: The Critique of Racial Liberalism* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2017), 8.

¹¹ Mills, *Black Rights/White Wrongs*, 8.

¹² Oyèrónké Oyewuémì, *The Invention of Women: Making an African Sense of Western Gender Discourses* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997), chapter one.

¹³ Amie Césaire, *Discourse on Colonialism*, trans. Joan Pinkham (New York: Monthly Review Press, 2001); Albert Memmi, *The Colonizer and the Colonized*, trans. Howard Greenfield (London: Earthscan Publications Ltd., 2003); Frantz Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth*, trans. Richard Philcox (New York: Grove Press, 2004).

¹⁴ Perhaps the three published works to place much of an emphasis on Du Bois’s anticolonialism are Amy Kaplan’s *The Anarchy of Empire in the Making of U.S. Culture* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2002), Brandon Kendhammer, “Du Bois the Pan-Africanist and the Development of African Nationalism,” *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 30.1 (2007): 51-71; and August Carbonella and Sharryn Kasmir’s “W.E.B. Du Bois’s *Darkwater* and an Anti-colonial, Internationalist Anthropology,” *Dialectical Anthropology* 32 (2008): 113–121.

Manning Marable’s *W. E. B. Du Bois: Black Radical Democrat* (Boston: Twayne Publishers, 1986) was one of the first book-length studies of Du Bois’s political theory, but even in the updated version, anticolonialism is conspicuously absent from the discussion (see *W. E. B. Du Bois: Black Radical Democrat, New Updated Edition* (Boulder, CO: Paradigm Publishers, 2005)). Robert Gooding-Williams offers a compelling account of the early Du Bois in *In the Shadow of Du Bois: Afro-Modern Political Thought in America* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2009), but because his focus is *The Souls of Black Folk*, he does not follow through with an anticolonial understanding of how Du Bois moved away from or qualified his early comments on the color line, as I do here. For other works on Du Bois that are interesting but nevertheless fail to comment on his anticolonialism, see Joseph P. DeMarco, *The Social Thought of W. E. B. Du Bois* (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1983); Mary Keller and Chester J. Fontenot, Jr., eds., *Re-Cognizing W. E. B. Du Bois in the Twenty-First Century: Essays on W. E. B. Du Bois* (Macon, GA: Mercer University Press, 2007); Edward J. Blum, *W. E. B. Du Bois: American Prophet* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2007); and Aldon D. Morris, *The Scholar Denied: W. E. B. Du Bois and the Birth of Modern Sociology* (Oakland: University of California Press, 2015). For various arguments on the relationship between Du Bois and the Marxist tradition, see Cedric J. Robinson, *Black Marxism: The Making of the Black Radical Tradition* (London, England: Zed Press, 1983); Adolph L. Reed Jr., *W. E. B. Du Bois and American Political Thought: Fabianism and the Color Line* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997); Reiland Rabaka, *Du Bois’s Dialectics: Black Radical Politics and the Reconstruction of Critical Social Theory* (New York, NY: Lexington Books, 2008); Reiland Rabaka, *Africana Critical Theory: Reconstructing the Black Radical Tradition, from W. E. B. Du Bois and C. L. R. James to Frantz Fanon and Amilcar Cabral* (New York, NY: Lexington Books,

2009); Bill V. Mullen, *Un-American: W. E. B. Du Bois and the Century of World Revolution* (Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press, 2015).

¹⁵ Early responses to Fanon sought to apply, develop, or exegete Fanon's political philosophy, the first wave of which were the anticolonial activists of the 1960s, and the second wave of which were primarily political scientists. See, for example, Renate Zahar, *Frantz Fanon: Colonialism and Alienation* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1974); Emmanuel Hansen, *Frantz Fanon: Social and Political Thought* (Columbus, OH: Ohio State University Press, 1977); and L. Adele Jinadu, *Fanon: In Search of the African Revolution* (New York: KPI, 1986). In the 1980s, there was a literary turn in Fanon scholarship, which took the postcolonialism and cultural studies approach, and in the 1990s, philosophers returned to Fanon and, in opposition to the various literary approaches, developed "critical" philosophical projects extending Fanon's ideas. Unlike the previous social-political theorists, however, these writers offered psychological and phenomenological readings of Fanon. My approach fits into the critical wave of Fanon scholarship that has dominated for the last two decades, but it does so specifically by extending the social-political projects of earlier Fanon scholars. Explicating the agreements and disagreements between my reading of Fanon and other approaches must be left for a future project, but it is enough to note here that virtually every other Fanon scholar centers race in their analyses, whereas I center the colonial relation, otherwise considered the material or ontological foundation for understanding racialization.

For examples of the literary and critical approaches to Fanon, as well as competing narratives of the historical development of Fanon scholarship, see Lewis R. Gordon, T. Denean Sharpley-Whiting, and Renée T. White, eds., *Fanon: A Critical Reader* (Cambridge: Blackwell Publishers, 1996); Nigel C. Gibson, ed., *Rethinking Fanon: The Continuing Dialogue* (Amherst, NY: Humanity Books, 1999); Anthony C. Alessandrini, ed., *Frantz Fanon: Critical Perspectives* (New York: Routledge, 1999); Reiland Rabaka, *Forms of Fanonism: Frantz Fanon's Critical Theory and the Dialectics of Decolonization* (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2010); and Nigel C. Gibson, ed., *Living Fanon: Global Perspectives* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011).

¹⁶ Ato Sekyi-Otu's *Fanon's Dialectic of Experience* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1996), especially 24-25, 87-100.

¹⁷ W. E. B. Du Bois, "The Present Outlook for the Darker Races of Mankind," in *The Oxford W. E. B. Du Bois Reader*, ed. Eric Sundquist (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), 47-54.

¹⁸ W. E. B. Du Bois, "Address to the Nations of the World," in *The Oxford W. E. B. Du Bois Reader*, ed. Eric Sundquist (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), 625.

¹⁹ W. E. B. Du Bois, "The African Roots of the War," *The Atlantic*, May 1915, 707-714.

²⁰ W. E. B. Du Bois, *Darkwater: Voices From Within The Veil* (Mineola, NY: Dover Publications, 1999), 33.

²¹ Du Bois, *Darkwater*, 33.

²² Du Bois, *Darkwater*, 56.

²³ W. E. B. Du Bois, *The World and Africa and Color and Democracy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 293.

²⁴ In his notes from a trip to Texas and New Orleans, dated roughly in 1934, Du Bois remarks on race relations in Houston, TX, and he observes what he calls a "triple Color Line." He writes: "In this part of Texas and almost more so further West, one sees a triple Color Line between whites and the Mexicans, between whites and the Negroes, between the Mexicans and the Negroes. The Mexicans are legally white but yellow and brown. The Negroes are legally black but actually white, yellow, brown and black." Du Bois's observation here suggests that he was in the process of displacing *the* color line in favor of a sort of racial pluralism that is organized by some underlying structure or principle. His latter comments on the color line in *Color and Democracy* suggest that the political economy of global colonial capitalism ultimately occupies that position in his theory. W. E. B. Du Bois, "A journey to Texas and New Orleans, ca. April 1934," W. E. B. Du Bois Papers (MS 312), Special Collections and

University Archives, University of Massachusetts Amherst Libraries. Accessed 20 Jan. 2017. Available at <http://credo.library.umass.edu/view/full/mums312-b211-i120>.

²⁵ W. E. B. Du Bois, *The Souls of Black Folk* (New York: The Blue Heron Press, 1953), “Preface.”

²⁶ Frantz Fanon, *Black Skin/White Masks*, trans. Richard Philcox (New York: Grove Press, 2008), xii. All English translations of Fanon (both *BSWM* and *Wretched*) that are cited hereafter will be from the Philcox translations unless otherwise stated.

²⁷ Fanon, *Black Skin/White Masks*, xiii.

²⁸ Fanon, *Black Skin/White Masks*, xvi.

²⁹ Fanon, *Black Skin/White Masks*, xiv-xv.

³⁰ Fanon, *Black Skin/White Masks*, 202.

³¹ Frantz Fanon, “Racism and Culture,” in *Toward the African Revolution*, trans. Haakon Chevalier (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1967), 31.

³² Fanon, “Racism and Culture,” 40.

³³ W. E. B. Fanon, “West Indians and Africans,” in *Toward the African Revolution*, trans. Haakon Chevalier (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1967), 18.

³⁴ Frantz Fanon, *A Dying Colonialism* trans. Haakon Chevalier (New York: Grove Press, 1967), 128.

³⁵ Frantz Fanon, *Alienation and Freedom*, ed. Jean Khalifa and Robert J. C. Young, trans. Steven Corcoran (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2018), 573.

³⁶ Fanon, *Wretched of the Earth*, 6.

³⁷ Fanon, *Wretched of the Earth*, 40.

³⁸ Fanon, *Wretched of the Earth*, 53.

³⁹ Fanon’s shift toward viewing the colonizer-colonized relation as the foundation of modern ontology is reflected in “Racism and Culture,” where he writes, “The apparition of racism is not fundamentally determining. Racism is not the whole but the most visible, the most day-to-day and, not to mince matters, the crudest element of a given structure” (31-32).

⁴⁰ Fanon, *Black Skin/White Masks*, 95. (Philcox translation modified: Philcox uses “species” to translate “genre.” He likely changed the translation of this word to be consistent with his 2004 translation of *The Wretched of the Earth*, in which he translates “espèce” as “species.” While translating “espèce” as “species” is correct, trying to do the same for “genre” is problematic because it obscures Fanon’s modification of vocabulary.) Frantz Fanon, *Peau noir/masques blancs* (Paris: Éditions du Sueil, 1952), 93.

⁴¹ Fanon, *Wretched of the Earth*, 3, 5. Frantz Fanon, *Les damnés de la Terre* (Paris: François Maspero, 1970), 9.

⁴² Fanon, *Wretched of the Earth*, 94. Fanon, *Les damnés de la Terre*, 92.

⁴³ Fanon, *Black Skin/White Masks*, 178.

⁴⁴ Sylvia Wynter, “Toward the Sociogenic Principle: Fanon, Identity, the Puzzle of Conscious Experience, and What It Is Like to Be ‘Black,’” *National Identities and Socio-Political Changes in Latin America*, ed. Antonio Gomez-Moriana and Mercedes Duran-Cogan (New York: Routledge, 2001), 33, 52-53.

⁴⁵ Wynter, "Toward the Sociogenic Principle," 58.

⁴⁶ Fanon, *Black Skin/White Masks*, xii.

⁴⁷ Fanon, *Wretched of the Earth*, 6.

⁴⁸ Fanon, *Wretched of the Earth*, 182.

⁴⁹ Fanon, *Black Skin/White Masks*, 89-90.

⁵⁰ It should also be noted that this colonial ontology is not ahistorical but properly historicist, always reflective of the socio-political context. See Fanon, "West Indians and Africans." Ato Sekyi-Otu distinguishes between ontological and historicist understandings of the human, placing Fanon in the latter category. I, however, use "ontology" in a strictly historicist manner: the only possible ontology is historical. There is no ontic-ontological distinction; all ontology is always already ontic, which is why what many would call ontic I call ontological. See Ato Sekyi-Otu, "Form and Metaphor in Fanon's Critique of Racial and Colonial Domination," in *Domination*, ed. Alkis Kontos (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1975), 133-161.

⁵¹ Fanon, *Wretched of the Earth*, 3-4.

⁵² Fanon, *Wretched of the Earth*, 4.

⁵³ Regarding these three forms of colonial relations, I was partly influenced by the following texts. Assimilation: Fanon, "Racism and Culture"; John F. Laffey, *Civilization and Its Discontents* (Montreal: Black Rose Books, 1993); and Glen Sean Coulthard, *Red Skins, White Masks: Rejecting the Colonial Politics of Recognition* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2014). Domination: W. E. B. Du Bois, *The Negro* (New York: Cosimo Classics, 2007); and W. E. B. Du Bois, *Black Reconstruction* (New York: The Free Press, 1992). Elimination: Nicholas P. Canny, "The Ideology of English Colonization: From Ireland to America," *The William and Mary Quarterly* 30.4 (1973): 575-598; Reginald Horsman, *Race and Manifest Destiny: The Origins of American Racial Anglo-Saxonism* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1981); and Patrick Wolfe, "Settler Colonialism and the Elimination of the Native," *Journal of Genocide Research* 8.4 (2006): 387-409. For more on a similar but different taxonomy of colonial relations see Kohn, "Reflections on Colonialism."

⁵⁴ J. M. Blaut, *The Colonizer's Model of the World: Geographical Diffusionism and Eurocentric History* (New York: The Guilford Press, 1993).

⁵⁵ Hitler biographer John Toland explains how Hitler cited U.S. domestic policy and British colonial strategies as inspirations for the Holocaust: "Hitler's concept of concentrations camps as well as the practicality of genocide owed much, so he claimed, to his studies of English and United States history. He admired the camps for Boer prisoners in South Africa and for the Indians in the wild West; and often praised to his inner circle the efficacy of America's extermination – by starvation and uneven combat – of the red savages who could not be tamed by captivity." John Toland, *Adolf Hitler*, Volume II (New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1976), 802. For anticolonial analyses of the Nazi movement, see Amie Césaire, *Discourse on Colonialism*, trans. Joan Pinkham (New York: Monthly Review Press, 2001); Frantz Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth*, trans. Richard Philcox (New York: Grove Press, 2004), 57; and W. E. B. Du Bois, *The World and Africa and Color and Democracy*, 15.

⁵⁶ Martin R. Delany, *The Condition, Elevation, Emigration, and Destiny of the Colored People of the United States, Politically Considered* (New York: Arno Press, 1968), 19-22.

⁵⁷ Delany, *The Condition*, 14.

⁵⁸ Martin R. Delany, "Political Aspect of the Colored Race of the United States," in *Martin R. Delany: A Documentary Reader*, ed. Robert S. Levine (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2003), 282-283.

⁵⁹ Karl Marx, “The Communist Manifesto,” *Selected Writings*, ed. Lawrence H. Simon (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1994), 162-163.

⁶⁰ Shlomo Avineri, “Introduction,” in *Karl Marx on Colonialism and Modernization: His Dispatches and Other Writings on China, India, Mexico, The Middle East, and North Africa*, ed. Shlomo Avineri (Garden City, NY: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1968), 12.

⁶¹ See Karl Marx, “The British Rule in India” and “The Future Results of British Rule in India” in *Karl Marx on Colonialism and Modernization: His Dispatches and Other Writings on China, India, Mexico, The Middle East, and North Africa*, ed. Shlomo Avineri (Garden City, NY: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1968).

⁶² Friedrich Engels, “[French Rule in Algeria], *The Northern Star*, January 22, 1848,” in *Karl Marx on Colonialism and Modernization: His Dispatches and Other Writings on China, India, Mexico, The Middle East, and North Africa*, ed. Shlomo Avineri (Garden City, NY: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1968), 43.

⁶³ Frantz Fanon, “Decolonization and Independence,” in *Toward the African Revolution*, trans. Haakon Chevalier (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1967), 101.

⁶⁴ Karl Marx to Sigfried Meyer and August Vogt, April 9, 1870, *Karl Marx and Frederick Engels: Collected Works*, Volume 43 (New York: International Press, 1988), 473-475.

⁶⁵ V. I. Lenin, *Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism* (New York: International Publishers, 1939).

⁶⁶ Charles W. Mills, *From Class to Race: Essays in White Marxism and Black Radicalism* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2003), 147-172.

⁶⁷ W. E. B. Du Bois, “Marxism and the Negro Problem,” *The Crisis*, May 1933, 104.

⁶⁸ W. E. B. Du Bois, *The Autobiography of W. E. B. Du Bois: A Soliloquy on Viewing My Life from the Last Decade of Its First Century* (New York: International Publishers, 1968), 17.

⁶⁹ Frantz Fanon, “French Intellectuals and Democrats and the Algerian Revolution,” in *Toward the African Revolution*, trans. Haakon Chevalier (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1967), 82.

⁷⁰ The following three paragraphs are adapted from Patrick Anderson, “Levinas and the Anticolonial,” *Journal of French and Francophone Philosophy*, Vol. XXV, No. 1 (2017): 150-181.

⁷¹ Regarding identity, poststructuralism and postmodernism provide the tools with which postcolonial thinking can avoid the identity essentialism of modernist European thought. Regarding geographies, postcolonial theory seeks to “deterritorialize” the colonial landscape and disobey imposed borders through a resistance to linguistic and cultural hegemony. See Bart Moore-Gilbert, Gareth Stanton, and Willy Maley, “Introduction,” in *Postcolonial Criticism*, ed. Bart Moore-Gilbert, Gareth Stanton, and Willy Maley (New York: Longman, 1997). Homi Bhabha, “Postcolonial Criticism,” in *Redrawing the Boundaries: The Transformation of English and American Literary Studies*, ed. Stephen Greenblatt and Giles Gunn (New York: MLA, 1992), 441; Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, *Kafka: Toward a Minor Literature*, trans. Dana Polan (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1986).

⁷² It is interesting to note that the origin of “post-colonial” comes from Hamza Alavi, “The State in Post-Colonial Societies: Pakistan and Bangladesh,” *New Left Review* 74 (1972): 59-81. In this article, Alavi develops a reply to Marxist theories of the state, showing that postcolonial states do not operate according to existing Marxist categories, and in this way, the analysis has more in common with anticolonial criticisms of neo-colonialism than it does with what passes for postcolonial theory in the academy today.

⁷³ Linda Tuhiwai Smith, *Decolonizing Methodologies: Research and Indigenous Peoples* (New York: Zed Books, 1999), 14.

⁷⁴ Moore-Gilbert, Stanton, and Maley, "Introduction," *Postcolonial Criticism*, 3-4.

⁷⁵ Moore-Gilbert, Stanton, and Maley, "Introduction," *Postcolonial Criticism*, 3-4.

⁷⁶ Graham Huggin, "The Neocolonialism of Postcolonialism: A Cautionary Note," *Links and Letters* 4 (1997): 19-24; and Jeannine Purdy, "Postcolonialism: The Emperor's New Clothes?," *Social & Legal Studies* 5.3 (1996): 405-426.

⁷⁷ Qtd. in Robert L. Allen, *Black Awakening in Capitalist America* (Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press, 1992), 8.

⁷⁸ Jared Sexton, "People-of-Color-Blindness: Notes on the Afterlife of Slavery," *Social Text* 103, 28.2 (2010), 44.

⁷⁹ Sexton, "People-of-Color-Blindness," 47, emphasis added.

⁸⁰ Frank B. Wilderson III, "Afro-Pessimism & the End of Redemption," *The Occupied Times*, March 30, 2016.

⁸¹ Wilderson, "Afro-Pessimism & the End of Redemption."

⁸² Greg Thomas, "Afro-Blue Notes: The Death of Afro-pessimism (2.0)?" *Theory & Event* 21.1 (2018), 290.

⁸³ Thomas, "Afro-Blue Notes," 291.

⁸⁴ Thomas, "Afro-Blue Notes," 288.

⁸⁵ Thomas, "Afro-Blue Notes," 297. Thomas also adds that postcolonialism falsely tries to exert a proprietary right over the study of colonialism and that Afro-pessimists accept this as their starting point: "colonialism cannot be granted as an object of study to "postcolonial" theory in US or Western academia. It can only *appropriate* the matter or study of colonialism— from the long history of anti-colonialist theory and praxes preceding it and persisting in spite of it—as a colonizing political act itself, an arrogant critical appropriation that Wilderson routinely accepts with- out question" (297).

⁸⁶ Theodore W. Allen, *The Invention of the White Race, Volume I: Racial Oppression and Social Control* (New York: Verso, 1994), 66.

⁸⁷ Allen, *Invention of the White Race, Volume I*, 47-48.

⁸⁸ Allen, *Invention of the White Race, Volume I*, 22. Audrey Smedley's *Race in North America: Origin and Evolution of a Worldview, Third Edition* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2007) offers an excellent account similar to Allen's.

⁸⁹ Leonard P. Liggio, "English Origins of Early American Racism," *Radical History Review* 1976.11 (1976): 1-36.

⁹⁰ John Patrick Montaña, *The Roots of English Colonialism in Ireland* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 391.

⁹¹ Ngũgĩ wa Thiong'o, *Something Torn and New: An African Renaissance* (New York: BasicCivitas Books, 2009), x-xi.

⁹² Nicholas P. Canny, "The Ideology of English Colonization: From Ireland to America," *The William and Mary Quarterly* 30.4 (1973), 575; and Matthew Frye Jacobson, *Whiteness of a Different Color: European Immigrants and the Alchemy of Race* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1998), 38.

⁹³ Thomas Hacket compared Henry Sidney's task in Ireland to the Spanish in the New World, suggesting that getting control over Native Americans and over Irish were identical activities. Referring to the Spanish practices

used against Native Americans, the Earl of Essex said that “I would deall as I have hard and redd of such lyke how they have byn used” and “within two yeares, you shall make restraint for the English to come hither [in Ireland] without license as at this date it is in Spaine for going to the Indyces.” Later colonial ideologists in England, including Sir John Davies, agreed with Essex that Spanish approaches to subduing Native Americans would work just as well against the Irish. Edmund Spencer connected genealogically connected the Irish to Scythians in the ancient Middle East, and thereby connected them to culturally to Islam in the modern Middle East, claiming that the Irish might have descended from the Scythians because they have the same farming practices. Given the early modern orientalism and imperial jealousy directed toward the Ottoman Empire, Spencer’s suggestive connection carries much colonial meaning (Canny 586-587, 594). See also Leonard P. Liggio, “English Origins of Early American Racism,” *Radical History Review* 1976.11 (1976): 1-36; Kevin Wheland, “The Green Atlantic: Radical Reciprocities between Ireland and America in the Long Eighteenth Century,” in *A New Imperial History: Culture, Identity, and Modernity in Britain and the Empire, 1660-1840*, ed. Kathleen Wilson (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 216-238; and Colin Kidd, “Ethnicity in the British World, 1688-1830,” in *A New Imperial History: Culture, Identity, and Modernity in Britain and the Empire, 1660-1840*, ed. Kathleen Wilson (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 260-277.

⁹⁴ Kelly Brown Douglas, *Stand Your Ground: Black Bodies and the Justice of God* (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 2015), 7.

⁹⁵ Horsman, *Race and Manifest Destiny*, 12-15; Montaña, *Roots of English Colonialism*, 346-347; Robert Bucholz and Newton Key, *Early Modern England 1485-1714: A Narrative History*, Second Edition (Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009), 209-210; Nicholas Higham and M. J. Ryan, *The Anglo-Saxon World* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2013), 13-15; Allen D. Boyer, *Sir Edward Coke and the Elizabethan Age* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003), chapter 9; H. R. Woudhuysen, *Sir Philip Sidney and the Circulation of Manuscripts 1558-1640* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), chapter 4; Allen J. Frantzen, “Bede and Bawdy Bale: Gregory the Great, Angels, and the ‘Angli,’” in *Anglo-Saxonism and the Construction of Social Identity*, ed. Allen J. Frantzen and John D. Niles (Gainesville, FL: University Press of Florida, 1997), 17-39; Suzanne C. Hagedorn, “Received Wisdom: The Reception History of Alfred’s Preface to the *Pastoral Care*,” in *Anglo-Saxonism and the Construction of Social Identity*, ed. Allen J. Frantzen and John D. Niles (Gainesville, FL: University Press of Florida, 1997), 86-107; Mary P. Richards, “Anglo-Saxonism in the Old English Laws,” in *Anglo-Saxonism and the Construction of Social Identity*, ed. Allen J. Frantzen and John D. Niles (Gainesville, FL: University Press of Florida, 1997), 40-59; Janet Thormann, “The *Anglo-Saxon Chronicle* Poems and the Making of the English Nation,” in *Anglo-Saxonism and the Construction of Social Identity*, ed. Allen J. Frantzen and John D. Niles (Gainesville, FL: University Press of Florida, 1997), 60-85.

⁹⁶ Bucholz and Key, *Early Modern England*, 78.

⁹⁷ Liggio, “English Origins of Early American Racism,” 3.

⁹⁸ John O’Beirne Ranelagh, *A Short History of Ireland*, Second Edition (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 33-41, 46-47; Montaña, *Roots of English Colonialism*, 332; Steven G. Ellis, *Tudor Ireland: Crown, Community, and the Conflict of Cultures, 1470-1603* (New York: Longman, 1985), 77-78, 129-130, 139; and Bucholz and Key, *Early Modern England*, 83-84, 260; Alec Ryrie, “Reformations,” in *A Social History of England, 1500-1750*, ed. Keith Wrightson (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2017), 107-128; and John E. Curran, Jr., *Roman Invasions: The British History, Protestant Anti-Romanism, and the Historical Imagination in England, 1530-1660* (Newark: University of Delaware Press, 2002).

⁹⁹ Montaña, *Roots of English Colonialism*, 349-350.

¹⁰⁰ Montaña, *Roots of English Colonialism*, 344.

¹⁰¹ See for this discussion Montaña, *Roots of English Colonialism*.

¹⁰² Montaña, *Roots of English Colonialism*, 377, 385.

- ¹⁰³ Canny, "Ideology of English Colonization," 588.
- ¹⁰⁴ O'Beirne Ranelagh, *Short History of Ireland*, 51; Montaña, *Roots of English Colonialism*, 369.
- ¹⁰⁵ Ellis, *Tudor Ireland*, 284.
- ¹⁰⁶ Canny, "Ideology of English Colonization," 580-581.
- ¹⁰⁷ Nicholas P. Canny, *Making Ireland British, 1580-1650* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), 841.
- ¹⁰⁸ Montaña, *Roots of English Colonialism*, 360.
- ¹⁰⁹ Edmund Spencer, *A View of the State of Ireland*, ed. Andrew Hadfield and Willy Maley (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishers, 1997), 101-102; O'Beirne Ranelagh, *Short History of Ireland*, 52.
- ¹¹⁰ O'Beirne Ranelagh, *Short History of Ireland*, 49-53; Ellis, *Tudor Ireland*, 268-269, 297-312; and Cyril Falls, *Elizabeth's Irish Wars* (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1997), 11.
- ¹¹¹ Allen, *Invention of the White Race, Volume I*, 70.
- ¹¹² Laura O'Connor, *Haunted English: The Celtic Fringe, the British Empire, and De-Anglicization* (Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006), 3.
- ¹¹³ Bucholz and Key, *Early Modern England*, 256.
- ¹¹⁴ Philip Sidney, "Discourse on Irish Affairs," in *Miscellaneous Prose of Sir Philip Sidney*, ed. Katherine Duncan-Jones and Fan Van Dorsten (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1973), 8-12; John Milton, "Observations Upon the Articles of Peace," in *Complete Prose Works of John Milton, Volume III, 1648-1649* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1962), 259-334; Andrew Hadfield and Willy Maley, "Introduction," in Edmund Spencer, *A View of the State of Ireland*, ed. Andrew Hadfield and Willy Maley (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishers, 1997), xi; Bart van Es, *Spencer's Forms of History: Elizabethan Poetry and the 'State of Present Time'* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), chapters one and three; Canny, "Ideology of English Colonization," 576, 592; O'Beirne Ranelagh, *Short History of Ireland*, 63-65; Montaña, *Roots of English Colonialism*, 254; Nell Irvin Painter, *The History of White People* (New York: W. W. Norton, 2010), 42; Bruce Mcleod, *The Geography of Empire in English Literature, 1580-1745* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999); and Walter S. H. Lim, *The Arts of Empire: The Poetics of Colonialism from Raleigh to Milton* (Newark: University of Delaware Press, 1998);
- ¹¹⁵ Bucholz and Key, *Early Modern England*, 256; Montaña, *Roots of English Colonialism*, 254, 278; O'Beirne Ranelagh, *Short History of Ireland*, 52-71.
- ¹¹⁶ O'Beirne Ranelagh, *Short History of Ireland*, 69.
- ¹¹⁷ Bucholz and Key, *Early Modern England*, 332; O'Beirne Ranelagh, *Short History of Ireland*, 52-71; Allen, *The Invention of the White Race* 71.
- ¹¹⁸ O'Beirne Ranelagh, *Short History of Ireland*, 70.
- ¹¹⁹ Bucholz and Key, *Early Modern England*, 307.
- ¹²⁰ Michael Hechter, *Internal Colonialism: The Celtic Fringe in British National Development* (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1999).
- ¹²¹ O'Beirne Ranelagh, *Short History of Ireland*, vii.

¹²² A. L. Rowse, "Tudor Expansion: The Transition from Medieval to Modern History," in *Essays in American Colonial History*, ed. Paul Goodman (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1967), 10; and A. L. Rowse, *The Elizabethans and America* (London: MacMillan & Co, 1959), 16-60.

Chapter III: Inventing Whiteness in an Anglo-Saxon Empire, 1600-2000

¹ Theodore Parker, "Some Thoughts on the Progress of America, and the Influence of Her Diverse Institutions," in Mason I. Lowance, Jr., ed., *A House Divided: The Antebellum Slavery Debates in America, 1776-1865* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003), 302-304.

² Eldridge Cleaver, Social Analysis 139X, Lecture No. 4, Working Draft - Edited Transcript, 1968 November 5, Eldridge Cleaver Collection, Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley, Carton 2, Folder 79.

³ Leonard Harris, "'Believe It or Not' or the Ku Klux Klan and American Philosophy Exposed," *Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association* 68(5): 133-137.

⁴ Eldridge Cleaver, *Soul on Ice* (New York: Delta Publishing, 1992), 87-107; Charles W. Mills, *Black Rights/White Wrongs: The Critique of Racial Liberalism* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2017), 181-200.

⁵ For an overview of the initial period of whiteness studies, see David R. Roediger, "Critical Studies of Whiteness, USA: Origins and Arguments," *Theoria: A Journal of Social and Political Theory* 98 (2001): 72-98; and Peter Kolchin, "Whiteness Studies: The New History of Race in America," *The Journal of American History* 89.1 (2002): 154-173. For the primary texts in whiteness studies in both history and philosophy, see David R. Roediger, *Wages of Whiteness: Race and the Making of the American Working Class* (New York: Verso, 1991); David R. Roediger, *Colored White: Transcending the Racial Past* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002); David R. Roediger, *Working Toward Whiteness: How America's Immigrants Became White, The Strange Journey from Ellis Island to the Suburbs* (New York: Basic Books, 2005); David R. Roediger, *How Race Survived US History: From Settlement and Slavery to the Obama Phenomenon* (New York: Verso, 2008); Noel Ignatiev, *How the Irish Became White* (New York: Routledge, 1995); Matthew Frye Jacobson, *Whiteness of a Different Color: European Immigrants and the Alchemy of Race* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1998); Charles W. Mills, *The Racial Contract* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1997); Charles W. Mills, *Blackness Visible: Essays on Philosophy and Race* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998); George Yancy, ed., *What White Looks Like: African American Philosophers on the Whiteness Question* (New York: Routledge, 2004); George Yancy, ed., *White on White/Black on Black* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2005); George Yancy, ed., *The Center Must Not Hold: White Women Philosophers on the Whiteness of Philosophy* (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2010); George Yancy, ed., *Christology and Whiteness: What Would Jesus Do?* (New York: Routledge (2012); George Yancy, ed., *Look, A White! Philosophical Essays on Whiteness* (Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press, 2012); George Yancy, ed., *White Self-Criticality beyond Anti-Racism: How Does It Feel to Be a White Problem?* (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2015); and Linda Martín Alcoff, *The Future of Whiteness* (Malden, MA: Polity, 2015). For a discussion of whiteness as a structuring property, see David S. Owen, "Towards a Critical Theory of Whiteness," *Philosophy & Social Criticism* 33.2 (2007): 203-222.

⁶ Peter Kolchin, "Whiteness Studies: The New History of Race in America," *The Journal of American History* 89.1 (2002): 154-173; and Ian Haney López, *White By Law: The Legal Construction of Race, Revised and Updated* (New York: New York University Press, 2006), chapter 2.

⁷ Robyn Wiegman, "Whiteness Studies and the Paradox of Particularity," *boundary 2* 26.3 (1999): 115-150.

⁸ Wiegman, "Whiteness Studies and the Paradox of Particularity," 147.

⁹ Howard F. Stein and Robert F. Hill, *The Ethnic Imperative: Examining the New White Ethnic Movement* (University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1977) 139, 145

¹⁰ Sallie TeSelle, ed., *The Rediscovery of Ethnicity* (New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1973). Contributors to this collection found that suburban ethnics rely on ethnicity to remind themselves of the “hard work” they and their families put in to “make it,” while urban ethnics, no longer feel supported by the “liberal elites,” turn away from the “liberals” who seem to blame “white people” for Black suffering. These ideologies are not necessarily romantic; instead, they are practical and future-oriented, or in other words, they are political strategies. See also Joshua A. Fishman, et al., *The Rise and Fall of the Ethnic Revival* (New York: Mouton Publishers, 1985), which finds that ethnicity is “a behavioral/attitudinal repertoire experience” (512) that provides identity roots and personal style but that does not cause conflict among whites. In part, ethnicity provides a supplement to the emptiness of whiteness.

¹¹ Russell A. Kazal, “Revisiting Assimilation: The Rise, Fall, and Reappraisal of a Concept in American Ethnic History,” *The American Historical Review* 100.2 (1995): 437-471.

¹² Robert Kelley, “Ideology and Political Culture from Jefferson to Nixon,” *The American Historical Review* 82.3 (1977): 531-562; Kathleen Neils Conzen, David A. Gerber, Ewa Morawska, George E. Pozzetta, and Rudolph J. Vecoli, “The Invention of Ethnicity: A Perspective from the U.S.A.,” *Journal of American Ethnic History* 12.1 (1992): 3-41; Werner Sollors, ed. *The Invention of Ethnicity* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989); and Amy Kaplan and Donald E. Pease, *Cultures of United States Imperialism* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1993). Elsewhere, Kaplan also points out that, even though whiteness studies scholars like Roediger claim to have derived their work from Du Bois’s thought, Du Bois emphatically situated whiteness in an international and imperial context, a context that is largely missing from whiteness studies. See Amy Kaplan, *The Anarchy of Empire in the Making of U.S. Culture* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2002), 193, 244.

¹³ Reginald Horsman, *Race and Manifest Destiny: The Origins of American Racial Anglo-Saxonism* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1981), 84. “Americans shared with the English a belief in the political and individual freedoms of the Anglo-Saxon period,” Horsman adds. “Americans of the Revolutionary generation believed they were helping to recreate freedoms enjoyed in England more than seven hundred years ago.” *Race and Manifest Destiny*, 3-4. Kelly Brown Douglas corroborates this view: “the Pilgrims and the Puritans not only ensured that the Anglo-Saxon myth was the defining piece of American identity, but they provided this myth with religious legitimation... Believing that they were the true and chosen heirs to a divine Anglo-Saxon mission, they were determined not to betray their Anglo-Saxon roots, as they thought the English had done.” *Stand Your Ground: Black Bodies and the Justice of God* (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 2015), 10.

¹⁴ Horsman, *Race and Manifest Destiny*, 84.

¹⁵ Steven G. Ellis, *Tudor Ireland: Crown, Community, and the Conflict of Cultures, 1470-1603* (New York: Longman, 1985), 145; David Dobson, *Scottish Emigration to Colonial America, 1607-1785* (Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press, 1994), 18; Robert A. Williams, Jr., “Columbus’s Legacy: Law as an Instrument of Racial Discrimination Against Indigenous Peoples’ Rights of Self-Determination,” *Arizona Journal of International and Comparative Law* 8.2 (1991), 68-70; A. L. Rowse, *The Elizabethans and America* (London: MacMillan & Co, 1959), 7, 190-191; Timothy J. Shannon, *Indians and Colonists at the Crossroads of Empire: The Albany Congress of 1754* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2000); Owen Stanwood, *The Empire Reformed: English America in the Age of the Glorious Revolution* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2011); John Barrington, “Symbiotic Strength: An Eighteenth-Century View of the British-American Relationship,” in *American in the British Imagination*, ed. Catherine Armstrong, Roger Fagge, and Tim Lockley (Newcastle, UK: Cambridge Publishing Scholars, 2007), 65-85; David S. Lovejoy, “Virginia’s Charter and Bacon’s Rebellion, 1675-1676,” in *Anglo-American Political Relations, 1675-1775*, ed. Alison Gilbert Olson and Richard Maxwell Brown (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1970), 31-51; Thomas C. Barrow, “The Old Colonial System from an English Point of View,” in *Anglo-American Political Relations, 1675-1775*, ed. Alison Gilbert Olson and Richard Maxwell Brown (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1970), 125-139; John M. Murrin, “England and Colonial America: A Novel Theory of the American Revolution,” in *Anglicizing America: Empire, Revolution, Republic*, ed. Ignacio Gallup-Diaz, Andrew Shankman, and David J. Silverman (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2015), 9-19; and David S. Lovejoy, *The Glorious Revolution in America* (Hanover, NH: Wesleyan University Press, 1987).

¹⁶ Horsman, *Race and Manifest Destiny*, 84.

¹⁷ Christopher Buck, *Religious Myths and Visions of America: How Minority Faiths Redefined America's World Role* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2009), 27-44.

¹⁸ Douglas, *Stand Your Ground*, 96. Catherine Armstrong, "Contesting the Meaning of America: Printed Representations of Before 1630," in *American in the British Imagination*, ed. Catherine Armstrong, Roger Fagge, and Tim Lockley (Newcastle, UK: Cambridge Publishing Scholars, 2007), 9 [8-26]; and Rosemary Radford Ruether, *America, Amerikkka: Elect Nation and Imperial Violence* (London: Equinox, 2007).

¹⁹ Fred Somkin, *Unquiet Eagle: Memory and Desire in the Idea of American Freedom, 1815-1860* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1967), 175-206; Eric Foner, *The Story of American Freedom* (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1998), 77.

²⁰ Douglas, *Stand Your Ground*, 99.

²¹ Horsman, *Race and Manifest Destiny*, 175.

²² Somkin, *Unquiet Eagle*, 55-90. See also Sam W. Haynes and Christopher Morris, eds., *Manifest Destiny and Empire: American Antebellum Expansionism* (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1997).

²³ Rowse, *The Elizabethans and America*, 122.

²⁴ Qtd. in Lovejoy, *Glorious Revolution in America*, 123.

²⁵ Sacvan Bercovitch, *The Puritan Origins of the American Self* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1975), 108, 137. Alen Heimert, "Puritanism, the Wilderness, and the Frontier," *The New England Quarterly* 26.3 (1953): 361-382.

²⁶ Bercovitch, *Puritan Origins of the American Self*, 105.

²⁷ Michael Walzer, "Puritanism as a Revolutionary Ideology," in *Essays in American Colonial History*, ed. Paul Goodman (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1967), 33-67; and Bercovitch, *Puritan Origins of the American Self*, 183, 160.

²⁸ Oscar Handlin, "The Significance of the Seventeenth Century," in *Essays in American Colonial History*, ed. Paul Goodman (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1967), 97-107; Perry Miller and Thomas H. Johnson, "The Theory of the State and of Society," in *Essays in American Colonial History*, ed. Paul Goodman (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1967), 137-151; Bernard Bailyn, "Politics and Social Structure in Virginia," in *Essays in American Colonial History*, ed. Paul Goodman (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1967), 272-295; Alison Gilbert Olson, "The British Government and Colonial Union, 1754," in *Essays in American Colonial History*, ed. Paul Goodman (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1967), 511-523; and Lovejoy, *The Glorious Revolution in America*, 26, 30.

²⁹ Horsman, *Race and Manifest Destiny*, 298.

³⁰ Alexander Saxton, *The Rise and Fall of the White Republic: Class Politics and Mass Culture in Nineteenth-Century America* (New York: Verso, 1990), 23-72; Lawrence J. Friedman, *Inventors of the Promised Land* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1975), 3-74, 203-205; Somkin, *Unquiet Eagle*, 28-29; and Robert S. Levine, *Dislocating Race and Nation: Episodes in Nineteenth-Century American Literary Nationalism* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2008), 29, 35.

³¹ Horsman, *Race and Manifest Destiny*, 205.

³² Ruether, *America, Amerikkka*, 43, 46, 52-53; Gary B. Nash, "The Image of the Indian in the Southern Colonial Mind," *The William and Mary Quarterly* 29.2 (1972): 197-230; Edmund S. Morgan, "The Labor Problem at Jamestown, 1607-18," *The American Historical Review* 76.3 (1971): 595-611; Roy Harvey Pearce, "The 'Ruines of Mankind': The Indian and the Puritan Mind," *Journal of the History of Ideas* 13.2 (1952): 200-217; Horsman, *Race and Manifest Destiny*, 103; David J. Silverman, "Racial Walls: Race and the Emergence of American White Nationalism," in *Anglicizing America: Empire, Revolution, Republic*, ed. Ignacio Gallup-Diaz, Andrew Shankman, and David J. Silverman (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2015), 196; Catherine Armstrong, "Contesting the Meaning of America: Printed Representations of Before 1630," in *American in the British Imagination*, ed. Catherine Armstrong, Roger Fagge, and Tim Lockley (Newcastle, UK: Cambridge Publishing Scholars, 2007) 8-26; Ian Chambers, "British Imaginings of the Eighteenth-Century Southeast," in *American in the British Imagination*, ed. Catherine Armstrong, Roger Fagge, and Tim Lockley (Newcastle, UK: Cambridge Publishing Scholars, 2007), 48-64; Rowse, *The Elizabethans and America*, 27; Heidi Kiiwetepinesik Stark, "Criminal Empire: The Making of the Savage in a Lawless Land," *Theory & Event* 19.4 (2016); and Stacy L. Leeds, "By Eminent Domain or Some Other Name: A Tribal Perspective on Taking Land," *Tulsa Law Review* 41.1 (51-77).

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³⁴ Alexander Saxton, *The Rise and Fall of the White Republic: Class Politics and Mass Culture in Nineteenth-Century America* (New York: Verso, 1990), 142.

³⁵ Levine, *Dislocating Race and Nation*, 62-63; Foner, *Story of American Freedom*, 50.

³⁶ Frederick Douglass, "Speech Delivered at the Mass Democratic Convention at Ithaca, New York, Oct. 14th 1852," in *The Life and Writings of Frederick Douglass, Volume 5*, ed. Philip S. Foner (New York: International Publishers, 1975), 252.

³⁷ Saxton, *The Rise and Fall of the White Republic*, 136-142.

³⁸ Christopher Hanlon, *America's England: Antebellum Literature and Atlantic Sectionalism* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013), 1, 24-27.

³⁹ Qtd. in Richie Devon Watson, Jr., *Normans and Saxons: Southern Race Mythology and the Intellectual History of the American Civil War* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2008), 19.

⁴⁰ Watson, Jr., *Normans and Saxons*, 90.

⁴¹ Qtd. in Levine, *Dislocating Race*, 240. Paul Kleppner observes that "Pietists used the Republican party as a vehicle through which they sought to translate their religious values into legalized social norms." *The Cross of Culture: A Social Analysis of Midwestern Politics, 1850-1900* (New York: The Free Press, 1970), 91.

⁴² Saxton, *The Rise and Fall of the White Republic*, 247.

⁴³ Qtd. in Blum, *Reforging the White Republic*, 87-88.

⁴⁴ Saxton, *The Rise and Fall of the White Republic*, 261-262, 269-288, 293-316.

⁴⁵ Foner, *Story of American Freedom*, 134.

⁴⁶ Qtd. in Ruether, *America, Amerikkka*, 108.

⁴⁷ Christopher Lasch, "The Anti-Imperialists, the Philippines, and the Inequality of Man," *The Journal of Southern History* 24.3 (1958): 319-331; Foner, *Story of American Freedom*, 115-137; Blum, *Reforging the White*

Republic; Ruether, *America, Amerikkka*; David W. Blight, *Race and Reunion: The Civil War in American Memory* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2001).

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⁴⁹ Kelley, "Ideology and Political Culture from Jefferson to Nixon," 539; Jacobson, *Whiteness of a Different Color*, 206-208.

⁵⁰ Painter, *History of White People*, 132, 201; Blum, *Reforging the White Republic*.

⁵¹ James G. Leyburn, *The Scotch-Irish: A Social History* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1962), 113-114.

⁵² Canny, *Making Ireland British*, 197, 204-242; Leyburn, *The Scotch-Irish*, 111; Carlton Jackson, *A Social History of the Scotch-Irish* (New York: Madison Books, 1993), ix, 4, 20; Theodore W. Allen, *The Invention of the White Race, Volume I: Racial Oppression and Social Control* (New York: Verso, 1994).

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⁵⁴ O'Beirne Ranelagh, *Short History of Ireland*, 71.

⁵⁵ Jackson, *Social History of the Scotch-Irish*, 112.

⁵⁶ Leyburn, *The Scotch-Irish*, 292.

⁵⁷ Ron Chepesiuk, *The Scotch-Irish: From the North of Ireland to the Making of America* (Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Company, Inc., 2000), 139; Leyburn, *The Scotch-Irish*, 269, 270-272, 282-285; Jackson, *Social History of the Scotch-Irish*, 64, 112-118; and David W. Millar, "Searching for a New World: The Background and Baggage of Scots-Irish Immigrants," in *Ulster to America: the Scots-Irish migration experience, 1680-1830*, Warren R. Hofstra (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 2012), 17-19.

⁵⁸ Jackson, *Social History of the Scotch-Irish*, 62.

⁵⁹ Patrick Griffin, "Searching for Independence: Revolutionary Kentucky, Irish American Experience, and Scotch-Irish Myth, 1770s-1790s," in *Ulster to America: the Scots-Irish migration experience, 1680-1830*, Warren R. Hofstra (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 2012), 221.

⁶⁰ Leyburn, *The Scotch-Irish*, 223-225 232-233; Griffin, "Searching for Independence," 211-213, 223.

⁶¹ Kevin Whelan, "The Green Atlantic: Radical Reciprocities Between Ireland and America in the Long Eighteenth Century," in *A New Imperial History: Culture, Identity and Modernity in Britain and the Empire, 1660-1840*, ed. Kathleen Wilson (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 216-238.

⁶² Kelley, "Ideology and Political Culture from Jefferson to Nixon," 535, 556.

⁶³ Leyburn, *The Scotch-Irish*, 223-235; Michael Montgomery, "Searching for Security: Backcountry Carolina, 1760s-1780s," in *Ulster to America: the Scots-Irish migration experience, 1680-1830*, Warren R. Hofstra (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 2012), 148; Chepesiuk, *The Scotch-Irish*, 121.

⁶⁴ Kelley, "Ideology and Political Culture from Jefferson to Nixon," 537.

⁶⁵ A. J. Williams-Myers, *Destructive Impulses: An Examination of an American Secret in Race Relations: White Violence* (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1995), 8-13.

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⁶⁷ Horsman, *Race and Manifest Destiny*, 70.

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⁷⁰ Horsman, *Race and Manifest Destiny*, 179-180; Jacobson, *Whiteness of a Different Color*, 31-37, 46-47, 53; Colin Kidd, "Teutonist Ethnology and Scottish Nationalist Inhibition, 1780-1880," *The Scottish Historical Review*, Volume LXXIV, 1: no. 197 (1995): 45-68.

⁷¹ Watson, Jr., *Normans and Saxons*, 68.

⁷² Horsman, *Race and Manifest Destiny*, 251.

⁷³ Qtd. in Foner, *Story of American Freedom*, 92.

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⁷⁵ Christine Kinealy, "Was Ireland a Colony? The Evidence of the Great Famine," in *Was Ireland a Colony? Economics, Politics and Culture in Nineteenth-Century Ireland*, ed. Terrence McDonough (Portland, OR: Irish Academic Press, 2005), 48-65; Terrence McDonough, "Introduction," in *Was Ireland a Colony? Economics, Politics and Culture in Nineteenth-Century Ireland*, ed. Terrence McDonough (Portland, OR: Irish Academic Press, 2005), vii-xiv; Peter Gray, "'Ireland's last fetter struck off': The Lord-Lieutenancy Debate 1800-67," in *Was Ireland a Colony? Economics, Politics and Culture in Nineteenth-Century Ireland*, ed. Terrence McDonough (Portland, OR: Irish Academic Press, 2005), 87-101; Terry Eagleton, "Afterward: Ireland and Colonialism," in *Was Ireland a Colony? Economics, Politics and Culture in Nineteenth-Century Ireland*, ed. Terrence McDonough (Portland, OR: Irish Academic Press, 2005), 326-333; Michael Hechter, *Internal Colonialism: The Celtic Fringe in British National Development* (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1999); Graham Finlay, "John Stuart Mill and Ireland," in *Social Thought on Ireland in the Nineteenth Century*, ed. Séamas Ó Síocháin (Dublin: University College Dublin Press, 2009), 27-46; Chandana Mathur and Dermot Dix, "The Irish Question in Karl Marx's and Friedrich Engel's Writings on Capitalism and Empire," in *Social Thought on Ireland in the Nineteenth Century*, ed. Séamas Ó Síocháin (Dublin: University College Dublin Press, 2009), 97-107; Amy E. Martin, "'Becoming a Race Apart': Representing Irish Racial Difference and the British Working Class in Victorian Critiques of Capitalism," in *Was Ireland a Colony? Economics, Politics and Culture in Nineteenth-Century Ireland*, ed. Terrence McDonough (Portland, OR: Irish Academic Press, 2005), 186-211; Allen, *Invention of the White Race*, 91-114.

⁷⁶ O’Beirne Ranelagh, *Short History of Ireland*, 114-118; Ignatiev, *How the Irish Became White*, 44, 163.

⁷⁷ Allen, *Invention of the White Race*, 168.

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⁷⁹ Nini Rodgers, *Ireland, Slavery, and Anti-Slavery: 1612-1865* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 2.

⁸⁰ Dale T. Knobel, *Paddy and the Republic: Ethnicity and Nationality in Antebellum America* (Middletown, CT: Wesleyan University Press, 1986), 104-128, 134, 161-164.

⁸¹ Ignatiev, *How the Irish Became White*, 78-81, 187; Painter, *History of White People*, 202; Gleeson, *Irish in the South*, 27, 54-55, 155-156, 186, 202, chapter eleven; David J. Silverman, “Racial Walls: Race and the Emergence of American White Nationalism,” in *Anglicizing America: Empire, Revolution, Republic*, ed. Ignacio Gallup-Diaz, Andrew Shankman, and David J. Silverman (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2015), 181-204, 280-286; Owen Stanwood, *The Empire Reformed: English America in the Age of the Glorious Revolution* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2011), chapter two; John Barrington, “Symbiotic Strength: An Eighteenth-Century View of the British-American Relationship,” in *American in the British Imagination*, ed. Catherine Armstrong, Roger Fagge, and Tim Lockley (Newcastle, UK: Cambridge Publishing Scholars, 2007), 65-85; Rodgers, *Ireland, Slavery, and Anti-Slavery*, 307; Allen, *Invention of the White Race* 84, 152, 167-199; Peter J. Bowler, “Race Theory and the Irish,” in *Social Thought on Ireland in the Nineteenth Century*, ed. Séamas Ó Síocháin (Dublin: University College Dublin Press, 2009), 135-146; Conzen et al., “The Invention of Ethnicity,” 14.

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⁸³ James R. Barrett, “Americanization from the Bottom Up: Immigration and the Remaking of the Working Class in the United States, 1880-1930,” *The Journal of American History* 79.3 (1992): 996-1020. Conzen et al., “The Invention of Ethnicity,” 14. Interestingly, Conzen et al. observes that “the Irish represented the most proximate models of ‘American’ success, and not a small part of what became Italian-American ethnicity was borrowed from their Celtic antagonists and tutors” (“The Invention of Ethnicity,” 14-15).

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⁸⁵ Alan Ware, *The Democratic Party Heads North, 1877-1962* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 48, 51, 121-125; Allen, *Invention of the White Race*, 188; Steven P. Erie, *Rainbow's End: Irish-Americans and the Dilemmas of Urban Machine Politics, 1840-1985* (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1988); Roediger, *Wages of Whiteness*, 136; Robert C. Smith, *John F. Kennedy, Barack Obama, and the Politics of Ethnic Incorporation and Avoidance* (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 2013), 35-38; Kelley, “Ideology and Political Culture from Jefferson to Nixon,” 543-544, 547; and Kleppner, *Cross of Culture*, 5-34, 91.

⁸⁶ Foner, *Story of American Freedom*, 42.

⁸⁷ Kelley, “Ideology and Political Culture from Jefferson to Nixon,” 542.

⁸⁸ Barrett, “Americanization from the Bottom Up,” 1002, 1010; Ignatiev, *How the Irish Became White*, 134-135; Foner, *Story of American Freedom*, 176.

⁸⁹ Hans Gerth and C. Wright Mills, *Character and Social Structure: The Psychology of Social Institutions* (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1953), 333.

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⁹¹ Kelley, “Ideology and Political Culture from Jefferson to Nixon,” 548.

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¹⁰¹ Williams, "The Frontier Thesis and American Foreign Policy," 392.

¹⁰² Chalmers Johnson, *Blowback: The Costs and Consequences of American Empire* (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 2004); Louw, *Roots of Pax Americana*, 192-217.

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¹⁰⁴ Bacevich, *American Empire*, 215.

¹⁰⁵ Richard Spielman, "The Emerging Unipolar World," *The New York Times*, August 21, 1990; Charles Krauthammer, "The Unipolar Moment," *Foreign Affairs* 70.1 (1990/91): 23-33; Patrick E. Tyler, "U.S. Strategy Plan Calls for Insuring No Rivals Develop," *The New York Times*, 8 March 1992; Donald E. Pease, "New Perspectives on U.S. Culture and Imperialism," in *Cultures of United States Imperialism*, ed. Amy Kaplan and Donald E. Pease (Durham: Duke University Press, 1993), 23.

¹⁰⁶ Qtd. in Maria Ryan, *Neoconservatism and the New American Century* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 172.

¹⁰⁷ Ryan, *Neoconservatism*, 188-189.

¹⁰⁸ Jesús Velasco, *Neoconservatives in U.S. Foreign Policy under Ronald Reagan and George W. Bush: Voices Behind the Throne* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2010); Danny Cooper, *Neoconservatism and American Foreign Policy: A Critical Analysis* (New York: Routledge, 2011); Ryan, *Neoconservatism and the New*

American Century; Siobhán McEvory-Levy, *American Exceptionalism and US Foreign Policy: Public Diplomacy at the End of the Cold War* (New York: Palgrave, 2001), 119-164; Tudor A. Owen, *US Foreign Policy in the Post-Cold War Era: Restraint versus Assertiveness from George H. W. Bush to Barack Obama* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013); Carl Boggs, *Origins of the Warfare State: World War II and the Transformation of American Politics* (New York: Routledge, 2017); Louw, *Roots of Pax Americana*, 251-252.

¹⁰⁹ Qtd. in Levine, *Dislocating Race*, 27. One could also quote Charles Brockden Brown: “One of the consequences of extended empire is to pull down those barriers which separate mankind from each other; to enlarge that circle which each man calls his country; to take away the grounds of dissension and rivalry; to create one nation out of many; to blend into one system of friendly, and especially of commercial intercourse, tribes that formerly looked upon each other as natural and hereditary enemies” (qtd. in Levine, *Dislocating Race*, 66).

¹¹⁰ Kelley, “Ideology and Political Culture from Jefferson to Nixon,” 548.

¹¹¹ Joseph Epstein, “REVIEW --- the Late, Great American WASP --- the Old U.S. Ruling Class had Plenty of Problems; but are we really Better Off with a Country Run by the Self-Involved, Over-Schooled Products of Modern Meritocracy?” *Wall Street Journal*, 21 December 2013.

¹¹² Jacobson, *Whiteness of a Different Color*, 262.

¹¹³ Jacobson, *Whiteness of a Different Color*, 262.

¹¹⁴ See Baltzell, *The Protestant Establishment*.

¹¹⁵ Baltzell, *The Protestant Establishment*; Kleppner, *Cross of Culture*.

¹¹⁶ Houston Stewart Chamberlain, *Foundations of the Nineteenth Century, Volumes I and II*, trans. John Lees (New York: Howard Fertig, 1977).

¹¹⁷ Elazar Barkan, *The Retreat of Scientific Racism: Changing Concepts of Race in Britain and the United States Between the World Wars* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992); Stefan Kuhl, *The Nazi Connection: Eugenics, American Racism, and German National Socialism* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994); Marouf Arif Hasian, Jr., *The Rhetoric of Eugenics in Anglo-American Thought* (Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press, 1996); Steven Selden, *Inheriting Shame: The Story of Eugenics and Racism in America* (New York: Teachers College Press, 1999); Nancy L. Gallagher, *Breeding Better Vermonters: The Eugenics Project in the Green Mountain State* (Hanover: University Press of New England, 1999); and André Pichot, *The Pure Society: From Darwin to Hitler*, trans. David Fernbach (New York: Verso, 2009); Mark H. Haller, *Eugenics: Hereditarian Attitudes in American Thought* (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1984); Chloe Campbell, *Race and Empire: Eugenics in Colonial Kenya* (New York: Manchester University Press, 2007); Marius Turda, *Modernism and Eugenics* (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2010); Painter 278-290, 301-309; Mario R. DiNunzio, *Who Stole Conservatism? Capitalism and the Disappearance of Traditional Conservatism* (Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger, 2016), 59-69; Christina A. Ziegler-McPherson, *Americanization in the States: Immigrant Social Welfare Policy, Citizenship, & National Identity in the United States, 1908-1929* (Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 2009); Jacobson, 77-90

¹¹⁸ Qtd. in Thomas D. Fallace, *Race and the Origins of Progressive Education, 1880-1929* (New York: Teachers College Press, 2015), 49.

¹¹⁹ Milton M. Gordon, *Assimilation in American Life: The Role of Race, Religion, and National Origins* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1964), 139-140; Painter, *History of White People*, 228-244, 350-351; Baltzell, *The Protestant Establishment*; Fallace, *Race and the Origins of Progressive Education*; Jacobson, *Whiteness of a Different Color*, 103-109.

¹²⁰ Baltzell, *The Protestant Establishment*, 177.

¹²¹ Baltzell, *The Protestant Establishment*, 230.

¹²² Baltzell, *The Protestant Establishment*, 315.

¹²³ Baltzell, *The Protestant Establishment*, 121-129, 227-228, 248, 291, 321, 383; Mills, *The Power Elite*; Painter, *History of White People*, 324-325.

¹²⁴ Foner, *Story of American Freedom*, 139-162, 195-218, 236-247; Baltzell, *The Protestant Establishment*, 52-53; Painter, *History of White People*, 346-358; Wendy L. Wall, "Symbol of Unity, Symbol of Pluralism: The Interfaith Idea in Wartime and Cold War America," in *Making the American Century: Essays on the Political Culture of Twentieth Century America*, ed. Bruce J. Schulman (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014), 171-187; Mark Brilliant, "Re-imagining Racial Liberalism," in *Making the American Century: Essays on the Political Culture of Twentieth Century America*, ed. Bruce J. Schulman (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014), 215-227.

¹²⁵ Ira Katznelson, *When Affirmative Action Was White: An Untold History of Racial Inequality in Twentieth-Century America* (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2005), 113.

¹²⁶ Matthew Frye Jacobson has identified immigration policy and anthropology two other important factors. Between 1924 and 1965, immigration policy and economic change worked together to normalize and assimilate European immigrants and their descendants, making them Americans. In 1965, Democrats liberalized the immigration restrictions put in place by the Anglo-Saxonists in the 1920s, and as a new wave of immigrants began arriving in the United States, white ethnics appeared increasingly "native" by contrast. "The liberalized immigration legislation of 1965" writes Jacobson, "consecrated the earlier waves of European immigration by giving preference to those immigrants' relatives and so normalizing the presence of non-Anglo-Saxon white persons in the body politic." By "critically dismantling" the various white races (Ruth Benedict's anthropology), racial progressives actually created the conditions for a reified white supremacy by producing a Black-white binary. Jacobson, *Whiteness of a Different Color*, 117, 269.

¹²⁷ C. Wright Mills, *White Collar: The American Middle Classes* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 34.

¹²⁸ Mills, *White Collar*, 33.

¹²⁹ Mills, *White Collar*, 33.

¹³⁰ E. Franklin Frazier, *Black Bourgeoisie* (New York: Free Press, 1997), 47-53, 243n.12.

¹³¹ Mills, *White Collar*, 248-249.

¹³² Kenneth T. Jackson, *Crabgrass Frontier: The Suburbanization of the United States* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985), 4-5.

¹³³ Robert O. Self, *American Babylon: Race and the Struggle for Postwar Oakland* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003), 333.

¹³⁴ Self, *American Babylon*, 99; Jackson, *Crabgrass Frontier*, 45-86, 97-99, 190-218.

¹³⁵ Andrew L. Barlow, *Between Fear and Hope: Globalization and Race in the United States* (New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2003), 39.

¹³⁶ Barlow, *Between Fear and Hope*, 40-41; Painter, *History of White People*, 377; Mills, *White Collar*.

¹³⁷ Joseph Crespino, "Party Hopping: Strom Thurmond and the Origins of the Modern GOP," in *Making the American Century: Essays on the Political Culture of Twentieth Century America*, ed. Bruce J. Schulman (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014), 59.

¹³⁸ Katznelson, *When Affirmative Action Was White*.

¹³⁹ Brilliant, "Re-imagining Racial Liberalism"; Randolph Hohle, *Race and the Origins of American Neoliberalism* (New York: Routledge, 2015); Ware, *Democratic Party Heads North*, 145, 173; Mary L. Dudziak, "Desegregation as a Cold War Imperative," *Stanford Law Review* 41.1 (1988): 61-120. See also Jason Morgan Ward, *Defending White Democracy: The Making of a Segregationist Movement and the Remaking of Racial Politics, 1936-1965* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2011).

¹⁴⁰ Christopher Malone, *Between Freedom and Bondage: Race, Party, and Voting Rights in the Antebellum North* (New York: Routledge, 2008), 195.

¹⁴¹ Mel Piehl, "Perspectives on Religion in Twentieth-Century American History," in *Making the American Century: Essays on the Political Culture of Twentieth Century America*, ed. Bruce J. Schulman (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014), 152.

¹⁴² Lisa McGurr, *Suburban Warriors: The Origins of the New American Right* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001); Piehl, "Perspectives on Religion in Twentieth-Century American History"; Crespino, "Party Hopping"; Ware, *Democratic Party Heads North*, 181-182, 202, 205, 228-230; E. Digby Baltzell, *The Protestant Establishment Revisited*, ed. Howard G. Schneiderman (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1991), 87, 97; Leslie Berlin, "The First Venture Capital Firm in Silicon Valley: Draper, Gaither & Anderson," *Making the American Century: Essays on the Political Culture of Twentieth Century America*, ed. Bruce J. Schulman (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014), 155-170.

¹⁴³ Paul V. Murphy, *The Rebuke of History: The Southern Agrarians and American Conservative Thought* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2001); Ward, *Defending White Democracy*; George H. Nash, *The Conservative Intellectual Movement in America Since 1945* (Wilmington, DE: Intercollegiate Studies Institute, 1996).

¹⁴⁴ Charles M. Payne, "'The Whole United States Is Southern!': *Brown v. Board* and the Mystification of Race," *The Journal of American History* 91.1 (2004), 83-91.

¹⁴⁵ Qtd. in Hohle, *Race and the Origins of American Neoliberalism*, 199.

¹⁴⁶ Kelley, "Ideology and Political Culture from Jefferson to Nixon," 554.

¹⁴⁷ Arnold R. Hirsch, *Making the Second Ghetto: Race and Housing in Chicago, 1940-1960* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983); Smith, *John F. Kennedy*, 47-50; Radley Balko, *Rise of the Warrior Cop: The Militarization of America's Police Forces* (New York: PublicAffairs, 2013), 68-69; Jackson, *Crabgrass Frontier*, 148-156; Ward, *Defending White Democracy*, 73-74; Jacobson, *Whiteness of a Different Color*, 96, 113, 271-272; Dan T. Carter, *From George Wallace to Newt Gingrich: Race in the Conservative Counterrevolution, 1963-1994* (Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State University Press, 1996).

¹⁴⁸ Kelley, "Ideology and Political Culture from Jefferson to Nixon," 556.

¹⁴⁹ Kelley, "Ideology and Political Culture from Jefferson to Nixon," 557.

¹⁵⁰ Jackson, *Crabgrass Frontier*, 283.

¹⁵¹ Nash, *Conservative Movement Since 1945*, 310, 425n.48.

¹⁵² Nash, *Conservative Movement Since 1945*; Murphy, *Rebuke of History*; Paul Edward Gottfried, *Conservatism in America: Making Sense of the American Right* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007).

¹⁵³ Eldridge Cleaver, "The Nixon Question" and Other Writings on Nixon, n.d., Eldridge Cleaver Collection, Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley, Carton 2, Folder 11.

¹⁵⁴ Watson, Jr. 250. See also James Webb, *Born Fighting: How the Scots-Irish Shaped America* (New York: Broadway Books, 2004); Tony Horowitz, *Confederates in the Attic: Dispatches from the Unfinished Civil War* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1998); James W. Loewen and Edward H. Sebesta, eds., *The Confederate and Neo-Confederate Reader: The "Great Truth" about the "Lost Cause"* (Jackson: University of Mississippi Press, 2010).

¹⁵⁵ Cantrell, *How Celtic Culture Invented Southern Literature*, 75.

Chapter IV: "We have not addressed you as citizens": Martin R. Delany, Colonial Sovereignty, and Black Positivism in Nineteenth-Century Amerika

¹ Qtd. in Frank A. Rollin, *Life and Public Services of Martin R. Delany* (New York: Arno Press, 1969), 140.

² Martin R. Delany, "Political Destiny of the Colored Race on the American Continent," in *Martin R. Delany: A Documentary Reader*, ed. Robert S. Levine (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2003), 245-279; and Frederick Douglass, "The Claims of Our Common Cause, address of the Colored Convention held in Rochester, July 6-8, 1853, to the People of the United States," in *Frederick Douglass: Selected Speeches and Writings*, ed. Philip Foner, abridged by Yuval Taylor (Chicago: Lawrence Hill Books, 1999), 260-271. On legislative sovereignty, see Daniel Engster, *Divine Sovereignty: The Origins of Modern State Power* (Dekalb, IL: Northern Illinois University Press, 2001).

³ Carl Schmitt, *Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty*, trans. George Schwab (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2005), 5.

⁴ Norberto Bobbio, *Left and Right: The Significance of a Political Distinction*, trans. Allan Cameron (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1997).

⁵ Giorgio Agamben, *Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life*, trans. Daniel Heller-Roazen (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998); Giorgio Agamben, *State of Exception*, trans. Kevin Attell (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2005); Judith Butler, *Precarious Life: The Powers of Mourning and Violence* (New York: Verso, 2004); Jacques Derrida, *The Beast and the Sovereign, Volume I*, ed. Michel Lisse, Marie-Louise Mallet, and Ginette Michaud, trans. Geoffrey Bennington, (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2009); Jacques Derrida, *The Beast and the Sovereign, Volume II*, ed. Michel Lisse, Marie-Louise Mallet, and Ginette Michaud, trans. Geoffrey Bennington (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2011); Jacques Derrida, *Rogues: Two Essays on Reason*, trans. Pascale-Anne Brault and Michael Naas (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005).

⁶ Utz McKnight, *Race and the Politics of the Exception: Equality, Sovereignty, and American Democracy* (New York: Routledge, 2013); Alexander G. Weheliye, *Habeas Viscus: Racializing Assemblages, Biopolitics, and Black Feminist Theories of the Human* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2014); and Michael Hanchard, *Party/Politics: Horizons in Black Political Thought* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006).

⁷ Achille Mbembe, "Necropolitics," trans. Libby Meintjes, *Public Culture* 15.1 (2003), 21, 24. [11-40]. Mbembe's use of the state of exception seems to be an extension of his earlier position that "The legal model of sovereignty is hard put to account for the relations of subjection as they functioned" in the colonial regimes. See *On the Postcolony* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001), 36.

⁸ Marcello Svirsky and Simone Bignall, "Introduction," in *Agamben and Colonialism*, ed. Marcello Svirsky and Simone Bignall (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2012), 7.

⁹ Schmitt, *Political Theology*, 8-9.

¹⁰ Jean Bodin, *Six Books on the Commonwealth*, translated and abridged by M. J. Tooley (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1955), 43.

¹¹ Engster, *Divine Sovereignty*, 48. Schmitt also falsely claims that the state of exception does not appear in the history of liberal political theory, writing, “The exception was something incommensurable to John Locke’s doctrine of the constitutional state and the rationalist eighteenth century” (*Political Theology*, 13-14). In truth, the modern notion of the exception first appears in chapter fourteen of John Locke’s *Second Treatise on Government*. Locke drew from Gabriel Naudé’s 1639 *Considérations politiques sur les coups d’état*, which provided a *raison d’état* justification for executive prerogative to suspend the law (Engster, *Divine Sovereignty*, 100, 112). Locke’s theory of prerogative reappears in works by nearly all major liberal theorists after him, including Montesquieu’s *The Spirit of the Laws*, Immanuel Kant’s “On the Common Saying: ‘This May be True in Theory, but it does not Apply in Practice,’” and even John Rawls’s *A Theory of Justice*.¹¹ Thus, the limited insights offered by the Schmittian conception of sovereignty are offset by the costs imposed by his fundamental misreading of history and theory, and all those theorists who have built their arguments on his conception merely perpetuate his errors. See Montesquieu. *The Spirit of the Laws*, ed. and trans. Anne M. Cohler, Basia C. Miller, and Harold S. Stone (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 159, 209; Immanuel Kant, “On the Common Saying: ‘This May be True in Theory, but it does not Apply in Practice,’” in *Political Writings*, ed. Hans Reiss, trans. H. B. Nisbet (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 75, 80; John Rawls, *A Theory of Justice* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971), 240.

¹² Agamben, *State of Exception*, 21, emphasis added.

¹³ Engster, *Divine Sovereignty*, 47.

¹⁴ M. J. Tooley, “Introduction,” in Jean Bodin, *Six Books on the Commonwealth*, translated and abridged by M. J. Tooley (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1955), xxxviii

¹⁵ Victor Ullman, *Martin R. Delany: The Beginnings of Black Nationalism* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1971), 104.

¹⁶ George Shepperson, “Notes on Negro American Influences on the Emergence of African Nationalism,” *The Journal of African History* 1.2 (1960): 299-312; Harold Cruse, *The Crisis of the Negro Intellectual: From its Origins to Its Present* (New York: William Morrow & Company, 1967); Theodore Draper, “The Father of Black Nationalism,” *The New York Review of Books*, 12 March 1970, 33-41; Theodore Draper, *The Rediscovery of Black Nationalism* (New York: Viking Press, 1970), chapter 2 (for the controversy over Draper’s work, see the debates in the pages of *The New York Review of Books*, March-December 1970); Dorothy Sterling, *The Making of an Afro-American: Martin Robison Delany, 1812-1885* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday & Company, 1971); Ullman, *Martin R. Delany: The Beginnings of Black Nationalism*; Cyril E. Griffith, *The African Dream: Martin R. Delany and the Emergence of Pan-African Thought* (University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1975); Floyd J. Miller, *The Search for a Black Nationality: Black Emigration and Colonization 1787-1863* (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1975); Wilson Jeremiah Moses, *The Golden Age of Black Nationalism, 1850-1925* (Hamden, CT: Archon Books, 1978); Richard Blackett, “Martin R. Delany and Robert Campbell: Black Americans in Search of an African Colony,” *The Journal of Negro History* 62.1 (1977): 1-25; and Bernard Boxill, “Two Traditions in African American Political Philosophy,” in *African-American Perspectives and Philosophical Traditions*, ed. John P. Pittman (New York: Routledge, 1997), 119-135.

¹⁷ Robert S. Levine, *Martin Delany, Frederick Douglass, and the Politics of Representative Identity* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1997); Robert S. Levine, “Twelve Years with Martin Delany: A Confession,” in *White Scholars/African American Texts*, ed. Lisa A. Long (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 2005), 173-185; Tunde Adeleke, “Race and Ethnicity in Martin R. Delany’s Struggle,” *Journal of Thought* 29.1 (1994): 19-49; Tunde Adeleke, “Black Biography in the Service of a Revolution: Martin R. Delany in Afro-American Historiography,” *Biography* 17.3 (1994): 248-267; Tunde Adeleke, “Martin R. Delany’s Philosophy of Education: A Neglected Aspect of African American Liberation Thought,” *The Journal of Negro Education* 63.2 (1994): 221-236; Tunde Adeleke, *Without Regard to Race: The Other Martin Robison Delany* (Jackson: University

Press of Mississippi, 2003); and Tommie Shelby, *We Who Are Dark: The Philosophical Foundations of Black Solidarity* (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 2005).

¹⁸ Tommie Shelby, "Two Conceptions of Black Nationalism: Martin Delany on the Meaning of Black Political Solidarity," *Political Theory* 31.5 (2003): 664-692; Tommy J. Curry, "Who K(new): The Nation-ist Contour of Racial Identity in the Thought of Martin R. Delany and John E. Bruce," *The Journal of Pan African Studies* 1.10 (2007): 41-61.

¹⁹ Robert M. Khan, "The Political Ideology of Martin R. Delany," *Journal of Black Studies* 14.4 (1984): 415-440.

²⁰ Antony Anghie, *Imperialism, Sovereignty, and the Making of International Law* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 37-38, 102

²¹ Peter J. King, *Utilitarian Jurisprudence in America: The Influence of Bentham and Austin on American Legal Thought* (New York: Garland Publishing, Inc., 1986), 427-428.

²² Russell Hittinger, "Liberalism and the American Natural Law Tradition," *Wake Forest Law Review* 25 (1990): 429-499.

²³ Clement Fatovic, *Outside the Law: Emergency and Executive Power* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2009), 172.

²⁴ Stephen M. Feldman, *American Legal Thought from Premodernism to Postmodernism: An Intellectual Voyage* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 50-56.

²⁵ Richard H. Helmholz, "The Law of Nature and the Early History of Unenumerated Rights in the United States," *University of Pennsylvania Journal of Constitutional Law* 9 (2007), 409.

²⁶ Lawrence M. Friedman, *A History of American Law*, Second Edition (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1985), 391.

²⁷ King, *Utilitarian Jurisprudence in America*, 63-64.

²⁸ King, *Utilitarian Jurisprudence in America*, 39, 41.

²⁹ Charles M. Cook, *The American Codification Movement: A Study of Antebellum Legal Reform* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1981), 3-18, 75-77, 158-164; King, *Utilitarian Jurisprudence in America*, 70-71, 131, 249, 255.

³⁰ King, *Utilitarian Jurisprudence in America*, 314-329, 335. States that adopted codes during this period: New York (1848), Missouri (1849), California (1850), Kentucky, Iowa, Minnesota (1851), Indiana (1852), Ohio (1853), Oregon, Washington (1854), Nebraska (1855), Wisconsin (1856), and Kansas (1859). Thirty states in total adopted codes between 1848 and 1900.

³¹ G. Alan Tarr, *Understanding State Constitutions* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998), 97.

³² Tarr, *Understanding State Constitutions*, 106.

³³ Tarr, *Understanding State Constitutions*, 94

³⁴ James L. Huston, *Stephen A. Douglas and the Dilemmas of Democratic Equality* (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2006), 64-67, 108-109.

³⁵ Huston, *Stephen A. Douglas and the Dilemmas of Democratic Equality*, 90.

³⁶ Gregory D. Smithers, *Science, Sexuality, and Race in the United States and Australia, 1789s-1890s* (New York: Routledge, 2009), 113.

³⁷ Frederick Douglass, "The Claims of the Negro Ethnologically Considered," *Selected Speeches and Writings*, ed. Philip S. Foner, abridged and adapted Yuval Taylor (Chicago: Lawrence Hill Books, 1999), 282-298.

³⁸ Reginald Horsman, *Race and Manifest Destiny: The Origins of American Racial Anglo-Saxonism* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1981), 136 and chapter seven.

³⁹ Waldo E. Martin Jr., *The Mind of Frederick Douglass* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1984), 198, 220.

⁴⁰ Frederick Douglass, "The Nation's Problem," in *Negro Social and Political Thought 1850-1920, Representative Texts*, ed. Howard Brotz (New York: Basic Books, 1966), 311-328; Frederick Douglass, "The Return of the Democratic Party to Power," in *The Life and Writings of Frederick Douglass, Volume 4*, ed. Philip S. Foner (New York: International Publishers, 1975), 413-426; Frederick Douglass, "The Democratic Party," in *The Life and Writings of Frederick Douglass, Volume 2*, ed. Philip S. Foner (New York: International Publishers, 1975), 493-494.

⁴¹ Ullman, *Martin R. Delany*, 33, 125; Sterling, *The Making of an Afro-American*, 136-137; Rollin, *Life and Public Services*, 54, 69; Maurice Wallace, "'Are We Men?': Prince Hall, Martin Delany, and the Masculine Ideal in Black Freemasonry, 1775-1856," *American Literary History* 9.3 (1997), 410.

⁴² Martin R. Delany, *Principia of Ethnology: The Origins of Races and Color* (Baltimore, MD: Black Classics Press, 1991).

⁴³ Martin R. Delany, "Letter to Frederick Douglass, 10 July 1852," in *Martin R. Delany: A Documentary Reader*, ed. Robert S. Levine (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2003), 221.

⁴⁴ Martin R. Delany, "Political Destiny of the Colored Race on the American Continent," in *Martin R. Delany: A Documentary Reader*, ed. Robert S. Levine (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2003), 253.

⁴⁵ Tunde Adeleke, "Race and Ethnicity in Martin R. Delany's Struggle," *Journal of Thought* 29.1 (1994), 30.

⁴⁶ Qtd. in Charles W. Mills, *Blackness Visible: Essays on Philosophy and Race* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998), 185.

⁴⁷ Mills, *Blackness Visible*, 174-175.

⁴⁸ Martin R. Delany, *The Condition, Elevation, Emigration, and Destiny of the Colored People of the United States, Politically Considered* (New York: Arno Press, 1968), 49.

⁴⁹ Delany, *The Condition*, 49-146.

⁵⁰ Delany, *The Condition*, 48-49, 146.

⁵¹ Delany, *The Condition*, 41.

⁵² Delany, *The Condition*, 41.

⁵³ Martin R. Delany, "The Origin and Objects of Ancient Freemasonry," in *Martin R. Delany: A Documentary Reader*, ed. Robert S. Levine (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2003), 54.

⁵⁴ Delany, *The Condition*, 8-9.

⁵⁵ Delany, *The Condition*, 157.

- ⁵⁶ Delany, "The Origin and Objects of Ancient Freemasonry," 53.
- ⁵⁷ Delany, *The Condition*, 51.
- ⁵⁸ Delany, "Political Destiny," 269.
- ⁵⁹ Delany, "Political Destiny," 269.
- ⁶⁰ Delany, "Political Destiny," 247.
- ⁶¹ John Austin, *The Province of Jurisprudence Determined*, ed. Wilfrid E. Rumble (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 212.
- ⁶² Delany, *The Condition*, 209.
- ⁶³ W. E. B. Du Bois, "A Negro Nation Within the Nation," in *The Oxford W. E. B. Du Bois Reader*, ed. Eric J. Sundquist (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), 431-438.
- ⁶⁴ Douglass, "The Nation's Problem," 319.
- ⁶⁵ Shelby, "Two Conceptions of Black Nationalism," 667.
- ⁶⁶ Delany, *The Condition*, 11-13.
- ⁶⁷ Delany, *The Condition*, 14.
- ⁶⁸ See John McLean, *Reports of Cases Argued and Decided in the Circuit Court of the United States for the Seventh Circuit, Volume IV* (Cincinnati: H. W. Derby & Co., Publishers, 1851), *Giltner v. Gorham et al.*, 402-426; and Robert Gooding-Williams, "Fugitive Slave Mentality," *The New York Times*, March 27, 2012.
- ⁶⁹ Martin R. Delany, "Western Tour for the *North Star*," in *Martin R. Delany: A Documentary Reader*, ed. Robert S. Levine (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2003), 113.
- ⁷⁰ McLean, *Reports of Cases*, 417.
- ⁷¹ Delany, "Western Tour for the *North Star*," 114.
- ⁷² Delany, "Western Tour for the *North Star*," 114-115.
- ⁷³ Delany, *The Condition*, 147-153.
- ⁷⁴ Delany, *The Condition*, 154.
- ⁷⁵ Delany, "Political Destiny," 273.
- ⁷⁶ Delany, "Political Destiny," 273-274.
- ⁷⁷ Delany, "Political Destiny," 273.
- ⁷⁸ Anghie, *Imperialism*, 100.
- ⁷⁹ Anghie, *Imperialism*, 63.
- ⁸⁰ J. G. A. Pocock, "The Ideal of Citizenship Since Classical Times," in *Theorizing Citizenship*, ed. Ronald Beiner (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1995); Derek Heater, *What is Citizenship?* (Malden, MA: Polity Press, 1999); Derek Heater, *Citizenship: The Civic Ideal in World History, Politics, and Education* (New

York: Palgrave, 2004); and Richard Bellamy, *Citizenship: A Very Short Introduction* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008).

⁸¹ Richard Bellamy, *Citizenship: A Very Short Introduction* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 40

⁸² Delany, "Political Destiny," 246. It should be noted that the *ius quiritium* is actually the title for a more ancient form of Roman law and citizenship, but the Oxford English Dictionary cites the ancient Roman scholar Marcus Terentius Varro (116 BCE – 27 BCE) as part of its etymology for the word "cry." This connection must have been the basis for Delany's definition of the supplicating citizens.

⁸³ Delany, "Political Destiny," 246-247.

⁸⁴ Delany, "Political Destiny," 269.

⁸⁵ Delany, "Political Destiny," 247.

⁸⁶ Delany, "Political Destiny," 269-270.

⁸⁷ Delany, "Political Destiny," 258.

⁸⁸ Delany, "Political Destiny," 249.

⁸⁹ Richard H. King, *Civil Rights and the Idea of Freedom* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), 33.

⁹⁰ Anghie, *Imperialism*, 103.

⁹¹ Ullman, *Martin R. Delany*, 211.

⁹² This is not to say that good work, such as Howard McGary and Bill E. Lawson's *Between Slavery and Freedom: Philosophy and American Slavery* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1992), on slavery is not needed, but that this is a limited view of Black oppression in nineteenth-century Amerika. If slavery is just seen as the problem, then it becomes easier to slip in to the dangerous comfort that, on Delany's view, emancipation would represent.

⁹³ Eldridge Cleaver, *Soul on Ice* (New York: Delta Publishing, 1992), 149.

⁹⁴ Cleaver, *Soul on Ice*, 236, 156.

⁹⁵ Eldridge Cleaver, *Post-Prison Writings and Speeches*, ed. Robert Scheer (New York: Ramparts Books, 1969), 58.

⁹⁶ Cleaver, *Soul on Ice*, 151.

Chapter V: "I, a black man, confronted The Ogre": Eldridge Cleaver, Sexual Image, and the Rejection of Imperial Somatocentricity

¹ Charles White, *An Account of the Regular Gradation in Man, and In Different Animals and Vegetables; and From the Former to the Latter* (London, 1799), 135.

² Bruckner H. Payne, *The Negro: What Is His Ethnological Status? Is He the Progeny of Ham? Is He a Descendant of Adam and Eve? Has He a Soul? Or Is He a Beast in God's Nomenclature? What Is His Status as Fixed by God in Creation? What Is His Relation to the White Race?*, Second Edition (Cincinnati, 1867), 48.

³ These letters of Eldridge Cleaver to Beverly Axelrod can be found in Melanie Margaret Kask, "Soul Mates: The Prison Letters of Eldridge Cleaver and Beverly Axelrod," Dissertation, University of California, Berkeley (2003), 153-201.

⁴ Ange-Marie Hancock, *Intersectionality: An Intellectual History* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016), 16, 122.

⁵ Kimberle Crenshaw, "Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics," *University of Chicago Legal Forum* (1989): 139-167. See also her follow piece, Kimberle Crenshaw, "Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence against Women of Color," *Stanford Law Review* 43.6 (1991): 1241-1299.

⁶ Anna Carastathis, *Intersectionality: Origins, Contestations, Horizons* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2016), 54-55.

⁷ Carastathis, *Intersectionality*, 11.

⁸ Hancock, *Intersectionality*, 24.

⁹ Crenshaw, "Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex," 144

¹⁰ Hancock, *Intersectionality*, 30.

¹¹ Carastathis, *Intersectionality*, 15-16.

¹² It is, of course, possible to question the supposed intellectual genealogy of intersectionality by simply reading the texts of Maria Stewart (who wrote during the antebellum period when Black people were thought to not have genders), Anna Julia Cooper (who advocated U.S. imperialism in the late-nineteenth century), or Claudia Jones (who was a member of the Communist Party in the mid-twentieth century). While these women can be grouped by race-sex identities, they cannot be so easily grouped by the content of their philosophies without a seriously ahistorical distortion of their texts. Here, however, I plan to question intersectionality and its genealogy from a slight different angle.

¹³ Douglas Taylor, "Three Lean Cats in a Hall of Mirrors: James Baldwin, Norman Mailer, and Eldridge Cleaver on Race and Masculinity," *Texas Studies in Literature and Language* 52.1 (2010), 91 [70-101]

¹⁴ Eldridge Cleaver, *Soul on Ice* (New York: Delta Publishing, 1992), 142.

¹⁵ E. S. Miller, "Cleaver and Juminer: Black Man and White Woman," *Black American Literature Forum* 11.1 (1977): 25-31; Sean L. Malloy, "Uptight in Babylon: Eldridge Cleaver's Cold War," *Diplomatic History*, 37.3 (2013): 538-571.

¹⁶ See Michelle Wallace, *The Black Macho and the Myth of the Superwoman* (New York: The Dial Press, 1979); Robert R Reid-Pharr, "Tearing the Goat's Flesh: Homosexuality, Abjection and the Production of a Late Twentieth-Century Black Masculinity," *Studies in the Novel* 28.3 (1996): 372-94; Amy Abugo Ongiri, "We Are Family: Black Nationalism, Black Masculinity, and the Black Gay Cultural Imagination," *College Literature* 24.1 (1997): 280-94; Darieck Scott, "More Man Than You'll Ever Be: Antonio Fargas, Eldridge Cleaver, and Toni Morrison's *Beloved*," in *Dangerous Liaisons: Blacks, Gays, and the Struggle for Equality*, ed. Eric Brandt (New York: The New Press, 1999), 217-242; Jared Sexton, "Race, Sexuality, and Political Struggle: Reading *Soul on Ice*," *Social Justice* 30.2 (2003): 28-41; Michael Hanchard, *Party/Politics: Horizons in Black Political Thought* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006); Douglas Taylor, "Three Lean Cats in a Hall of Mirrors: James Baldwin, Norman Mailer, and Eldridge Cleaver on Race and Masculinity," *Texas Studies in Literature and Language* 52.1 (2010), 70-101.

¹⁷ Kathleen Rout, *Eldridge Cleaver* (Boston: Twayne Publishers, 1991).

¹⁸ Josh Vandiver, "Plato in Folsom Prison: Eldridge Cleaver, Black Power, Queer Classicism," *Political Theory* 44.6 (2016), 764-796.

¹⁹ Tommy J. Curry, *The Man-Not: Race, Class, Genre, and the Dilemmas of Black Manhood* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2017).

²⁰ See, for example, Ronald Hyam, *Empire and Sexuality: The British Experience* (New York: Manchester University Press, 1990); Robert Aldrich, *Colonialism and Homosexuality* (New York: Routledge, 2003); Mason Stokes, *The Color of Sex: Whiteness, Heterosexuality, and the Fictions of White Supremacy* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2001); Curry, *The Man-Not*.

²¹ Malloy, "Uptight in Babylon," 542.

²² Oyèrónké Oyewuémì, *The Invention of Women: Making an African Sense of Western Gender Discourses* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997), 3, 5

²³ Sexton, "Race, Sexuality, and Political Struggle," 35.

²⁴ Eldridge Cleaver, Letter from Eldridge Cleaver to Dave Welsh, Sept 16, 1966, Eldridge Cleaver Collection, Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley, Box 3, Folder 20.

²⁵ Eldridge Cleaver, "White Woman, Black Man" and Early Outline for *Soul on Ice*, n.d., Eldridge Cleaver Collection, Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley, Carton 1, Folder 6. For Cleaver's comment about "sociology" see Eldridge Cleaver, Letter from Eldridge Cleaver to Dave Welsh, Sept 16, 1966, Eldridge Cleaver Collection, Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley, Box 3, Folder 20.

²⁶ Cleaver, *Soul on Ice*, 206-207.

²⁷ Cleaver, *Soul on Ice*, 208.

²⁸ Cleaver, *Soul on Ice*, 210.

²⁹ Cleaver, *Soul on Ice*, 210-211.

³⁰ Cleaver, *Soul on Ice*, 213-214.

³¹ Cleaver, *Soul on Ice*, 218.

³² Cleaver, *Soul on Ice*, 207.

³³ Cleaver, *Soul on Ice*, 209.

³⁴ Cleaver, *Soul on Ice*, 217.

³⁵ Cleaver, *Soul on Ice*, 218.

³⁶ Cleaver, *Soul on Ice*, 217.

³⁷ Cleaver, *Soul on Ice*, 219-220.

³⁸ Eldridge Cleaver, *On the Ideology of the Black Panther Party* (c.1970), 6.

³⁹ Cleaver, *Soul on Ice*, 213.

⁴⁰ Cleaver, *Soul on Ice*, 45, 49, 163.

⁴¹ Cleaver, *Soul on Ice*, 116.

⁴² Cleaver, *Soul on Ice*, 228, 230.

⁴³ Greg Thomas, *The Sexual Demon of Colonial Power: Pan-African Embodiment and Erotic Schemes of Empire* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2007), 68. A similar phenomenon can be found in the work of W. E. B. Du Bois, who distinguished the gender identities and sexual mores of the Black folk from the Black Talented Tenth in his early work. Unfortunately, Du Bois's descriptive value gets lost in the rabid compulsion to condemn his normative views. This is not to say authors should not be criticized for advancing problematic views. It just means that there is a value in distinguishing rather than conflating and author's descriptive and normative statements. For an example of such a conflation in scholarship on Du Bois, see Aaron Shaheen, *Androgynous Democracy: Modern American Literature and the Dual-Sexed Body Politic* (Knoxville, TN: The University of Tennessee Press, 2010), 114-124. Shaheen relies on Hazel V. Carby's *Race Men* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1998) as his point of departure; thus, for an interesting "full circle" discussion, see Thomas's critique of Carby in *The Sexual Demon of Colonial Power*, 40-45.

⁴⁴ The "conservatism" of Cleaver's normative remarks about sex and gender is also not so straightforward as some have insisted. As Josh Vandiver notes, "for all of Cleaver's much-bemoaned heterosexism, of which the yearning for heterosexual (re)union in the Primeval Mitosis myth is supposedly indicative, the fact remains that within this model Cleaver's heterosexuals are striving to achieve *hermaphroditic* wholeness. The genesis and telos of Cleaver's supposedly arch-heterosexist myth is, literally and logically, a hermaphrodite." "Plato in Folsom Prison," 774.

⁴⁵ Elizabeth Cady Stanton, "Address to Anniversary of American Equal Rights Association, May 12, 1869, New York City," in *Elizabeth Cady Stanton, Feminist as Thinker: A Reader in Documents and Essays*, ed. Ellen Carol DuBois and Richard Cándida Smith (New York: New York University Press, 2007), 187-205.

⁴⁶ Carole Pateman, *The Sexual Contract* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988); Catherine MacKinnon, *Feminism Unmodified* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1987).

⁴⁷ María Lugones "Toward a Decolonial Feminism," *Hypatia* 25.4 (2010), 743.

⁴⁸ Lugones "Toward a Decolonial Feminism," 744-745.

⁴⁹ Martin R. Delany, *The Condition, Elevation, Emigration, and Destiny of the Colored People of the United States, Politically Considered* (New York: Arno Press, 1968), 58-59.

⁵⁰ Martin R. Delany, "Political Destiny of the Colored Race on the American Continent," in *Martin R. Delany: A Documentary Reader*, ed. Robert S. Levine (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2003), 273.

⁵¹ For discussions on white womanhood in during the colonial period, see Jean E. Feerick, *Strangers in Blood: Relocating Race in the Renaissance* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2010), 122-126; David R. Ransome, "Wives for Virginia, 1621," *The William and Mary Quarterly* 48.1 (1991): 3-18; Winthrop D. Jordan, "Modern Tensions and the Origins of American Slavery," in *Essays in American Colonial History*, ed. Paul Goodman (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1967), 250-260; and Arthur M. Schlesinger, "The Aristocracy in Colonial America," in *Essays in American Colonial History*, ed. Paul Goodman (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1967), 524-541.

⁵² Kate Côté Gillin, *Shrill Hurrahs: Women, Gender, and Racial Violence in South Carolina, 1865-1900* (Columbia, SC: The University of South Carolina Press, 2013); Karen L. Cox, *Dixie's Daughters: The United Daughters of the Confederacy and the Preservation of Confederate Culture* (Gainesville, FL: University of Florida Press, 2003); and Louise Michelle Newman, *White Women's Rights: The Racial Origins of Feminism in the United States* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 26-28.

⁵³ Martha Hodes, *White Women, Black Men: Illicit Sex in the Nineteenth-Century South* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1997), 201-202.

⁵⁴ Robert F. Williams, *Negroes with Guns* (New York: Marzani & Munsell, 1962), 25.

⁵⁵ Frederick Douglass, "Why is the Negro Lynched?" in *Frederick Douglass: Selected Speeches and Writings*, ed. Philip S. Foner, abridged by Yuval Taylor, (Chicago: Lawrence Hill Books, 1999), 750-776; Ida B. Wells-Barnett, "The Case Stated," in *Brown v. Board of Education: A Brief History with Documents*, ed. Waldo E. Martin, Jr., 68-74 (Boston: Bedford/St. Martin's, 1998).

⁵⁶ A. J. Williams-Meyers, *Destructive Impulses: An Examination of an American Secret in Race Relations: White Violence* (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1995), 61.

⁵⁷ Hodes, *White Women, Black Men*, 203.

⁵⁸ David Marriott, *On Black Men* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000), 1-21; Felicity A. Nussbaum, "The Theater of Empire: Racial Counterfeit, Racial Realism," in *A New Imperial History: Culture, Identity and Modernity in Britain and the Empire, 1660-1840*, ed. Kathleen Wilson (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 74 [71-90]; Vron Ware, *Beyond the Pale: White Women, Racism and History* (New York: Verso, 1992), 169-224; Hodes, *White Women, Black Men*, 26, 147-175.

⁵⁹ Amy Kaplan, "Manifest Domesticity," *American Literature* 70.3 (1998), 582 [581-606]

⁶⁰ Kaplan, "Manifest Domesticity," 586

⁶¹ Kaplan, "Manifest Domesticity," 591

⁶² Glenda Elizabeth Gilmore, *Gender and Jim Crow: Women and the Politics of White Supremacy in North Carolina, 1896-1920* (Chapel Hill, NC: The university of North Carolina Press, 1996), 91-118; E. Digby Baltzell, *The Protestant Establishment: Aristocracy and Caste in America* (New York: Vintage Books, 1964), 349.

⁶³ Gilmore, *Gender and Jim Crow*, 217.

⁶⁴ Kathleen M. Blee, "Women in the 1920s Ku Klux Klan Movement," *Feminist Studies* 17.1 (1991), 68.

⁶⁵ Blee, "Women in the 1920s Ku Klux Klan Movement," 64.

⁶⁶ Blee, "Women in the 1920s Ku Klux Klan Movement," 63.

⁶⁷ Crystal N. Feimster, *Southern Horrors: Women and the Politics of Rape and Lynching* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2009), 157 and generally chapter five, which describes the use of lynching and rape by white women to increase their political power and influence.

⁶⁸ Jason Morgan Ward, *Defending White Democracy: The Making of a Segregationist Movement and the Remaking of Racial Politics, 1936-1965* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2011), 14.

⁶⁹ Cox, *Dixie's Daughters*, xi. For more on the Lost Cause movement, see David W. Blight, *Race and Reunion: The Civil War in American Memory* (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2001), 272-283.

⁷⁰ Cox, *Dixie's Daughters*, 2.

⁷¹ Cox, *Dixie's Daughters*, 120.

⁷² Newman, *White Women's Rights*, 5. See also, Michela Bank, *Women of Two Countries: German-American Women, Women's Rights, and Nativism, 1848-1890* (New York: Berghahn Books, 2012).

- ⁷³ Newman, *White Women's Rights*, 19-20.
- ⁷⁴ Newman, *White Women's Rights*, 14.
- ⁷⁵ Newman, *White Women's Rights*, 20, 182.
- ⁷⁶ Edward J. Blum, *Reforging the White Republic: Race, Religion, and American Nationalism, 1865-1898, Updated Edition* (Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State University Press, 2015), 14.
- ⁷⁷ Blum, *Reforging the White Republic*, 16, 200-202; Gilmore, *Gender and Jim Crow*, 58-59.
- ⁷⁸ Blum, *Reforging the White Republic*, 16.
- ⁷⁹ Ian Tyrrell, *Woman's World, Woman's Empire: The Woman's Christian Temperance Union in International Perspective, 1880-1930* (Chapel Hill, NC: The university of North Carolina Press, 1991), 12
- ⁸⁰ Tyrrell, *Woman's World, Woman's Empire*, 27.
- ⁸¹ Tyrrell, *Woman's World, Woman's Empire*, 28.
- ⁸² Anne McClintock, *Imperial Leather: Race, Gender and Sexuality in the Colonial Contest* (New York: Routledge, 1995), 6, 379.
- ⁸³ McClintock, *Imperial Leather*, 11-15
- ⁸⁴ Sarah Carter, *Imperial Plots: Women, Land, and the Spadework of British Colonialism on the Canadian Prairies* (Winnipeg: University of Manitoba Press, 2016), 4.
- ⁸⁵ Carter, *Imperial Plots*, 10.
- ⁸⁶ Kaplan, "Manifest Domesticity," 598.
- ⁸⁷ Cox, *Dixie's Daughters*, 6.
- ⁸⁸ Newman, *White Women's Rights*, 183.
- ⁸⁹ Vron Ware, *Beyond the Pale: White Women, Racism and History* (New York: Verso, 1992), 227-254.
- ⁹⁰ Curry, *The Man-Not*, 208-222. Curry notes that every acknowledgement of Black male vulnerability is accompanied by a reassertion of his (supposed) male privilege.
- ⁹¹ W. E. B. Du Bois, *Darkwater: Voices From Within The Veil* (Mineola, NY: Dover Publications, 1999), 17; Cleaver, *Soul on Ice*, 87.
- ⁹² Thomas A. Foster, "The Sexual Abuse of Black Men under American Slavery," *Journal of the History of Sexuality* 20.3 (2011), 458.
- ⁹³ Foster, "Sexual Abuse of Black Men," 461, 449.
- ⁹⁴ Qtd. in Hodes, *White Women, Black Men*, 136.
- ⁹⁵ Hodes, *White Women, Black Men*, 14-15, 135-136.
- ⁹⁶ Foster, "Sexual Abuse of Black Men," 462.
- ⁹⁷ Calvin C. Hernton, *Sex and Racism in America* (New York: Anchor Books, 1992), 21, 12.

⁹⁸ Danielle L. McGuire, *At the Dark End of the Street: Black Women, Rape, and Resistance – A New History of the Civil Rights Movement from Rosa Parks to the Rise of Black Power* (New York: Vintage Books, 2011), 48-49, 56-60.

⁹⁹ Alex Heard, *The Eyes of Willie McGee: A Tragedy of Race, Sex, and Secrets in the Jim Crow South* (New York: Harper Collins, 2010), 90.

¹⁰⁰ McGuire, *At the Dark End of the Street*, 57.

¹⁰¹ Williams-Meyers, *Destructive Impulses*, 37-38.

¹⁰² Feimster, *Southern Horrors*, 142.

¹⁰³ Cleaver, *Soul on Ice*, 213-214.

¹⁰⁴ Cleaver, *Soul on Ice*, 215.

¹⁰⁵ Calvin C. Hernton, *Sex and Racism in America* (New York: Anchor Books, 1992), 25.

¹⁰⁶ E. Franklin Frazier, "The Pathology of Race Prejudice," *The Forum* (June 1927), 859.

¹⁰⁷ Frazier, "Pathology of Race Prejudice," 861.

¹⁰⁸ Frazier, "Pathology of Race Prejudice," 860.

¹⁰⁹ Frazier, "Pathology of Race Prejudice," 859.

¹¹⁰ Hernton, *Sex and Racism*, 20.

¹¹¹ Thomas Foster notes that even ostensibly consensual sexual relations between Black men and white women under such disparity of power are really not consensual in the full meaning and connotation of that word.

¹¹² Hernton, *Sex and Racism*, 23.

¹¹³ Cleaver, *Soul on Ice*, 194.

¹¹⁴ Hernton, *Sex and Racism*, 18.

¹¹⁵ Frantz Fanon, *Black Skin/White Masks*, trans. Richard Philcox (New York: Grove Press, 2008), 28n.5. Greg Thomas offers the following reading on Fanon here: "An acceptance of colonial bourgeois gender conventions encourages Fanon to view relationships with white males in their crude colonial context while romanticizing relationships with white females, outside their crude colonial context" (*Sexual Demon of Colonial Power*, 85).

¹¹⁶ Carolyn M. Shafer and Marilyn Frye, in *Feminism and Philosophy*, eds. Mary Vetterling-Braggin, Frederick Elliston, and Jane English (Totowa, N.J.: Littlefield, Adams & Co., 1977), 334.

¹¹⁷ Carastathis, *Intersectionality*, 56.

¹¹⁸ Abouali Farmanfarmanian, "Did You Measure Up? The Role of Race and Sexuality in the Gulf War," in *Collateral Damage: The New World Order at Home and Abroad*, ed. Cynthia Peters (Boston: South End Press, 1992), 120.

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Chapter VI: Neocolonial Amerika: Rethinking the Domestic Colony in a Twenty-First-Century Empire

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⁴ Saad-Filho and Johnston, "Introduction," 1.

⁵ See Taylor C. Boas and Jordan Gans-Morse, "Neoliberalism: From New Liberal Philosophy to Anti-Liberal Slogan," *Studies in Comparative International Development* 44 (2009), 137–161; and Philip Mirowski and Dieter Plehwe, eds., *The Road from Mont Pèlerin: The Making of the Neoliberal Thought Collective* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2009).

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¹⁰ Brown, *Undoing the Demos*, 62.

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²⁴ Nkrumah, *Neo-Colonialism*, xv.

²⁵ Nkrumah, *Neo-Colonialism*, xvi.

²⁶ Nkrumah, *Neo-Colonialism*, 245.

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³⁵ Writing favorably of U.S. commercial empire, Patrick Mendis argues that the Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution provided the groundwork for American economic expansion because it granted the federal government the power to regulate trade between the several states and internationally. According to Mendis, commercial expansion lies at the very heart of the American imperial project. See his *Commercial Providence: The Secret Destiny of the American Empire* (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 2010).

³⁶ Qtd. in W. E. B. Du Bois, *Black Reconstruction* (New York: The Free Press, 1992), 276.

³⁷ Qtd. in Du Bois, *Black Reconstruction*, 244.

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³⁹ Nancy MacLean, "Southern Dominance in Borrowed Language: The Regional Origins of American Neoliberalism," in *New Landscapes of Inequality: Neoliberalism and the Erosion of Democracy in America* (Santa Fe, NM: Scholl for Advanced Research Press, 2008), 22.

⁴⁰ MacLean, "Southern Dominance in Borrowed Language," 23.

⁴¹ Randolph Hohle, *Race and the Origins of American Neoliberalism* (New York: Routledge, 2015), 3.

⁴² Hohle is very clear that the standard narrative regarding neoliberalism is false. "Rather than a national crisis of capital," he forcefully contends, "the pretext to neoliberalism was found in changing racial relations between blacks and whites created by the success of the black civil rights movement. In other words, the black civil rights movement inadvertently created the conditions that made the neoliberal turn in America possible. There was no crisis in the welfare state in the 1950s and early 1960s, so the neoliberal pretext was not made in response to an economic crisis. The politics of neoliberalism is built on race rather than class." *Race and the Origins of American Neoliberalism*, 4.

⁴³ Ira Katznelson has also noted this connection, writing, "Echoing the response to Reconstruction, affirmative action's challengers offer a rationale that each individual should count as any other." *When Affirmative Action Was White*, 155.

⁴⁴ Lawrence J. Friedman, *The White Savage: Racial Fantasies in the Postbellum South* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1970), 84.

⁴⁵ Qtd. in Friedman, *The White Savage*, 99.

⁴⁶ Mary L. Dudziak, "Desegregation as a Cold War Imperative," *Stanford Law Review* 41.1 (1988), 103.

⁴⁷ W. E. B. Du Bois, *The Autobiography of W. E. B. Du Bois: A Soliloquy on Viewing My Life from the Last Decade of Its First Century* (New York: International Publishers, 1968), 370.

⁴⁸ Daniel Geary and Jennifer Sutton, "Resisting the Winds of Change: The Citizens' Councils and European Decolonization," in *The U.S. South and Europe: Transatlantic Relations in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries*, ed. Cornelis A. van Minnen and Manfred Berg (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2013), 267.

⁴⁹ Geary and Sutton, "Resisting the Winds of Change," 265.

⁵⁰ Qtd. in Geary and Sutton, “Resisting the Winds of Change,” 277.

⁵¹ See also Hohle, *Racial Origins of American Neoliberalism*, 30, 32; Clive Webb, “Britain, the American South, and the Wide Civil rights Movement,” in *The U.S. South and Europe: Transatlantic Relations in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries*, ed. Cornelis A. van Minnen and Manfred Berg (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2013), 243-263.

⁵² E. Digby Baltzell, *The Protestant Establishment: Aristocracy and Caste in America* (New York: Vintage Books, 1964), 75-76, 80.

⁵³ Michelle Alexander, *The New Jim Crow: Mass Incarceration in the Age of Colorblindness* (New York: The Free Press, 2012).

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⁵⁵ Huey P. Newton, *War Against the Panthers: A Study of Repression in America* (Baltimore, MD: Black Classics Press, 1996).

⁵⁶ Newton, *War Against the Panthers*.

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⁵⁸ Michael Tonry, *Malign Neglect: Race, Crime, and Punishment in America* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 104.

⁵⁹ Carl L. Hart “How the Myth of the ‘Negro Cocaine Fiend’ Helped Shape American Drug Policy,” *The Nation*, 29 January 2014; Nick Miroff “From Teddy Roosevelt to Trump: How drug companies triggered an opioid crisis a century ago,” *Washington Post*, 17 October 2017; Kenneth B. Nunn, “Race, Crime, and the Pool of Surplus Criminality: Or Why the ‘War on Drugs’ Was a ‘War on Blacks,’” *The Journal of Gender, Race & Justice* 6 (2002): 381-445; Ian Tyrrell, *Woman’s World, Woman’s Empire: The Woman’s Christian Temperance Union in International Perspective, 1880-1930* (Chapel Hill, NC: The university of North Carolina Press, 1991), 146-169.

⁶⁰ Friedman, *The White Savage*, 127.

⁶¹ Alan F. Westin, *Privacy and Freedom* (New York: Atheneum, 1967); Diana R. Gordon, *The Justice Juggernaut: Fighting Street Crime, Controlling Citizens* (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1990); Captain Timothy A. Raezer, “Needed Weapons in the Army’s War on Drugs: Electronic Surveillance and Informants,” *Military Law Review* 116 (1987): 1-65.

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¹¹⁷ Greg Thomas, *The Sexual Demon of Colonial Power: Pan-African Embodiment and Erotic Schemes of Empire* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2007), 78,

¹¹⁸ Alexander, *The New Jim Crow*, 202-217.

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¹²⁰ Goldberg, *The Threat of Race*, 16, emphasis added.

Chapter VII: Conclusion: Anticolonial Futures

¹ Erik H. Erikson and Huey P. Newton, *In Search of Common Ground: Conversations with Erik H. Erikson and Huey P. Newton* (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1973), 29-30.

² Tommy J. Curry, “Back to the Woodshop: Black Education, Imperial Pedagogy, and Post-Racial Mythology Under the Reign of Obama,” *National Society for the Study of Education* 114.2 (2015): 27–52.

³ Frantz Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth*, trans. Richard Philcox (New York: Grove Press, 2004), 235.

⁴ Fanon, *Wretched of the Earth*, 236.

⁵ Fanon, *Wretched of the Earth*, 236.

⁶ Fanon, *Wretched of the Earth*, 236-237.

⁷ Frantz Fanon, *Wretched of the Earth*, 236. For the biographical details of Fanon’s last days, see David Macey, *Frantz Fanon: A Biography* (New York: Verso, 2012), 450-451; and Lewis R. Gordon, *What Fanon Said: A Philosophical Introduction to His Life and Thought* (New York: Fordham University Press, 2015), 110-112.

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⁹ Greg Thomas, *The Sexual Demon of Colonial Power: Pan-African Embodiment and Erotic Schemes of Empire* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2007), ix.

¹⁰ Thomas, *Sexual Demon of Colonial Power*, x.

¹¹ Alexis de Tocqueville, *Democracy in America*, trans. Arthur Goldhammer (New York: The Library of America, 2004), 391.

¹² Even Giorgio Agamben, the leading contemporary theorist of the “state of exception,” acknowledges this. Explaining the executive powers exercised by Woodrow Wilson during and after World War I – censoring and imprisoning various “seditious” individuals – Agamben notes how Wilson operated differently from other presidents, such as Abraham Lincoln: “instead of ignoring Congress, as Lincoln had done, Wilson preferred each time to have the powers in question delegated to him by Congress. In this regard, his practice of government is closer to...the current one, which instead of declaring the state of exception prefers to have *exceptional laws* issued.” Agamben never explains what “exceptional laws” are, but they are presumably distinct from “regular” laws, which he seems to have no problem with. And because we are not told what makes exceptional laws both different and bad, we have no way of knowing what Agamben is even saying here. Giorgio Agamben, *State of Exception*, trans. Kevin Attell (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2005), 21, emphasis added.

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¹⁵ Curry, *The Man-Not*, 207.

- ¹⁶ Thomas, *Sexual Demon of Colonial Power*, 149.
- ¹⁷ Robert J. Hind, "The Internal Colonial Concept," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 26.3 (1984), 553.
- ¹⁸ Hind, "The Internal Colonial Concept," 561.
- ¹⁹ Nikhil Pal Singh, *Black is a Country: Race and the Unfinished Struggle for Democracy* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2004), 109.
- ²⁰ Singh, *Black is a Country*, 52.
- ²¹ Singh, *Black is a Country*, 222.
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- ²³ William J. Pomeroy, *American Neo-Colonialism: Its Emergence in the Philippines and Asia* (New York: International Publishers, 1970), 224.
- ²⁴ W. E. B. Du Bois, "The African Roots of the War," *The Atlantic*, May 1915, 707-714; and W. E. B. Du Bois, *The Autobiography of W. E. B. Du Bois: A Soliloquy on Viewing My Life from the Last Decade of Its First Century* (New York: International Publishers, 1968), 20-21, 406.
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- ²⁸ W. E. B. Du Bois, *The World and Africa and Color and Democracy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 262-263.
- ²⁹ David Harvey, *A Brief History of Neoliberalism* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 7.
- ³⁰ Henry A. Giroux, *The Terror of Neoliberalism* (Boulder, CO: Paradigm Press, 2004), xix, emphasis added.
- ³¹ Wendy Brown, *Undoing the Demos: Neoliberalism's Stealth Revolution* (New York: Zone Books, 2015).
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- ³⁴ Du Bois, *Color and Democracy*, 241.
- ³⁵ Du Bois, *Color and Democracy*, 269.
- ³⁶ Fanon, *Wretched of the Earth*, 239.

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